daftandbarmy
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British Military Current Events
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FJAG
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I keep saying that the upshot from the Cold War "Forces in Being" concept that developed in some countries, including Canada, is that we concentrate solely on the forces that we need for today on a day-to-day basis and we've completely abandoned the idea of a potential force that we might need tomorrow and in a hurry. Considering how long it takes to acquire equipment and train a force to an adequate standard it would always be prudent to have the foundation of that "force for tomorrow" in our inventory.
Within the Canadian army, the concept of the "Army of Tomorrow" as envisioned for the 2020s under "Advancing with Purpose" was simply the way that Canada expected its "Army for Today" to look when the army finished its contemplated transformation. It hasn't envisioned a real "Army for Tomorrow" for well over a half a century.
medicineman
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Seems the "Army For Tomorrow" is the Ukranian one, since it appears they're getting stuff that should be going to folks here...I keep saying that the upshot from the Cold War "Forces in Being" concept that developed in some countries, including Canada, is that we concentrate solely on the forces that we need for today on a day-to-day basis and we've completely abandoned the idea of a potential force that we might need tomorrow and in a hurry. Considering how long it takes to acquire equipment and train a force to an adequate standard it would always be prudent to have the foundation of that "force for tomorrow" in our inventory.
Within the Canadian army, the concept of the "Army of Tomorrow" as envisioned for the 2020s under "Advancing with Purpose" was simply the way that Canada expected its "Army for Today" to look when the army finished its contemplated transformation. It hasn't envisioned a real "Army for Tomorrow" for well over a half a century.
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OK, helmets on 
:
In the 1970s there was a process (and a joint Army/Air staff branch) called "combat development." The "combat developers," I was one of them, were told, by the Chief of Land Operations (
in NDHQ, the commander of the Army was Comd Mobile Command) that there were three armies:
bunch handful of G1 and G4 majors which actually went out and talked to the Militia units.
In the 1970s and early '80s the Army was seized with the idea of 1st Canadian Division and the RV series of exercises followed, but there are, I remind you all, seven stages to any and all military endeavours:
:In the 1970s there was a process (and a joint Army/Air staff branch) called "combat development." The "combat developers," I was one of them, were told, by the Chief of Land Operations (
in NDHQ, the commander of the Army was Comd Mobile Command) that there were three armies:- Army 1 consisted of 4CMBG in Europe plus 1 and 2 CIBGs which were to -
- Replace 4CMBG's initial combat losses, and
- Bring it up to full CMBG strength - we were never going to put a
Div in CENTAG, and - Provide a base for further mobilization;
- Army 2 consisted of 5 CIBG - it was to be the Defence of Canada Force, specially organized, equipped and trained for medium-intensity operations anywhere in Canada but specially in the Arctic. No one was ever, ever to say this in public because it meant that the R22R was to be "fencible" force; and
- Army 3 was to be based on the remnants of 1 and 2 CIBGs and on the Militia and was to form 1st Canadian Division and, eventually 1st Canadian Corps.
In the 1970s and early '80s the Army was seized with the idea of 1st Canadian Division and the RV series of exercises followed, but there are, I remind you all, seven stages to any and all military endeavours:
- Initial Enthusiasm;
- Disillusionment;
- Panic;
- Search for the Guilty;
- Punishment of the Innocent;
- Destruction of All Useful Documentation; and
- Honour and Awards for Senior Non-Participants.
medicineman
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That's why every ROTO is ROTO 0...
daftandbarmy
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OK, helmets on
In the 1970s there was a process (and a joint Army/Air staff branch) called "combat development." The "combat developers," I was one of them, were told, by the Chief of Land Operations (
Dreaming in technicolour you might say but, at the very least, there was an embryonic mobilization plan - in Ottawa, NOT in Mobile Command which was the current "operator" - and a small staff, heavy on a
- Army 1 consisted of 4CMBG in Europe plus 1 and 2 CIBGs which were to -
- Replace 4CMBG's initial combat losses, and
- Bring it up to full CMBG strength - we were never going to put a
- Provide a base for further mobilization;
- Army 2 consisted of 5 CIBG - it was to be the Defence of Canada Force, specially organized, equipped and trained for medium-intensity operations anywhere in Canada but specially in the Arctic. No one was ever, ever to say this in public because it meant that the R22R was to be "fencible" force; and
- Army 3 was to be based on the remnants of 1 and 2 CIBGs and on the Militia and was to form 1st Canadian Division and, eventually 1st Canadian Corps.
bunchhandful of G1 and G4 majors which actually went out and talked to the Militia units.
In the 1970s and early '80s the Army was seized with the idea of 1st Canadian Division and the RV series of exercises followed, but there are, I remind you all, seven stages to any and all military endeavours:
- Initial Enthusiasm;
- Disillusionment;
- Panic;
- Search for the Guilty;
- Punishment of the Innocent;
- Destruction of All Useful Documentation; and
- Honour and Awards for Senior Non-Participants.
Not to be confused with the Stages of Consulting.
And I can vouch for the knowledge trend
OldSolduer
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I recall running the slide deck for LCol Ashton (2VP) in Cyprus in which he describe Corps 84 (IIRC). As a MCpl I thought this was a bit of a pipe dream, but being a somewhat smart MCpl I kept my mouth shut.I keep saying that the upshot from the Cold War "Forces in Being" concept that developed in some countries, including Canada, is that we concentrate solely on the forces that we need for today on a day-to-day basis and we've completely abandoned the idea of a potential force that we might need tomorrow and in a hurry. Considering how long it takes to acquire equipment and train a force to an adequate standard it would always be prudent to have the foundation of that "force for tomorrow" in our inventory.
Within the Canadian army, the concept of the "Army of Tomorrow" as envisioned for the 2020s under "Advancing with Purpose" was simply the way that Canada expected its "Army for Today" to look when the army finished its contemplated transformation. It hasn't envisioned a real "Army for Tomorrow" for well over a half a century.
FJAG
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Corps 86 was an often misunderstood and actively rejected concept that was championed by Charles Belzile when he was commander of Mobile Command in the early 1980s. It had actually started a little earlier. It had, to the best of my recollection several purposes: firstly it served as a model organization for common doctrinal study purposes based on military operations in a European high intensity conflict situation; secondly it created a doctrinal structure around which new equipment purchases could be justified and prioritized and lastly, it gave a stage 4 mobilization structure which slotted reserve units with tasks.
Corps 86 was never designed to create a full corps but a Canadian division and the necessary corps units to support it. Here's a small quote from Granatstein
We'd already started division level exercises in 1981 with Rendezvous 81 in Gagetown which grouped pretty much a whole division based on 1,2 and 5 brigades (4 CMBG was still in Europe at the time and the plan for a 1 Div based on 4 and 5 bdes was part of the concept at the time. For the artillery, we had the requisite M109 equipped regiments and the low level aid defence regiment that the division needed. It's STA resources did have radars but as yet no operational drones. The key element that was missing was an MLRS regiment to provide general support. We gunners were as close to a real divisional structure as we ever had since the 1960s. We held on to it until the early 00s and the long range rocket requirement has never really been off albeit its priority level has surged and waned over the years.
There was much internal army opposition to Corps 86 from the RegF "forces in being" crowd because it did not fully appreciate the objectives and who resist any role for the reserve force beyond augmentation. I'm not sure that the ResF ever really bought into it either.
Belzile was very much the champion of the need for a plan to grow the army into "a great host" through Stage 4 mobilization and repeated the concept in his role as part of the Ministers monitoring committee on the LFRR. Unfortunately the initial report came out during the decade of darkness when money was tight and the RegF concentrated on saving itself and again in the ten year review in 2005 when there were too many distractions to look at it seriously.
Corps 86 is seen by many as a folly. IMHO it was a missed opportunity to move the goal posts for the army as a whole. IMHO again, the army's focus on how to maintain a tiny operational force has become its primary objective. It has given up looking at ways to surge the force. How much of that is government direction or an ingrained belief that this is all that is possible is anyone's guess. There's one thing for sure; the Canadian army does not believe in the motto "Be all you can be."
daftandbarmy
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Interesting...
Historian James Holland and Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a former commander of 1st Royal Tank Regiment, look at how the technical superiority of Nazi Germany was defeated by the superior numbers of the Allies.
The pair wonder whether Britain could be treading down the same path in prioritising quality over quantity.
In this week of the 80th Anniversary of D-Day, it is useful to pause and consider why the Allies prevailed on D-Day and why, 77 days later, they had utterly destroyed two entire German armies in a crushing victory that ensured the outcome of the war was no longer in any doubt.
Over the past few anniversaries, the focus has understandably been on the men who were leaping from landing craft or floating down in their parachutes.
But the world is a very different place since even 2019, and we now have another brutal conflict going on in Europe on a scale that is reminiscent of the Second World War.
The moment of jeopardy for the Allies with the cross-Channel invasion was in undertaking D-Day in the first place and the days that followed – when the race was on as to who could bring to bear a decisive amount of men and materiel in the bridgehead.
This race was won hands-down by the Allies whose harnessing of air power ensured the Germans, despite already being on the continent, could not swiftly reinforce Normandy, and naval power, which allowed gargantuan amounts of supplies to rapidly cross the Channel.
It was also because of the preponderance on vast amounts of firepower – mostly in terms of artillery – and basic equipment, whether it be tanks, trucks, bulldozers or a mass of other supplies essential for protracting an all-consuming global war.
And what the British and, subsequently, the Americans realised early on was that quantity had a considerable value all of its own.
Having the qualitative best helped too, but numbers mattered.
www.forces.net
Quantity not quality tipped to be the winning factor in modern conflict, not just WW2
Hamish de Bretton-Gordon James Holland6th June 2024 at 11:28amHistorian James Holland and Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a former commander of 1st Royal Tank Regiment, look at how the technical superiority of Nazi Germany was defeated by the superior numbers of the Allies.
The pair wonder whether Britain could be treading down the same path in prioritising quality over quantity.
In this week of the 80th Anniversary of D-Day, it is useful to pause and consider why the Allies prevailed on D-Day and why, 77 days later, they had utterly destroyed two entire German armies in a crushing victory that ensured the outcome of the war was no longer in any doubt.
Over the past few anniversaries, the focus has understandably been on the men who were leaping from landing craft or floating down in their parachutes.
But the world is a very different place since even 2019, and we now have another brutal conflict going on in Europe on a scale that is reminiscent of the Second World War.
The moment of jeopardy for the Allies with the cross-Channel invasion was in undertaking D-Day in the first place and the days that followed – when the race was on as to who could bring to bear a decisive amount of men and materiel in the bridgehead.
This race was won hands-down by the Allies whose harnessing of air power ensured the Germans, despite already being on the continent, could not swiftly reinforce Normandy, and naval power, which allowed gargantuan amounts of supplies to rapidly cross the Channel.
It was also because of the preponderance on vast amounts of firepower – mostly in terms of artillery – and basic equipment, whether it be tanks, trucks, bulldozers or a mass of other supplies essential for protracting an all-consuming global war.
And what the British and, subsequently, the Americans realised early on was that quantity had a considerable value all of its own.
Having the qualitative best helped too, but numbers mattered.
Quantity not quality tipped to be the winning factor in modern conflict, not just WW2
Is there a future where Britain prioritises quality over quantity?
FJAG
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It's an interesting article, but the text shows that its more a question of manufacturing capacity than complexity which is the issue.
That statement jumps a bit to this conclusion.
The new factor here is cost. There is a difference as between manufacturing capacity per se and the cost of complexity which restrains manufacturing output artificially. Sometimes we delude ourselves by add limiting buzz words like "precision negates the need for mass."
NATO countries still have more than enough manufacturing capacity to turn out large quantities of complex weapons systems if they choose to. The US seems to be the only NATO country that operates at scale. So does China. Russia hasn't - it just mobilized a lot of old crap.
I still think its too bad that most NATO countries (except the US) treat the word "reserve" as a dirty word. Whether its for reserve forces or for defence manufacturing lines that are overbuilt, run at low peacetime rates of production but have a reserve ability to be scaled up in short order.
That statement jumps a bit to this conclusion.
The new factor here is cost. There is a difference as between manufacturing capacity per se and the cost of complexity which restrains manufacturing output artificially. Sometimes we delude ourselves by add limiting buzz words like "precision negates the need for mass."
NATO countries still have more than enough manufacturing capacity to turn out large quantities of complex weapons systems if they choose to. The US seems to be the only NATO country that operates at scale. So does China. Russia hasn't - it just mobilized a lot of old crap.
I still think its too bad that most NATO countries (except the US) treat the word "reserve" as a dirty word. Whether its for reserve forces or for defence manufacturing lines that are overbuilt, run at low peacetime rates of production but have a reserve ability to be scaled up in short order.
OldSolduer
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I have long thought that the super techy things that cost mega dollars limits the number of (ships/planes/tanks/subs etc) that a country can possess. The Olde USSR never (AFAIK) tossed anything away but storing it for a rainy day.
I know this will hurt but the cutting up of the M 109s IMO was a huge error.
But Peace Dividend!!
I do believe Ike was right....
Blackadder1916
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If ever there was a story that's the perfect intersection of cyber warfare, foreign interference, the new Monarch and dress, this has to be it.
www.ft.com
British army delays King Charles cap badges over China spying fears
UK defence official cites possibility that tracking devices or GPS transmitters could be embedded into metal crests
www.ft.com
here is a lesson for those who feel that off-shoring your mfg. capability in order to save 10 cents in production costs is good business. In the long run you are giving up a portion of your independence regardless of how good a friend the other country may be at the time.If ever there was a story that's the perfect intersection of cyber warfare, foreign interference, the new Monarch and dress, this has to be it.
British army delays King Charles cap badges over China spying fears
UK defence official cites possibility that tracking devices or GPS transmitters could be embedded into metal crests
GR66
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I agree with you in general but the one notable difference between WWII and now is the length of time, technical skill and specialized materials that it takes to produce modern weapon systems.It's an interesting article, but the text shows that its more a question of manufacturing capacity than complexity which is the issue.
That statement jumps a bit to this conclusion.
The new factor here is cost. There is a difference as between manufacturing capacity per se and the cost of complexity which restrains manufacturing output artificially. Sometimes we delude ourselves by add limiting buzz words like "precision negates the need for mass."
NATO countries still have more than enough manufacturing capacity to turn out large quantities of complex weapons systems if they choose to. The US seems to be the only NATO country that operates at scale. So does China. Russia hasn't - it just mobilized a lot of old crap.
I still think its too bad that most NATO countries (except the US) treat the word "reserve" as a dirty word. Whether its for reserve forces or for defence manufacturing lines that are overbuilt, run at low peacetime rates of production but have a reserve ability to be scaled up in short order.
You can't just hire a bunch of "Rosie the Riveters" and increase combat aircraft production 30-fold like the US did between 1940 and 1943. You're also not going to build a modern ship in 42 days. Yes, the US (and the West) have significant untapped industrial capacity but there are definitely serious constraints on how quickly modern, top-tier systems can be produced.
While the US is certainly in a completely different league than the rest of the West when it comes to defence production, I bet that in a full-scale war with China/Russia that even the Americans would end up like the Russians in Ukraine...simply mobilizing their Reserve stock rather than replacing losses with new production to any significant extent.
Again in total agreement with you that this fact proves the necessity of major stocks of equipment being available in Reserve, but when even those stocks start to run out it may be necessary to focus military production on what can be built quickly at scale because the capacity simply won't exist to increase production of "exquisite" systems enough to meet demand.
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Just needed Army Reserve restructuring and that would be an army.ca 5x bingoIf ever there was a story that's the perfect intersection of cyber warfare, foreign interference, the new Monarch and dress, this has to be it.
British army delays King Charles cap badges over China spying fears
UK defence official cites possibility that tracking devices or GPS transmitters could be embedded into metal crests
daftandbarmy
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FJAG
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It's definitely a major factor.
I often think of the time as a young reserve gunner when I would work on the automotives of my 3/4 ton. There's a lot you could do with a tool bag and some sweat. I doubt if any of the young drivers today can do much with the complex, computer-controlled mess that's under their hoods without major diagnostic tools and access to a shelf filled with replacement components.
Time is an interesting issue. I'm one of those who feels we're already at war and we're wasting time as we speak. Just saw the CBC article where Trudeau's issue is the children Russia has kidnapped. I guess that if you can't find a proper defence issue to speak about then you need to find a touchy feely issue that you can.
There are equipment items that the Forces (especially the army) needs on a day-to-day basis: ammunition; logistics vehicles; combat vehicles etc. I'm firmly convinced we could set up industries like GDLS in London to turn out those item on a continuing basis at a relatively low production rate during peacetime but capable of ramping up in time of need. Rather than buying 2,000 trucks over two years every fifteen years or so, produce 300 a year every year (with incremental changes when needed) but make it a facility that is set up to increase production to 2,000 per year. The key element is that it stays in business on a continuous long-term basis as a manufacturer and repair/upgrade facility.
Specialized materials should be stockpiled in time of peace. Labour can be trained if there is a plan for ramping up training and a workforce where individuals are restricted to limited scope repetitive tasks.
I don't want to underestimate the complexity of the problem but I always take the view that the best way to beat a complex problem is to examine it and prepare for it long before you need to.
Colin Parkinson
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I wonder if it would work to build "complete knockdown" AFV, so a complete AFV partly assembled, preserved, wrapped and stored in Nevada. wait 10 years start pulling the first ones out, assemble them and use them, dispose of them in 5 years and move onto the next batch or similar.
Basically you have all your long lead items already made. Being partly assembled and protected, means you can renew seals during assembly. Plus mods can be more easily done.
Basically you have all your long lead items already made. Being partly assembled and protected, means you can renew seals during assembly. Plus mods can be more easily done.
Totally agree. The fact that militaries across the west are experiencing major recruiting & retention problems is almost a funny coincidence that it's occurring during a time when equipment fleets are shrinking in favour of being fancier...
Makes me think of the Rafale jet that the French produce. They've finally managed to boost production of the jet to 3 units a month (up from one a month not all that long ago)
In a wartime scenario, 3 jets a month wouldn't even cover combat losses.
Exquisite product that's already being built in 'surge mode' - that can't be easily ramped up further if things go south
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