When was the IDF using the 60mm high-velocity cannon on operations?
I do appreciate the higher rate of fire and number of stowed on-board kills associated with guns over missiles, but there might be a reason why that 60mm cannon did not enter operational service on AFVs outside of Chile. The 60mm high-velocity cannon seems to be an engineering solution looking for a problem to solve. If you want to kill tanks from a light chassis then ATGMs are your answer.
The M10 Booker, and I am not here to defend it, has been conceived as a bunker-buster/direct fire support system and not a tank-killer. The advantage of the 105mm in that case is the HE payload for its expected role over 25mm to 25mm chain guns and ATGMs that might otherwise be fielded.
I think they mounted it to some super Shermans, not sure they saw combat service.
@Halifax Tar Tar is correct
@TangoTwoBravo. The only country to put the 60mm into service was Chile. The other variants (Super Shermans and M113s, Piranhas and Centauros etc) were never more than prototypes with the results I quoted coming from range tests.
Where this entire line of thought began was with the M10 Booker and its failure to meet the requirements that would have permitted it to replace the Stryker MGS as an infantry support vehicle that could be air-dropped, LAPES'd or even TALO'd.
The Stryker MGS was at least air portable in the C130 and a LAV-25 was air-dropped by the 82nd.
82nd Airborne Division's 3rd Brigade Combat Team airdrop tests Light Armor Vehicle
Working with that as a base, and remembering that a major criticism of the MGS was its auto-loader and its small magazine, got me to wondering about what would happen if the calibre of the gun were reduced. That led me down the trail from 105 to 90 to 76 and ultimately to the 60.
What attracted me to the 60 was that it had a track record with auto-loaders and that, with the right ammunition, it could add to anti-tank defences, or at least manage light armour.
The 60 HVMS, from what I could gather actually started with a 76mm cartridge case. That case was common to the 17 pdr AT gun, the gun on the Sherman Firefly, the Curassier/AMX-13 and the Rooikat, which used a variant of the OtoMelara SR76/62. And OtoMelara, like Bofors, had experience in compact, reliable autoloaders.
Based on that I indulged myself in a thought experiment that resulted in taking the Stryker/Bison hull, using the overhead mount of the MGS but downsizing the 105 to the 60/76. My next leap after that was to question whether a variant of the Bofors 57 autoloader could be considered.
All of this is against the backdrop of autocannons of increasing calibre being considered in a variety of roles, up to and including air defence.
....
The underlying premise is that there are at least three types of forces - light, medium and heavy. The dichotomy between light and heavy has been easy. Light means foot borne. Heavy means track borne. But Medium seems to mean everything and nothing.
That is where I proposed 30 tonne vehicles were already Heavies and no longer Mediums and that 60-70 tonne vehicles were Super Heavies. The Super Heavies are not just hard to transport but put a lot of civilian infrastructure under stress. That means, in my opinion, that their application to the battlefield will be limited. But it also means that, on the right battlefield, they are going to be necessary because the opposition likely has them.
Light Forces are primarily foot borne soldiers that can be easily transported by air, both fixed wing and rotary, to any battlefield, including a tank rich battlefield. That however would not be a wise course of action. They are better deployed where tanks are not likely to be found, or at least, not found in great numbers. Having said that even a lightly armoured self-propelled gun that can be transported by helicopter, or TALO'd by C130, can add a lot to the capabilities of a light force if the enemy doesn't have an equivalent asset. My own touchstone on that is the impact that 4 Scorpions and 4 Scimitars had on the Falklands. I have been a fan of adding the CVRT to the Canadian Army to support its light troops, like the SSF and the CAR, since the 1970s. And I considered the AVGP to have been a poor decision at the time. My own preferences were the CVRTs for the SSF and the Infantry Recce Platoons and the Marder for 4 CMBG. But nobody was asking me.
.
With the arrival of the LAV-25/Coyote/Bison as amphibious 8x8s then I started to reconcile myself to the advantage of a 15 tonne air-portable wheeled force. I was strongly influenced by the Saladin/Saracen/Stalwart solution for End of Empire policing. They were also useful for moving troops on the flanks and between the front and rear. In addition they were an effective thickener, as the Staghound had been when employed by alongside the 6th Airborne Div in Palestine.
....
So, while I appreciate the sentiment of just sending a tank, I qualify that by asking if the tank can be sent, and can it be sent in useful quantities, and further, what can the enemy put in the field.
...
I appreciate that any force can be over-matched both in terms of numbers and capabilities. My position is that the more capabilities I can carry with me into the field the more likely I am going to be able to over-match my opposition. At very least I will force the opposition to expend more effort trying to over-match my force by bringing heavier elements into the field at considerable logistical cost.
