Canada's tanks

[Colin Parkinson]

Armoured Recce should be a VBL or Lynx (tracked) type vehicle equipped with a mast mounted optic that does not require stays and several small UAS's. Their job is to work near the front lines, have enough armour to help protect against smaller FPV munitions and artillery fragments. Be mobile to move quickly and small enough to easily conceal. They will be the mobile eyes and ears and supplement what the infantry units have organically. It's unlikely they ever cross enemy lines, but they could move forward to support advances of our infantry and bring both direct and indirect fire. They need to have basic FOO training.
The plus side is that these units can also operate in low threat environments such as UN/COIN missions (if ever again we do them) provide the force commander with good up to date intel.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Canadian Armoured Corps has taken the Cavalry concept from the British Army so looking at them is useful to a degree to understand what our Armoured Corps is thinking.

My understanding from the last several years of briefings etc. is that the changes are not driven by enemy threat analysis nor force employment either really although that has been tacked on.

The impetus for this was started by concerns that with 2/3 of the Regular Armoured units and all reserves focus on reconnaissance / surveillance the Corps was losing, had lost much of its aggressive offensive mindset. Very very few officers and NCOs had/have training on the MBTs due to the dual stream model of training some on MBT sabre squadron TTPs and training the majority on Recce Squadron TTPs.

The Cav Concept sees everyone trained on the same TTP for a sabre squadron doing all typical missions and tasks that a sabre squadron would do. The concept is that then with a one month conversion vehicle course any squadron can assume a light or heavy role.

The Armoured Corps at times seems to consider the light squadrons with LAVs and TAPVs as equipped with tank trainers although expressly denying that at the same time. Officially the light squadrons do the same tasks as heavy just against a lesser enemy force structure. All can find, fix and strike with the same TTPs.

There was some talk about how the light squadrons could be more strategically mobile and could support the light infantry Bns however I think with the failure to group our light forces in a Bde and with sealift being the primary preferred mechanism for deploying the light squadron that is a dormant if not dead idea that I don’t think is even being considered for the GRTF.

Overall it appears to me to be an effort to maintain an 3 unit regular force armoured corps with reinforcements from a number of reserve units in the face of only having a units worth of MBTs. I say that with no judgment, it’s simply another element of the CAF trying their best to maintain a basic level of competence while working with limited resources.
It does give us something on which to expand our armoured forces given 6-10 years to procure more MBTs.

And then there's the 'Cav Scout'

 

[KevinB]

Armoured Recce should be a VBL or Lynx (tracked) type vehicle equipped with a mast mounted optic that does not require stays and several small UAS's. Their job is to work near the front lines, have enough armour to help protect against smaller FPV munitions and artillery fragments. Be mobile to move quickly and small enough to easily conceal. They will be the mobile eyes and ears and supplement what the infantry units have organically. It's unlikely they ever cross enemy lines, but they could move forward to support advances of our infantry and bring both direct and indirect fire. They need to have basic FOO training.
The plus side is that these units can also operate in low threat environments such as UN/COIN missions (if ever again we do them) provide the force commander with good up to date intel.

I’d argue that there is no need for that role anymore.
There is a role for protected mobility, and a role for ISR, however the role that Armoured Recce and CavScouts held has been eclipsed by the advancement of uncrewed systems, and ISR systems.

There are some Mud Recce, SR and Engineer Recce task that haven’t yet been a supplanted by UCGV/UAS/Robotic Systems— but quite frankly those will mostly likely fall as well in the next decade. As even now units that have extremely high budgets can get those tasks done via extremely expensive systems that aren’t generally public domain yet.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I’d argue that there is no need for that role anymore.
There is a role for protected mobility, and a role for ISR, however the role that Armoured Recce and CavScouts held has been eclipsed by the advancement of uncrewed systems, and ISR systems.

There are some Mud Recce, SR and Engineer Recce task that haven’t yet been a supplanted by UCGV/UAS/Robotic Systems— but quite frankly those will mostly likely fall as well in the next decade. As even now units that have extremely high budgets can get those tasks done via extremely expensive systems that aren’t generally public domain yet.

I see armoured recce basically being FOO parties, the armour is there for protection and not actually going across frontlines.

 

[KevinB]

I see armoured recce basically being FOO parties, the armour is there for protection and not actually going across frontlines.

FOO’s are Arty (or SOF personnel trainer as Observers) it’s not an Armored role.

 

[Kirkhill]

What would be the point? If we need something that strong for recce, what should we be using for assaults? And if we don't need something that strong for assaults, why would we need it for recce?

With 80 to 100 tanks able to field a squadron at a time how much of a trench line are we going to be able to storm? A km or two?

We can find and fix. Can we destroy? Or does somebody else have to do that?

 

[Kirkhill]

FOO’s are Arty (or SOF personnel trainer as Observers) it’s not an Armored role.

I think you might want to discuss that with the Brits.
Their Divisional Recce Strike Brigade suggests something different.

 

[Kirkhill]

I’d argue that there is no need for that role anymore.
There is a role for protected mobility, and a role for ISR, however the role that Armoured Recce and CavScouts held has been eclipsed by the advancement of uncrewed systems, and ISR systems.

There are some Mud Recce, SR and Engineer Recce task that haven’t yet been a supplanted by UCGV/UAS/Robotic Systems— but quite frankly those will mostly likely fall as well in the next decade. As even now units that have extremely high budgets can get those tasks done via extremely expensive systems that aren’t generally public domain yet.

I think it depends on how close to the FEBA you have to get to see what is happening. And how far into the rear you get to see.
In the dispersed battlefield can you penetrate into the enemy's rear?

The vehicles may only carry the UAS into range.

 

[McG]

I think you might want to discuss that with the Brits.
Their Divisional Recce Strike Brigade suggests something different.

Some ideas coming out of UK in 2014-2020 might have been motivated by budget pressures more than what is best operational capability.

Military expenditure per capita

Military expenditures include military and civil personnel, operation and maintenance, procurement, military research and development, and military aid. Civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities are excluded. This data is expressed in US dollars. It is adjusted for...

ourworldindata.org

 

[childs56]

My belief is Canada’s Army is way to small not to get Cadillac equipment.

You can’t afford to lose anything- be it equipment or personnel, so best to hedge towards the best.

I agree we should have a fleet of state of the art equipment across the board.

 

[Kirkhill]

Some ideas coming out of UK in 2014-2020 might have been motivated by budget pressures more than what is best operational capability.

View attachment 81298

Military expenditure per capita

Military expenditures include military and civil personnel, operation and maintenance, procurement, military research and development, and military aid. Civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities are excluded. This data is expressed in US dollars. It is adjusted for...

ourworldindata.org

Fair comment.

 

[FJAG]

I think you might want to discuss that with the Brits.
Their Divisional Recce Strike Brigade suggests something different.

Yes and no. I'm on board with Deep Recce Strike, but like everything else there's a certain level of all arms call for fire that you can teach to most people in a reasonable amount of time but there's so much more involved in FOOing, JTACing and FSCCing.

Deep Recce strike will have a coordinating arty CO (read bde level FSCC, STACC and ASCC) and a number of tactical gps (read Bn level FSCC, FOOs and JTACs etc) to round out the brigade. It's an even more complex task than at the manoeuvre brigade level.

I’d argue that there is no need for that role anymore.
There is a role for protected mobility, and a role for ISR, however the role that Armoured Recce and CavScouts held has been eclipsed by the advancement of uncrewed systems, and ISR systems.

I think that the "traditional" way of doing that job is changing - and dramatically - but a lot of the basic way of operating is still there.

I can see a troop of VBLs with each vehicle carrying multiple drones and controllers, supported by a nearby launch platform and various uncrewed systems. Basically you still need people forward, easily concealed, armoured, lightly armed but connected into multiple weapon systems with which to strike deep. Maybe behind them is a pool of heavy armour and some infantry and the odd engineer to help bail them out when shit happens.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yes and no. I'm on board with Deep Recce Strike, but like everything else there's a certain level of all arms call for fire that you can teach to most people in a reasonable amount of time but there's so much more involved in FOOing, JTACing and FSCCing.

Deep Recce strike will have a coordinating arty CO (read bde level FSCC, STACC and ASCC) and a number of tactical gps (read Bn level FSCC, FOOs and JTACs etc) to round out the brigade. It's an even more complex task than at the manoeuvre brigade level.



I think that the "traditional" way of doing that job is changing - and dramatically - but a lot of the basic way of operating is still there.

I can see a troop of VBLs with each vehicle carrying multiple drones and controllers, supported by a nearby launch platform and various uncrewed systems. Basically you still need people forward, easily concealed, armoured, lightly armed but connected into multiple weapon systems with which to strike deep. Maybe behind them is a pool of heavy armour and some infantry and the odd engineer to help bail them out when shit happens.

Interesting claims from the Ukrainians

1. The Robotyne and Avdiivka operations are linked - Ukrainians pushing at Robotyne and Russians pushing at Avdiivka.
2. Both Russians and Ukrainians relocated forces from Robotyne to Avdiivka
3. Russians moved 50% of their forces while the Ukrainians moved 40%.
4. Russians left their front line in place and relocated their entire reserve and abandoned unit rotation.
5. The Ukrainians reduced their front line strength but retained their reserves and preserved unit rotation.
6. The Ukrainians also reassigned their artillery support. Volume went to the Avdiivka front to deal with the mass of infantry. Precision went to Robotyne to continue the wearing down.
7. The Russians eventually succumbed to fatigue in Robotyne and Kopani and let the Ukrainians slip through their lines. NVGs and silencers permitted the Ukrainians to suppress the Russian guards and allowed the Ukrainians access to an underground barracks. The occupants were machine gunned in their sleep. The Ukrainians left, threw in a few grenades and departed.
8. The Ukrainians are now widening the Robotyne salient rather than deepening it.
9. Against this back drop the Russian Avdiivka assaults are resulting in more than 1000 killed and wounded Russians every day.
10. Cluster rounds work really well against infantry attacks. (And the don't wear out barrels as fast).

Being a drone operator in the Ukraine war:

• it’s exhausting,
• stressful,
• you’re a HV target,
• people expect more than drone with a dying battery can often deliver.

https://x.com/DanielR33187703/status/1724939623938584952?s=20

It strikes me that the impact of the Drone campaign is akin to the effect of the sniper. It is ultimately a harassing campaign. Only with much greater range, a much larger target set and denying the targets the comfort of cover. They can be killed anywhere, any time, in any vehicle or any trench, dugout or building.

It is likely to be much more effective, and cost efficient, than harassment by artillery fire. I suspect the psychological effects on the enemy are likely to be greater. I also suspect that the material effects are also likely to be significantly greater. $5000 drones that take a week to build are destroying $100,000,000 EW and AD assets that take a year to build. And the operators that take years to train.

And with the drones being as cheap as they are they can be expended against trucks carrying troops, against battery ammunition dumps and company CPs.

The arty is saved for dealing with imminent threats and concentrations by applying volume of fire and mass. Effects that are enhanced by employing cluster munitions judiciously.

....

If this then tanks at the front are as vulnerable as infanteers. Over time both of them will suffer casualties and be worn down.

But

If tanks, or infantry, are kept in reserve for shock action how do you get them to the front line. Somebody once described breaching options to me as a choice between slow and quiet or fast and noisy. If you go fast and noisy you invite the attentions of conventional artillery. If you go slow and quiet you risk being worn down before you gets a useful mass into position and risk giving away your intentions.

Is it better to go with a constant trickle of reinforcements across a broad front, accepting a constant loss rate as the price of keeping the enemy guessing, then looking for opportunities to bring all those probing fingers together into fists?

If that course of action then keeping tanks forwards, at least some portion of them, makes sense to me.

When, or if, the enemy can be put on the backfoot then there would be opportunities to bring a heavy reserve forward to exploit the situation.

....

WW1 in the west was characterized by an inability to exploit opportunities because the reserve either wasn't available or couldn't get forwards over the ground fast enough. Even Cambrai, which was a tactical success, failed at the strategic level due to the lack of a ready reserve.

The Hundred Days started with an assault over new ground by hardened troops exploiting combined arms, as at Cambrai, but that had significant reserves. Reserves that could be brought forwards in useful numbers even while absorbing losses en route to the front.

 

[ueo]

Honestly the issue can’t solely be laid at the feet of the GoC, the CA does a marvelously shitty job of writing requirements, and often buys obsolete equipment as it’s easy.

And then wants Cdn content and multi change orders dependant on wind direction.

 

[ueo]

FOO’s are Arty (or SOF personnel trainer as Observers) it’s not an Armored role.

Most Tp Ldrs and many TCs were trained in calling arty. Guess its a dying art now as trg time more useful in colored hair and men in skirts!

 

[Kirkhill]

Calling for fires and fire control

How Ukraine’s “Uber for Artillery” is Leading the Software War Against Russia

www.newamerica.org

“Uber for Artillery”​

Today, Ukraine’s software offense is perhaps best embodied by a software package called Geographic Information System Art for Artillery (“GIS Arta” for short). A GIS is any computer software used to depict and manipulate geographic data. GISs are in use across numerous industries and sectors. For example, popular mobile navigation app Google Maps is a GIS. GIS Arta weaves together disparate targets, sensors, and artillery units into an “Uber for artillery.” Uber uses algorithms to optimize across riders, positions, and traffic to assign trips to drivers in a given geographic area. GIS Arta uses an algorithm to optimize across variables like target type, position, and range to assign “fire missions” to available artillery units. Users connect to GIS Arta using phones, laptops, and tablets connected to military radios, cellphones, or the Starlink satellite internet system.

Artillery units connect to the network and mark themselves open for “jobs” in much the same way that Uber drivers make themselves available for potential rides in a phone app. A graphical interface with touch capability allows users to select targets, after which artillery batteries within range are highlighted for fire missions. The time from target acquisition to fire mission can be as little as 30 to 45 seconds. Information in GIS Arta is sourced from drones, targets reported by forward observers armed with cell phones, counter battery radars, and satellite-based imagery. GIS Arta even embeds information like munition suitability into its targeting process. For example, a mortar team can be assigned to attack personnel in the open, or an artillery unit can be assigned to attack a vehicle target. With GIS Arta, multiple guns in different locations can be brought to bear on the same target all at once.

GIS Arta allows for the dynamic employment and deployment of Ukrainian artillery on the battlefield. Ukraine’s batteries can displace, or “shoot and scoot,” setting up, firing, and moving on again from one location to the next within minutes rather than hours. This reduces the opportunities Russia has to engage in devastating counter battery fire. (Of note, Ukraine is likely playing a similar game of cat-and-mouse to protect its Patriot batteries around Kyiv in the face of attack by Russian hypersonic missiles.) GIS Arta also allows Ukraine to overcome a significant artillery hardware disadvantage. On some parts of the front line, Russian artillery outnumbers Ukrainian hardware 20 to one. GIS Arta acts as a “force multiplier,” increasing the effectiveness of each given artillery unit by enabling them to take on more targets, more accurately, and with less time and risk.

GIS Arta is, at its core, an application like any other found on a common smartphone or computer. Like Uber or Google Maps, it needs infrastructure and human capital to sustain it. Human developers write and maintain its code. They also build and maintain the networked systems it lives on. With multiple users spread across a vast physical and cyber space, GIS Arta has many points of entry that must be secured. Like any smartphone or computer application, it is vulnerable to cyber threats and must be updated on a continuous basis to maintain its integrity. Ukraine has built an ecosystem capable of developing and protecting software like GIS Arta thanks to a concerted, long-term investment in its information technology sector.

...

https://i.vimeocdn.com/video/630237211-4932a6a6e16f0a56ddcb75d77a5161604de1055833d3532ed88c729af98e7dbb-d?f=webp

A BFIST can designate targets for artillery batteries even while itself under fire. The vehicle’s armor protects its four crew from small arms and artillery fragments. Its 25-millimeter gun is good for self-defense. A BFIST can spot targets while on the move.

Ukraine’s other methods of targeting its precision artillery are fragile in comparison. Drones can be jammed or shot down. Unprotected forward observers are vulnerable to snipers and artillery and practically every other threat on the battlefield.

Ukraine also is getting from the United States a small number of reconnaissance-optimized Stryker wheeled fighting vehicles that, while not quite as sophisticated as a BFIST, also can spot targets from miles away.

Ukraine apparently got some dumbed-down versions of IFATDS

Ukrainian Troops will get IFATDS Automated Field Artillery Control Systems from USA | Defense Express

The contract command of the US Ground Forces has placed a tender for the purchase for Ukraine of sets of an automated field artillery fire control system (IFATDS), related software, as well as a profile course for training complex operators

en.defence-ua.com

...

A RUSI article on the role of the artillery and the different demands when switching from defence to offense.

Lean on the Barrage: The Role of Artillery in Ukraine's Counteroffensive

Artillery has been a crucial capability for Ukraine in the conflict to date. As attention turns to the long-awaited counteroffensive, fires are once again coming into focus. However, the way guns are employed when shifting from the defence to the offence must change to unlock their full...

rusi.org

 

[FJAG]

Most Tp Ldrs and many TCs were trained in calling arty. Guess its a dying art now as trg time more useful in colored hair and men in skirts!

The all-arms call for fire is still a useful thing.

Fire support has gotten more complex. Almost all the precision weapon systems these days need specialist tools and training to use - expensive training. In my day we all had the same tools--a map, a set of binos, a compass, a grease pencil and a radio. The gear that FOOs and JTACs have these days are not widely distributed. I think its going to become even more complex once we introduce drones and loitering munitions on the scale that they should be.

I'm not saying that recce can't be taught this and equipped for it - in fact I'm very much of the view that they should be. From what I see from the outside looking in its that recce should be moving from just ISTAR to being an organization that adds a heavy attritional fight to its ISTAR functions through a variety of stand-off precision weapons tied in to a variety of sensors. IMHO - in the recce (or cavalry role) the FOO will more than likely become a fire support coordinator across a wide front rather than the guy that actually engages targets. It's the recce dets that will be doing the actual engagements.

I think the Brits have the concept right with "deep strike" but right now they are doing it with the tools at hand while they are working out more efficient ways of doing business. Coupling recce in its various forms with long range fires is the answer. Solutions to problems that dictated how we fought in the past are popping up all over the place. Its time to develop the doctrine and TTPs to make it work and acquire the right tool sets to give it effect.

 

[Kirkhill]

The all-arms call for fire is still a useful thing.

Fire support has gotten more complex. Almost all the precision weapon systems these days need specialist tools and training to use - expensive training. In my day we all had the same tools--a map, a set of binos, a compass, a grease pencil and a radio. The gear that FOOs and JTACs have these days are not widely distributed. I think its going to become even more complex once we introduce drones and loitering munitions on the scale that they should be.

I'm not saying that recce can't be taught this and equipped for it - in fact I'm very much of the view that they should be. From what I see from the outside looking in its that recce should be moving from just ISTAR to being an organization that adds a heavy attritional fight to its ISTAR functions through a variety of stand-off precision weapons tied in to a variety of sensors. IMHO - in the recce (or cavalry role) the FOO will more than likely become a fire support coordinator across a wide front rather than the guy that actually engages targets. It's the recce dets that will be doing the actual engagements.

I think the Brits have the concept right with "deep strike" but right now they are doing it with the tools at hand while they are working out more efficient ways of doing business. Coupling recce in its various forms with long range fires is the answer. Solutions to problems that dictated how we fought in the past are popping up all over the place. Its time to develop the doctrine and TTPs to make it work and acquire the right tool sets to give it effect.

Is there a simple solution to be found in simply training more Fire Controllers, Forward Observation Officers, JFACs etc and just assigning them downwards as the USMC seems to be doing with their Asst Squad Leaders / Systems Operators?

We seem to be stumbling over the need for concentration and the dispersed battlefield.

I am seeing a lot of evidence that suggests concentration is becoming harder and distribution is becoming more necessary.

If that is so then delivery of effects from stand off positions is going to become more prevalent. That suggests one of two things to me: the section/squad requires longer ranged munitions which will necessarily be larger and more complex or they require the means to accurately designate fires from third parties.

Some years back a young infanteer on this site argued that in the future he could envisage the section as an escort for the sensor operators and that the sensor operator, not the machine gun, would become the central organizing principle.

I think that day has come.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Most Tp Ldrs and many TCs were trained in calling arty. Guess its a dying art now as trg time more useful in colored hair and men in skirts!

Every CC in a recce troop has the capability to do fire missions providing we have arty on call.

EDIT: I've been out of the saddle for awhile, so I'm not sure about all the new doodads or requirements to call fire on target. I'll offer two things.

One- We never, in all my miles and platforms, had a FOO with the Troop
Two- If we sent a fire mission it was grid, direction, target and type of fire required (I think I got it all). If fancy gizmos were needed, that wasn't our problem. That was up to the guns to sort. Those four items listed should be all that's required for me to put rounds on the target (with corrections if required),

That was then, but I see no reason it shouldn't work now.

Better hope there's no battlefield EMP that knocks out all that fancy gear.

 

[KevinB]

Is there a simple solution to be found in simply training more Fire Controllers, Forward Observation Officers, JFACs etc and just assigning them downwards as the USMC seems to be doing with their Asst Squad Leaders / Systems Operators?

We seem to be stumbling over the need for concentration and the dispersed battlefield.

I am seeing a lot of evidence that suggests concentration is becoming harder and distribution is becoming more necessary.

If that is so then delivery of effects from stand off positions is going to become more prevalent. That suggests one of two things to me: the section/squad requires longer ranged munitions which will necessarily be larger and more complex or they require the means to accurately designate fires from third parties.

Some years back a young infanteer on this site argued that in the future he could envisage the section as an escort for the sensor operators and that the sensor operator, not the machine gun, would become the central organizing principle.

I think that day has come.

There is a big difference in a FOO (and JTAC) and an MFC or other arms observer.

Calling for fire can be done by any idiot with access to a radio.

But they are not running Fire Plans for Deliberate Attacks, or setting up Defensive Fire Plans either.

During GWOT a lot of folks got given ‘god guns’ to try to call air strikes, and coordinate which A/C was hitting what — it was messy and dangerous— you want a JTAC to do that.

You can only get so many FOO’s and JTAC’s as their is only so many assets to go around to run courses and keep current.

Not everyone needs a FOO or JTAC. All Arms Calls for Fire and learning adjustment aren’t hard (I mean I was a FOO Tech back in my Arty days, it can’t be that hard ), but when your dealing with coordinating of fires or dealing with multiple air assets, it isn’t for the layman.

Each Coy should have a FOO party able to be assigned to it - as well as there should be MFC’s available at the Platoon level that can help.

Most SOF teams will have a JTAC attached, and the OPS Sgt is generally a qualified MFC or equivalent.