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CAJ, Vol 7 No 2

a_majoor

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Round two of the transformation debate in the CAJ finally hit my mailbox (Summer 2004 issue?!), with LCol Banks weighing in with "The Single Combat Branch" and LCol Bondy offering his reply. The Single Combat Branch is a good primer to the idea that branches and MOCs built around a single idea or platform are becoming obsolete, and he offers a well reasoned argument why such a transformation should start with a "green" soldier as opposed to a "purple" recruit, and carries on with building from the basic Infantry skill sets.

Although as a thought experiment, he never gets right down into the weeds and specifies the size and shape of the "Single Combat Branch" unit, I got the distinct impression it is modeled after a mechanized Infantry battalion, with a vastly enhanced "combat support" capability. The DF, IF, AD and "Protection and Mobility" assets would seem to be integral to the "Close Combat" sub units, creating a unit of three pre formed combat teams, a service support company and a HQ/ISTAR company to run things, if current practices are used as a template. Please note this is my interpretation of the article, and I will take any corrections in stride.

LCol Bondy's reply pointed out the "Single Combat Branch" still offers a division of labour based on "an industrial era division of labour... to the exclusion of personnel strategies and cultural intangibles?" Perhaps I cannot quite fathom LCol Bondy's arguments (I have also re read his piece in Vol 7, No 1), but it seems to me that there is a division of labour, and certain skills need specialist training and practice for the soldiers to attain proficiency. The "cultural intangibles" which motivate soldiers involve such factors as the underlying society which we recruit from, the perceptions that underly our thinking (compare the idea of a corporal 20 years ago with the "strategic corporal" idea in vogue today) and the environment created within the "Regimental Family" and the associated sub-units. No one could possibly mistake 1 RCR's soldiers for 3 RCR soldiers after a short period of observation, even though they share the regimental title, history and even are co-located on the same base.

Should "Single Combat Branch" units be formed, each one will evolve a distinct sub cultures, either taking on the attributes of a unit they perpetuate (A Single Combat Branch 1 RCR will still set the standard for "Spit and Polish"), or create entirely new traditions if they are "new" creations, similar to the numbered battalions of the WWI CEF. once again, these are my interpretations of this idea.

LCol Banks and LCol Bondy have formalized some of the ideas which have been debated on various threads in this forum, and I would reccomend reading their arguments in both CAJ Vol 7 No 1 and CAJ Vol 7 No 2 as fine additions to the ongoing debate on how our Army should be transformed.
 
Thanks, a majoor. You have summed it up pretty neatly. My "Combat Branch" is unashamedly based on the Infantry, for the reasons that I state (perhaps not too clearly) in my article. You are right to say that I did not get into the weeds: that was by intention. I also identified some areas in which I clearly stated I had no real idea of how we might proceed. My purpose, as I think you saw, was not to produce a TTP manual but rather to stimulate debate.

However, do not forget my caveat: If (IF) we are able to preserve separate combat branches that are strong, capable, relevant and deliver unique capabilities that only they can deliver, then my idea is rendered null and void. But, that is not what I see happening.

Cheers.
 
I'm still waiting for it to be posted on the Land Force Doctrine and Training website so I can have a look...
 
pbi said:
However, do not forget my caveat: If (IF) we are able to preserve separate combat branches that are strong, capable, relevant and deliver unique capabilities that only they can deliver, then my idea is rendered null and void. But, that is not what I see happening.
Cheers.
If I read this correctly pbi, you're saying that the single combat branch concept is a response to reduced capabilities and reduced funding? And that if the army had adequate funding to maintain capabilities like MBTs, then it would be unnecessary?
If so, it reminds me about what Lew MacKenzie said about "plug and play" ...  :(
 
GGboy said:
If I read this correctly pbi, you're saying that the single combat branch concept is a response to reduced capabilities and reduced funding? And that if the army had adequate funding to maintain capabilities like MBTs, then it would be unnecessary?
If so, it reminds me about what Lew MacKenzie said about "plug and play" ...   :(

Yes-and I hope that is clear to those who read my article. Believe me, I am not quite as stupid as I look (oh-wait a minute-you can't see me...) I am a fan of being supported by modern MBTs beside me and modern, capable indirect fire systems firing over my head. I don't question the need for those capabilities. The "unique thing" about Armour is (was...) the "shock action" thing with the MBT. Everything else they do can be (and has been...)   done by one or more of the capability functions in a mech inf bn, or easily could be with some additional training. The unique thing about Arty (IMHO) is (was) the ability to bring down decisive amounts of firepower with precision, at a calibre and range beyond the types of mortars typically found in the world's Inf bns (that includes up to 120mm in some armies).

My premise was that instead of preserving and strenghtening the ability of these branches to do this, we have just gone and ripped the guts out of what was (IMHO) one of the most capable Mech Inf Bn TOEs in the entire world, US Army included. The second order effects of this on the Inf world are IMHO going to be very sad. Worse, we have reduced our comrades in the Guns and Horse (and perhaps even the Sappers) to "vultures", each feasting on a bit of the Infantry corpse, strangely concurrent with a frantic search for relevance on their own parts. As I stated in the article, instead of preserving branches for a reason, we are finding reasons to preserve branches.

Finally, I am more convinced than ever that the type of warfare we face in the world right now, and in the near future, is predominantly a game for high quality Inf and SF. Therefore, I based my concept, without blinking an eye, on the Infantry branch, but with the integration of the needed functions into a single new Combat Branch. I suggested the preservation of capabilities rather than of branches.

Cheers.
 
pbi,

How about two branches: Infantry and Cavalry.  The Infantry would be light infantry (true light infantry and not mech battalions on light scales) and the Cavalry would be the mounted soldiers. The Cavalry branch would include all AFV crews and the soldiers in the back of AFVs.  One branch is designed to fight without AFVs, while the other wouldn't fight without them.  Both are roles that we can do with our kit and both are roles that are in demand by our potential coalition allies.  Both could be made the same MOC but the result could be that both are done to a lesser standard.

Cheers,

2B
 
2Bravo, it looks like the Infantry is indeed heading that way, as the discussion on this thread here would seem to indicate.  Again, splitting between "Light Infantry" and "Cavalry" MOC's has been a position I've held for a time now
 
2Bravo said:
pbi,

How about two branches: Infantry and Cavalry.   The Infantry would be light infantry (true light infantry and not mech battalions on light scales) and the Cavalry would be the mounted soldiers. The Cavalry branch would include all AFV crews and the soldiers in the back of AFVs.   One branch is designed to fight without AFVs, while the other wouldn't fight without them.   Both are roles that we can do with our kit and both are roles that are in demand by our potential coalition allies.   Both could be made the same MOC but the result could be that both are done to a lesser standard.

Cheers,

2B

2B: I touched on this idea at http://army.ca/forums/threads/26016/post-158133.html#msg158133. It might be very nice to be left alone to work on pure Inf skills (quite a wide range actually if you include the proper array of Cbt Sp functions) and leave the driving to the Cavalry. Cheers.
 
While I think most of us would agree light infantry is a specialist skill, the "mounted" end of things is more controversial. Historically we have seen Mounted Infantry, Motor Infantry, Mech Infantry, Air Cavalry and so on. Each flavor of infantry offers certain advantages and disadvantages based on the situation. Even in todays environment, we can argue over what is needed; a Cavalry force to do screens and patrols or a heavy force to root out enemies in an urban environment?

Right now, we are a bit like people locked in a darkened warehouse looking for the way out. There is no real government directionwhich would formalize what choices we should make, and depending on how persuasive we are (or how loudly we shout), we could end up advocating something inappropriate.

The Single Combat Branch battalion, with its resemblance to a mech Infantry battalion of old, is an attempt to get the flexibility needed to deal with all three blocks of the "three block war". This is the biggest difference between the SCB idea and the "Armoured Cavalry" idea debated in the combat arms board. Given the lack of effective DF power in our current equipment model, we may end up going "Cavalry" by default, but I think there is room for both, with the current Armoured Regiments evolving into Cavalry Regiments, while the Infantry Battalions evolve into "SCB" battalions. The Light Infantry Battalion should stay with the brigade to give each brigade commander the widest range of options, while engineer and artillery units under the SCB model become more like brigade level schools to provide "critical mass" centralized training for the sub-units in Cavalry and SCB units.

The main difference between Cavalry and SCB units in terms of TO&E would be the relative proportions of Infantry.Cavalry units would also load up with more mobility and protection elements and long range IF; whereas an SCB battalion would have a very high proportion of short range assets, many of which could have dual purpose capabilities. SCB battalions equipped with breach loading 120 mm turreted mortars would have the ability to both fire IF missions, and close up and blast bunkers and fixed defenses, for example. The AD element might best be served by "triple A" automatic cannons, giving the SCB unit a source of close in fire against ground targets as well.

Turning to Col Bondy's proposed structure, I was a bit puzzled by how he sees the New Specialist Corps (NSC). As human resources professionals, they are to test and select members of the NR and NGS, but what exactly is the relationship between them and the soldiers they are examining? My impression from re reading his article in Vol 7 No 1 is the NSC is outside the chain of command rather like the Ombudsman's office. Given Col Bondy's sensitivity to the need of supporting the soldiers, I don't see how an outside agency approach would instill confidence in members of the CF that the leadership selected by the NSC for the NR and NGS is in fact the "best". I do agree with his observation that a 360o observation of potential leaders would assist in finding the best people, but there is no reason this couldn't be formalized inside a regimental structure rather than imposed from outside.

The SCB idea is coming, although the exact ways and means is still debatable. My own thoughts are the increasing capabilities of modern military hardware will drive the change. The best example I can think of would be substituting ground fired Hellfire or Brimestone missiles for TOW. With the ability to strike targets up to 8km away with observer assistance and destroy hard targets and AFVs, a unit packing these would have "some" of the capabilities of Armour and Artillery. 120mm breach loading mortars provide a greater IF range, but a much shorter DF range and capability. Units equipped with these systems would blur many of the current distinctions between Infantry, Armour and Artillery.

Col Banks believes the change will be driven by the reduction of capabilities in the Armour and Artillery branches, and it certainly may come to that. Even in some brave new world of reasonable defense funding, a future MBT will probably have a greatly enhanced IF capability, and may also have the ability to carry a "close protection section" like a Merkava or some models of the Centurio tank destroyer, so I would not expect to see Armour and Artillery to be reserected in their current forms.
 
Thanks a majoor. I am gratified to see that some of my ideas got across. My point in writing the article was not really to provide an "end state" (although I find the idea of the "all functions" SCB battalion very attractive and probably do-able) but rather to stimulate folks to toss the ideas around (as you have) and to look beyond "We've Always Done It This Way". I am not a proponent for mindless "faddy" change for change's sake, but I think that our archetypal conception of what our Army should look like is about to be OBE.

Cheers

 
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