I've kept quiet on this one as I expect everyone knows my thoughts anyway and this whole thing sounds very preliminary.
On the div commander issue it's really quite simple; if there is a 7 Div, then there will be a div commander. The question is BGen or MGen and RegF v ARes? There already is an ARes BGen staff officer at Army HQ as Director General Army Reserve (I think the title has changed since my time). There's really no use for that position if all the ARes comes under one div commander.
We did that in Winnipeg in 2010 or so, it worked for a bit then the units were tactically ungrouped.
What needs to happen a few regiments need to be reduced to Nil Strength.
The former doesn't work well and the later doesn't work at all. In 1964/5 we had the last real Militia reorganization (everything since then has been putting lipstick on a pig). The Suttie Commission recommended, amongst other things a reduction of units. To avoid the term disbandment the
Supplementary Order of Battle was created and specific units retired there. The people were moved into units that continued. This had a temporary effect as the government also assigned many units national survival roles (the Snakes and Ladders folks) and limited funding as general force reductions came with Unification and other force reduction schemes. The end result was a near crash and burn for the Militia as thousands voted with their feet and quit.
3. The Continental Division will be domestic operations but not warfighting. I would not expect it to be thought of as having any role in the defence of North America. It’s fires and floods. Its war fighting function will be individual augmentation to the Reg Force.
I was a young Militia gunner when National Survival was introduced in the 1960s. The trauma of what was now third tier military service was profound. I came through a recruit troop of roughly 40-50 people when the reorganization was announced. Within a month of the announcement there were 5 of us left. We'd all joined to be gunners and not rubble clearers. And yes. We were phoney about it. We did zero national survival training but kept up gunnery training and even got a few live rounds made available for firing at Meaford. By the time I transferred to the RegF in 1969 the national survival concept was completely abandoned.
My personal take-away from the experience is that the vast majority of young kids who join the army reserves do so to do military things; hands on stuff that includes weapons and equipment. If you want to have a civil defence force, create it as a separate agency and let those people inspired to do search and rescue concentrate on that alone with the right training and gear.
Purely in terms of structure, what needs to change in your opinion. Im curious to hear a different perspective from the usual suspects positing ideas here.
I'm one of the usual suspects and have made my position clear - it's 30/70 units and the like. Creating a reserve division is just another lipstick on a pig transformation. It does not move any yard posts. Moving the yardsticks is expensive in both full-time personnel and equipment. You can cut units all you want and you can amalgamate units all you want but you won't create anything better than what is there now until there is real adult full-time leadership right down to the LCol and CWO unit level, proper equipment and budgeting, a sound role and the appropriate individual and collective training supported by a workable administrative system (largely staffed by full-timers) and a proper personnel program that accounts for the soldiers family life and civilian employment by way of proper legislation and policies. Add in a practical recruiting system and the right incentives for joining and retention and you might, after several years be able to field formed sub-units and maybe in a decade a formed unit.
What I'm sensing is coming out of the army at this time is a big push to create a viable RegF with the usual sloughing off of the reserves as a bridge too far to cross. Sad.
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