Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

[KevinB]

And I'd add Air Defence capabilities to that priority list (whether controlled by the Army, RCN, RCAF or more likely all of the above).

We don't need to create an "Iron Igloo" (Canadian version of Trumps "Golden Dome") but our military bases (especially our airfields and dockyards) require robust C-UAS capabilities so that an enemy can't cripple our ability to deploy forces with a preemptive attack. The coasts should also have AD capabilities to counter possible submarine launched missile attacks against our facilities.

You are much better off with the RCN and RCAF using NORAD for those threats at this time.
P-8's, F-35's, River Class Destroyers are much better for that.
You won't have Reg Force AD personnel sitting at alert 24/7
Canada (and the US) have no real rationale for Golden Shower Dome as POTUS has pitched it - other than cooperative BMD.
Iron Dome Israeli works for Israel due to its small size, and short range threats.
I believe that Golden Dome will eventually be rationalized as a much better NORAD/NAEEZ Sensor System - and leave the interception of threats to the Air Forces and Navy's outside of some locations that already have Point Defense systems for C-UAS and AD.

 

[GR66]

You are much better off with the RCN and RCAF using NORAD for those threats at this time.
P-8's, F-35's, River Class Destroyers are much better for that.
You won't have Reg Force AD personnel sitting at alert 24/7
Canada (and the US) have no real rationale for Golden Shower Dome as POTUS has pitched it - other than cooperative BMD.
Iron Dome Israeli works for Israel due to its small size, and short range threats.
I believe that Golden Dome will eventually be rationalized as a much better NORAD/NAEEZ Sensor System - and leave the interception of threats to the Air Forces and Navy's outside of some locations that areas have Point Defense systems for C-UAS and AD.

Canada relies on it's ships and aircraft to be able to project power to where a war is likely to be taking place. The Ukrainian UAV attacks on Russian strategic bomber forces and USV attacks on Russian ships show the vulnerability to low cost uncrewed systems.

I'm not suggesting that we need C-UAS and C-USV/UUV teams sitting at our bases 24/7 but we should have the capability in place (a Reserve capability?) that can be deployed at times of increased tension in order to protect against an attack. That should be combined with basic physical precautions like hangers/aircraft shelters, jamming systems (can be activated from the control tower?), harbour nets and booms, perimeter security patrols, etc.

As for Golden Dome, I'm in favour of agreeing to join as a stroke to Trumps ego...primarily as you say through NORAD sensor upgrades (which we would be doing anyway) but I'm also fine with a limited number of interceptors being included. Not enough to defeat a full-out attack by Russia/China (I think that is likely impossible or at the very least cripplingly expensive based on current technology and enemy missile numbers) but having just enough interceptors on the coasts that China/Russia couldn't launch a very limited conventional strike to try and take out our Fleet.

If you have just enough missile defence to be able to force them to launch an attack large enough that it could be mistaken as a pre-emptive nuclear strike rather than a limited conventional strike then you've created perceptional deterrence. They won't want to risk a conventional attack because in order to have a reasonable expectation of success the strike would have to be large enough that it could be perceived as being a nuclear first strike...and result in massive nuclear retaliation.

 

[brihard]

I'm not suggesting that we need C-UAS and C-USV/UUV teams sitting at our bases 24/7 but we should have the capability in place (a Reserve capability?) that can be deployed at times of increased tension in order to protect against an attack.

If you need to be confident that you can learn of an emergent threat Wednesday morning and have a capability in place later that day ready to pull a trigger, that’s not a reserve task.

 

[GR66]

If you need to be confident that you can learn of an emergent threat Wednesday morning and have a capability in place later that day ready to pull a trigger, that’s not a reserve task.

That would suggest that those that have been beating the drum for a fundamental change to the way the Army Reserves are organized, equipped, trained, led and legislated are correct. It's certainly the type of capability that some other county's reservists have the capability to do.

...and hopefully we are not so blind to what's going on in the world that we don't figure out until the day of a potential war with Russia/China/Iran/North Korea that we might need to think about tightening our security.

 

[brihard]

That would suggest that those that have been beating the drum for a fundamental change to the way the Army Reserves are organized, equipped, trained, led and legislated are correct. It's certainly the type of capability that some other county's reservists have the capability to do.

...and hopefully we are not so blind to what's going on in the world that we don't figure out until the day of a potential war with Russia/China/Iran/North Korea that we might need to think about tightening our security.

I’m speaking in the present tense and in the context of the military we actually have.

I don’t envision such a threat as most likely in the context of “oh crap there’s a war”, but rather in the context of a (probably state-sponsored) terrorist threat where relatively low cost, low tech UAS are used to strike at CAF assets, and where actionable intelligence comes from a foreign or domestic national security partner, and action needs to be taken immediately to mitigate and disrupt a threat. Imagine what a dozen FPV drones with a couple pounds of explosives could do at, say, CFB Trenton.

 

[Furniture]

It's certainly the type of capability that some other county's reservists have the capability to do.

To augment an already existing RegF capability, in times of emergency.

If we need to mobilize the reserves to go to a heightened state of readiness, why have a standing force at all?

 

[KevinB]

Canada relies on it's ships and aircraft to be able to project power to where a war is likely to be taking place. The Ukrainian UAV attacks on Russian strategic bomber forces and USV attacks on Russian ships show the vulnerability to low cost uncrewed systems.

Well lets be honest the Russia equipment is pretty bad, and the crews are worse, they shouldn't be used as an example of what is or is not susceptible to attacks from UUV, USV, UAS or UGV's as well as more conventional threats.

I'm not suggesting that we need C-UAS and C-USV/UUV teams sitting at our bases 24/7 but we should have the capability in place (a Reserve capability?) that can be deployed at times of increased tension in order to protect against an attack. That should be combined with basic physical precautions like hangers/aircraft shelters, jamming systems (can be activated from the control tower?), harbour nets and booms, perimeter security patrols, etc.

Better use would be increased Int, LE and SOF work to detect and neutralize local threats.

As for Golden Dome, I'm in favour of agreeing to join as a stroke to Trumps ego...primarily as you say through NORAD sensor upgrades (which we would be doing anyway) but I'm also fine with a limited number of interceptors being included. Not enough to defeat a full-out attack by Russia/China (I think that is likely impossible or at the very least cripplingly expensive based on current technology and enemy missile numbers) but having just enough interceptors on the coasts that China/Russia couldn't launch a very limited conventional strike to try and take out our Fleet.

NORAD sensors are only part of what I anticipate Golden Dome being - think more like adding AI/ML SOSUS to watch the territorial waters and EEZ as well.
So UUV's, Submarines etc can be tracked and intercepted prior to a launch close to land.

If you have just enough missile defence to be able to force them to launch an attack large enough that it could be mistaken as a pre-emptive nuclear strike rather than a limited conventional strike then you've created perceptional deterrence. They won't want to risk a conventional attack because in order to have a reasonable expectation of success the strike would have to be large enough that it could be perceived as being a nuclear first strike...and result in massive nuclear retaliation.

China has around 600 Nuclear Warheads, Russia has ~4,500, but only ~1,700 active.
Most of those are MIRV's so if you can intercept the outbound ICBM with a hypersonic interceptor prior to separation you won't need 2,300+ Interceptors, as well as DEW intercept capabilities have been tested that would provide another method.

 

[FJAG]

If you need to be confident that you can learn of an emergent threat Wednesday morning and have a capability in place later that day ready to pull a trigger, that’s not a reserve task.

Not the way today's reserves are organized and managed but I could easily see an RCAF base defence force capability that has designated full-timers ready at all times to leave their desks and man an air defence system and then within a day or so be augmented/replaced by an RCAF ResF defence force/AD component.

The big bugbear is equipment. This is one thing where there needs to be a good threat analysis so that the proper equipment is already in situ.

IMHO, airfield defence ought to be an RCAF function (largely because there are no ARes units in nearby locations and the thing needs to be stood up from scratch anyway. I'm a little more flexible as to RCN facilities because they are somewhat concentrated and because I believe that joint A2/AD defence ought to be the a tasking for many of the BC and Atlantic Maritimes ARes units who already are in place.

 

[Brad Sallows]

We don't need to create an "Iron Igloo" (Canadian version of Trumps "Golden Dome") but our military bases (especially our airfields and dockyards) require robust C-UAS capabilities so that an enemy can't cripple our ability to deploy forces with a preemptive attack.

Bunkers and pens. Added bonus: surveillance security.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not the way today's reserves are organized and managed but I could easily see an RCAF base defence force capability that has designated full-timers ready at all times to leave their desks and man an air defence system and then within a day or so be augmented/replaced by an RCAF ResF defence force/AD component.

The big bugbear is equipment. This is one thing where there needs to be a good threat analysis so that the proper equipment is already in situ.

IMHO, airfield defence ought to be an RCAF function (largely because there are no ARes units in nearby locations and the thing needs to be stood up from scratch anyway. I'm a little more flexible as to RCN facilities because they are somewhat concentrated and because I believe that joint A2/AD defence ought to be the a tasking for many of the BC and Atlantic Maritimes ARes units who already are in place.

Air Defence is a tech heavy tasking. It doesn't require many operators on shift to maintain a bubble. It does require a fortune in sensors and effectors and munitions.

 

[Kirkhill]

PS A CUAS facility is going to be necessary for every combat arms, combat support and combat service support organization.

If that were built around a 30 mm cannon then any unit could be pressed into VP defence service.

And the 30 mm cannon would add to any defensive plan as a general purpose support weapon.

 

[FJAG]

Air Defence is a tech heavy tasking. It doesn't require many operators on shift to maintain a bubble. It does require a fortune in sensors and effectors and munitions.

Air Defence is a 24/7 activity. You need three shifts if going for any length of time plus within shift rotations. CUAV becomes even more challenging as you need to create a viable perimeter much of which needs manning or observation and protection of the deployed systems. Tech is not the solution to manpower needs; its an enabler that increases effectiveness but do not underestimate the manpower requirements needed to keep a base secure against even a handful of little green men or long range weapons. Many of them do not need extensive training but their presence is vital.

PS A CUAS facility is going to be necessary for every combat arms, combat support and combat service support organization.

If that were built around a 30 mm cannon then any unit could be pressed into VP defence service.

And the 30 mm cannon would add to any defensive plan as a general purpose support weapon.

There are two issues here: defence of the deployed field force and defence of vital points in the homeland. They need to be approached very differently as to risk assessments involved in engaging targets in the field and ones within local civilian neighborhoods.

The biggest issue we face is the scale of the deployment. In my most recent napkin force I assess a need four six - yes six - AD regiments. Three for close support of the three armoured divisions; one as general support to the homeland division and one each to protect the fleet dockyards on each coast as part of the A2/AD brigades. That constitutes the bare minimum and doesn't cover any of the vital points that you contemplate.

Costs are exorbitant. The 1980s LLAD project cost around $1 billion for two batteries to protect two airfields and 4 CMBG with Oerlikons, ADATS, Javelins. That was roughly a regiments worth of around 450 RegF and another 450 ARes.

The current GBAD project started at $0.25 billion, went to around $0.4 billion and is looking like probably $1 billion for probably two batteries. I'm just pulling numbers out of my ass here, but I would think to just adequately protect the field force and the homeland air and naval bases alone would cost upward of $15 - 20 billion. Manpower wise I would put that at roughly 1,200 - 2,000 RegF and 3,000 - 4,000 reservists.

My expectation is that no government will accept that. My guess is they'll accept the risk that nothing will happen to any infrastructure in the homeland and buy just enough kit the equip a brigade or a division tops when deployed (plus the usual stock for spares and training)

 

[daftandbarmy]

Air Defence is a tech heavy tasking. It doesn't require many operators on shift to maintain a bubble. It does require a fortune in sensors and effectors and munitions.

Incorrect...

It's one of the most complex and potentially resource intensive jobs, depending on threat levels and tactical situations, in modern warfare. That includes situating troops in what is essentially a large cordon around the airfield's 'vital ground' 24/7.

Defending the Air Base | The Company Leader

Defending the air base is necessary for projecting logistics and combat power in LSCO. These are some common considerations for air base defense.

companyleader.themilitaryleader.com

 

[Czech_pivo]

Air Defence is a 24/7 activity. You need three shifts if going for any length of time plus within shift rotations. CUAV becomes even more challenging as you need to create a viable perimeter much of which needs manning or observation and protection of the deployed systems. Tech is not the solution to manpower needs; its an enabler that increases effectiveness but do not underestimate the manpower requirements needed to keep a base secure against even a handful of little green men or long range weapons. Many of them do not need extensive training but their presence is vital.


There are two issues here: defence of the deployed field force and defence of vital points in the homeland. They need to be approached very differently as to risk assessments involved in engaging targets in the field and ones within local civilian neighborhoods.

The biggest issue we face is the scale of the deployment. In my most recent napkin force I assess a need four six - yes six - AD regiments. Three for close support of the three armoured divisions; one as general support to the homeland division and one each to protect the fleet dockyards on each coast as part of the A2/AD brigades. That constitutes the bare minimum and doesn't cover any of the vital points that you contemplate.

Costs are exorbitant. The 1980s LLAD project cost around $1 billion for two batteries to protect two airfields and 4 CMBG with Oerlikons, ADATS, Javelins. That was roughly a regiments worth of around 450 RegF and another 450 ARes.

The current GBAD project started at $0.25 billion, went to around $0.4 billion and is looking like probably $1 billion for probably two batteries. I'm just pulling numbers out of my ass here, but I would think to just adequately protect the field force and the homeland air and naval bases alone would cost upward of $15 - 20 billion. Manpower wise I would put that at roughly 1,200 - 2,000 RegF and 3,000 - 4,000 reservists.

My expectation is that no government will accept that. My guess is they'll accept the risk that nothing will happen to any infrastructure in the homeland and buy just enough kit the equip a brigade or a division tops when deployed (plus the usual stock for spares and training)

Maybe they’ll send the AD forces on some ‘Skeet’ shooting classes and equipment them with some over/under shotguns and call it a day.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The current GBAD project started at $0.25 billion, went to around $0.4 billion and is looking like probably $1 billion for probably two batteries. I'm just pulling numbers out of my ass here, but I would think to just adequately protect the field force and the homeland air and naval bases alone would cost upward of $15 - 20 billion. Manpower wise I would put that at roughly 1,200 - 2,000 RegF and 3,000 - 4,000 reservists.

A dozen current-generation fighters must be worth roughly a billion. I'd spend some money to protect them. Protection is part of the cost of being in that business.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am differentiating between securing an airfield and operating an air defence system.

The number of people on shift in a 24/7 operation appears to be two. To run a 24/7 operation requires 5 shifts and someone to manage the group.

Securing an airfield with a long perimeter will obviously require a lot of manpower.
On the other hand adding an ability to knock down aerial threats does not require a lot of people. Particularly if the threat level is low and the weapons are only fired infrequently.

On the other hand those gunners are manipulating an awful lot of budget - and a lot more if they actually have to fire them.

.....

 

[Furniture]

To run a 24/7 operation requires 5 shifts and someone to manage the group.

It requires at least 7 people for every 24/7 position, to account for the fact people get sick and like to take vacation... If you factor in other tasks/training, it should in reality be 8-9 people for every 24/7 position.

So, to maintain a 24/7 section of two per shift on a wing will require at least 20 people to be effective.