Lots of possibilities but in my view the "strategic partnership" is most decidedly not new.
I think you need to focus on the term "strategic" within "strategic partnership." The CAG/GoC certainly has a transactional history with GDLS-C. I was around when we got the AVGPs then built by General Motors Diesel (GMD), GM's defence wing. The expected winner of the project was Cadillac-Gauge's (later to become Textron of the TAPV vehicle) when out of left field came the Swiss Mowag Pirhana line. Mowag partnered with GMD and the rest is history.
The genesis behind AVGP was the desire to meet two major defence challenges. 1. 4 CMBG was mech while Canada's forces were lighter. We had some mech and a whole lot of light to be able to respond to world crises rapidly. (remember M109s in Germany; L5s in Canada; an airborne regiment etc etc) The AVGP gave us a light, easily transportable, "highly manoeuvrable" armoured vehicle. Who cares if the armour was paper thin. 2. With the Cougar, we could play armoured warriors in Canada. They were cheap training aids for training troops for rotations to 4 CMBG. Then came the ass-on purchase of the 8 wheeled Bisons for the Militia. We all know how that turned out.
By the end of the 1980s, the army had come to the conclusion that none of their armoured vehicle fleet-AVGP, Bison, Lynx and M113, was up to the task. The light wheeled vehicle fetish had set in but more protection was needed and started a project called the Multi-Role Combat Vehicle family (MRCV). That was deemed unaffordable and morphed into the LAV project. The army got the camels nose under the tent with its need to replace Lynx with the Coyote surveillance and recce vehicle and the, once again, rest is history. There's an excellent
CMJ article by my old gunner colleague Prof Craig Stone that covers the whole story quite well.
The point here is that GDLS-C didn't get involved until it acquired GMD in London in around 2003. I wouldn't call the relationship as strategic- more transactional and forged through a number of independent decisions and CAF policy and tactics changes that drifted us to the all-purpose wheeled armoured vehicle fleets and dealing with previous insufficiencies, or perceived insufficiencies, of the fleets. (I won't even get into the CCV v LAV-UP debacle)
I have a hope with the term "strategic partnership" as heralding a new vision for armoured vehicle production. This is to create a move away from transactional, feast or famine, projects to a directed joint system where DIA staff and CAF project and maintenance staff all partner with GDLS-C design and production staff to create solutions to future needs. My own pet project would be to develop compatible, but tracked, lines of vehicles including cavalry and, dare I say it, tanks. My second wish is a similar partnership with Roshel for a fleet of light armoured and unarmoured vehicles. That would onshore all out major armour needs. I don't know what to think about logistics vehicles. I know that GDLS-C has a hand in the LVM project, but other than the mission modules, I'm not so sure that any permanent manufacturing of medium or heavy vehicles capability will be developed in Canada. IMHO, we need a long-term continuous domestic production line partnership for these types of vehicles.
