British / US Blue on Blue Incident - Merged
- Thread starter The Rifleman
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Hmmm.... Considering that the vehicles were from "the Blues" and considering that same said unit now have some "Royals" in their ranks, I shudder at the thought that Skeeter could have "stung" the Royal family - if the incident was repeated round about now.
Somehow, think that things would haven't gone as smoothly for the ANG pilots career.
However, I still go back to the main point that the AWACS, AND Command & Control just weren't happening that day (same as our blue on blue blowout in '02). Even if the pilots were on their 1st sortie, the Air controllers should have zeroed in on the "orange panel" thing the minute it was blabbed on the air.
IMHO, don't shoot the pilot.... time to have a real serious talk with the controllers who are riding in the virtual back seat of each aircraft.
Somehow, think that things would haven't gone as smoothly for the ANG pilots career.
However, I still go back to the main point that the AWACS, AND Command & Control just weren't happening that day (same as our blue on blue blowout in '02). Even if the pilots were on their 1st sortie, the Air controllers should have zeroed in on the "orange panel" thing the minute it was blabbed on the air.
IMHO, don't shoot the pilot.... time to have a real serious talk with the controllers who are riding in the virtual back seat of each aircraft.
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geo said:
Geo has a very good point, although we all appear to agree that the A-10s are wrong and screwed the pouch, they are only part of the chain. As I said in an earlier post the problem is procedure. If one looks very close at all the FF incidents the errors would have been caught had the procedures been changed to the Ground FAC points I raised several posts ago. We (the FAC community) had this resolved we thought in 91-95 but in the intervening years 96 to 01 the whole program went for a sleeper as war again disappeared from our tours. With Iraq and A stan it would appear we are slowly relearning our weakness, problem is that I have not seen any changes moving towards fixing it.
Rifleman, On the SUN media thing, I am surprised the widow did not know how her husband died or am I getting the wrong slant from the reporter.
edit spell check
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She knew it was a Blue on Blue alright - just not the details
FormerHorseGuard
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i hope lessons are learned from these accidents or what ever you want to call them, i think a lot more training as to be done on afv rec and some sort of marking system has to be in place....a huge white star was used in WW 2 on equipment, and stripes on the aircraft to help the people relaize what was there.
something has to be made to work and prevent this sort of thing
something has to be made to work and prevent this sort of thing
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click on this link to see the extent of the damage to the AFV's
http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2007060452,00.html
http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2007060452,00.html
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Hmmm.... Can only imagine the extent of pressure Canada applied on the US for them to have dealt with our 1st blue on blue (PPCLI) incident. The US military pert well clipped the wings of those two "good old boys" ..... while "nada" was done about this one?
Why was this dealt with differently?
Why was this dealt with differently?
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The Yanks don't seem to be improving -
Police Killed In Blunder
Updated: 14:00, Friday February 09, 2007
American helicopters have mistakenly launched a deadly attack on Kurdish positions in Northern Iraq, reports have said.
At least five police officers were killed.
American officials said the helicopter crews believed they had been targeting Al Qaeda guerrillas.
The US military said the attack was launched after soldiers identified armed men in a bunker near a building which they thought was being used for bomb-making.
The troops called for the men to put down their weapons in Arabic and Kurdish and fired warning shots, a spokesman said.
Helicopters fired at the bunker, killing the five men and detaining nine others who were later identified as Kurdish officers.
Officials with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the party headed by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said the helicopters had hit a guard post.
news.sky.com/skynews/a...74,00.html
Police Killed In Blunder
Updated: 14:00, Friday February 09, 2007
American helicopters have mistakenly launched a deadly attack on Kurdish positions in Northern Iraq, reports have said.
At least five police officers were killed.
American officials said the helicopter crews believed they had been targeting Al Qaeda guerrillas.
The US military said the attack was launched after soldiers identified armed men in a bunker near a building which they thought was being used for bomb-making.
The troops called for the men to put down their weapons in Arabic and Kurdish and fired warning shots, a spokesman said.
Helicopters fired at the bunker, killing the five men and detaining nine others who were later identified as Kurdish officers.
Officials with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the party headed by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said the helicopters had hit a guard post.
news.sky.com/skynews/a...74,00.html
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After having lost several helicopters since Jan 1st, I venture to think that the jockeys are somewhat "jumpy". However, if a police station is occupying a bunker, I would have thought that people who need to know... would know... but I have been known to be wrong... though they should have (known I mean)
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Begining of TAC Air: Some thoughts
With the power of the press one only has to mention tank busting and readers immediately imagine one of two things. The first is of Oberst Rudel in his Ju. 87 flying low over the Russian steppes above columns of burning Russian tanks. One the opposite side of the continent paintings glamorize Royal Air Force Typhoons hurtling rockets into stranded German armored columns. The second image is of the vaunted Fairchild A-10 flames blazing from it’s nose as Iraqi soldiers cower in foxholes.
The true ancestor of the A-10 is actually thought to be the German He 129. Both are described as being a “purpose built flying gun platform designed to destroy tanks”. The He. 129 was armed with four 30 cm. forward firing cannons and was the evolutionary upgrade of Rudel’s Ju. 87. The employment of these aircraft due to the vastness of the Russian steppe and the doctrinal changes of the German high command resulted in the few aircraft available becoming a ‘fire brigade’. Rushing from one break through to another. German doctrine was based on the perception that “tank where to small a target to hit effectively”(Muller 135) Further, that without the purpose built ‘gun platform’ the “Luftwaffe air armaments where unsuitable to the task” of stopping tanks(Muller 123). This doctrine therefore lead to the belief that the Luftwaffe was “more suited to an indirect interdiction role”.
The allied thought after the success of the “Huribuster” in the initial stages of the desert campaign was to develop a dedicated ground attack aircraft, enter the Typhoon. Purpose built with four 20 mm wing mounted cannons and the ability to carry either bomb loads or rockets. Desmond Scott, a former Typhoon pilot and author offers these insights. An accurate placed bomb will flip a tank over, there is no need for a direct hit. A mixed flight of both rocket carrying and bomb carrying aircraft guaranteed the best chance of success. He also thought that the rockets carried were extremely effective and accurate.
From the ground perspective in Field of Fire by Terry Copp it is noted that an examination of German fortifications in the D-day area showed little evidence of being hit by allied tactical air. Weather additionally contributed as low lying fog prevented target identification and or the aircraft themselves being able to take off from home bases. One only has to watch Clint Eastwood in the movie “Kelly’s Hero’s” to gain an accurate picture of the problems of TAC air hitting there own troops.
Sources:
Copp, Terry. Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003
Muller, Richard. The German Air War in Russia. Baltimore, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993
Scott Desmond. Typhoon Pilot. London, Random House, 1982
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3rd Herd
A couple of minor corrections to your informative post,the Typhoon was developed as a
fighter to specifically combat the FW 190 however the instillation of 4 20mm cannon in the wing
in an upright position led to overly thick wing, this led to dissapointing performance over 20000ft.
plus the tail kept falling off.The RAF then used it as a ground attack aircraft and with the use of
air force FACs in direct contact with the pilots turned the "Tiffy" into the best allied ground attack
aircraft of the war.Incidentley they did fix the, tail falling off, problem.
Getting back to the subject of this thread,one does not hear many of these blue on blue problems
with the US naval air and none from USMC ,I suspect CAS is still not a job the USAF wants to
do,they did not want the A10 in the beginning and only accepted it to avoid it going to the US
Army and of course losing budget funds, and even after getting the aircraft were very slow in up
grading the electronic fit to make it a more capable CAS platform.This goes back to the Korean
war when the USAF where not trained to do CAS instead did intediction that is to attack the
enemy suppy lines at least 20 miles behind the FEBA,CAS however was the bread and butter of
Marine air and the US navy.This lack of CAS trg. led to plenty of blue on blue involving USAF
aircraft in Korea.
Maybe this problem could be traced to earlier training errors as the the US army and
air force seem to have a very poor institutional memory.
Regards
A couple of minor corrections to your informative post,the Typhoon was developed as a
fighter to specifically combat the FW 190 however the instillation of 4 20mm cannon in the wing
in an upright position led to overly thick wing, this led to dissapointing performance over 20000ft.
plus the tail kept falling off.The RAF then used it as a ground attack aircraft and with the use of
air force FACs in direct contact with the pilots turned the "Tiffy" into the best allied ground attack
aircraft of the war.Incidentley they did fix the, tail falling off, problem.
Getting back to the subject of this thread,one does not hear many of these blue on blue problems
with the US naval air and none from USMC ,I suspect CAS is still not a job the USAF wants to
do,they did not want the A10 in the beginning and only accepted it to avoid it going to the US
Army and of course losing budget funds, and even after getting the aircraft were very slow in up
grading the electronic fit to make it a more capable CAS platform.This goes back to the Korean
war when the USAF where not trained to do CAS instead did intediction that is to attack the
enemy suppy lines at least 20 miles behind the FEBA,CAS however was the bread and butter of
Marine air and the US navy.This lack of CAS trg. led to plenty of blue on blue involving USAF
aircraft in Korea.
Maybe this problem could be traced to earlier training errors as the the US army and
air force seem to have a very poor institutional memory.
Regards
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time expired said:
Time expired,
Thank you for your comments. First I am not trying a thread hijack but laying the ground work in a perspective for which members can understand the evolution of TAC air and close support in order to have a reasonable amount of information to make an 'informed' judgement about what is occurring today. While agreeing about the FW 190, the Tiffy was on the drawing board before the appearance of or mention of the FW 190 as a replacement for the Hurricane (Scott). Somewhat of a evolutionary advancement.
Back to the subject at hand.
As noted by Time expired on of the faults of the Tiffy was the tail section separating from the sircraft in a dive. I suspect this was due to the airflow and compression resulting from the high rate of speed attained in a acute angle dive. I believe the P-47 employed by the United States suffered the same problems. What has this to do with the matter at hand ? Simply that pilots where trying to accurately as possible place their ordnance without endangering friendly troops. Secondly, the projectiles leaving the aircraft travel in the same direction as the aircraft was flying at the moment of release. The Germans for example over came this problem in the JU. 87 with it's dive brakes and later the same application was fitted to the JU.88 in a dive bomber role. The latter American series of aircraft followed suit in this time era. As mentioned the next step was to control attacking and supportting aircraft by using another aircraft. Prior to this occurring though there was a restructuring in both British and German airforces. This was a result of exactly what we are discusing at present. Scott found through personal observation that the standard formation of twelve aircraft has too large a group to effectively control and according reduced the number of aircraft to eight. A practice that was soon adopted as standard protocol. Likewise Muller points to the same reorganization in some Luftwaffe squadrons.
The second adaptation on the Anglo side of this development was the formation of the "cab rank". Intially, the "cab rank" was controlled by a member of the attacking unit. Here again Scott illuminates the problem of command and control while also trying to fight the 'battle'. One solution was the assignment of a pilot to the ground forces with suitable means of communication and protection to control air support. Digressing for a moment there is an excellent photo of a command and control tank in one of the other threads with the comment "what good is a wooden gun on a tank" The other adaptation as mention by Time expired was the flying FAC. In this I do not mind being corrected on but I believe here again this was developed by the Anglo effort using Austers(?). While the Americans having a similar aircraft in the Piper cub. This aircraft to my knowledge was attached to artillery units to direct and control their fire and remained so for most of the war. But the British apparently had already saw the light and where using it to direct aircraft. At this junction in time from the German perspective this was not necessary as just about every armoured vehicle and transport was enemy and therefore a target. In conjunction at this time the Allies had near total air superiority. Ground attack could take place without having to worry about being attack by opposing fighters. These changes in doctrine resulting in more accurate, timely and effective support to the troops on the ground.
With the Korean War the learned lesson's of WW2 were dusted off and the next step in control took place. From the commonwealth point of view the Harvard became the ideal. Intially used as a trainer for pilots having dual seats it was discovered improved control could be obtained by having the pilot concentrate on flying and the second seat carried the controller of the air support. Air ordnance was directed on target by marker rockets containing white phosphorous fired by the FAC aircraft. Hence the expression "hit my smoke". The use of the Harvard in this role comes from Blood On The Hills by David Burcuson. Also at this point in time another doctrinal question resurfaced. That of causality rates in the infantry formations and the availability of replacements.
First appearing in WW2 the Anglo forces fresh with the memories of horrific slaughter in the trenches and the resulting public opinion sought to minimize rates. This leading to criticism of Montgomery in the Northwest Europe campaign of his tactics and his master plan. On the otherhand the Americans having forgotten James Brady's photographs of the Battle of Anteim where perfectly willing to accept a statical percentage of causalities due to 'friendly fire' in order to achieve the combat aim. This doctrine of acceptable causaltiles due to friendly fire or blue on blue became public knowledge with the publishing of the book Friendly Fire by C.D.B. Bryan and a movie under the same title in 1979. Congressional hearings, public outcry and doctrinal development yet again.
Enough for now. And if any objects to this PM me and I will shut up.
Sources:
Burcuson, David. Blood On The Hills: The Canadian Army in Korea, Toronto: University Press, 2003
Bryan, C.D.B. Friendly Fire.Bantam; Reissue edition (June 1, 1982)
Scott, Desmond. Typhoon Pilot London:Secker & Warburg, 1982
Stahl, P.W. KG 200:The True Story: London: Janes, 1981.
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Fratricide is a fact of life in a combat zone. It can be minimized through intense training stressing ROC-V's.
But vehicles and troops in combat need to have markers. US vehicles have multiple markers from phoenix junior markers at a cost of $25 positioned on the vehicle antenna, they can be programmed to send out various codes so a commander is able to tell where each company is located on the battlefield.Phoenix junior lights are also carried by individual soldiers.Glow tape attached to the back of the helmet and on each shoulder.Soldiers also have IR strobes.
CIP's,combat identification panels,a 5 panel set for an Abrams costs $1200. A three panel set for a IFV around $500.Thermal identification panels are for air-to ground recognition and cost $125 per panel.
Dust degrades the CIP/TIP. Normal range from the air is around 12 k under good thermal conditions. Dust cuts that distance in half.Wiping the panels off just doesnt help.
In short some of these fratricide incidents occur because our allies lack these markers.There is an aspect of pilot error involved as well. The USAF has been extremely deadly in Afghanistan causing numerous casualties to US forces. The causes range from human error to lack of properly marked local vehicles the operators were using.For an army it is expensive to mark each vehicle so it can be identified by air and ground thermal devices.Not to mention providing multiple markers for each soldier so they can be seen by air assets and fellow soldiers on the ground.There is a measure of blame that has to be shouldered by the UK and Canadian governments when they send their troops onto the battlefield without these marking systems. The fratricide incident involving Canadian troops last year did have one positive,DND purchased IRR markers for their ground troops which should avoid future accidents.I doubt if UK infantry even have strobes due to the bean counters in Whitehall, but correct me if I am wrong.
But vehicles and troops in combat need to have markers. US vehicles have multiple markers from phoenix junior markers at a cost of $25 positioned on the vehicle antenna, they can be programmed to send out various codes so a commander is able to tell where each company is located on the battlefield.Phoenix junior lights are also carried by individual soldiers.Glow tape attached to the back of the helmet and on each shoulder.Soldiers also have IR strobes.
CIP's,combat identification panels,a 5 panel set for an Abrams costs $1200. A three panel set for a IFV around $500.Thermal identification panels are for air-to ground recognition and cost $125 per panel.
Dust degrades the CIP/TIP. Normal range from the air is around 12 k under good thermal conditions. Dust cuts that distance in half.Wiping the panels off just doesnt help.
In short some of these fratricide incidents occur because our allies lack these markers.There is an aspect of pilot error involved as well. The USAF has been extremely deadly in Afghanistan causing numerous casualties to US forces. The causes range from human error to lack of properly marked local vehicles the operators were using.For an army it is expensive to mark each vehicle so it can be identified by air and ground thermal devices.Not to mention providing multiple markers for each soldier so they can be seen by air assets and fellow soldiers on the ground.There is a measure of blame that has to be shouldered by the UK and Canadian governments when they send their troops onto the battlefield without these marking systems. The fratricide incident involving Canadian troops last year did have one positive,DND purchased IRR markers for their ground troops which should avoid future accidents.I doubt if UK infantry even have strobes due to the bean counters in Whitehall, but correct me if I am wrong.
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As usual 3rd Herd is giving us all a very good education, thanks for that it does help put the current state into perspective.
Tomahawk6
Very valid and excellent points but they are technical solutions. I have been arguing a simple change in procedure, it is IMHO the simplest and quickest solution. If life were perfect the technical solutions combined with the procedural changes would be instituted together.
Tomahawk6
Very valid and excellent points but they are technical solutions. I have been arguing a simple change in procedure, it is IMHO the simplest and quickest solution. If life were perfect the technical solutions combined with the procedural changes would be instituted together.
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T6... all valid points. The fog of war says it all BUT, as indicated at the start of this thread, UK troops weree told that their vehicles had to have orange panel markers .... which they did. Are the pilots at fault? Are the AWAC controllers at fault? Let's face it, in a fluid combat environment when the ground is "rich" in targets it is essential that everyone is in agreement on what is AND is not a recognized sign that we are the good guys.
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3rd Herd said:
3rd Herd:
Fascinating reading. Don't stop.
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Part Three
Some back tracking to begin with to answer a few of the comments which have been posted here. The examples of the big white star on allied vehicles and the special white and black stripes on aircraft were a valid attempt to prevent blue on blue or ‘fratricide’ (thanks T-6 I had forgotten that word). Interestingly enough though the big white star became an excellent aiming point for a multitude of German anti-armour weapons. Easy to see through the haze of battle and prominently placed for ranging a first shot kill. Many tank crews obliterated the white star once this was realized or the star was unintentionally covered up in an upgrading of vehicle protection by accident.
The white and black stripes on aircraft apparently did not help much either. I am surmising this development came out after the Scilly, Italy invasions. In that case naval vessels opened fire on the preinvasion forces airborne troop carriers. This had two results, casualties in the air and a wide dispersal of the airborne troops themselves which leads to various connotations. Jumping forward the same happened with the Normandy landings and naval gunners firing at their own transport with the same afore mentioned results. Now in reading after action reports one of the conclusions that could be reached is that there was considerable “buck fever” amongst the young gunners. We will come back to this term and I think it plays a great role in todays or this topics thread. In a strictly air to air context the stripes did not help much as with a little bit of inquisitive research anecdotal information abounds with blue on blue kills, most of which was over looked by historians at the time.
Also in the attempt to minimize casualties by air was the two minute release delay in the heavy or strategic bombing of German beachhead fortifications by radar. In an attempt to prevent an accidental slaughter from the air in turn led to a slaughter on the beach. Omaha beach as exemplified in the movies Longest Day (1962) and Saving Private Ryan have provided the public at large with very good visual examples. For those who prefer a textual based reference point, recent studies and their resulting books have come to this exact conclusion. In this case Terry Copp’s Fields of Fire serves as an excellent example.
Now we return to our regular feature in progress. T-6 has brought up the excellent example of technology primarily American developed and used to help alleviate this reoccurring problem. I feel that it is just more than a technological fix but requires a shift in doctrine which has been identified in prior conflict but not yet solved. The campaigns in Normandy during the Second World War illustrated the host of logistical and command and control problems of multi national forces engaged in combat. A prime illustration is the advance on Caen and the lack of movement of British forces when compared to gains achieved by the Canadian forces. In the command and control realm senior staff did not know what was actually happening or were units where. In the logistical sense British prudence could be seen as husbanding vital resources, troops. More recent example of this can be found in the Korea effort in which such Canadian commanders such as Rockingham and Stone refused to move into combat zones until certain conditions were met. These conditions ranged from securing proper equipment from American sources to the readiness of their own troops. At times their decisions where even at odds with members of the Canadian government. A thought which carries over to this day is “well since you have invited us to this conflict, how about some help in the equipment department”. And I use the term invited loosely as with both the Korean conflict and today’s adventure in Afghanistan considerable political pressure has been applied in securing ground troops from a multitude of nations.
With the American doctrine of acceptable losses through ‘fratricide’ well known publicly through movies including Jack Nicholson’s famous line in A Few Good Men, “the truth, you can’t handle the truth” and supported by textual statements on internet sites such as "the Navy and Air Force air combat training force structure has been starved into decline. The implications are far reaching and long term: without the best possible, fully supported training, our pilots will, quite simply, not be the best. They will be, in fact they are now being, sent to combat theatres without meeting standards that were commonly met in the past and that current instructor personnel regard as minimal. In fact, in some respects current "standards" are inadequate. The implications for the lives of pilots and the ability of the US to achieve its own goals in a conflict are obvious. (Trip)
Leaving doubt about the abilities of those in the air is it little wonder there is public outcry in Canada and abroad when some of our highly valued limited resources are lost through an accident or mistake. In my mind losses due to accidents fall into a palatable if some what distasteful acceptance. Examples of such ‘accidents’ I define as very last minute obstruction of view, faulty munitions, mother nature’s divine interruption in a host of forms. Mistakes on the other hand are unforgivable. In that not all options were considered or employed to the extent of the professionalism of the person committing them. This was exemplified by the video footage quoted in this thread, “Dude, I think we are going to jail.” In closing, I particularly used the Trip report as it nicely fits into the ‘mistake’ in which four members of my former regiment lost their lives.
The end.
Sources:
Trip Report: Navy and Air Force Air Combat Training: http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/trip_rpt_act.htm
A Few Good Men. Reiner, Robert. 1992.
The Longest Day. Annakin, Ken . Marton, Andrew.1962
Saving Private Ryan. Speilberg Steven.1998.
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