Canada's tanks

[Kirkhill]

I'm putting this here because the Driver called it a tank. Of course he is Household Cavalry.

And this is how they got there from where they were.

 

[IKnowNothing]

One trade for all , same Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 4 vehicules troop for Everyone. Only the vehicules change.

All armored regiment are cavalry regiment.

The CAJ article from last year essentially admit that the current LAV/TAPV combo are pretty much placeholders that don't provide meaningful value within the 4x4 / cavalry construct- so what does?

Medium is pretty much capped at LAV weight- if materially higher might as well just commit to MBT. Based on current offerings that's an option set of essentially upgunned LAV/ Redback/ Jaguar. A squadron of any of the 3 would add meaningful capability to LAV 6 based BG, but so would a squadron of Leo's. Are there scenarios that we would send the medium instead of the heavy? Or both medium and heavy?

Light- how light are we talking? 10 tonne JLTV/Fennek, 7 tonne Hawkei/Jackal, sub 3 tonne GMV/Flyer? What's the mission set, provide firepower for a LIB, security tasks for a LAV Bn, both?

Is there enough value in having separate medium and light?

 

[Fabius]

The Canadian Armoured Corps has taken the Cavalry concept from the British Army so looking at them is useful to a degree to understand what our Armoured Corps is thinking.

My understanding from the last several years of briefings etc. is that the changes are not driven by enemy threat analysis nor force employment either really although that has been tacked on.

The impetus for this was started by concerns that with 2/3 of the Regular Armoured units and all reserves focus on reconnaissance / surveillance the Corps was losing, had lost much of its aggressive offensive mindset. Very very few officers and NCOs had/have training on the MBTs due to the dual stream model of training some on MBT sabre squadron TTPs and training the majority on Recce Squadron TTPs.

The Cav Concept sees everyone trained on the same TTP for a sabre squadron doing all typical missions and tasks that a sabre squadron would do. The concept is that then with a one month conversion vehicle course any squadron can assume a light or heavy role.

The Armoured Corps at times seems to consider the light squadrons with LAVs and TAPVs as equipped with tank trainers although expressly denying that at the same time. Officially the light squadrons do the same tasks as heavy just against a lesser enemy force structure. All can find, fix and strike with the same TTPs.

There was some talk about how the light squadrons could be more strategically mobile and could support the light infantry Bns however I think with the failure to group our light forces in a Bde and with sealift being the primary preferred mechanism for deploying the light squadron that is a dormant if not dead idea that I don’t think is even being considered for the GRTF.

Overall it appears to me to be an effort to maintain an 3 unit regular force armoured corps with reinforcements from a number of reserve units in the face of only having a units worth of MBTs. I say that with no judgment, it’s simply another element of the CAF trying their best to maintain a basic level of competence while working with limited resources.
It does give us something on which to expand our armoured forces given 6-10 years to procure more MBTs.

 

[KevinB]

The Canadian Armoured Corps has taken the Cavalry concept from the British Army so looking at them is useful to a degree to understand what our Armoured Corps is thinking.

My understanding from the last several years of briefings etc. is that the changes are not driven by enemy threat analysis nor force employment either really although that has been tacked on.

The impetus for this was started by concerns that with 2/3 of the Regular Armoured units and all reserves focus on reconnaissance / surveillance the Corps was losing, had lost much of its aggressive offensive mindset. Very very few officers and NCOs had/have training on the MBTs due to the dual stream model of training some on MBT sabre squadron TTPs and training the majority on Recce Squadron TTPs.

Perhaps split the trade - Armoured Crew versus Amoured Reconnaissance ?

The Cav Concept sees everyone trained on the same TTP for a sabre squadron doing all typical missions and tasks that a sabre squadron would do. The concept is that then with a one month conversion vehicle course any squadron can assume a light or heavy role.

More like 2 of Clubs for all trades and masters of none.

The Armoured Corps at times seems to consider the light squadrons with LAVs and TAPVs as equipped with tank trainers although expressly denying that at the same time. Officially the light squadrons do the same tasks as heavy just against a lesser enemy force structure. All can find, fix and strike with the same TTPs.

Ah yes the Cougar re-enters the chat, stop me if you have heard this one before.

There was some talk about how the light squadrons could be more strategically mobile and could support the light infantry Bns however I think with the failure to group our light forces in a Bde and with sealift being the primary preferred mechanism for deploying the light squadron that is a dormant if not dead idea that I don’t think is even being considered for the GRTF.

Well I guess to be fair, the Infantry have fucked that all up, so the Armoured may as well join them in the stupidity.

Overall it appears to me to be an effort to maintain an 3 unit regular force armoured corps with reinforcements from a number of reserve units in the face of only having a units worth of MBTs.

Again a lesson in incompetence taken from the Infantry Regiments...

I say that with no judgment, it’s simply another element of the CAF trying their best to maintain a basic level of competence while working with limited resources.
It does give us something on which to expand our armoured forces given 6-10 years to procure more MBTs.

Somehow I tend to doubt the CAF will even be fielding several hundred MBT's ever again.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Canadian Armoured Corps has taken the Cavalry concept from the British Army so looking at them is useful to a degree to understand what our Armoured Corps is thinking.

My understanding from the last several years of briefings etc. is that the changes are not driven by enemy threat analysis nor force employment either really although that has been tacked on.

The impetus for this was started by concerns that with 2/3 of the Regular Armoured units and all reserves focus on reconnaissance / surveillance the Corps was losing, had lost much of its aggressive offensive mindset. Very very few officers and NCOs had/have training on the MBTs due to the dual stream model of training some on MBT sabre squadron TTPs and training the majority on Recce Squadron TTPs.

The Cav Concept sees everyone trained on the same TTP for a sabre squadron doing all typical missions and tasks that a sabre squadron would do. The concept is that then with a one month conversion vehicle course any squadron can assume a light or heavy role.

The Armoured Corps at times seems to consider the light squadrons with LAVs and TAPVs as equipped with tank trainers although expressly denying that at the same time. Officially the light squadrons do the same tasks as heavy just against a lesser enemy force structure. All can find, fix and strike with the same TTPs.

There was some talk about how the light squadrons could be more strategically mobile and could support the light infantry Bns however I think with the failure to group our light forces in a Bde and with sealift being the primary preferred mechanism for deploying the light squadron that is a dormant if not dead idea that I don’t think is even being considered for the GRTF.

Overall it appears to me to be an effort to maintain an 3 unit regular force armoured corps with reinforcements from a number of reserve units in the face of only having a units worth of MBTs. I say that with no judgment, it’s simply another element of the CAF trying their best to maintain a basic level of competence while working with limited resources.
It does give us something on which to expand our armoured forces given 6-10 years to procure more MBTs.

Is there an institutional reluctance to consider an All-Arms or Combined-Arms regiment after the fashion of the US Army's Cavalry or the Swedish Army's Pansarbataljonen? Something that intimately and permanently mixes Leos and LAVs with infanteers/assault troopers? It would seem to me to be a reasonable organizational base for both an aggressive offensive mindset as well as recce and screening.

It would spread the few tanks that are available and mix them with other assets to create a solid offensive force that can act against an appropriate enemy force.

If it is possible to select a light or a heavy force depending on the nature of the enemy force then surely it must be possible to say that we have a given capability that is useful against enemy forces of this type and quality? We know that you can't tackle everything. Nobody should expect that.

Edit - transferring some of the LAVs to the RCAC would free up more ground-pounders for a properly resourced Light Force that would justify an air mobile force that can be deployed strategically with best in class light armoured assets.

 

[GR66]

Is there an institutional reluctance to consider an All-Arms or Combined-Arms regiment after the fashion of the US Army's Cavalry or the Swedish Army's Pansarbataljonen? Something that intimately and permanently mixes Leos and LAVs with infanteers/assault troopers? It would seem to me to be a reasonable organizational base for both an aggressive offensive mindset as well as recce and screening.

But what colour beret would be in command???

 

[Kirkhill]

But what colour beret would be in command???

My wife could felt up a bunch of these.



But there is a whole dietary regime that comes with them.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Role of Armour:
To defeat the enemy through the aggressive use of firepower and battlefield mobility.​

aka, Speed and Violence​

Not with LAVs, TAPV or GWagon.

There is only one way to fulfill the Role of the Corps and that's with tanks. Tracks, turrets and big effing guns.

 

[FJAG]

Is there an institutional reluctance to consider an All-Arms or Combined-Arms regiment after the fashion of the US Army's Cavalry

I wouldn't hold the US Army's "Cavalry" as a positive example for this concept. Combined arms is a straight armor / mech infantry concept.

Cavalry in the US Army is primarily a reconnaissance concept which has had rounds of trying to find the right establishment/equipment mix for some time. Most of the cavalry is in the BCTs where the establishments vary depending on the type of BCT with equipment choices that go from footborne to HMWWVs to Strykers to MGS to M3 Bradleys and M1.

The concept of the Cold War Armored Cavalry Regiments went through a changes as well and were purged albeit some remained as Cavalry Brigade Combat Teams (like the Idaho National Guard's 116th CBCT) but in reality these are just ABCTs by another name wearing black hats - they herald the survival of a brand name rather than a unique combined arms organization. And don't get me started on the 1st Cavalry Division which is basically just an armored division with several CBCTs - once again with black hats - but with a heritage which included once having been the 1st Cavalry Division (airmobile) with grunts and helicopters (and black hats)

Long story short, from an outsiders viewpoint looking in, while the combined arms model is in there, US Cavalry organizations are every bit as mixed up - if not much more so - than the developing Canadian concept. By my way of figuring the new Canadian cavalry models are heavily influenced by the American ones albeit at a reduced scale and without the lethal weapons that they need to be effective.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

My wife could felt up a bunch of these.

View attachment 81246

But there is a whole dietary regime that comes with them.

Gravy?

 

[Ludoc]

But what colour beret would be in command???

Of an a unit with an aggressively offensive mind set? Probably aggressive salmon.

How could the CAF turn down the opportunity to make a new hat?

 

[GK .Dundas]

Of an a unit with an aggressively offensive mind set? Probably aggressive salmon.

How could the CAF turn down the opportunity to make a new hat?

Well not only are you more likely to get a new hat then a new tank but I suspect the procurement process should ,take less time and should cost less then new tanks ...... possibly.

 

[quadrapiper]

On the general topic of Canada's tanks, and how the CA presents itself, I was quite impressed with a few clips of an interview with IIRC a LdSH captain by CBC when the first Leos were being sent to Ukraine. A competent-sounding officer, with a definite fondness for tanks.

Need to see more of people like her.

 

[ueo]

But what colour beret would be in command???

IAW new dress regs- pink!

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Thanks for the informative update!

Dumb question: why eight recce squadrons? (after C Sqn RCD converts)

Sorry - missed this.

My understanding is that it will be seven recce/Armour Sqn (Medium/Light) Sqns. This is the current Pet and Val laydown with C Sqn RCD in Gagetown converting while the LdSH convert their one recce/Armour Sqn (Medium/Light) to tanks (Armour Squadron Heavy?).

I don't want to get too far into the eFP commitment, but both types of squadrons will be deploying there. There were a variety of factors at play, with tank centralization being one of them.

From a structure point of view I think it would be preferable to have more tank sub-units, but we work in the now with what we have...

For those serving there is a new Doctrine Note. The role of armoured cavalry is to find, shape and defeat the enemy through the aggressive use of firepower and mobility.

Light, medium, and heavy AFVs are defined. Tanks are heavy (tracks, turret cannon, able to destroy similar threats while also protected against similar threats). Medium armour is a bit of a question mark.

Is a LAV Recce a light or medium AFV? I tend to think its a light AFV using the doctrine note's definitions. A TAPV is certainly light. So is a LUVW. Super-light. Ultra-light. I think in practice the distinction between Medium and Light will be rather moot for the time being, but perhaps there will be some capability development. Medium works great for Goldilocks' choice of porridge temperature, but it can be an awkward place in terms of battlefield capabilities.

The organization of armoured regiments and squadrons will be more or less identical, but equipment will vary. "Heavy" squadrons will have four troops of four heavy AFVs, while Medium/Light Squadrons will have four troops of four medium or light AFVs. Medium/Light Squadrons might have some additional assets.

In theory, a heavy squadron with Leopard 2A6Ms will use the same tactics as a squadron equipped with TAPVs. Dependent on the threat/situation they are all intended to execute the same tactical tasks. So a Troop equipped with Leopard 2A6M could Screen or conduct a Zone Recce while a Troop with LAV Recce or TAPV could Destroy or Support by Fire.

This does enable one stream of tactics courses for leadership. Without minimizing the challenges, converting between platforms should be less difficult. I've converted a recce sqn to a tank sqn and it was certainly a process.

 

[FJAG]

Light, medium, and heavy AFVs are defined. Tanks are heavy (tracks, turret cannon, able to destroy similar threats while also protected against similar threats). Medium armour is a bit of a question mark.

Where I'm having the disconnect in all this is the "F" in "AFV".

Tanks - no problems.

LAVs and TAPVs - big problem. I can see both in the recce role. Where the problem comes in for me is with the theory:

In theory, a heavy squadron with Leopard 2A6Ms will use the same tactics as a squadron equipped with TAPVs. Dependent on the threat/situation they are all intended to execute the same tactical tasks. So a Troop equipped with Leopard 2A6M could Screen or conduct a Zone Recce while a Troop with LAV Recce or TAPV could Destroy or Support by Fire.

I can't see that you can choose your threats all that easily. Threats are whatever comes your way and most likely they won't be isolated TAPV or LAV analogs. Especially when we're in the offensive phase.

I can clearly see uses for LAVs and TAPVs in a screen fight if they are up armed considerably with ATGMs, loitering munitions and tied into a system of guns and missiles which do the killing. But I think that calls for different organizations, doctrine and TTPs from the way that tanks fight. For LAVs and TAPVs, the "F", the "firepower", needs to come from elsewhere in the "here and now."

I can see tanks and LAVs and TAPVs as being complementary in a fight, but I don't see that they are a replacement for each other even if we had the ability to be selective in the level of threat that they face.

Maybe I'm a bit too influenced by the difference between a combined arms battalion and a cavalry squadron in an ABCT and how they differ and how they fight. The same for a UK armoured brigade and a deep reconnaissance strike brigade in an armoured division. The concepts are a bit different but both of those make sense to me as "fighting" organizations.

This Canadian cavalry concept is a bit reminiscent of when we received Grizzlies and Cougars. The Grizzlies made sense. The Cougars only made sense if you saw them as a training aid for teaching combined arms tactics to people destined for 4 CMBG's Leopards.

I think the armoured corps is very much in the same conundrum as the artillery - it's too small to diversify and still manage trade and career development in a comprehensive way. Four regiments of gunners are trying to spread themselves across guns and tactical groups (FSCCs, FOOs, JTACs) and STA and GS and soon AD again. Armour has the same problem in thinking light, medium and heavy with just three regiments. It's a tough challenge.

 

[GR66]

It's fitting the doctrine to the equipment rather then equipping to suite your doctrine.

I get it that you often have to make due with what you have on hand, but it often seems like our military leadership is too quick to roll over than to try and make the case to the government of the day.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm putting this here because the Driver called it a tank. Of course he is Household Cavalry.

And this is how they got there from where they were.

Just noticed something taking another look at the first "everything's fixed" video.

The driver says his Ajax "tank" weighs 40 tonnes.
The reporter says the Atlas ARV has a 30 tonne winch.

Is that a problem?

 

[Kirkhill]

Where I'm having the disconnect in all this is the "F" in "AFV".

Tanks - no problems.

LAVs and TAPVs - big problem. I can see both in the recce role. Where the problem comes in for me is with the theory:

The theory fits if you treat the Tanks like TAPVs and LAVs rather than treating the TAPVs and LAVs like Tanks.
That seems to be Ukrainian practice.

They keep a healthy distance between themselves and the opposition and rely on their optics and third party drones. They engage at extreme range.

Neither the Russians nor Ukrainians seem to have had much success massing their vehicles.

 

[IKnowNothing]

It's fitting the doctrine to the equipment rather then equipping to suite your doctrine.

I get it that you often have to make due with what you have on hand,

I don't think that's fair.

Seems like it would be a far easier "fit" to tweak existing armoured recce doctrine to accomodate for mixed Coyote 2.0 / TAPV squadrons than to completely redefine 2/3's of the RCAC and leave it ill equiped for said new definition for the balance of the decade.

To the contrary I'd say this is a fairly blatant and ambitious long term play for the RCAC to stake its ground for the next round of fleet recapitalization.

If the name of the game is trade commonality, and taking our marriage to a certain London company, my guess is there might be some engineers feverishly copying the homework of the Centauro II.