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British Military Current Events

They also include recommendations that are deeply naïve, such as this one:

Recommendation 43
Issue a definitive leadership statement, endorsed by Ministers, Service Chiefs, the Chief of Defence People and others, that sets out how a systems approach to the non-operational leadership and management of people will be achieved, applying mission command principles. This should clearly set the expectation for leaders throughout the organisation that they are empowered to innovate and take risk. It should define leadership responsibilities and accountabilities for key posts. And it should commit to recognising the value to and from Service personnel as a core part of military capability

file:///C:/Users/reaton/Downloads/14.278_MOD_HRAFI_headline_report_WEB.pdf
For naivety, one could vote Labour.



Of course The Spectator provides an opportunity for response (not surprisingly, by a former army officer)

 
ARRSE has spoken ;)


Recently I was talking to an individual who is now (nominally) in charge of somewhere I made training recommendations about 10 years ago (which some people cooed about). I asked if they had implemented X thing. Individual said yes. I asked how they were doing it. Individual clarified that actually, no, they hadn't done it. But it was in the pipeline waiting for some bureaucratic blah blah from above. X is a not very complex training change that, separately, I wrote a version of on my own in about a month: not because I am brilliant, but because X is very basic. X is also apparently a "core skill" that you cannot throw a rock at in this branch without hitting someone who will mention it, or listen to a speech from some senior officer in the area without them mentioning how X is fundamental - including as I heard from the head of the branch in the pub six months earlier, and can read the speeches from the Defence lead online. We do a lot of X, apparently. Yet X is still not formally trained for any soldiers or officers. More than 10 years later. While being an acknowledged "core skill". How does anyone have any faith that anyone in this organisation is ever going to get anything done? Perhaps instead of these 110-page reports (saying things we all knew and discussed fifteen years ago) they should just take that time and DO SOMETHING.


Skim read of exec summary seems potential for good although a lot of management BS thrown in. The real problem is everbody knows that virtually nothing will change, except where it saves money and suits the internal politics. I also dispute a key line that the Senior leadership all care deeply about their people. That is not my view, the Senior leadership say a lot of things but only actually care about themselves and their trajectory. Also focusses on diversity, the limt of our understanding still being that means female and skin colour. It’s a big report. Reading more I get a sense that despite criticising (rightly) the over complex, over tedious admin, this then does the same to make it’s points. Why do I get the sense this was merely written to (a) justify the effort, (b) given enough hooks for existing agendas to be pushed? It’s certianly a far cry from the root and branch reforms the forces need.

 
Now does the RSM lose it at the troops for their kit being all goobered up or at the CE creatures that allowed it to occur? Or both...

I don't know about today's army, but I recall a soldier being jacked up for being in 'rag order' shortly after getting blown up, so probably ;)
 
Nothing's too good for our troops, so nothing is what they'll (probably) get... and like it ;)


Armed Forces pay decision 'may not be popular', Rishi Sunak says​



Rishi Sunak has stressed that his decision on Armed Forces pay will be "responsible" and may not be popular in the short term.

This warning has come ahead of the Prime Minister receiving the public sector pay review bodies' recommendations, which are expected to be published before MPs depart for their summer recess on 20 July.

The PM told the BBC's Sunday With Laura Kuenssberg: "I have to make difficult decisions as Prime Minister. Everyone can see the context that we're in with inflation and interest rates."


 
Nothing's too good for our troops, so nothing is what they'll (probably) get... and like it ;)


Armed Forces pay decision 'may not be popular', Rishi Sunak says​



Rishi Sunak has stressed that his decision on Armed Forces pay will be "responsible" and may not be popular in the short term.

This warning has come ahead of the Prime Minister receiving the public sector pay review bodies' recommendations, which are expected to be published before MPs depart for their summer recess on 20 July.

The PM told the BBC's Sunday With Laura Kuenssberg: "I have to make difficult decisions as Prime Minister. Everyone can see the context that we're in with inflation and interest rates."



I sense a new medal in the offing.
 
37,000 down, a million to go ;)

UK Armed Forces on track to train 37,000 Ukrainian recruits​


26 June marks the first anniversary of the launch of Operation Interflex, the codename given to the UK Armed Forces’ training programme to develop and prepare Ukrainian recruits to take the fight to their country’s Russian invaders.

To date, some 17,000 Ukrainians have gone through the five-week training package and in the year 2023 to 2024 the UK is on track to deliver another 20,000. Hundreds of British military personnel including from the Army along with military personnel from Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Lithuania and The Netherlands have been committed to this operation at several locations across the UK.

One year ago, the first two tranches of recruits received a basic five-week training package; however, during the intervening 12 months the requirements have changed to the point whereby the recruits now remain in the UK receiving five weeks of intense training. The instructors are quick to point out the course’s content is very much intelligence lead and therefore continually being updated and developed according to the latest needs.

Of course, it would be wrong to make a direct comparison to the 14 weeks it takes to put a British Army soldier recruit through their basic training, known as the Common Military Syllabus. There is no need to teach these Ukrainians parade square drill, all the classroom-based educational aspects, qualities of a soldier etc. Interflex is solely about improving the survivability and increasing the lethality of people who only a matter of a couple of weeks previously may have been a butcher, a baker, or a computer game maker.

For all too obvious reasons it would be irresponsible to divulge the specific content of the recruits’ training. What I can say is they are taught battlefield casualty drills, the law of armed conflict and cyber warfare. They will spend a lot of time out in the training areas learning fieldcraft skills as well as some of the more key elements such as skill at arms and weapon handling, so they spend many hours on the ranges honing their accuracy skills. As you may imagine, given the prevalence of drones in this conflict the use of and counter drone measures form an important module within their package.

 

Andrew Welsh, paratrooper known as ‘Sergeant O’ at the Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday – obituary​

He insisted that he had not simply started shooting but had returned fire at three gunmen

ByTelegraph Obituaries13 July 2023 • 6:00am

Andrew Welsh

Andrew Welsh
Andrew Welsh, who has died aged 82, was the platoon sergeant of the Mortar Platoon, Support Company, 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment (1 Para), who were deployed to Londonderry on January 30 1972, the day that came to be known as Bloody Sunday. In the subsequent inquiry headed by Lord Saville of Newdigate, Welsh would be identified only as “Sergeant O”.
At the time of Bloody Sunday, 1 Para had already been the Province Reserve Battalion for some 20 months and were by far the most experienced public order battalion in the Army. They had been sent from Belfast that morning to deal with the rioting which was expected to follow a march against internment organised for that afternoon.
In the preceding months, daily rioting and destruction of property had been creeping closer to the city centre, and only three days previously the IRA had murdered an RUC sergeant and a constable a few hundred yards from where the action would take place.
Welsh and members of his mortar platoon deployed in armoured personnel carriers into the Bogside to arrest rioters and, immediately after disembarking, assessed that they had come under sporadic gunfire. (Lord Saville found that firing at the soldiers did take place, but not by any of those subsequently shot by the soldiers.)


Sergeant O stated that he identified a man firing a pistol from behind a car about 50 metres away and returned fire, after which he saw the gunman appear to be thrown backwards. Sergeant O then reported seeing a second gunman, armed with an M1 carbine about 75 metres away and engaged him.
He claimed another hit as he saw the man jerk backwards. Later, another man appeared from close to the position of the second gunman with what he always believed was probably the original small rifle and he opened fire. Welsh returned fire but was not sure if he hit him. In total he fired eight rounds from his SLR.
Welsh gave this evidence to the original 1972 Widgery Inquiry into the events of the day and also consistently over the years in a number of media interviews. He repeated it to the Saville Inquiry arranged by the then prime minister, Tony Blair, and was astonished to be eventually told by Lord Saville that he did not hit anyone. Welsh went to his death believing that he had shot at least two gunmen on the day.
Welsh said: “If Lord Saville had accepted that I hit two gunmen, then the entire theme of his report, that we just jumped out of our vehicles and started shooting innocent people, was undermined, and Blair did not get what he wanted.”
He acknowledged the thoroughness of the Saville-led inquiry, but asserted that its report was littered with examples of “cherry-picking” evidence which supported what he regarded as a preordained conclusion.
For his services in Northern Ireland, Welsh was awarded the Military Medal, a Queen’s Commendation for Brave Conduct and a certificate of commendation from the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland.

He acknowledged the thoroughness of the Saville inquiry, but asserted that its report was littered with examples of 'cherry-picking' evidence
Andrew Robb Welsh, the youngest of three boys, was born at Kilwinning in Ayrshire on November 27 1941 to Andrew and Agnes Welsh. In 1961 he enlisted into the Parachute Regiment, and after training in Aldershot he was posted to 1 Para. Somewhat unusually, he was already a married man when he enlisted.
In the early 1960s the situation in the Persian Gulf was becoming unstable and 2 Para were rushed to Kuwait to deter a threatened invasion by Iraq. The deterrent worked, and thereafter the British government decided to have a parachute battalion permanently deployed in the region – trained, acclimatised and immediately available for action.
Welsh deployed with 1 Para for 12-month tours in 1962-63 and again in 1965-66. Stationed in Bahrain, the tours involved hard soldiering, with desert training under extremes of temperature; frequent parachuting exercises in what were then known as the Trucial States, now the United Arab Emirates; and operations fighting rebels in the Radfan mountains 50 miles north of Aden.
In the early days the men lived under canvas, with no air-conditioning, no home leave or phone calls home, and the 12-month separations were hard on families.
In 1964 1 Para were sent on a six-month emergency deployment to Cyprus to separate the warring factions and later on a 1973 United Nations peacekeeping tour there.
Welsh specialised in the 81mm mortar, the infantry battalion’s artillery support. As platoon sergeant he trained his men to the highest standards, and they regularly came top in inter-unit competitions. He became an expert parachutist and one of the select band of assistant parachute jumping instructors qualified to assist RAF instructors in organising military parachuting.
For much of 1967, 1 Para were deployed to Aden to help contain the rapidly deteriorating situation which followed the prime minister Harold Wilson’s decision to withdraw all British forces from east of Suez. The resulting chaos cost many lives as local factions fought the British and each other and Welsh and his comrades found themselves attacked and shot at on a daily basis.
One officer recalled of Welsh: “The mortar platoon was surrounded for a week in a police station in hostile territory and constantly under fire, and Corporal Welsh’s coolness under fire and irrepressible sense of humour helped keep morale high and contributed to the survival of the subunit without any casualties.”
Welsh left the Army in 1983 in the rank of warrant officer (2nd class) and went to work as a security officer for an oil company in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. He played football and was a keen walker, regularly taking part in the Nijmegen Marches. He later retired to Princetown, Devon.
Welsh was forever saddened by the loss of life on January 30 1972 but was convinced that he had returned fire at three gunmen and had hit at least two. He remained loyal to his commanding officer, Colonel Derek Wilford, whom he adjudged was made a scapegoat; in Welsh’s opinion, a cleaner and more limited arrest operation would have resulted if a decision to commit the Paras earlier had been made by senior officers.
Andrew Welsh’s wife Alice predeceased him, as did his son, Stephen, who was in the Royal Military Police.
Andrew Welsh, born November 27 1941, died April 13 2023
 
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