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British Military Current Events

Yeah FJAG, this is really disconcerting. The number of vexatious/frivolous lawsuits, both domestically and ICC driven, against UK forces, is surreal. Do you think the US disdain for the ICC, while the UK abides by it, has been the reason why the US sees relatively few of these cases?
There were two things. Firstly the US has not signed on to the Rome statute (or perhaps more accurately, like Russia, withdrew its signature never having ratified it) so there are no ICC cases.

Up until recently, the Brits were tied into EU legislation which made suing on human rights complaints much easier and to top it off had wonderful little bureaucratic organizations like iHAT and of course private solicitors who made an industry out of milking the somewhat lucrative Brit compensation system. (see what you get when at the core there's a Labour movement/attitude in your country that considers the public purse a humongous teat - where else is there a country where first responders don't go into harms way to rescue people because it might get them in trouble with workplace health and safety - but I digress)

I think a limitation period as to such complaints makes sense (especially when you consider the bullhockey that keeps cropping up over Northern Ireland.) I think that Fatou Bensouda is overstepping her authority (which isn't unusual for the ICC which has really no oversight worth speaking of - generally speaking a court should be independent--and something like the ICC is needed--but I just don't trust this outfit)

Its not that there is no ability to sue and win compensation in the US (The CIA torture cases is one example, the Abu Ghraib settlements is another, and the US Army JAG resolves numerous compensation claims for numerous situations on an ongoing basis) Its just the scale and notoriety of the former UK system that gets all the attention.

🍻
 
Looks like British Army to take main hit in "Integrated Review"--implications, if any, for CAF?

Britain unveils date to release transformative military review​

The British government said it will take the wraps off a review March 16 that is expected to fundamentally transform its defense capabilities.

The government also announced the chief of the Defence Staff‚ Gen. Nick Carter, will remain in his post until the end of November, rather than depart in June as previously planned. A government statement said Carter’s extension is meant to provide the military with continuity as the integrated review of defense, security, foreign policy and development aid is implemented.

Carter has been one of the key architects behind the review, which Prime Minister Boris Johnson has said will trigger a fundamental transformation of the military. The prime minister announced the government’s intention to hold the review immediately following his win in the 2019 general election.

The review, which is already delayed, is expected to dictate the size and shape of the British military for years to come. Following its March 16 release, the Ministry of Defence on March 22 will publish the details of a defense modernization effort in which the Army is expected to take the brunt of capability cuts, notably in end strength and armored vehicles. The cuts are meant to help fund the purchase of cutting-edge weapons in the areas of space, cyber, underwater and unmanned warfare [emphasis added].

“Gen. Sir Nick Carter will remain as chief of Defence Staff during this critical time for defense. His experience and expertise are central to the modernization of how defense operates, and his leadership implementing the integrated review will ensure the men and women of our armed forces are best prepared to counter the threats of tomorrow,” Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said.

The government announced late last year that it is increasing the defense budget by £24.1 billion (U.S. $33.6 billion) over the next four years. Most of that is going toward equipment. But with defense spending already heavily overcommitted, capability cuts are expected in order to balance the books while creating room for investing in advanced sunrise technologies...
Mark
Ottawa
 
Looks like British Army to take main hit in "Integrated Review"--implications, if any, for CAF?


Mark
Ottawa

And I'd bet a fish and chip supper that, astonishingly, the Guards Division will, once again, emerge unscathed.

Conan Obrien Ugh GIF by Team Coco
 
Looks like British Army to take main hit in "Integrated Review"--implications, if any, for CAF?


Mark
Ottawa
Major article at "The War Zone" (excellent site):

British Armed Forces Poised To Make Big Cuts To F-35 Plans And More​

The large-scale modernization promised under the upcoming defense review is likely to be tempered by some severe force reductions.​


As the United Kingdom Armed Forces brace themselves for the government’s next defense review, signs point to significant cuts to the Royal Air Force and the British Army, including a potential reduction of the planned F-35B stealth fighter fleet by around two-thirds. At the same time, the forthcoming document promises to outline a wide-ranging modernization of the armed forces, among them new space and cyber capabilities.

While we don’t know for sure what the review, formally titled Global Britain in a Competitive Age, will contain, a preview was provided in The Times yesterday, citing sources within the U.K. Prime Minister’s office, commonly referred to as No. 10. The review itself is set to be officially unveiled in two parts beginning on March 16, followed by further details of the defense modernization effort on March 22...

We already know that the defense review will bring a major funding increase for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Last November, Johnson unveiled plans to add almost $22 billion to the defense budget over the next four years. Among flagship projects mentioned by the prime minister at the time were a new class of warships, known as the Type 32, and the continued development of the Tempest stealth fighter. You can read more about the aspirations covered by that promised investment in this previous War Zone story.

However, all this new investment has to be balanced by spending reductions elsewhere in the military and we now have a better understanding of what’s likely to be cut from the armed forces.

Royal Air Force

Long seemingly under threat, it now seems as if the ax will finally drop on the U.K. government’s plans to buy 138 F-35B short takeoff and landing (STOVL) versions of the Joint Strike Fighter. The fledgling F-35 fleet is operated by a joint force of RAF and Royal Navy personnel, but which are based at RAF Marham in Norfolk, England when not embarked aboard one of the two Queen Elizabeth class carriers.

The Times reports that a full 90 aircraft will be cut from the planned F-35B total buy, eventually providing a force of just 48 aircraft. To date, the United Kingdom has committed to buying 48 Lightning jets by the end of 2025, but previously the U.K. Ministry of Defense steadfastly held to the 138-aircraft figure in its communications...

Officials have said that 24 F-35Bs need to be embarked on the ship for a “credible complement” in the core Carrier Strike role. However, a force of 48 would not allow both carriers to sail with the jets simultaneously, once training and maintenance, and not least all the force’s other frontline commitments, are taken into account. In fact, it might not even be sufficient for one carrier...[lots more on all three services, note Indo-Pacific]

Mark
Ottawa
 
Major article at "The War Zone" (excellent site):


British Armed Forces Poised To Make Big Cuts To F-35 Plans And More​

The large-scale modernization promised under the upcoming defense review is likely to be tempered by some severe force reductions.​



Mark
Ottawa
And there was much rejoicing.............in Moscow and Beijing.
 
I'm still confused...is the MoD getting an extra $10 Billion a year for the next several years still, or not??

I swear their government announces 'big budget boost to stabilize their funding' one day, and 'massive review & cuts' like 3 days later. Like a roller coaster...
 
I'm still confused...is the MoD getting an extra $10 Billion a year for the next several years still, or not??

I swear their government announces 'big budget boost to stabilize their funding' one day, and 'massive review & cuts' like 3 days later. Like a roller coaster...
Yes but, taking a page from Canada's playbook, It will mostly go to performance and efficiency bonuses for all the high back leather chair operators at Horse Guards.
 
I'm still confused...is the MoD getting an extra $10 Billion a year for the next several years still, or not??

I swear their government announces 'big budget boost to stabilize their funding' one day, and 'massive review & cuts' like 3 days later. Like a roller coaster...
Competing power blocs in the UK government for a long time, short of a fiscal Game of Throne

also
 
Part of the scheme for reallocating Aid funds (reduced from 0.7% of GNP to 0.5%) to the Defence budget, I presume.
There is also a new push under way to acquire what are called loitering munitions, sometimes dubbed “kamikaze drones”, which can hover around a target before donating. (sic)


£80bn boost for military to arm it with new tanks, warships and ‘kamikaze drones’​

Government announces modernisation drive to ensure the Armed Forces are ready to fight the wars of the future



And General Dannatt's take


I find it fascinating how often 2023 comes up as a milestone in current planning - Canadian light forces, US littoral regiments, US Army's Mid-Range Capability re-introducing the GLCM/Pershing capability of the 80's but with PGMs and adding long range hypersonic glide bombs, USAFs B-52/B51 launched AGM-183A ARRW Mach 20 hypersonic missile, USMCs light amphibious ships... "loyal wingmen?" "high altitude pseudo-satellites?" "space commands"

(up to 800 km)


(500 to 2000 km range)

(Beyond 2000 km)

(anywhere in the world in under one hour - 20,000 km)

I can't help but wonder if the F-35 should be redesignated as a GR-35 (Ground strike -Recce in British usage) and added to the Wedgetail, Poseidon, Sentinel, Rivet Joint families of aircraft as part of the ISTAR capability. Judging from public sources it seems that the real added value of the F35 has been providing SA to conventional strike packages of earlier generations of aircraft. Air controlers vectoring their wingmen through the enemy battlespace while remaining unseen themselves.
 
Just as a further observation: the China Seas are bounded by the Malay Archipelago and Japan

The Malay Archipelago is the 17-18,000 islands of Indonesia and the 7,000 or so Islands of the Phillipines.
Japan has 6852 islands
Total 30 to 32,000 launch sites.
Add in the islands of Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia and Australasia and China has over 40,000 launch sites to contend with.

And perturbed neighbours on every border.

And perturbed locals in Hong Kong, (Taiwan), Xinjiang and Tibet.

Meanwhile China, as of 2015 has "conducted a land reclamation project which had built at least seven artificial islands in the South China Sea totaling 2000 acres in size by mid 2015.[14] One artificial island built on Fiery Cross Reef near the Spratly Islands is now the site of a military barracks, lookout tower and a runway long enough to handle Chinese military aircraft.[15]"

 
I note further that the most successful phase of the intervention in Afghanistan was the first phase -

origin.jpg060209-F-2907C-243.jpg
 
Similar things could be said about most forces in the western world, as a majority of western countries re-equipped themselves while COIN was at it's peak.

Iraq and Afghanistan required mobility and protection primarily, with a 25mm being more than adequate to take out any hostile forces in a tic. AFV fleets throughout NATO were refurbished & recapitalized during and after the conflict, with that conflict still mostly in the minds of decision makers.

Most of us will be outgunned by Russian forces, regardless of country.


Russian armour tends to be designed to be simple, reliable, and unleash as much firepower as possible at an OPFOR vehicle. Some of their more recent versions of AFVs have firepower that looks utterly brutal.
 
Similar things could be said about most forces in the western world, as a majority of western countries re-equipped themselves while COIN was at it's peak.

Iraq and Afghanistan required mobility and protection primarily, with a 25mm being more than adequate to take out any hostile forces in a tic. AFV fleets throughout NATO were refurbished & recapitalized during and after the conflict, with that conflict still mostly in the minds of decision makers.

Most of us will be outgunned by Russian forces, regardless of country.


Russian armour tends to be designed to be simple, reliable, and unleash as much firepower as possible at an OPFOR vehicle. Some of their more recent versions of AFVs have firepower that looks utterly brutal.
The demise of the tank and the afv has been predicted before - but there time is passing.

How do you get tanks and LAVs to Beijing or Vladivostok?

And are they necessary? The Russians beat Ukrainians using Russian kit and tactics with Russian kit and tactics - when in doubt send another salvo.

The Turks and Azerbaijanis beat the Syrians and Armenians using Russian kit and tactics with .... drones




The Turkish military's devastating display of power against the Syrian army last week — which saw the destruction of hundreds of regime tanks, artillery pieces and armored vehicles — came from a cheap but effective domestic drone program that NATO officials say has changed the military equation against Russia in Syria's Idlib Province. March 2020

Turkey's offensive was conducted with about 100 domestically produced drones launching cheap guided munitions with deadly efficiency.

The Turks established an aerospace firm in 2009, Baykar, under the control of President Recep Erdogan's son-in-law. Baykar developed the Bayraktar TB2 drone, a medium range drone that could spend 24 hours over a target. By 2015, the TB2 was test firing domestically produced weapons and was deployed for the first time a year later targeting PKK targets.

"The MAM-L [drone] stuff they deployed in Idlib worked spectacularly. It's cheap, easy to make and clearly doesn't miss," said the NATO official.

The source is referring to the MAM-L SMART MICRO MUNITION, a small, guided anti-armor bomblet with a range of about 10 KM and a highly accurate laser-GPS guidance system that directs the bomb to within a meter or so of its target.

"Dropping these bomblets on Syrian regime tanks all night got Putin's attention"​

While Turkey guards the exact cost of producing the Bayraktar TB2 as a state secret, it sold 12 drones and three ground command centers to Ukraine last year for $69 million. At less than $6 million per drone, the TB2 is about a third of the cost of the similarly capable US produced Reaper MQ-9, which retails for US allies at about $16 million a piece.

Bayraktar_TB2_Runway.jpg
TB-2 - 24h MALE

download.jpg
MAM-L 10 km 22kg 160 mm SAL
 
I know we are well off track now, and perhaps this discussion needs to be relocated .....

Further to the discussion

Turkish and Israeli drones were matched against Russian tanks, IFVs, guns and rockets. Most importantly they were matched against Russian BUK and Pantsir air defences.

The air defences were suppressed by a combination of EW and Loitering Anti-Radiation Munitions. The EW was supplied by the Turkish KORAL system, mounted on 8x8 trucks. The Loitering Munitions were the IAI Harop .

300px-IAI_Harop_PAS_2013_01.jpg


The IAI Harop (or IAI Harpy 2) is a loitering munition developed by the MBT division of Israel Aerospace Industries. It is an anti-radiation drone that can autonomously home in on radio emissions. This SEAD-optimised loitering munition is designed to loiter the battlefield and attack targets by self-destructing into them.[1] The drone can either operate fully autonomously, using its anti-radar homing system, or it can take a human-in-the-loop mode. If a target is not engaged, the drone will return and land itself back at base.


General characteristics

  • Crew: None
  • Length: 2.5 m (8 ft 2 in)
  • Wingspan: 3.00 m (9 ft 10 in)
  • Communication Range: 200 km (120 mi)
  • RCS: <0.5m2
Performance

  • Maximum speed: 417 km/h (259 mph, 225 kn)
  • Range: 1,000 km (620 mi, 540 nmi)
  • Endurance: 9 hours
  • Service ceiling: 4,600 m (15,000 ft)
Armament

  • 23 kg (51 lb) warhead
  • CEP: <1 m (3 ft 3 in) with 16 kg (35 lb) warhead



Harop is being superceded / reinforced by IAI's Green Dragon

iai-green-dragon-attack-drone-israel.jpg


The IAI Green Dragon is a loitering munition developed by the Israel Aerospace Industries. The drone is low cost that can loiter for 1.5 hours and a range of 40–50 km. It is munition itself with 3 kg warhead that can approach the target silently and hit with the effect of < 1m.[1]

Green Dragon can be launched from a small vehicle through a [2] sealed 1.7-meter-long canister with 12-16 units.[3] Each has 15 kg weight.[4]

Specifications[edit]​

Data from Israel Aircraft Industries[5]

General characteristics

  • Crew: None
  • Empty weight: 15 kg (33 lb)
Performance

  • Range: 40 km (25 mi, 22 nmi)
  • Endurance: 1 hours 30 minutes
Armament

  • 3 kg warhead



In addition to the Bayktar TB-2 MALE UAV the TAI Anka-S MALE was also deployed.

TAI_ANKA-S..jpg


The primary munitions were Rocketsan's 160 mm Hellfire analog (MAM - L) and the 70 mm APKWS analog (MAM-C) - Both as SAL guided

220px-Roketsan_MAM-L_Mini_Akıllı_Mühimmat,_Teknofest_2019.jpg

UAVs were lost. Perhaps 100 or so on each side in each "war/campaign"

But the exchange rate wrt ground forces appears to be something like 2 or 3 vehicles to every UAV.

And as Indian General Hooda points out - 100 UAVs is less than 2 Rafale fighters. And no pilots lost, or wounded, or required an SOF recovery after being shot down.

Tanks will continue to have utility but will continue to have less utility and require more expensive defenses (eating into their offensive capabilities) and require more support (tactical, combat service and maintenance) and more capable crews.

tribuneindia.com/news/comment/in-drone-era-tanks-must-adapt-to-last-longer-155904
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/12/07/drone-effectiveness-air-defense/
Drone Effectiveness Against Air Defenses, Not Tanks, Is the Real Concern
https://www.dailysabah.com/business...em-multiply-turkeys-idlib-operation-shows/amp
Tanks’ viability in modern warfare declines as methods to hunt them multiply, Turkey’s Idlib operation shows | Daily Sabah
 
For reference - Aselsan's KORAL EW System.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KORAL_Electronic_Warfare_System


 
I know we are well off track now, and perhaps this discussion needs to be relocated .....

Further to the discussion

Turkish and Israeli drones were matched against Russian tanks, IFVs, guns and rockets. Most importantly they were matched against Russian BUK and Pantsir air defences.

The air defences were suppressed by a combination of EW and Loitering Anti-Radiation Munitions. The EW was supplied by the Turkish KORAL system, mounted on 8x8 trucks. The Loitering Munitions were the IAI Harop .

View attachment 64718




Harop is being superceded / reinforced by IAI's Green Dragon

View attachment 64719






In addition to the Bayktar TB-2 MALE UAV the TAI Anka-S MALE was also deployed.

View attachment 64720


The primary munitions were Rocketsan's 160 mm Hellfire analog (MAM - L) and the 70 mm APKWS analog (MAM-C) - Both as SAL guided

View attachment 64721

UAVs were lost. Perhaps 100 or so on each side in each "war/campaign"

But the exchange rate wrt ground forces appears to be something like 2 or 3 vehicles to every UAV.

And as Indian General Hooda points out - 100 UAVs is less than 2 Rafale fighters. And no pilots lost, or wounded, or required an SOF recovery after being shot down.

Tanks will continue to have utility but will continue to have less utility and require more expensive defenses (eating into their offensive capabilities) and require more support (tactical, combat service and maintenance) and more capable crews.

tribuneindia.com/news/comment/in-drone-era-tanks-must-adapt-to-last-longer-155904
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/12/07/drone-effectiveness-air-defense/
Drone Effectiveness Against Air Defenses, Not Tanks, Is the Real Concern
https://www.dailysabah.com/business...em-multiply-turkeys-idlib-operation-shows/amp
Tanks’ viability in modern warfare declines as methods to hunt them multiply, Turkey’s Idlib operation shows | Daily Sabah
Good thing the Turks are on our side... :D
 
The House of Commons Committee has spoken, and it's not good news ...



Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability

Summary

The recent history of the British Army’s armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) capability is deplorable. Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the Army’s AFV fleets have been characterised by increasing obsolescence and decreasing numbers. In 1990 the UK had around 1,200 main battle tanks in its inventory, today has 227, and those that remain are in urgent need of modernisation. The perceived loss of a challenging but known threat in the form of the armoured forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact meant the British Army has struggled to redefine its role. Since at least the 1990s it has tried to move to more deployable, mediumweight armoured forces, suitable for expeditionary warfare against unforeseeable opponents.

However, indecision around requirements, a desire to have the latest (immature) technology, operational experience and a lack of stable funding for its programmes mean the British Army’s AFV fleet currently faces mass obsolescence and requires significant funding for modernisation. At the same time the UK is reviewing its future defence and security posture and what this means for traditional military capabilities. Therefore, the Army’s AFV programmes and capability is now vulnerable when weighed against the desire to fund other priorities such as ‘cyber’, information warfare and other capabilities.

We are astonished that between 1997 and late 2020 (with the exception of a small number or armoured engineering and Viking protected mobility vehicles) the Department has not delivered a single new armoured vehicle from the core procurement programme into operational service with the Army. It is clear that the Ministry of Defence’s armoured vehicles programme requires independent scrutiny. We ask the National Audit Office to revisit this issue.

The delayed Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review (at time of writing scheduled for publication in March 2021) is expected to make a number of significant decisions about the UK’s defence posture and the capabilities it requires to meet this. These have been characterised as being about the need to reduce or remove ‘sunset’ (or industrial-era) capabilities and replace them with ‘sunrise’ (or information-era) alternatives.

There has been much speculation about what this means for the Army’s AFV capability, notably the Challenger 2 main battle tank and the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle. Both vehicles have been in service for decades without meaningful upgrades and are both awaiting decisions about modernisation programmes. In 2015 the Ministry of Defence outlined the requirement for a warfighting division that by 2025 could be deployed to assist NATO in the event of conflict on its Eastern borders. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 highlighted that NATO (and the UK) still face a potential threat from a challenging peer adversary state that retained considerable armoured forces which were being modernised at pace. The UK division was to draw on a number of capabilities but its core would have been two armoured infantry brigades and a new strike brigade, alongside 16 Air Assault brigade.

If the Integrated Review concludes that the Ministry of Defence and the British Army are to retain a heavy armoured capability it is clear that they must learn the hard lessons from recent history, and these are spelled out in the rest of this report. Furthermore,to support this capability the UK requires an industrial base. The current procurement and upgrade programmes have led to new investment in skills and production facilities. To sustain this regrowth in what was a decaying sector, the Ministry of Defence (and wider government) must provide greater certainty about future requirements and possible contracts.

The proposal to develop a Land Industrial Strategy is a welcome step in this direction. In the course of this inquiry, it emerged that the Army will be unable to field its warfighting division as planned, reducing it by one Armoured Infantry brigade. This was apparently due to a lack of resources. In addition, the Army is deficient in important capabilities such as artillery and air defence.

We heard evidence from witnesses that, despite assurances from the Ministry of Defence, it is possible that such a reduced UK division could be ‘overmatched’ (i.e. defeated) by its Russian armoured counterpart. This assessment was based on the assumption that current in-service vehicles would be upgraded or replaced, which as this report shows, is a matter of some uncertainty. It appears that the UK’s armoured forces are at very serious risk of being both quantitively and qualitatively outmatched by potential peer adversaries.

This report reveals a woeful story of bureaucratic procrastination, military indecision, financial mismanagement and general ineptitude, which have continually bedevilled attempts to properly re-equip the British Army over the last two decades. Even on the MoD’s own current plans, (but subject to the Integrated Review) we are still some four years away from even being able to field a “warfighting division”, which, itself, would now be hopelessly under-equipped and denuded of even a third combat brigade.

As a result, were the British Army to have to fight a peer adversary - a euphemism for Russia - in Eastern Europe in the next few years, whist our soldiers would undoubtedly remain amongst the finest in the world, they would, disgracefully, be forced to go into battle in a combination of obsolescent or even obsolete armoured vehicles, most of them at least 30 years old or more, with poor mechanical reliability, very heavily outgunned by more modern missile and artillery systems and chronically lacking in adequate air defence. They would have only a handful of long-delayed, new generation vehicles, gradually trickling into the inventory, to replace them.


 
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