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Does he say that it would under wartime conditions? I mean why are they under DND if not even then.
Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC
- Thread starter Maxman1
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Switzerland, principles and Francs
Apparently nobody was buying their stuff anymore because they wouldn't supply it once the shooting started.
Change of mind now.
Apparently nobody was buying their stuff anymore because they wouldn't supply it once the shooting started.
Change of mind now.
Halifax Tar
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Good watch
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I saw this on the 'Royal Canadian Navy Yesterday and Today' FB page:
Here’s the reality check people don’t like hearing about the “arm the Coast Guard” debate.
There’s a big difference between designing ships so they could be armed in wartime and turning the Canadian Coast Guard into a second navy in peacetime. Quietly improving sensors, communications, and data sharing with the Royal Canadian Navy under Department of National Defence oversight makes total sense and that's the current plan. That builds the maritime picture, which is often more valuable than another gun. A CCG ship spotting, tracking, and reporting in the Arctic can be strategically more important than one pretending to be a warship.
Some Coast Guard operations already involve firearms in a law-enforcement context, especially during fisheries enforcement. Small arms and even .50 cal capability for force protection isn’t the same thing as turning a vessel into a warship. We have CCG ships for fisheries enforcement that have .50 Cals operated by CCG crews. Mounts, lockers, and ammo storage are technically easy to add. Engineering isn’t the issue.
Where the fantasy starts is the “just put containerized missiles on them” crowd. Missiles aren’t plug and play. They need environmental control, constant maintenance, trained operators, and integration into a fire-= control network. That’s not “open a container and push a button.” Very few navies actually operate containerized systems in a ready, sustained way for a reason, it’s logistically messy and operationally fragile.
The bigger problem is construction standards. Coast Guard ships are built to civilian maritime rules: efficiency, endurance, crew safety. Warships are built to survive being hit. They have shock hardening, protected magazines, redundant firefighting, and serious compartmentalization to stop flooding from spreading. Put missile containers full of explosives on a civilian-standard deck and you haven’t created a combatant , you’ve created a floating ammunition truck without warship survivability. You’re adding offensive risk without adding defensive resilience. That’s a bad trade.
Then there’s command and control. Missiles aren’t just hardware; they’re part of a kill chain involving sensors, targeting, doctrine, and engagement authority. Coast Guard bridge teams aren’t structured like a naval combat information centre. So now you either embark navy crew which effectively makes the ship military anyway or expect civilian mariners to operate combat systems. Legally and culturally, that’s a mess and many would quit if that was to happen.
Most important of all is the legal and strategic line. Right now, the Coast Guard’s value is that it’s seen as civilian: search and rescue, environmental response, icebreaking, access. That status gives freedom of movement and diplomatic flexibility. The moment they start looking like armed auxiliaries, an adversary can argue they’re legitimate military targets. You can bolt a weapon on in a day. You can’t undo how the world categorizes your fleet once that line is crossed.
Designing ships so they can be adapted in wartime is smart contingency planning. Advertising them as combat platforms in peacetime is how you lose the very protection and access that make the Coast Guard useful in the first place.
Here’s the reality check people don’t like hearing about the “arm the Coast Guard” debate.
There’s a big difference between designing ships so they could be armed in wartime and turning the Canadian Coast Guard into a second navy in peacetime. Quietly improving sensors, communications, and data sharing with the Royal Canadian Navy under Department of National Defence oversight makes total sense and that's the current plan. That builds the maritime picture, which is often more valuable than another gun. A CCG ship spotting, tracking, and reporting in the Arctic can be strategically more important than one pretending to be a warship.
Some Coast Guard operations already involve firearms in a law-enforcement context, especially during fisheries enforcement. Small arms and even .50 cal capability for force protection isn’t the same thing as turning a vessel into a warship. We have CCG ships for fisheries enforcement that have .50 Cals operated by CCG crews. Mounts, lockers, and ammo storage are technically easy to add. Engineering isn’t the issue.
Where the fantasy starts is the “just put containerized missiles on them” crowd. Missiles aren’t plug and play. They need environmental control, constant maintenance, trained operators, and integration into a fire-= control network. That’s not “open a container and push a button.” Very few navies actually operate containerized systems in a ready, sustained way for a reason, it’s logistically messy and operationally fragile.
The bigger problem is construction standards. Coast Guard ships are built to civilian maritime rules: efficiency, endurance, crew safety. Warships are built to survive being hit. They have shock hardening, protected magazines, redundant firefighting, and serious compartmentalization to stop flooding from spreading. Put missile containers full of explosives on a civilian-standard deck and you haven’t created a combatant , you’ve created a floating ammunition truck without warship survivability. You’re adding offensive risk without adding defensive resilience. That’s a bad trade.
Then there’s command and control. Missiles aren’t just hardware; they’re part of a kill chain involving sensors, targeting, doctrine, and engagement authority. Coast Guard bridge teams aren’t structured like a naval combat information centre. So now you either embark navy crew which effectively makes the ship military anyway or expect civilian mariners to operate combat systems. Legally and culturally, that’s a mess and many would quit if that was to happen.
Most important of all is the legal and strategic line. Right now, the Coast Guard’s value is that it’s seen as civilian: search and rescue, environmental response, icebreaking, access. That status gives freedom of movement and diplomatic flexibility. The moment they start looking like armed auxiliaries, an adversary can argue they’re legitimate military targets. You can bolt a weapon on in a day. You can’t undo how the world categorizes your fleet once that line is crossed.
Designing ships so they can be adapted in wartime is smart contingency planning. Advertising them as combat platforms in peacetime is how you lose the very protection and access that make the Coast Guard useful in the first place.
daftandbarmy
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FWIW, I think the days of 'we're unarmed so you can't shoot us' are well behind us, and anyone who still thinks that being helpless will keep them safe should also invest in magic spells for all the good that will do
