Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

[Good2Golf]

Program, or perhaps Bonus?

 

[ytz]

You mean something like a "Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program"?

I wonder what might show up if you google that phrase?

Didn't know we already do that!

Thanks.

 

[dapaterson]

Didn't know we already do that!

Thanks.

The problem with large, complex organizations is that it's hard to know everything going on, so you can frequently end up with parallel efforts that are unknown to each other, or recreating the wheel...

 

[PrairieFella]

Para 23 of chapter 2 of B-GL-300-008 - Training Canada's Army (1992 version) - indicates that Level 4 Training (sub-unit) "is the upper level of competency for collective training in the Reserves, beyond which resource constraints are normally prohibitive."

For ARes gunners Level 4 was easy - a BC, a FOO, a CP, 2 guns and a BSM - basically 28 people - were good enough to train all aspects of a battery's functions. They did that three to four times a year before they even got to the summer concentration. For the infantry and armoured corps that basically platoon or troop was the best before summer.

In the summer. With a bit of work you could get in Level 5 (working with a combat team) and Level 6 as to regimental fire and movement. Maybe even a bit of Level 6 combined arms if the supported arms were up for it.

Level 3 Live in a Level 4 context and Level 4 Dry is what my Res unit hits yearly. That said its getting harder andharder to do it yearly with equipment shortages. Its very doable with the right kit and the right people in key positions.

 

[mariomike]

In my world, a mandatory weekend a month and a two week summer concentration is all that you are required to do once DP1 is completed.

CERP says,

The reservist-employee must be away from the civilian workplace for a minimum of 30 consecutive days < snip >

CERP does not appear to cover the two week summer concentration.

I think something we need to consider is some kind of reimbursement to employers for employees missing time. This might help reduce employment discrimination against reservists.

CERP,

military skills training (e.g., courses, exercises, training activities)

Not sure all employers would permit more than two weeks a year for "military skills training (e.g., courses, exercises, training activities) ".

The maximum period of absence is two weeks in a calendar year.

OTOH,

Leave of absence shall be granted to employees to serve in the Armed Forces during hostilities or during a time of war as declared by the Government of Canada

YMMV per full-time employer.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Who is currently validating that collective BTS are in fact being satisfactorily achieved (consistently over multiple repetitions), instead of merely executed once?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Who is currently validating that collective BTS are in fact being satisfactorily achieved (consistently over multiple repetitions), instead of merely executed once?

FWIW, I always had great confidence in my well trained and diligent, mainly SNCO, training staff who delivered training in line with required standards. Usually the Unit's RSSWO would provide oversight and collate and report results upwards as required.

Anyone who didn't nail it first time was given some re-training and run through again until they passed. I never saw any 'favouritism', or diversion from holding people accountable to the correct standard.

 

[Brad Sallows]

FWIW, I always had great confidence in my well trained and diligent, mainly SNCO, training staff who delivered training in line with required standards. Usually the Unit's RSSWO would provide oversight and collate and report results upwards as required.

Anyone who didn't nail it first time was given some re-training and run through again until they passed. I never saw any 'favouritism', or diversion from holding people accountable to the correct standard.

I was thinking that ordinarily it should be someone two-up - platoon assessed by CO, company assessed by formation commander (brigade) (or their delegates).

I was also wondering if there is enough time to adequately complete, say, Level 4 on a Res F annual budget.

 

[Fabius]

I was thinking that ordinarily it should be someone two-up - platoon assessed by CO, company assessed by formation commander (brigade) (or their delegates).

I was also wondering if there is enough time to adequately complete, say, Level 4 on a Res F annual budget.

Yes, in the CA it’s a Comd 2 up who conducts the validation of an elements collective training BTS.

Section - OC Coy
Pl - CO Unit
Coy - Comd Bde
Bn/BG - Comd Div
Bde - Comd CDTC

Sections often do multiple iterations dry and live for BTS.

Pls often do multiple dry iterations and might do two iterations live of a particular BTS if the first attempt was marginal.

Coy often do multiple iterations dry and will likely only do one iteration live unless something went very wrong or perhaps if the range was designed for multiple attacks down a trace etc.

Bn/BG and Bde aren’t really assessed live, they are assessed usually by a combination of CPX with computer assisted simulation or in an FTX with force on force of varying levels of OPFOR freedom. Very rarely is there a redo or reset but the exercise design unusually allows several tactical scenarios to test and validate the BTS.

It’s very rare for an element to not be validated as successful. If it’s the normal non high readiness BTS assigned in the Army Op Plan to all units, the BTS completion is to ensure an institutional baseline of proficiency vs an actual certification of any element.

For deploying elements it is a certification of a type however it runs into the reality of the fact that there isn’t another force typically available and ready to assume that mission nor is there time and resources to reset and retrain an entire unit or formation. That means that there isn’t another validation is not really a hard assessment but rather a sort of final training culmination that gives the element a mirror to see itself and its performance allowing it to make improvements during its high readiness or deployed period.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Yes, in the CA it’s a Comd 2 up who conducts the validation of an elements collective training BTS.

Section - OC Coy
Pl - CO Unit
Coy - Comd Bde
Bn/BG - Comd Div
Bde - Comd CDTC

Sections often do multiple iterations dry and live for BTS.

Pls often do multiple dry iterations and might do two iterations live of a particular BTS if the first attempt was marginal.

Coy often do multiple iterations dry and will likely only do one iteration live unless something went very wrong or perhaps if the range was designed for multiple attacks down a trace etc.

Bn/BG and Bde aren’t really assessed live, they are assessed usually by a combination of CPX with computer assisted simulation or in an FTX with force on force of varying levels of OPFOR freedom. Very rarely is there a redo or reset but the exercise design unusually allows several tactical scenarios to test and validate the BTS.

It’s very rare for an element to not be validated as successful. If it’s the normal non high readiness BTS assigned in the Army Op Plan to all units, the BTS completion is to ensure an institutional baseline of proficiency vs an actual certification of any element.

For deploying elements it is a certification of a type however it runs into the reality of the fact that there isn’t another force typically available and ready to assume that mission nor is there time and resources to reset and retrain an entire unit or formation. That means that there isn’t another validation is not really a hard assessment but rather a sort of final training culmination that gives the element a mirror to see itself and its performance allowing it to make improvements during its high readiness or deployed period.

YMMV but in the Reserves, unless you're very lucky, you'll rarely/ inconsistently be assessed at anything during any type of collective exercise run by Bde/higher that gives you time to go through those iterations.

 

[Kirkhill]

YMMV but in the Reserves, unless you're very lucky, you'll rarely/ inconsistently be assessed at anything during any type of collective exercise run by Bde/higher that gives you time to go through those iterations.

If the reserve structure is based on single platoon companies in single company battalions in single battalion regiments collectively commanded by one colonel/acting-brigadier, where, on a typical training night or weekend, does one find a competent local officer capable of assessing more than a section?

Two up from the section is the OC.
The section's platoon leader would be assessed by the CO. That seems like a possibility.

But the OC? The OC only has one platoon to work with. Collective training is likely to be hard.

And as for finding a colonel/brigadier to assess each of the OCs under command on any given weekend, that seems likely to be challenging.

 

[daftandbarmy]

If the reserve structure is based on single platoon companies in single company battalions in single battalion regiments collectively commanded by one colonel/acting-brigadier, where, on a typical training night or weekend, does one find a competent local officer capable of assessing more than a section?

Two up from the section is the OC.
The section's platoon leader would be assessed by the CO. That seems like a possibility.

But the OC? The OC only has one platoon to work with. Collective training is likely to be hard.

And as for finding a colonel/brigadier to assess each of the OCs under command on any given weekend, that seems likely to be challenging.

Correct, I would say.

But, to be 'assessed', you require some kind of standards to first be set out by someone in command authority, then backed up with the right work up training including the right kind of assessment/AAR process.

I've never seen that happen above IBTS level. No commander has ever, at the start of the training year, said 'we will train to Level 4' and then supported that goal with the training and resources to ensure that this goal is achieved between September and April/May. Budgets are not really set up to achieve that either as 37 days per soldier, perhaps, per year is pretty thin and designed to ensure IBTS is achieved as a priority.

What I have seen, and experienced, is IBTS level qualified soldiers being dropped in at the deep end to be assessed on collective training - without any consistent work up training - and then been scolded for their incompetence by higher ups who failed to first establish the right conditions for success.

This is the way

 

[Brad Sallows]

Budgets are not really set up to achieve that either as 37 days per soldier, perhaps, per year is pretty thin and designed to ensure IBTS is achieved as a priority.

That is what I see as the core issue for Res F aspiring to do something meaningful with CARBs.

From 37.5 (or 37, regardless, the number has been remarkably stable for decades), subtract time for all the other mandated events (including IBTS) and the administrative time required to sustain the element in "garrison" and prepare for all the mandated events AND actual BTS events (training and assessment). How many paid days are left? What can reasonably be accomplished? If you simply run down the list starting with Level 1 crossing out items and reducing the paid days as each is ticked off, how far down the list do you really get?

I heard plenty of "we did Level X" claims in my time, which meant the unit did a field (or approximately field), sometimes range, exercise with a "Level X" theme and subtitle/PR blurb. It almost never meant an O/C team walked around doing O/C stuff with a hot wash after each training or assessment iteration.

 

[FJAG]

If the reserve structure is based on single platoon companies in single company battalions in single battalion regiments collectively commanded by one colonel/acting-brigadier, where, on a typical training night or weekend, does one find a competent local officer capable of assessing more than a section?

That's not correct. You are confusing the structure - as established by the ARE - with the reality of recruiting, retention, and participation on the ground.

The ARE for an infantry battalion provides for a battalion headquarters and headquarters company of 42 all ranks and rifle companies of 128 all ranks with three rifle platoons and a company headquarters. There is a mixture across the country with all battalions authorized at least a single company, some a company and one or two platoons and some with two companies. It's the same for all reserve units. The service battalion structures of Forward Support Groups, rather than companies is , IMHO (I'm no LogO), a good way to go. To my gunner mind, an FSG with 141 all ranks, more than anything, resembles a battalion or regiment's administrative coy with a transport platoon, a combat stores platoon, a food services platoon, and a maintenance platoon.

Much as I like to whinge about the reserve force, the ARE itself is not that bad. It provides the basic foundation that ought to work to create workable companies throughout the year, and to an extent, set the conditions for decent composite unit exercises in the summer.

IMHO, the fundamental problem lies with the "come when you feel like it" system of parading and training that the ARes has. You cannot create a decent anything just on Thursday nights. People need to be there for field exercises and summer concentrations. But . . . they aren't.

 

[Kirkhill]

That's not correct. You are confusing the structure - as established by the ARE - with the reality of recruiting, retention, and participation on the ground.

The ARE for an infantry battalion provides for a battalion headquarters and headquarters company of 42 all ranks and rifle companies of 128 all ranks with three rifle platoons and a company headquarters. There is a mixture across the country with all battalions authorized at least a single company, some a company and one or two platoons and some with two companies. It's the same for all reserve units. The service battalion structures of Forward Support Groups, rather than companies is , IMHO (I'm no LogO), a good way to go. To my gunner mind, an FSG with 141 all ranks, more than anything, resembles a battalion or regiment's administrative coy with a transport platoon, a combat stores platoon, a food services platoon, and a maintenance platoon.

Much as I like to whinge about the reserve force, the ARE itself is not that bad. It provides the basic foundation that ought to work to create workable companies throughout the year, and to an extent, set the conditions for decent composite unit exercises in the summer.

IMHO, the fundamental problem lies with the "come when you feel like it" system of parading and training that the ARes has. You cannot create a decent anything just on Thursday nights. People need to be there for field exercises and summer concentrations. But . . . they aren't.

And what level of training are all of those 128 at?

My observation was that there were two actual company HQs. One had one platoon of people who had been recruited that year and were being led through their BMQ. By the end of the year we were lucky to parade a section regularly. The other company HQ had many promenading officers and one active platoon inhabited by long service militiamen with machine gun and mortar courses, assault pioneer and rappelmaster courses and a smattering of wings.

On a regular parade night we might have 40 or 50 in the armouries and signing in. Plus a few detached on courses.
128 showed up for Remembrance Day, Regimental Birthdays (2 of), and the year end.

I can think of a couple of times we got more than a single coachload out to exercises at Suffield and Wainwright. And we were one of the better performing units at the time. Comments on this site over the years don't give me a sense that a lot has changed.

....

We did have a well staffed BOR with competent clerks (ladies that were secretaries in civvy life), FIN O (civvy accountant and another woman), Adj (civvy oil company manager) and RSS.

 

[FJAG]

My observation was that there were two actual company HQs

Your observations would have been pre ARE. The current ARE came out late in 2012 replacing an earlier on from 2000 which itself replaced earlier versions. Most of those had larger numbers of sub-units.

But all that said, the battalion HQ is 6 people while the remaining 36 are termed a HQ and Services "sub-unit" commanded by a major with a CSM and an individual training cadre of 9 led by a Capt/Lt and a WO.

Units routinely keep authorized sub-unit designators. Gunners, who have distinct number designators for all line subunits which are authorized rather than just A, B or C, can use those designators as the unit sees fit.

For example, when I joined 7 Toronto RCA in 1965 there were three batteries, 9, 15 and 130. Their only difference was what day of the week they paraded on. My battery, 130, paraded on Saturdays and had most of the high school kids while 9 and 15 paraded Tue and Thur evening respectively and had older folks working for a living.

Currently they are authorized a HQ and Services Bty - 130 - and a gun battery -9 - and a mortar battery -15. That translates into 42 + 105 + 105 positions (not counting the band) and they have just under 200 on the books (according to a recent post). In fact, they have 15 and 130 batteries run jointly as one organization primarily as a large HQ and Services and training organization commanded by a captain.

Interestingly there was one article in a recent newsletter about several Toronto gunners who would be going as augmentees to Latvia taking part on the summer concentration with the 1st Battalion, 258 Field Artillery Regiment of the NY Army National Guard at Fort Drum. The 1-258 has three full batteries including M777 and a battalion's complement of counter mortar radars. - That, in a nutshell, describes what is wrong with our ARes. It's not just the establishment per se. The establishment can do the job it is designed for. But . . . the problem is the Canadian army dicks around reshuffling Titanic deckchairs every decade or two rather than addressing what really needs to be done to create effective, deployable, reserve force units that can attract, train, and retain skilled personnel in units that are fully equipped and capable of being mobilized. - 7th Toronto is exactly what I joined 60 years ago. For Christ's sake they are using basically still the same guns I trained on. Probably the most progressive thing in those six decades is that they now have a 20 some odd year-old computer rather than an arty board.

I'm rambling on again but its because I see "Inflection Point 2025" being just another example of the army ignoring and misusing the opportunity that the government has given them in order to focus on the RegF component.

 

[Kirkhill]

Your observations would have been pre ARE. The current ARE came out late in 2012 replacing an earlier on from 2000 which itself replaced earlier versions. Most of those had larger numbers of sub-units.

But all that said, the battalion HQ is 6 people while the remaining 36 are termed a HQ and Services "sub-unit" commanded by a major with a CSM and an individual training cadre of 9 led by a Capt/Lt and a WO.

Units routinely keep authorized sub-unit designators. Gunners, who have distinct number designators for all line subunits which are authorized rather than just A, B or C, can use those designators as the unit sees fit.

For example, when I joined 7 Toronto RCA in 1965 there were three batteries, 9, 15 and 130. Their only difference was what day of the week they paraded on. My battery, 130, paraded on Saturdays and had most of the high school kids while 9 and 15 paraded Tue and Thur evening respectively and had older folks working for a living.

Currently they are authorized a HQ and Services Bty - 130 - and a gun battery -9 - and a mortar battery -15. That translates into 42 + 105 + 105 positions (not counting the band) and they have just under 200 on the books (according to a recent post). In fact, they have 15 and 130 batteries run jointly as one organization primarily as a large HQ and Services and training organization commanded by a captain.

Interestingly there was one article in a recent newsletter about several Toronto gunners who would be going as augmentees to Latvia taking part on the summer concentration with the 1st Battalion, 258 Field Artillery Regiment of the NY Army National Guard at Fort Drum. The 1-258 has three full M777 batteries and a battalion's complement of counter mortar radars. - That, in a nutshell, describes what is wrong with our ARes. It's not just the establishment per se. The establishment can do the job it is designed for. But . . . the problem is the Canadian army dicks around reshuffling Titanic deckchairs every decade or two rather than addressing what really needs to be done to create effective, deployable, reserve force units that can attract, train, and retain skilled personnel in units that are fully equipped and capable of being mobilized. - 7th Toronto is exactly what I joined 60 years ago. For Christ's sake they are using basically still the same guns I trained on. Probably the most progressive thing in those six decades is that they now have a 20 some odd year-old computer rather than an arty board.

I'm rambling on again but its because I see "Inflection Point 2025" being just another example of the army ignoring and misusing the opportunity that the government has given them in order to focus on the RegF component.

Here we agree.

It is the Continental Divide between the permanent constabulary and the insurance policy.

 

[Brad Sallows]

To my gunner mind, an FSG with 141 all ranks, more than anything, resembles a battalion or regiment's administrative coy with a transport platoon, a combat stores platoon, a food services platoon, and a maintenance platoon.

Might be a better fit than the typical infantry/armour/artillery sub-unit-sized element for small communities with no prospect of immediate access to any range complex more ambitious than a 300 metre rifle gallery. Requires buildings, useful general-purpose and not particularly expensive equipment, and mostly just as-needed land clearances. Fills what seems to be a known capability gap.

 

[FJAG]

Might be a better fit than the typical infantry/armour/artillery sub-unit-sized element for small communities with no prospect of immediate access to any range complex more ambitious than a 300 metre rifle gallery. Requires buildings, useful general-purpose and not particularly expensive equipment, and mostly just as-needed land clearances. Fills what seems to be a known capability gap.

Notwithstanding having been shot down by a few folks with much more log experience than I, I think the right solution for our reserve force are service battalions using the American brigade support battalion (BSB) structure.

A BSB has a distribution company and a maintenance company to look after the brigades overall supply, transport and maintenance needs. It also has one forward support company (FSC) for each unit in the brigade. The FSG provides all the log and maintenance needs for these individual battalions and, in the ARNG context, are usually located close to the battalions themselves. Each FSG is tailored for the specific type of battalion it supports.

Like most Guard units, the BSB only parades once a month and on a two-week exercise basically training itself. Their real purpose is to be mobilizable to provide support on operations.

The real, day to day maintenance and logistics for the brigade during peacetime is conducted by full, time Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel (think Class B) working at training centres where much of the gear is stored.

 

[McG]

The real, day to day maintenance and logistics for the brigade during peacetime is conducted by full, time Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel (think Class B) working at training centres where much of the gear is stored.

In Canada under the extant NDA, this day-to-day support should be Reg Force in regional (or sub-regional) general support service battalions (GSSBs).