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Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

Boy have we ever hit the heart of the debate here. You are both absolutely right while also reflecting the polarity that exists around these issues. For once I'm 100% on board with what you are saying @Kirkhill.

I agree with your comments, too, @Furniture. Your comments, while also 100% correct, are where the gap between the RegF and the ResF - especially ARes - appears. There is a need for an absolutely essential institutional change vis a vis the army and it does have institutional consequences. They are only "unintentional consequence" if they are not examined and accounted for in the plan. The problem is that we all - RegF and ARes alike - acknowledge that the ARes is a weak organization for multiple reasons. During Afghanistan we acknowledged how vital ARes augmentation is to any sustained war-fighting effort by Canada. The army has, as an institution, examined transformation of the ARes and the army as a whole in a serious way at least a half dozen times during my years of service. And yet the army has accomplished a net zero improvement.

My objection to the proposed 6 Div/7Div model (now and when it was floated for Force 2025) is that the Land Force Area (LFA) model of integrated RegF and ARes units worked for Afghanistan. For the most part - not always, but for the most part - LFAs were able to FG deployable brigade/TF headquarters and battlegroup entities based on their integral RegF units augmented by their own ARes units. There was a vested interest in each LFA to foster and nurture their ARes components because they relied on them. Force 2013 was designed to build on that but floundered due to lack of $ and interest. Basically, in peacetime the CAF reverts to being concerned about generating Class Bs to fill cubicles and not with generating a viable mass army for the field.

When I floated the 30/70 concept I was in fact building on the successful aspects Afghanistan FG model to bring the level of RegF/ARes integration to a lower, and more intimate, level so that the training of given ARes personnel came under the direct control of the full-time staff of the hybrid unit. Again, its a model of the RegF having a vested interest in the quality of their ARes counterparts at the level where it matters - the unit. As a biproduct the system would create more deployable battalion and brigade level headquarters to form around and create the mass needed for a mobilized army and spread the burden of peacetime operational deployments. It also provided the higher level CS and CSS forces needed and was a roadmap to a force equipping program.

My biggest opposition to the proposed 6 Div/7 Div model is that it makes it very convenient to, once again, not ask all those questions about unintended consequences by hiving the ARes off into a little world of their own. The first unintended, but foreseeable, consequence of this reorganization may very well be an even weaker ARes than we already have.

I'll go a step further @Furniture - all these questions, should not only be considered, but they should be answered and a viable plan of action developed and implemented.

I'm saving that one for future reference! :D


I disagree.

Quite clearly there need to be more full-time support personnel than there currently are in peacetime but you will also need substantially more during a war. The whole NES system was an ad hoc structure poorly designed to meet the needs of a deployed force operating out of base camps. That system is utterly incapable of supporting a large deployed force operating in the field.

But many of the required CSS personnel for large scale deployments are not needed in large numbers during peacetime. You need enough to properly handle the supplies and maintenance held by the force. Logistics, maintenance, transport, and medical services can be greatly reduced during peacetime but need to be able to quickly scale up when the need arises. That requires a trained and equipped reserve CSS structure.

I know this will raise hackles (hopefully not blue ones) but lets be honest; many CSS trades are not rocket science at the DP1 level. Canada was able to fill out deployed NESs with All Trades and Ranks (ATR) ARes personnel as transport operators, warehouse staff and even wrench turners (I know of one ARes gunner who went over for the better part of a year working on in-theatre TLAV upgrades). What is needed is a large, core of trained and experienced leaders in these fields to mobilize on. These definitely need to be full-timers integrated into the mobilization plan. But that also needs a large base of adequately trained reservists to fill out the ranks.

🍻

But hiring truckers and mechanics is a lot easier than hiring riflemen and troopers. In fact the ones we would want to hire in an emergency are the same ones doing their job the day war broke out. (Are we agreeing here? I am not sure.)

I think we are better approaching young truckers and mechanics to sign them up to a list of people willing to serve in a crisis. People willing to spend a little time learning about the military culture and how the military operates. People willing to work alongside permanent military staff.

I don't think we need battalions of mechanics. We need lots of mechanics. Whether they work in large shops, or large companies or small battalions is probably less of a concern than that they are available to turn wrenches, or drive wreckers.

I think there is a lot that can be done with this mooted mobilization reserve of 5 day a year soldiers. Just like a lot more could be done with Rangers and Class A soldiers.

....

Our problem is the problem is ancient and every fix in the book has been suggested and many tried. But nobody, least of all the paymasters, want to commit to any solution. Everybody is willing to try the next thing in the hope that it will cost less than the last thing.
 
Can someone please explain to me how exactly DND is supposed to realize a 2% savings while surging to a massive growth (while critical support departments like PSPC may be downsized).
I’ll give you my thoughts on it but I could be wrong.

All departments are to reach a certain goal with this spending review. everyone is at 15%. DND, RCMP and CBSA are at 2%.

The goal is to cut back on the bureaucratic, the processes and redundancies.

Once that is done we will see money allocated from those savings into the things that are priority.

This is just the first phase or so I think.
 
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But hiring truckers and mechanics is a lot easier than hiring riflemen and troopers. In fact the ones we would want to hire in an emergency are the same ones doing their job the day war broke out. (Are we agreeing here? I am not sure.)
Aaaand . . . just like that we disagree again.

By signing them up to be willing to serve . . . and essentially making them subject to some form of CSD . . . you are essentially forming a reserve force and what we are really talking about is how much training you want to give them before the emergency rather than afterwards. Targeting truckers for transportation jobs, is off course desirable, but if not enough show up then you need to train some 18-year-old high school drop out to operate a ten tonner.

Our problem is the problem is ancient and every fix in the book has been suggested and many tried. But nobody, least of all the paymasters, want to commit to any solution. Everybody is willing to try the next thing in the hope that it will cost less than the last thing.
I think the paymasters would be happy with your proposal. It's the risk aversion crowd that will give you grief.

I'm already on record in support of a greatly expanded Ranger program - its already a sub-component of the Reserve Force and has an operating infrastructure that can easily be built on with the right championship.

But I see a clear distinction as between a Ranger program and a primary reserve. Much of that turns on role, equipment and training. I can easily see the Rangers (like the cadet program) being a feeder system to the PRes, and ultimately to the RegF, but essentially they are distinct.

🍻
 
I’ll give you my thoughts on it but I could be wrong.

All departments are to reach a certain goal with this spending review. everyone is at 15%. DND, RCMP and CBSA are at 2%.

The goal is to cut back on the bureaucratic, the processes and redundancies.

Once that is done we will see money allocated from those savings into the things that are priority.

This is just the first phase or so I think.
I get that's the intent, but the processess and associated bureaucracies are built up around things like meeting TBS policies, PSPC requirements, Canadian legal and regulatory requirements, and a lot of things that are largely external to DND. Redundancies at that scale aren't really a thing, as we're running lean due to shortages of people, and a military is inherently redundant to achieve resilience and be ready to scale for full scale conflicts.

Kind of a simple but obvious example of bureaucratic waste of the travel process; you have to get approval for the concept of the trip (at ADM, sometimes DM level) with VROM costs, then another approval for your itinerary with ROM costs, and finally get actual approval for the travel with confirmed itinerary and detailed costs (with the section 32). There is a lot of wasted, high priced effort there for oversight on high volume, low dollar value transactions, but that's mandated by TBS. To cut that to just the final step, DND (and all other departments) needs TBS approval.

Similarly there is a lot driven by Cabinet level direction (DPS), etc that isn't within DND's arcs of fire to do anything about.

The only stuff that is actually completely in DND span of control is to either cut spending on O&M and/or delay/cut things from ongoing capitol projects, not fill billets when people retire, cut travel, and all sorts of things that have real impacts on short, medium and long term capabilities. Some things we've cut so far the capabilities arent' atrophied; they are just gone, so would cost a lot more time and money to get them back and have the expertise to do it again.

We can all go around the financial circle jerk in silos for as many phases as they want, but until the big giant heads make significant changes to very high level orders and directives, and update federal legislation and regulatory things, we're really just rearranging the deckchairs. Similarly because we are so short handed, with a lot of very small communities of SMEs, the same people paid for with O&M are also supporting capitol requirements.

The redundancies I could see cutting are all the pet projects being run at 'pre-option analysis phase' that aren't actually part of the defence plan (cough RCN corvettes), but those are really just drops in the bucket. Still, with the limited travel caps artificially limiting ongoign work that is required, stuff like that could be better used elsewhere.
 
I get that's the intent, but the processess and associated bureaucracies are built up around things like meeting TBS policies, PSPC requirements, Canadian legal and regulatory requirements, and a lot of things that are largely external to DND. Redundancies at that scale aren't really a thing, as we're running lean due to shortages of people, and a military is inherently redundant to achieve resilience and be ready to scale for full scale conflicts.

Kind of a simple but obvious example of bureaucratic waste of the travel process; you have to get approval for the concept of the trip (at ADM, sometimes DM level) with VROM costs, then another approval for your itinerary with ROM costs, and finally get actual approval for the travel with confirmed itinerary and detailed costs (with the section 32). There is a lot of wasted, high priced effort there for oversight on high volume, low dollar value transactions, but that's mandated by TBS. To cut that to just the final step, DND (and all other departments) needs TBS approval.

Similarly there is a lot driven by Cabinet level direction (DPS), etc that isn't within DND's arcs of fire to do anything about.

The only stuff that is actually completely in DND span of control is to either cut spending on O&M and/or delay/cut things from ongoing capitol projects, not fill billets when people retire, cut travel, and all sorts of things that have real impacts on short, medium and long term capabilities. Some things we've cut so far the capabilities arent' atrophied; they are just gone, so would cost a lot more time and money to get them back and have the expertise to do it again.

We can all go around the financial circle jerk in silos for as many phases as they want, but until the big giant heads make significant changes to very high level orders and directives, and update federal legislation and regulatory things, we're really just rearranging the deckchairs. Similarly because we are so short handed, with a lot of very small communities of SMEs, the same people paid for with O&M are also supporting capitol requirements.

The redundancies I could see cutting are all the pet projects being run at 'pre-option analysis phase' that aren't actually part of the defence plan (cough RCN corvettes), but those are really just drops in the bucket. Still, with the limited travel caps artificially limiting ongoign work that is required, stuff like that could be better used elsewhere.
Sure. I can’t speak to specifics or things intrinsic to various areas.

My department has to increase pers by 1K. It will likely be done incrementally but it is tasked with growth.

Speaking only to my limited area and group we have three groups that are short staffed that do similar work that could easily be merged under one director to be effective. Then cut the empty boxes.

Nice to have projects and programs could also be scaled back.
 
Aaaand . . . just like that we disagree again.

Phew! I'm relieved.

By signing them up to be willing to serve . . . and essentially making them subject to some form of CSD . . . you are essentially forming a reserve force and what we are really talking about is how much training you want to give them before the emergency rather than afterwards. Targeting truckers for transportation jobs, is off course desirable, but if not enough show up then you need to train some 18-year-old high school drop out to operate a ten tonner.


I think the paymasters would be happy with your proposal. It's the risk aversion crowd that will give you grief.

I'm already on record in support of a greatly expanded Ranger program - its already a sub-component of the Reserve Force and has an operating infrastructure that can easily be built on with the right championship.

But I see a clear distinction as between a Ranger program and a primary reserve. Much of that turns on role, equipment and training. I can easily see the Rangers (like the cadet program) being a feeder system to the PRes, and ultimately to the RegF, but essentially they are distinct.

🍻

Lawyers and their details. No wonder contracts are so long.

You know that we are agreed on the intent. We even agree on much of the verbiage. But there are a few thousand jobs in the forces and a multitude of differing situations in which those people might find themselves employed. Are we to enumerate each trade and each situation with a separate codicile?

It kind of comes down to that Title 32 issue in the States and Little Green Men in Crimea - the Gray Zones.

We have the population
We have the military population (unorganized militia)
We have the volunteer population (reserve militia - 5 day a year - mobilizable)
We have the part time volunteer population (active militia including the Rangers - 12 days a year, occasional nights and weekends - on-call)
We have the full time volunteer population (the permanent active militia or the Standing Army)

Our Gray Zone is what to expect from the volunteers of the reserve and active militia.

I think we have to take cognizance of all of those elements and use them to the extent they will allow themselves to be used. A common feature is that all of them are volunteers and they can only be voluntold so much, so often.

The related discussion is when to command the population at large.

....

Zelensky's predicament and his handling of it is informative.

He has to manage a population that can leave. Vladimir tried coercion and anyone that could afford a plane ticket or a tank of gas disappeared to Turkey.

He has to keep civil society functioning as close to normal as possible. He has to keep the stores and schools open and he has to keep making money. That means that some portion of society has to live a normal life and fill their normal jobs. They are not available to be conscripted.

He has to keep the population reproducing. And thus he would rather have youngsters getting pregnant and raising kids than being killed in trenches. Thus he delays compulsory service from 18 to 27 (now 25).

And so he relies on old men and technology.

...

He is testing this maxim:

Age and guile beat youth and enthusiasm.


....

If we can't get people in uniform to turn wrenches then hire local shops that hire people that turn wrenches. And look to them to volunteer when their community needs them.
 
Sure. I can’t speak to specifics or things intrinsic to various areas.

My department has to increase pers by 1K. It will likely be done incrementally but it is tasked with growth.

Speaking only to my limited area and group we have three groups that are short staffed that do similar work that could easily be merged under one director to be effective. Then cut the empty boxes.

Nice to have projects and programs could also be scaled back.
First you need to hire a tiger team to assess the options to combine the three groups.

Wait a year, let some reorgs happen, everyone forgets the goal, and now you have four groups doing similar work.
 
Lots of big army visions. But I struggle to understand what is the threat this big army is being built for. What's a scenario where Canada is fielding army divisions, but there's no nukes flying.

If we're talking about defending Canada, the investment should be air, sea, cyber and space. Large armies are only applicable in one scenario: prolonged conventional war in Europe. And it's debatable how much priority this should get against our domestic defence needs.
 
Lots of big army visions. But I struggle to understand what is the threat this big army is being built for. What's a scenario where Canada is fielding army divisions, but there's no nukes flying.

If we're talking about defending Canada, the investment should be air, sea, cyber and space. Large armies are only applicable in one scenario: prolonged conventional war in Europe. And it's debatable how much priority this should get against our domestic defence needs.
If the nukes are flying, it doesn't matter what we have in the air or space. Its Armageddon. So we build the focus of our military for the most likely scenario that doesn't involve nuclear Holocaust, a conventional land war in Europe if the Russians try a limited invasion of the Baltics and Poland.
 
I disagree.
I did a shit job explaining it.
I was attempting to talk about overly technical no civilian equivalent trades.

I’m open to Reserve positions, but I am adamant that one doesn’t dilute courses to make it easy or convenient to fit into a Reserve 25 trg day max course.

TBH I’m totally confused by the CA AR Res training model.

Officers do the same courses as the Reg Force during the Summer

NCM’s do a half assed 1/3 or less spin dry version of the Reg Force.
(At least Cbt Arms, I know the Trades had danced several different ways over the past 40 years)


I think there needs to be a 1 course standard between the Reg and Res.
Courses will be 50-55 training days.
Courses needing longer will be broken into Modules. If longer than 6 months between modules then there needs to be some sort of refresher run prior to the start of the next module.









Quite clearly there need to be more full-time support personnel than there currently are in peacetime but you will also need substantially more during a war.
110%


The whole NES system
(I think you mean NSE)
was an ad hoc structure poorly designed to meet the needs of a deployed force operating out of base camps. That system is utterly incapable of supporting a large deployed force operating in the field.

But many of the required CSS personnel for large scale deployments are not needed in large numbers during peacetime. You need enough to properly handle the supplies and maintenance held by the force. Logistics, maintenance, transport, and medical services can be greatly reduced during peacetime but need to be able to quickly scale up when the need arises. That requires a trained and equipped reserve CSS structure.
No disagreement. But it needs to be an actually training entity.
The whole 6 months to get ready to deploy is ridiculous.


I know this will raise hackles (hopefully not blue ones) but let’s be honest; many CSS trades are not rocket science at the DP1 level. Canada was able to fill out deployed NESs with All Trades and Ranks (ATR) ARes personnel as transport operators, warehouse staff and even wrench turners (I know of one ARes gunner who went over for the better part of a year working on in-theatre TLAV upgrades). What is needed is a large, core of trained and experienced leaders in these fields to mobilize on. These definitely need to be full-timers integrated into the mobilization plan. But that also needs a large base of adequately trained reservists to fill out the ranks.

🍻
Honestly I think you need well experienced Reservists too, if you are looking at a significant mobilization.
 
I did a shit job explaining it.
I was attempting to talk about overly technical no civilian equivalent trades.

I’m open to Reserve positions, but I am adamant that one doesn’t dilute courses to make it easy or convenient to fit into a Reserve 25 trg day max course.

TBH I’m totally confused by the CA AR Res training model.

Officers do the same courses as the Reg Force during the Summer

NCM’s do a half assed 1/3 or less spin dry version of the Reg Force.
(At least Cbt Arms, I know the Trades had danced several different ways over the past 40 years)


I think there needs to be a 1 course standard between the Reg and Res.
Courses will be 50-55 training days.
Courses needing longer will be broken into Modules. If longer than 6 months between modules then there needs to be some sort of refresher run prior to the start of the next module.










110%



(I think you mean NSE)

No disagreement. But it needs to be an actually training entity.
The whole 6 months to get ready to deploy is ridiculous.



Honestly I think you need well experienced Reservists too, if you are looking at a significant mobilization.
I can't speak for the other cbt arms but RQ Trooper for the RCAC is the exact same TP Reg and Res. Recently a big addition came in the form of a comprehensive small arms package and dismounted ops.

A PCF vehicle (TAPV/LAV/Leo/TLAV/ACSV) comes right before or after depending on VOR and what they had available prior to RQ Trooper for vehicles qualifications.

Works out to 60 or so training days with all the pre-req courses from RQ Trooper.
 
TBH I’m totally confused by the CA AR Res training model.
Me too. I had the army system down pat in the 1970s but that faded in my mind as it changed in the army. The LegO trg system was a dumbed down MITCP program (one week courses and online training modules) which was possible because our reservist recruits were all lawyers already called to the bar.

I think it is essential that RegF and ARes requirements be identical at the DP1 level but they must be such so that they are available to and achievable by to reservists within the constraints under which they serve. I like RESO, as an example. I think that also applies to ranks up to and including major and MWO. Beyond that we shouldn't expect the average Class A reservist to be employed. Again all those major/MWO courses need to be Class A achievable which in short means modularization and DL as much as possible.
(I think you mean NSE)
Yes. Yes, I did.
No disagreement. But it needs to be an actually training entity.
The whole 6 months to get ready to deploy is ridiculous.
I like the concept of Guard 4.0 where the mobilization pre-deployment training cycle is set based on where the unit/bde is in its four-year 40-60 day annual training readiness program. Essentially an ARNG unit, after finishing its last year of training, is ready to go immediately. A unit finishing its first year might need another two to three months training and a CTC Fort Polk or Irwin rotation. I like the concept but do have problems the way that would be scaled for a proper ARes organization.
Honestly I think you need well experienced Reservists too, if you are looking at a significant mobilization.
Yes. One of the benefits of a 30/70 unit is that the unit CO can rotate full-timers into slots where his ARes component is weak, both as temporary trainers or for deployments.

🍻
 
Lots of big army visions. But I struggle to understand what is the threat this big army is being built for. What's a scenario where Canada is fielding army divisions, but there's no nukes flying.

If we're talking about defending Canada, the investment should be air, sea, cyber and space. Large armies are only applicable in one scenario: prolonged conventional war in Europe. And it's debatable how much priority this should get against our domestic defence needs.
well said
 
Back in the 90’s I was on a full time ARes infantry QL2/3 for 12 straight weeks at the PPCLI Battle School in sunny Wainwright. Everyone else in my platoon was from Victoria to Thunder Bay. Although we were at the PPCLI’s school, almost all of our platoon’s instructor cadre, except for the platoon WO and swing NCO, were ARes. They were hard chargers that pushed us hard and trained us like we were all going back to their regiments (some of us were). Talking to troops from other platoons with all RegF instructors sounded like they were phoning it in.

I felt like we had the best of both worlds of doing our training full time at a RegF battle school but being trained by keen and hard charging reservists (and a hard charging RegF platoon WO) who didn’t want to send shitbags back to their units. It was probably one of the best experiences of my life.

I have no idea if this model is still used in ARes combat arms training, or if what I experienced was a one off when the stars align. But I think it worked.
 
If the nukes are flying, it doesn't matter what we have in the air or space. Its Armageddon. So we build the focus of our military for the most likely scenario that doesn't involve nuclear Holocaust, a conventional land war in Europe if the Russians try a limited invasion of the Baltics and Poland.

A limited invasion of the Baltics doesn't require the CAF to contribute several divisions.

Let's be honest here. There's a lot of wannabe generals who just want more GI Joes to play with.

If we're talking about the defence of Canada itself, the priorities are abundantly clear.
 
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