British / US Blue on Blue Incident - Merged

[time expired]

3rd Herd
          Interesting posts,agree with most of your conclusions,however I still think the USAF has
serious problems with the CAS mission that are institutionaly and historically driven.During WW2
9th Air force was the USAFs tactical air arm in Europe and it concerned itself mainly with interdiction,
that is the destruction of enemy supplies and reenforcements well behind the FEBA,it never attained
the level of CAS support that 2TAFsupplied to Brit.and Can.armies.Look at the German attempt to
split the US armies at Mortain,2 TAFs Typhoons had to be called in and stopped the German armour
cold.
          After the war the USAF turned wholeheartedly to strategic bombing and Stategic Air Comd.
was formed its commander Gen.Lemay saw little need for tactical fighter aircraft and only grudgingly
allowed that maybe fighter aircraft would be needed to intercept incoming Russian bombers.This
regime almost convinced Secretary of Defence Johnson to strip the Navy of its carriers but a revolt
of the admirals caused the government to reconsider and a few carriers were saved.
        During the Korean war the USAF was illequiped and poorly trained to do CAS and had to
pull F51 Mustangs out or retirment to try to fill the gaps,a poor choice as the Mustang was very vulnerable due to its
belly mounted radiator,.After the Chinese entered the conflict the allies initiated Operation
Strangle the aim was to use interdiction and strategic bombing to stop supplies from reaching the
enemy troops at the front this operation was a complete failure and the USAF returned to doing what it did best ,shooting down Migs in Mig alley,the interdiction campaign continued at a reduced level and the
USAF tried to improve its CAS performance and making more use of Moskito FACs,T6(Harvards), armed
with rockets for target marking. There were still problems however and in one incident Air force fighter
bombers hit the Argyll Sutherland Highlanders killing or wounding over a 150 Brits.
        By the time the Vietnam war rolled around Gen. Lemays diciples had all reached general officer rank
and many of these SAC attitudes prevailed, the Rolling Thunder ops. over North Vietnam must stand as
an example of how not to run an air interdiction campaign.Poor leadership both military and political
led this poor performance.In the South the USAF did much better using airborne FAC, but when reading
naratives by ground forces in this conflict one cannot help but get the feeling that the troops were more
comfortable with CAS from Marine or Navy air. The US Navy and Marines have special equipped ANGLICO
Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies which direct both gunfire and naval and marine air in support of
ground forces,this seems to indicate a much more professional attitude to the CAS mission that seems
to be still missing in the USAF.

  Ref: Going Downtown        Jack Broughton
        The Naval Air War In Korea      Richard P.Hallion
        The USAF In Korea          Robert F. Futrell

   

 

[tomahawk6]

Fratricide is as real on the battlefield today as it was in the past. We use technology and ROC-V training to lessen the occurances but it will never ever prevent future instances. Human beings make mistakes plain and simple just as governments err. Blame the pilot who fires on friendly forces,but also blame the bean counters who decided it was too expensive to provide their troops with the technology that might avoid friendly fire.To the infantryman who is pinned down by heavy enemy fire with bullets and shrapnel flying through the air there is nothing so welcome as friendly aircraft rolling in to surpress the enemy fire. Without CAS far more of our friends would be dead today than the few that have died in these incidents. I view fraticide in the same category as road accidents in combat, helicopter crashes and other causes.Getting killed in a vehicle rollover is far more common than friendly fire incidents.All these deaths are preventable. The more you preach safety the less likelihood your unit will have an accidental death. This applies to training at home as it does in the sandbox.So if you get a chance to buy a zoomie a drink do it because he may be the guy that saves your platoon tomorrow.

 

[1feral1]

Navy Blue - no need to apolagise, the Pilots in this instance were cowboys. We know they are not all like that. And this from yesterdays press makes it even worse:

The press makes it worse?

Yes, they sensationalise everything that is negative, and report little on the positive. For them, its about ratings and yes $$$$.

In many ways the press are a bigger enemy that the bad guys. I have NO USE for the media period!

As for The Sun, its a tabloid, like the National Enquirer.

You want the near truth, divide by 3 or maybe 4 in this instance and you'll get it. I am not denying this unfortuante incident happened, but saying it is being used for media sensationalism.

Sadly blue on blue is a sad fact of life in any war, and it will continue to happen. People error, or ROEs dictate fate, and in operational circumstances with stress and ROEs etc, decisions to shoot/don't shoot have to be made instantly in many occasions.

We had a blue on blue with fatal results last month, and we were not cowboys! No OPSEC here - openly reported in the media in Australia and the USA, so no one is immune.

My 2 cents


Wes

 

[Trip_Wire]

3rd Herd
           Interesting posts,agree with most of your conclusions,however I still think the USAF has
serious problems with the CAS mission that are institutionaly and historically driven.During WW2
9th Air force was the USAFs tactical air arm in Europe and it concerned itself mainly with interdiction,
that is the destruction of enemy supplies and reenforcements well behind the FEBA,it never attained
the level of CAS support that 2TAFsupplied to Brit.and Can.armies.Look at the German attempt to
split the US armies at Mortain,2 TAFs Typhoons had to be called in and stopped the German armour
cold.
          After the war the USAF turned wholeheartedly to strategic bombing and Stategic Air Comd.
was formed its commander Gen.Lemay saw little need for tactical fighter aircraft and only grudgingly
allowed that maybe fighter aircraft would be needed to intercept incoming Russian bombers.This
regime almost convinced Secretary of Defence Johnson to strip the Navy of its carriers but a revolt
of the admirals caused the government to reconsider and a few carriers were saved.
         During the Korean war the USAF was illequiped and poorly trained to do CAS and had to
pull F51 Mustangs out or retirment to try to fill the gaps,a poor choice as the Mustang was very vulnerable due to its
belly mounted radiator,.After the Chinese entered the conflict the allies initiated Operation
Strangle the aim was to use interdiction and strategic bombing to stop supplies from reaching the
enemy troops at the front this operation was a complete failure and the USAF returned to doing what it did best ,shooting down Migs in Mig alley,the interdiction campaign continued at a reduced level and the
USAF tried to improve its CAS performance and making more use of Moskito FACs,T6(Harvards), armed
with rockets for target marking. There were still problems however and in one incident Air force fighter
bombers hit the Argyll Sutherland Highlanders killing or wounding over a 150 Brits.
        By the time the Vietnam war rolled around Gen. Lemays diciples had all reached general officer rank
and many of these SAC attitudes prevailed, the Rolling Thunder ops. over North Vietnam must stand as
an example of how not to run an air interdiction campaign.Poor leadership both military and political
led this poor performance.In the South the USAF did much better using airborne FAC, but when reading
naratives by ground forces in this conflict one cannot help but get the feeling that the troops were more
comfortable with CAS from Marine or Navy air. The US Navy and Marines have special equipped ANGLICO
Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies which direct both gunfire and naval and marine air in support of
ground forces,this seems to indicate a much more professional attitude to the CAS mission that seems
to be still missing in the USAF.

  Ref: Going Downtown        Jack Broughton
         The Naval Air War In Korea       Richard P.Hallion
         The USAF In Korea          Robert F. Futrell

   

As a combat Veteran of the Korean war, I must agree the USAF wan't the best at CAS, especially with the jet fighter/bombers of that era. The F-51s of the USAF and the South African AF did a fine job at CAS. As you indicte the USMC has always been the best at CAS, no matter what they fly. Their gull winged Corsairs did a VERY good job at CAS, which I experienced, as well as the SA Air force. The US Navy's Battleships were also a great source of fire support, especially when a USMC trained to use the support was attached to your unit.

The old Spad (A-1 Sky radier) in Vietnam was also a GREAT CAS aircraft.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3897/is_200408/ai_n9458172

The problem with the USAF is that nobody really likes to do CAS, everybody wants to be an ACE and shoot down enemy figters, etc. We need a dedicated aircraft and squardrons of pilots designed and trained to perform CAS. The insurgents were fighting in the GWOT have no fighter aircraft to shoot down; however, lots of people on the ground to destroy!

 

[3rd Herd]

Time expired,
"I still think the USAF has serious problems with the CAS mission that are institutionally and historically driven" I do not disagree with this either but I would add that culture particularly American military culture and acceptable losses are still current doctrine. In conjunction Stedman states "despite the appearance of a harmonic doctrine in Vietnam, periodic evaluations of the state of the art suggest the doctrine remains a contested issue between the US Army and US Air Force." Interestingly though while researching for this thread I came across a US Navy website and have tried to go back and find it but the 'conclusion' 'was while every effort to avoid hitting friendly troops and civilians the mission comes first.' Mission historically defined as defined as the number of strikes carried out, ordnance dropped, BDA and the quantifiable body count. All needed for the successful climb up the promotion ladder. That is fine if you have a large standing army and a well developed reserve system but in a multi national task force all countries involved do not have this capability. As for the technological argument of better technology is needed this seems to be another block in tactical doctrine that the Americans in particular have not been able to wean themselves away from. The lesson of the French defeat in Indo China, the American's own defeat in Vietnam and the Soviets defeat in their excursion twice into Afghanistan bear witness.Mundane verses scientific technology. The only reasons the Soviets even 'won' in Chechnya was that they did what Nixon was unable to "bomb them back into the stone age" and to hell with world opinion. Photographs of Grozny after the Soviets had finished resembled German cities at the end of the Second world war.

In this case and you will like this Wesley (Over There), foregin 'journalists' were encouraged to cover conflicts elsewhere in the world. This was achieved by accurate directed sniper fire and other not so subtle means such as "oops your vehicle just blew up". Quoting my kid brother who has extensive experience in covering small conflicts off the beaten path amongst other things, "they manipulated things so well that we could just not get insurance coverage for any amount" (an aside is the the higher your insurance rider they higher up your are in the journalistic pecking order). It is kind of nice to have a war inside a sealled country, no oversight to worry about.

A quick peruse of journalled sources on the matter of modern Soviet doctrine of close air support particularly in Afghanistan revels some of the same problems we have been discusing so far. In that "the MiG-21s often fire from a range of about 2000 meters, which makes their strikes somewhat inaccurate and ineffective. This tactic, combined with the failure of many bombs to explode on impact and the failure of some cluster bombs to deploy and scatter, has at times rendered the Soviet fighter-bombers ineffective."(Nelson citing Hansen) Here again as with the Americans a technological fix was sought with the development  and introduction of "their new Su-25 Frogfoot fighter-bomber into the war.The Frogfoot, designed as a close-support aircraft, is similar in performance to the USAF A-10."(Nelson) though even with this technological leap Nelson states, "the use of forward air controllers (FACs), especially in the mode in which the United States used them in Vietnam, has been conspicuously absent (although, as noted previously, some helicopter FACs apparently have been used)." In his conclusion he notes that "exercises are good training, but real combat is the only true test of commanders, unit personnel, and equipment." And, I would add only if your training doctrine is correct. A further point Nelson brings forth in his conclusions is "gradually, the Soviets are learning the same hard lessons we learned in Vietnam. Fighting guerrilla forces with conventional forces is a long, arduous affair."

Further information on the Soviet perspective is illustrated by Steadman in that "even when modern sophisticated equipment is used, the Soviets believe that for air support of ground troops it is important to train pilots to navigate by landmarks, to search for targets visually, and to determine the distances to targets without technical aids." Of intrest is the discovery that during the Second world war "the Soviets limited such support to the first phase of offensive operations (air preparation), to the repulse of counterattacks, and to covering intervals between ground formations. Pilots seldom attacked targets within 10-15 kms of friendly forces."(Steadman citing Timokhovich)

With the war in the Pacific, Japanese doctrine states "If the conditions of the battle permitted, the Army Air Force would provide strategic and tactical reconnaissance for the ground forces. The keynote was "Air Superiority: A Must Over the Battlefield." and that their usual air ground communications consisted of "a wireless platoon (two air-ground radios, one truck) was attached to division head quarters." (Steadman)

Sources:

Nelson, Denny R. Lieutenant Colonel USAF."Soviet Air Power:Tactics and Weapons Used in Afghanistan" January-February 1985 http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/jan-feb/nelson.html

Steadman, Kenneth A. LTC."A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT AIR-GROUND SUPPORT DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE IN WORLD WAR II:with an appendix on Current Soviet Close Air Support Doctrine"  
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/steadman/steadman.asp

 

[3rd Herd]

As a combat Veteran of the Korean war, I must agree the USAF wan't the best at CAS, especially with the jet fighter/bombers of that era. The F-51s of the USAF and the South African AF did a fine job at CAS. As you indicte the USMC has always been the best at CAS, no matter what they fly. Their gull winged Corsairs did a VERY good job at CAS, which I experienced, as well as the SA Air force. The US Navy's Battleships were also a great source of fire support, especially when a USMC trained to use the support was attached to your unit.

The old Spad (A-1 Sky radier) in Vietnam was also a GREAT CAS aircraft.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3897/is_200408/ai_n9458172

The problem with the USAF is that nobody really likes to do CAS, everybody wants to be an ACE and shoot down enemy figters, etc. We need a dedicated aircraft and squardrons of pilots designed and trained to perform CAS. The insurgents were fighting in the GWOT have no fighter aircraft to shoot down; however, lots of people on the ground to destroy!

I did not intentionally overlook the Vietnam conflict or the fantastic ability of the Spad. Very few aircraft are/where able to land beside a down comrade pick him up and fly back off into the wild blue. I simply stayed away from it due to the geographical nature of the country in that the heavy jungle coverage limited CAS. Your point of "nobody wants to move mud" is I think part of the problem. To my knowledge only the USMC has managed to solve this problem to a successful degree with the doctrine or philosophy of "rifleman first". The siege of Khe Sanh is another excellent example of CAS directed by on the ground USMC pilots and a well trained FAC. Unfortunately, the majority of those lessons seem to have fallen by the wayside or there just are not enough Marines around. Again the argument of not enough resources and the shame to lose carelessly the little we have.

 

[time expired]

3rd. Herd
            I must disagree with your implication that Nixons air assault on North Vietnam was in anyway
a failure,the Linebacker 2 operation was the most effective use of air power during the Vietman war.It
was everthing that Rolling Thunder wasnt, 11 days of intense unlimited air attack at the end of which
Haiphong port was closed,the railway lines to China destroyed,the previously formidable air defenses
had ceased to exist,as did oil reserves and electrical energy.This was attained at the cost of 5000 civilian
casualties and the loss of 15 B52s caused mainly by poor tactic,SAC Generals again. I would maintain
that if this air op. had taken place in 1968 right after Tet the doves in the North Vietnam gov.,and there
were a good number,would have fired Giap and sued for peace,ah hindsight.
            I am sorry if this has gone a little off thread but Ihope it was interesting to some,a bunch of
"pongos" discusing Air Strategy.
                                        Regards

 

[3rd Herd]

Time Expired,
at the risk of digressing even further Linebacker was not CAS but used as an example of the failure of the lack competent  coherent developed CAS doctrine. If you are not trained well enough to hit the barn door then you might as well just take out the whole barn. As for us 'pongo's' discussing air strategy. Who flies home to a nice warm bed and who is residing in a nice warm bomb crater, due to the "oops" from above. Next, I remember being trained to call in support both arty and air and there are a few other "ground combat types"(not all of us are blessed enough to be infantry unfortunately) with the same experience. Some who have voiced an opinion in this thread have more than I. Perhaps, because at times I am so eloquent I chose to take the bull by the horn. But back to the matter at hand, I learned the procedure and the calls, nets, resources(aircraft, weapons loads etc.) never got a chance to use them for real though. But it was interesting though in all the sand table manovers more than 80% those above declined to come and play due to the "high threat environment". Such as hand helds, ZSU-23-4, SA 6 etc. The face saving acceptable excuse was they 'were conserving their resources for the 'big' push'. Point blank I was trained to "not count on air support" which was readily accepted. MY southern neighbours though in almost a hundred years of airwarfare have not improved much from throwing a brick or iron dart at the poor guys on the ground from a biplane tottering along at 80 miles an hour and throwing a 500lb bomb at 400 miles an hour at the same poor guys on the ground great grand kids and hitting the right great grand kids. Some of us pongos also take offense to those who do not check their posts for spacing of words, punctuation marks, run on sentences at least we know the right buttons to push prior to "bombs" away. And yes I am being a little cheeky.

 

[aesop081]

I see we're pretty far off now, is this going somehwere anytime soon ?

army.ca staff

 

[Petard]

Maybe if there is a common thread here it is that historically the air force's focus on depth targets made it diffcult to adapt to the close fight.
Since this incident occurred in March 2003, I am assuming the A10 pilots were operating when something more of a conventional war was taking place, but within the tragic events that occurred I would say the problem can be seen of  how top-down "netcentric" warfare is unable to cope with the exigencies of a battle transitioning from attacking strategic or operational targets to the tactical close fight. I would say this example is linked to the airforce role which has historically evolved to focus on the former two and is still having difficulty in dealing with the later.
If I'm reading it right the pilots were attacking targets of opportunity in support of an advancing ground force, eliminating as much of the threat and it's C2 as possible, well in advance so the ground force doesn't have to, and keep the momentum going. But references to adjusting artillery fire can be heard in their radio transmissions; the friendly forces couldn't have been too far away.
To me these pilots were trying to do what their training and doctrine had focused them to be doing, plus they had an additional worry of time running out; how many targets can they eliminate before breaking for home? Hence the urgency to engage one more.
Adding to the dilemma is the limitations of top-down control. The pilots were aware there might be friendlies near by and suspected as much, but to add to their confusion is the advice from their manila controller that there are no friendlies this far north (and I suspect he might have got confused himself by some of the cross-traffic talking about the friendly artillery fire at the same time as the pilots were trying to get information on the "trucks".) But they had a mission, driven home from historical years of evolution, to eliminate as much as possible the ground threat for their brothers in arms on the ground.
So they convinced themselves to attack.
We can say easily now it was a terrible mistake, or for the want of few seconds it wouldn't have happened, or whatever, but I think underlying all of this is the limitations of the current system in dealing with the current operating environment. I see these tragic incidents as a clear example of the false belief that top down control, so essential and evolved during the cold war for focusing on coordinating attacks on depth targets, is flexible enough to respond to the nature of warfare now. We need to take a look back and relearn from the hard lessons that came from dealing with very similar problems, as happened in the hedgerows of Normandy, the Korean hills, and the asymmetric war of Vietnam.
So, in a roundabout way, which happens so often around here, is that where this thread has been heading? 

 

[tomahawk6]

Petard there is nothing wrong with the way the US air forces[navy,marines.usaf]conduct the CAS mission.You can twist yourself into a pretzel over this issue if you want. The bottom line is that there have been accidental attacks on friendly forces.If you consider the sheer numbers of CAS hours flown, around 1.5 million,statistically the likelihood of getting hurt by friendly air is far lower. In fact I think you have a better chance of being killed/injured in a road accident or IED attack than by an errant CAS mission. As long as humans are in the loop there will be fratricide both on the ground and in the air. Going to war isnt like an FTX in the US or Canada. In the incidents I have studied the contributing causes of CAS fratricide are marking issues - ground forces lack the proper markers for night/low light operations, although I think this has been corrected.This doesnt mean the pilot gets a pass because he too is part of the problem.Its a chicken and the egg situation.If ground forces are not equiped to be seen from the air then that is a real problem. If your unit is about to be overrun by the enemy do you call for CAS danger close or take your chances ?

If you want to blame the pilots in a case of fratricide fine.But dont make blanket statements condemning CAS. No other country has the experience that the US has in this field and believe it or not it saves alot of lives.

 

[Petard]

I'm not twisting anything, if anything I'm trying to make sense of the turns this thread has taken, perhaps it's my explanation that's too twisted.

As far as this specific incident I would say the aircraft were operating on the fringe of an area where better ground control was needed, and not just the top down approach that was happening.
I don't believe the pilots are deserving of some of the slamming that has been directed at them, here and on the Sun's web site.
When to switch or involve the ground forces directly in the use of CAS is what I was referring to in the hard lessons learned. IMO, considering their proximity to friendly forces, their mission should've been directed by a FAC.

 

[3rd Horseman]

Petard may I be so bold as to correct your last sentence and say Ground FAC. I do believe that is what you intended since it would appear an Air FAC was involved in this incident.

T6 - I agree with most of what you say but I don't think the issue is resolvable by the ID tech stuff you suggest. It is all about the human factor as you have said and in this the solution appears. Ground FAC.....a human but the final say on the targets and the final word on control of CAS, without it you get what we are arguing about. Review each incident Canada has been in and all have been due to a lack of ground FACs. It would appear this Brit incident is the same. No Ground FAC increases Blue on Blue to a point of unacceptability no matter how many lives CAS saves.

 

[3rd Horseman]

I repeat my solution, easy, cheap, effective.

As a past FAC I have some thoughts on the issue.
Blue on Blue conflicts are a sad part of modern war, as they were in the past. It is tragic although not entirely preventable could be minimized more than it has through the adoption of new procedures. These procedures which have been called for in the past through AARs are not expensive nor do they require the purchase of new equipment like IFF. They are quite simple, just a change in sortie and FAC procedures.
They are in summary form as fols:

1. CAS sorties in the combat zone must have a Ground FAC, Air FACs are not enough on their own.
2. Non CAS hunter killer/seek and destroy sorties must never attack within the combat zone unless requested and accepted control by a ground FAC.
3. Other sorties that fly in the overall combat zone CAS mission packet but not directly assigned to CAS must never react to activities in the combat zone without clearance and accepted control by a ground FAC.
4. BAI and deep strike sorties must never react to activities in the combat zone as they transit without clearance and accepted control by a ground FAC.

Simple rules but they make all the difference. Too bad they have not been adopted.

 

[aesop081]

I just love this one: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/57584/post-528726/topicseen.html#new

I know tat at his point its all speculation but,

nice how some are pretty quick to justify shooting on allies when it happens on the ground.......

 

[time expired]

PETARD
          Great post and for me that rounds this thread out very nicely.
                                              Regards

 

[Trip_Wire]

Petard there is nothing wrong with the way the US air forces[navy,marines.usaf]conduct the CAS mission.You can twist yourself into a pretzel over this issue if you want. The bottom line is that there have been accidental attacks on friendly forces.If you consider the sheer numbers of CAS hours flown, around 1.5 million,statistically the likelihood of getting hurt by friendly air is far lower. In fact I think you have a better chance of being killed/injured in a road accident or IED attack than by an errant CAS mission. As long as humans are in the loop there will be fratricide both on the ground and in the air. Going to war isn't like an FTX in the US or Canada. In the incidents I have studied the contributing causes of CAS fratricide are marking issues - ground forces lack the proper markers for night/low light operations, although I think this has been corrected.This doesn't mean the pilot gets a pass because he too is part of the problem.Its a chicken and the egg situation.If ground forces are not equipped to be seen from the air then that is a real problem. If your unit is about to be overrun by the enemy do you call for CAS danger close or take your chances ?


If you want to blame the pilots in a case of fratricide fine.But don't make blanket statements condemning CAS. No other country has the experience that the US has in this field and believe it or not it saves alot of lives.

Good post, I agree with you! I just wish that the USAF would take their roles as providers of CAS a wee bit, more seriously! I'd like to see more thinking at the top levels of the USAF adopting the USMC's views on CAS.

I see a real need at the top levels of the USAF to face the facts, we need to get a lot better at supplying CAS to ground units involved in small unit tactics fighting a 'low intensity' war. The time for dog fighting 'Aces,' is over and I don't see a big need for it to be the the primary need at the moment.

The USAF, has always fought tooth & nail to prevent the US Army from developing a fixed wing CAS ability, I wonder if that isn't wrong and the Army should devote pilots and aircraft suited to do CAS to the troops. We'll take the A-10s and pilots and look at other designs and improvements to really support ground units! Just humble opinion! 

 

[3rd Herd]

Good post, I agree with you! I just wish that the USAF would take their roles as providers of CAS a wee bit, more seriously! I'd like to see more thinking at the top levels of the USAF adopting the USMC's views on CAS.

I see a real need at the top levels of the USAF to face the facts, we need to get a lot better at supplying CAS to ground units involved in small unit tactics fighting a 'low intensity' war. The time for dog fighting 'Aces,' is over and I don't see a big need for it to be the the primary need at the moment.

The USAF, has always fought tooth & nail to prevent the US Army from developing a fixed wing CAS ability, I wonder if that isn't wrong and the Army should devote pilots and aircraft suited to do CAS to the troops. We'll take the A-10s and pilots and look at other designs and improvements to really support ground units! Just humble opinion! 

Trip_Wire,
+1 on your post.
As I tried to illuminate through a historical capture of Close Air Support you have sucintly(?) captured two key points. One the days of dog fighting Aces are over and in fact have been over for twenty odd years. In spite of this no concreate doctrine has been advanced by the higher ups in the USAF. Maybe "LeMay" syndrome has just manifested itself in another form.

As for the vaunted A 10, I am still of the opinion that it is a stop gap fix and has been so for the aforementioned twenty years. Designed to combat Soviet armoured formations rolling across the plains of Europe it's usefulness in that designated role has passed. A fact realized with the withdrawl of the plane from regular USAF formations and reassignment to Reserve formations.

One has to question the disparity of flying time and expertise between regular and Reserve units and their ability to function in today's low intensity conflict. The Canadian military on the other hand has shown a spark of brilliance in the combining of pre deployment training between part time and full time units. I would suggest that the performance of Canadian units in the "Battle of the Medack Pocket" and other areas of the Yugoslavian conflict may have had something to do with this.

Lastly, given your profile information I think you under estimated the value of your opinion.

 

[geo]

3rd...
during GW1, A10s were an army resource that the USAF looked down upon.  They felt that their F whatevers could look after anything that needed to be done on the battlefield.  It stuck in their craw the devastation that the A10s inflicted upon the Republican guards. 

In order to get rid of it, they jockeyed around to get the A10s assigned to the USAF.  Once in the Airforce inventory, the A10s were relegated to the Res & NG formations.  Attrition has reduced the inventory - though nothing else has ben put on the table as a replacement - which they are not looking very hard to replace....

Only thing working as an alternative to the A10?.... the Harrier

 

[3rd Herd]

Geo
as always feel free to correct where necessary. As to the Harrier I think several of us who have posted in this thread have alluded to it vis via the comments about the USMC. It would interesting to hear the opinion of some of those who have had experience with the Harrier. In this regard I am thinking of some of our members from the South Atlantic excursions. Also citing a more or less complete lack of  knowledge of up to date Harrier qualifications it would be interesting to find out the thoughts on several points. Ranging from the high altitudes, narrow canyons, limited visibility which the Soviets faced when attempting to perform CAS in Afghanistan. Further given the recent rumblings or down right sabre rattling coming out of Iran and their Republican Guard the A 10 yet again may fulfil it's role as a tank killer extraordinaire. But the fact of the matter is in low intensity conflict there has not been allot of thinking in the terms of CAS doctrine. The other esteemed 3rd posts reflect several excellent proposals based on experience.