Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

[Maxman1]

Are you able to say if you’re off in a corner by yourself with a large white board and a box of dry erase markers putting this all together or, are you part of a larger effort connecting the dots and pulling on all the threads?

 

[Halifax Tar]

WRT hardening infrastructure there is a Quebec based company that should make a killing out of its dual use civil-military catalog

Skynex – Networked air defence

The modern air defence system Oerlikon Skynex is based on a concept to separate air traffic control from the effectors.

www.rheinmetall.com

Keep the heavy stuff in storage until the day war breaks out then add the local air defence battery on the net.

 

[ytz]

If y'all want to see how this is being done by the pros... See this presentation by CFD:

https://paxsims.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/cn2025-keeble-cdtip.pdf

And the above modelling and sim is part of this:

Future force design - Canada.ca

As Minister of National Defence, I have the privilege to present the Departmental Plan for Fiscal Year 2024-25. This report identifies the priorities of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and the initiatives that will guide these priorities to...

www.canada.ca

 

[ytz]

The NPSA enters the chat...


National Protective Security Authority

We are the National Technical Authority for physical and personnel security. As part of the Security Service, MI5, we make the UK more resilient to terrorism and state threats. NPSA's risk based guidance, covering: vehicles & drones, insider risk, sabotage, unauthorised entry, hostile reconnaissance, digital risk, explosives & weapons, intellectual property, fire & arson, democratic interference and CBRN

https://www.npsa.gov.uk/

And the MGS:

The MGS has guarded the defence estate for over 25 years and provides unarmed guarding services for over 100 sites in England, Scotland and Wales, including high profile locations such as MOD Main Building in London and His Majesty’s Naval Bases at Portsmouth, Devonport and the Clyde. We are passionate about the services we provide and work hard to keep pace with developments in the security industry, as we seek to be the unarmed guarding provider of choice.

MOD Guard Service

The MGS (MOD Guard Service) plays a vital role supporting MOD security.

www.gov.uk

Yep. Looking at stuff like this is more important than kit. "Armies win battles. Nations win wars." The constant focus on technology and procurement, while understandable (and possibly even excusable) is a massive failing. Kit is only one facet of DOTMLPF. And winning wars requires addressing all of it and across government and society from the DIME perspective.

 

[FJAG]

Yep. Looking at stuff like this is more important than kit. "Armies win battles. Nations win wars." The constant focus on technology and procurement, while understandable (and possibly even excusable) is a massive failing. Kit is only one facet of DOTMLPF. And winning wars requires addressing all of it and across government and society from the DIME perspective.

When I see the acronyms like "DOTMLPF" it reminds me of Ian Hope's article in the 2001-2 in The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin which puts forward the proposition that "doctrine" is a comprehensive concept that includes cognitive, procedural, organizational, material, and moral components. (See attached document - excuse the highlighting).

This was a critical issue at the time (and as it probably is now) in light of the transformation ongoing in the army from a Cold War force.

In effect the "OTMLPF" elements are all a subset of doctrine, not stand alone components.

 

[ytz]

When I see the acronyms like "DOTMLPF" it reminds me of Ian Hope's article in the 2001-2 in The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin which puts forward the proposition that "doctrine" is a comprehensive concept that includes cognitive, procedural, organizational, material, and moral components. (See attached document - excuse the highlighting).

This was a critical issue at the time (and as it probably is now) in light of the transformation ongoing in the army from a Cold War force.

In effect the "OTMLPF" elements are all a subset of doctrine, not stand alone components.

There's a number of ways to skin the proverbial cat. But the overall point here is that far too much attention, focus and effort is dedicated to seeing every single problem as solved by some procurement. That is dangerous and possibly even counterproductive. Kit that you buy with proper doctrine, organization, training, etc. is a target. Not a weapon that enables you to win the fight.

To that end, CDTIP (linked above) is superceding previous capability based planning. CFD is doing something like the example I gave here. They are putting up scenarios and pulling the threads to identify all of the gaps (not just kit), so that they can drive real institutional and governmental change. It's slow. It's tedious. But they are doing god's work in my opinion. It's necessary to move us from a contributing force to a sovereign military.

 

[daftandbarmy]

When I see the acronyms like "DOTMLPF" it reminds me of Ian Hope's article in the 2001-2 in The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin which puts forward the proposition that "doctrine" is a comprehensive concept that includes cognitive, procedural, organizational, material, and moral components. (See attached document - excuse the highlighting).

This was a critical issue at the time (and as it probably is now) in light of the transformation ongoing in the army from a Cold War force.

In effect the "OTMLPF" elements are all a subset of doctrine, not stand alone components.

When I see acronyms like "DOTMLPF" it reminds me that we are, sadly, probably still training our leaders to be corporate automatons as opposed to knowledgeable, gifted, outside the box strategic thinkers and leaders.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yep. Looking at stuff like this is more important than kit. "Armies win battles. Nations win wars." The constant focus on technology and procurement, while understandable (and possibly even excusable) is a massive failing. Kit is only one facet of DOTMLPF. And winning wars requires addressing all of it and across government and society from the DIME perspective.

Further to this,

My current pre-1913 fascination has brought me here.

The 1885 Rebellion was largely the result of a single Militia Squadron, the North West Mounted Rifles out of Prince Albert and Duck Lake. They were natives and metis that signed on to the government pay roll and then were promptly ignored. They had expected to be part of the new white man's economy.

1885 was a hard year due to the usual mix of environmental and political factors. The NWMR wanted their back pay. Their families were starving.
Then they got word that Ottawa was disbanding them. And there was no pay coming. Gabriel Dumont was a Lieutenant in the NWMR and they took the field under him and created a core around which the disgruntled coalesced and Louis Riel found a parade to lead.

Duck Lake was one of two NWMR elements. The other was in Prince Albert.

The rebellion started on March 18, 1885 when Gabriel Dumont and Lois Riel formed The Provisional Government of Saskatchewan and the first battle happened a week later when a squadron sized group of RNWMP, operating in their military role, met, and were defeated by 200-250 similarly armed rebels with at least some military experience.

Batoche was on May 9-12 - 44 days after Duck Lake and 7 weeks from the declaration of the provisional government.
Loon Lake, the final battle, was on June 3, 3 weeks later.
Riel was hanging by 16 November.

At Batoche Dumont's force tied down the Government's 916 troops for 3 days and inflicted casualties.

All-in-all, 250 disgruntled Metis militiamen and a similar number of angry Natives tied down 5000 to 8000 people serving the Crown. A 10 week event.

....

Now how much imagination does it take to conflate Batoche, Oka, Ipperwash, Gustafsen Lake and the 2020 CNR blockade to justify proposing a scenario of a foreign actor encouraging three or four concurrent Batoches, supplying the disgruntled with modern weapons and comms, including drones, along with a leavening of little green men at each site. A company of foreigners supplying a platoons-worth of motivation to each of those three or four sites would give you three or four concurrent Okas with the prospect of three or four concurrent Batoches.

Batoche took 918 troops to quell out of a raised force of 5000 to 8000 police, soldiers and volunteers.
Oka tied down 4500 soldiers, and 2000 SQ with a local force of 75 that at times swelled with 2500 activists, some 500 of whom seem to have taken up weapons from time to time.

Oka lasted from July 11 to September 26 or 2 months, 2 weeks and 1 day.

It seems to me that if I wanted to take the Canadian Army, as well as Canada's police forces, out of the game in Latvia then it wouldn't take much. And add in some Best Buy drones and you can shut down the commercial air space and the ports.

Canada is no longer reinforcing. or supplying anybody, and I would guess that everybody else is busy enough that, if they notice, won't be helping us out anytime soon.

...

So back to YTZ's question - what do you do without the 20th century Yanks or the 19th century Brits? (Or, for that matter, the 18th century French),

 

[GK .Dundas]

Further to this,

My current pre-1913 fascination has brought me here.

The 1885 Rebellion was largely the result of a single Militia Squadron, the North West Mounted Rifles out of Prince Albert and Duck Lake. They were natives and metis that signed on to the government pay roll and then promptly ignored. They had expected to be part of the new white man's economy.

1885 was a hard year due to the usual mix of environmental and political factors. The NWMR wanted their back pay. Their families were starving.
Then they got word that Ottawa was disbanding them. And there was no pay coming. Gabriel Dumont was a Lieutenant in the NWMR and they took the field under him and created a core around which the disgruntled coalesced and Louis Riel found a parade to lead.

Duck Lake was one of two NWMR elements. The other was in Prince Albert.

The rebellion started on March 18, 1885 when Gabriel Dumont and Lois Riel formed The Provisional Government of Saskatchewan and the first battle happened a week later when a squadron sized group of RNWMP, operating in their military role, met, and were defeated by 200-250 similarly armed rebels with at least some military experience.

Batoche was on May 9-12 - 44 days after Duck Lake and 7 weeks from the declaration of the provisional government.
Loon Lake, the final battle, was on June 3, 3 weeks later.
Riel was hanging by 16 November.

At Batoche Dumont's force tied down the Government's 916 troops for 3 days and inflicted casualties.

All-in-all, 250 disgruntled Metis militiamen and a similar number of angry Natives tied down 5000 to 8000 people serving the Crown. A 10 week event.

....

Now how much imagination does it take to conflate Batoche, Oka, Ipperwash, Gustafsen Lake and the 2020 CNR blockade to justify propsing a scenario of a foreign actor encouraging three or four concurrent Batoches, supplying the disgruntled with modern weapons and comms, including drones, along with a leavening of little green men at each site. A company of foreigners supplying a platoons-worth of motivation to each of those three or four sites would give you three or four concurrent Okas with the prospect of three or four concurrent Batoches.

Batoche took 918 troops to quell out of a raised force of 5000 to 8000 police, soldiers and volunteers.
Oka tied down 4500 soldiers, and 2000 SQ with a local force of 75 that at times swelled with 2500 activists, some 500 of whom seem to have taken up weapons from time to time.

Oka lasted from July 11 to September 26 or 2 months, 2 weeks and 1 day.

It seems to me that if I wanted to take the Canadian Army, as well as Canada's police forces, out of the game in Latvia then it wouldn't take much. And add in some Best Buy drones and you can shut down the commercial air space and the ports.

Canada is no longer reinforcing. or supplying anybody, and I would guess that everybody else is busy enough that, if they notice, won't be helping us out anytime soon.

...

So back to YTZ's question - what do you do without the 20th century Yanks or the 19th century Brits? (Or, for that matter, the 18th century French),

That's fu@#ing scary.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Now how much imagination does it take to conflate Batoche, Oka, Ipperwash, Gustafsen Lake and the 2020 CNR blockade to justify propsing a scenario of a foreign actor encouraging three or four concurrent Batoches, supplying the disgruntled with modern weapons and comms, including drones, along with a leavening of little green men at each site. A company of foreigners supplying a platoons-worth of motivation to each of those three or four sites would give you three or four concurrent Okas with the prospect of three or four concurrent Batoches.

It would take alot of imagination, actually, and this will never, ever happen in Canada but I'm impressed nonetheless.

Suggest you sign up for a history course at a local university and get your thesis published. Historians love to trash each other over their crazy ideas, especially if they're well documented and defended by a passionate owner.

I fondly recall the time I successfully argued that modern Canada, ironically, largely owes its existence to British incompetence and parsimony, American opportunism and obstreperousness and, most importantly, the loyalty, organizational effectiveness and industry of the 'conquered peoples' of New France

 

[Colin Parkinson]

During the 1970 October Fest, my troop had the task of guarding one VIP and four hydro towers crossing the St Lawrence River. It took all 30 of us and, IMHO, we were undermanned.

There are many more than merely "several choke points." Risk assessment and priorities are always a challenge, but we are so very short of the numbers and equipment to handle homeland defence in a meaningful way.

There is a piece of vital infrastructure here in Vancouver, that is highly exposed and vulnerable and damage to it could have significant effects. A bit of fencing and some other specific add on's would reduce the risk of a successfully sabotage attack. I pointed this vulnerability out to some "experts" during one of our disaster exercises, but other than being uncomfortable discussing it, nothing ever happened. Sadly typical of our head in the sand approach.

There is a lot of other vital infrastructure out there that would benefit from a bit of hardening.

 

[Kirkhill]

It would take alot of imagination, actually, and this will never, ever happen in Canada but I'm impressed nonetheless.

Suggest you sign up for a history course at a local university and get your thesis published. Historians love to trash each other over their crazy ideas, especially if they're well documented and defended by a passionate owner.

I fondly recall the time I successfully argued that modern Canada, ironically, largely owes its existence to British incompetence and parsimony, American opportunism and obstreperousness and, most importantly, the loyalty, organizational effectiveness and industry of the 'conquered peoples' of New France

Glad to hear that you are an optimist. You usually share my cynicism.

 

[FJAG]

Now how much imagination does it take to conflate Batoche, Oka, Ipperwash, Gustafsen Lake and the 2020 CNR blockade to justify proposing a scenario of a foreign actor encouraging three or four concurrent Batoches, supplying the disgruntled with modern weapons and comms, including drones, along with a leavening of little green men at each site. A company of foreigners supplying a platoons-worth of motivation to each of those three or four sites would give you three or four concurrent Okas with the prospect of three or four concurrent Batoches.

Back in the dark ages when Canada's army stilled believed in tracked vehicles, I was part of a tour of the US Army's Special Forces training facilities at Fort Bragg (the Confederate general Bragg, not the WW2 Private Bragg ).

Anyway . . . as part of the tour we had a slide show presentation (remember - dark ages - no PowerPoint) on A Teams and how each team was targeted to specialize on a certain country. Almost hidden in the fine print was Canada with one A Team allocated to it.

Oka tied down 4500 soldiers, and 2000 SQ with a local force of 75 that at times swelled with 2500 activists, some 500 of whom seem to have taken up weapons from time to time.

One ought to remember when talking force ratios on insurgent operations, that there is a much higher ratio of troops and police in a peacetime blockade/demonstration where it is the country's only security issue and the event does not constitute a national threat. In the situation that you posit, the number of troops allocated would be significantly less, and the rules of engagement much, much more robust. These would, in all probability, not be contain and wait operations but neutralize the threat ones.

That said, I think we all agree that Canada needs a much better capability to respond to these types of scenarios starting with ISR and moving into a large and viable paramilitary force. I think the debate is on the numerous details that relate to that force's structure. (I personally see a role for many, many Senator variants amongst other things)

 

[Kirkhill]

During the 1970 October Fest, my troop had the task of guarding one VIP and four hydro towers crossing the St Lawrence River. It took all 30 of us and, IMHO, we were undermanned.

There are many more than merely "several choke points." Risk assessment and priorities are always a challenge, but we are so very short of the numbers and equipment to handle homeland defence in a meaningful way.

Much of my thinking on these matters has been influenced by the final chapter of this book:

Ghost Force: The Secret History of the SAS: Connor, Ken: 9780304363674: Books - Amazon.ca

Ghost Force: The Secret History of the SAS: Connor, Ken: 9780304363674: Books - Amazon.ca

www.amazon.ca

The basic proposition is that somebody in a suit with a credit card is more of a threat than an armed squadron of SAS troopers.

If you want to make a splash then you go the 1982 Squamish Five route and bomb a substation.

The alternative is a rented quad, a back pack, a wrench, some bleach and some drano... and time.
Neither Hot Dipped Galvanized, nor Stainless Steel, are fans of chlorine or caustic. And power lines are held up by pylons bolted to 4 or 500 tonnes of concrete with HDG or SS bolts. 4 to 6 bolts per leg. 16 to 24 per pylon.

A little time, and assisting nature to speed up the natural maintenance schedule, and you too can recreate the effects of Quebec's 1998 ice storm.

 

[Kirkhill]

Glad to hear that you are an optimist. You usually share my cynicism.

PS. The disgruntled don't have to be natives. We have lots of other domestic candidates.

 

[Kirkhill]

Back in the dark ages when Canada's army stilled believed in tracked vehicles, I was part of a tour of the US Army's Special Forces training facilities at Fort Bragg (the Confederate general Bragg, not the WW2 Private Bragg ).

Anyway . . . as part of the tour we had a slide show presentation (remember - dark ages - no PowerPoint) on A Teams and how each team was targeted to specialize on a certain country. Almost hidden in the fine print was Canada with one A Team allocated to it.



One ought to remember when talking force ratios on insurgent operations, that there is a much higher ratio of troops and police in a peacetime blockade/demonstration where it is the country's only security issue and the event does not constitute a national threat. In the situation that you posit, the number of troops allocated would be significantly less, and the rules of engagement much, much more robust. These would, in all probability, not be contain and wait operations but neutralize the threat ones.

That said, I think we all agree that Canada needs a much better capability to respond to these types of scenarios starting with ISR and moving into a large and viable paramilitary force. I think the debate is on the numerous details that relate to that force's structure. (I personally see a role for many, many Senator variants amongst other things)

I agree with your points. And I have overstated the aggressor for requirements. As you say, and the IRA and others have consistently demonstrated, a small cell of half a dozen or so can generate the core elements for a Batoche/Oka type of force. Beyond the people supporting the cause there are estimated to be 70,000 individuals in Canada involved in organized gangs. Apparently Hell's Angels alone have about a thousand in 30 or 40 chapters.


....

AI helps me out - 500 Irishmen following Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams

Estimates for the number of core, active members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) during the Troubles (roughly 1969–1998) vary, but generally suggest a relatively small hard-core group of volunteers within a larger, fluctuating organization.

• Peak Active Strength: At the height of the conflict in the early 1970s, estimates of the "active" or core membership range from 1,500 (according to CAIN/Martin Melaugh) to several thousand, with some estimates citing up to 1,200 in Belfast alone in 1971.
• Later Years (Cell Structure): After reorganizing into smaller, more secure "cell" structures in the late 1970s, the number of active, full-time volunteers is believed to have reduced to a core group of approximately 500 to 800.
• Total Volunteers: While the core, active, and armed members were relatively few, some estimates suggest that as many as 8,000 to 10,000 individuals may have passed through the ranks of the Provisional IRA over the course of the 30-year conflict, including active volunteers, support staff, and those in prison

Tying down up to 300,000 Brits over 30 years and disrupting the lives and economy of 2,000,000 people locally and 55,000,000 back on the Mainland.

During the Troubles (1969–2007), over 300,000 British military personnel served in Northern Ireland as part of Operation Banner, with troop levels peaking at approximately 21,000 to 27,000 in the 1970s. They worked alongside the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which had over 10,000 officers during the conflict's height.
Wikipedia +3
Key Facts on Security Forces:

• Operation Banner: The longest continuous deployment in British military history, starting in 1969 and ending in July 2007.
• Peak Strength: In 1972, the height of the Troubles, there were 21,000 British troops stationed there. Other estimates place the total military personnel (including local regiments) as high as 27,000.
• Total Serving: More than 300,000 soldiers served in Northern Ireland during the 38-year campaign.
• Police (RUC): The Royal Ulster Constabulary maintained a force of around 10,000+ officers.
• Casualties: 1,441 military personnel died during the operation (722 in paramilitary attacks).
• UDR: The locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was also part of the security effort.
  Reddit +6

At the height of the conflict, the combined strength of the British Army, UDR, and RUC meant a very heavy security presence on the streets to manage riots, checkpoints, and counter-insurgency operations

....

But I am glad to be assured that this can never happen in Canada.

 

[RangerRay]

Anyway . . . as part of the tour we had a slide show presentation (remember - dark ages - no PowerPoint) on A Teams and how each team was targeted to specialize on a certain country. Almost hidden in the fine print was Canada with one A Team allocated to it.

Like these guys…

 

[Kirkhill]

One thing does occur to me - if right, then the unemployment problem goes away.