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Boy have we ever hit the heart of the debate here. You are both absolutely right while also reflecting the polarity that exists around these issues. For once I'm 100% on board with what you are saying @Kirkhill.
I agree with your comments, too, @Furniture. Your comments, while also 100% correct, are where the gap between the RegF and the ResF - especially ARes - appears. There is a need for an absolutely essential institutional change vis a vis the army and it does have institutional consequences. They are only "unintentional consequence" if they are not examined and accounted for in the plan. The problem is that we all - RegF and ARes alike - acknowledge that the ARes is a weak organization for multiple reasons. During Afghanistan we acknowledged how vital ARes augmentation is to any sustained war-fighting effort by Canada. The army has, as an institution, examined transformation of the ARes and the army as a whole in a serious way at least a half dozen times during my years of service. And yet the army has accomplished a net zero improvement.
My objection to the proposed 6 Div/7Div model (now and when it was floated for Force 2025) is that the Land Force Area (LFA) model of integrated RegF and ARes units worked for Afghanistan. For the most part - not always, but for the most part - LFAs were able to FG deployable brigade/TF headquarters and battlegroup entities based on their integral RegF units augmented by their own ARes units. There was a vested interest in each LFA to foster and nurture their ARes components because they relied on them. Force 2013 was designed to build on that but floundered due to lack of $ and interest. Basically, in peacetime the CAF reverts to being concerned about generating Class Bs to fill cubicles and not with generating a viable mass army for the field.
When I floated the 30/70 concept I was in fact building on the successful aspects Afghanistan FG model to bring the level of RegF/ARes integration to a lower, and more intimate, level so that the training of given ARes personnel came under the direct control of the full-time staff of the hybrid unit. Again, its a model of the RegF having a vested interest in the quality of their ARes counterparts at the level where it matters - the unit. As a biproduct the system would create more deployable battalion and brigade level headquarters to form around and create the mass needed for a mobilized army and spread the burden of peacetime operational deployments. It also provided the higher level CS and CSS forces needed and was a roadmap to a force equipping program.
My biggest opposition to the proposed 6 Div/7 Div model is that it makes it very convenient to, once again, not ask all those questions about unintended consequences by hiving the ARes off into a little world of their own. The first unintended, but foreseeable, consequence of this reorganization may very well be an even weaker ARes than we already have.
I'll go a step further @Furniture - all these questions, should not only be considered, but they should be answered and a viable plan of action developed and implemented.
I'm saving that one for future reference!

I disagree.
Quite clearly there need to be more full-time support personnel than there currently are in peacetime but you will also need substantially more during a war. The whole NES system was an ad hoc structure poorly designed to meet the needs of a deployed force operating out of base camps. That system is utterly incapable of supporting a large deployed force operating in the field.
But many of the required CSS personnel for large scale deployments are not needed in large numbers during peacetime. You need enough to properly handle the supplies and maintenance held by the force. Logistics, maintenance, transport, and medical services can be greatly reduced during peacetime but need to be able to quickly scale up when the need arises. That requires a trained and equipped reserve CSS structure.
I know this will raise hackles (hopefully not blue ones) but lets be honest; many CSS trades are not rocket science at the DP1 level. Canada was able to fill out deployed NESs with All Trades and Ranks (ATR) ARes personnel as transport operators, warehouse staff and even wrench turners (I know of one ARes gunner who went over for the better part of a year working on in-theatre TLAV upgrades). What is needed is a large, core of trained and experienced leaders in these fields to mobilize on. These definitely need to be full-timers integrated into the mobilization plan. But that also needs a large base of adequately trained reservists to fill out the ranks.
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But hiring truckers and mechanics is a lot easier than hiring riflemen and troopers. In fact the ones we would want to hire in an emergency are the same ones doing their job the day war broke out. (Are we agreeing here? I am not sure.)
I think we are better approaching young truckers and mechanics to sign them up to a list of people willing to serve in a crisis. People willing to spend a little time learning about the military culture and how the military operates. People willing to work alongside permanent military staff.
I don't think we need battalions of mechanics. We need lots of mechanics. Whether they work in large shops, or large companies or small battalions is probably less of a concern than that they are available to turn wrenches, or drive wreckers.
I think there is a lot that can be done with this mooted mobilization reserve of 5 day a year soldiers. Just like a lot more could be done with Rangers and Class A soldiers.
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Our problem is the problem is ancient and every fix in the book has been suggested and many tried. But nobody, least of all the paymasters, want to commit to any solution. Everybody is willing to try the next thing in the hope that it will cost less than the last thing.