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Canada's tanks

Why add an entirely new fleet of vehicles with the M10 if you're going to use it as a DFS vehicle to support the LAVs? Put the turret on the LAV and you simplify maintenance and supply and both supporting and supported vehicles have the same mobility.

Now if GDLS wins the US Army's XM30 OMFV competition with its Griffin-based entry then an M10 DFS vehicle could be paired with that to give the same chassis commonality. In that case I'd go for an Abrams MBT as the M10 and M1 have common systems which allow for a single training stream.
I think the if/then in the second para implicitly captures the "why" from the 1st paragraph- it's a question of time horizon. The way I see it there's two very different basic discussions- near term augmentation and long term clean sheet recapitalization. Both the Leo and LAV fleet are pegged to last until 2035. A mix of Griffin variants and Abrams X could certainly make sense for then, but for that to happen the doctrinal and structural discussions need to happen now.

In the near term- we have ~3 squadrons of Leo's and 3 squadrons of LRSS on the books, and divesting either prematurely is highly unlikely. Given the TAPV's unsuitability there's a (small?) chance that it could be pushed out to other roles, leaving a gap to be filled. I think most would agree that a LAV variant makes more sense than the M10 to fill that gap. Lower cost, lower maintenance, better fit with the existing LAV's, logistically simpler, etc. etc. etc. Such a purchase would be essentially off the shelf. The only questions are what makes more sense- the 3105 or 3035 ATGM turret, is the juice worth the squeeze to not just make do and wait until the 2035 re-cap, and would any interim armour money be better spent augmenting the Leo fleet
 
All RCAC units will be "Armoured Cavalry. " How a CMBG Comd chooses to group his forces for a given task will likely look similar to today. If a CMBG Comd has three Heavy Sqns with Leopard 2s then I anticipate he will use them pretty much like tank squadrons. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.

I don't like to use Cavalry in the Canadian context since it evokes US Army terminology where there is a specific mission set for Cavalry and another for Armor. That's not really the case up here.
I guess this part is what confuses me. A "heavy" Armoured Cavalry regiment will be used just like a current tank regiment would be used. A "medium" or "light" Armoured Cavalry regiment will be trained to operate exactly the same way that a "heavy" Armoured Cavalry regiment would using the same TTP's, etc. but due to the difference in vehicle capabilities will not really be able to perform all the functions that a "heavy" regiment would.

If a CMBG commander is going to employ each type of Armoured Cavalry regiment differently based on the vehicle capabilities then they really aren't interchangeable just like our current Tank Regiment/Armoured Recce Regiments aren't interchangeable.

It seems to me that this change to common training and doctrine between heavy/medium/light regiments is more designed to resolve RCAC training and posting issues than any type of Canadian Army-wide doctrinal vision on the use of armour in combined arms operations.
 
I guess this part is what confuses me. A "heavy" Armoured Cavalry regiment will be used just like a current tank regiment would be used. A "medium" or "light" Armoured Cavalry regiment will be trained to operate exactly the same way that a "heavy" Armoured Cavalry regiment would using the same TTP's, etc. but due to the difference in vehicle capabilities will not really be able to perform all the functions that a "heavy" regiment would.

If a CMBG commander is going to employ each type of Armoured Cavalry regiment differently based on the vehicle capabilities then they really aren't interchangeable just like our current Tank Regiment/Armoured Recce Regiments aren't interchangeable.

It seems to me that this change to common training and doctrine between heavy/medium/light regiments is more designed to resolve RCAC training and posting issues than any type of Canadian Army-wide doctrinal vision on the use of armour in combined arms operations.

As I've noted, the contradiction can be resolved by treating the tanks as being as vulnerable as the TAPVs and adjusting the tactics accordingly.

How aggressive can you get on today's battlefields with a small number of tanks in any case?
 
As I've noted, the contradiction can be resolved by treating the tanks as being as vulnerable as the TAPVs and adjusting the tactics accordingly.

How aggressive can you get on today's battlefields with a small number of tanks in any case?
Situation dictates.

If you can suppress the enemy, your tanks can move fairly unfettered.
 
Agreed wholesale.

Sea lift is the only real option to project heavy forces en masse. Which Canada does not have. Which will require a start of the convoy system. What we often fail to remember in our sustainment and projection planning is that the enemy will get a say in how much of that material actually reaches its desired destination.

Air is great for moving people, not so much for material.

Canada also needs to remember when the ball drops its too late to start buying the right quantity of material and weapons.
This may come as a shock, but we just moved a Leopard Sqn to Europe by sea. We also moved the initial eFP BG by sea. We moved a CMBG HQ, Svc Bn, Light Battalion and associated support to Norway in 2018 by sea from near Valcartier.

We are part of STEADFAST DEFENDER 24 this spring which practices moving forces to Europe from North America.
 
As I've noted, the contradiction can be resolved by treating the tanks as being as vulnerable as the TAPVs and adjusting the tactics accordingly.

How aggressive can you get on today's battlefields with a small number of tanks in any case?
Except Leopards are not TAPVs. We use our Leopard as Leopards. This doesn't mean we drive around without a care in the world asking to get shot. Tanks move tactically, bounding from feature to feature using covered approaches supported by other tanks. We use turret downs, hulldowns etc.

Now, by "we" I mean people in the field force. Its been almost a decade since I was in a turret in the field, but you get the idea.

The doctrine note has Aggressiveness as a fundamental. Aggressiveness does not mean throwing caution to the winds or ignoring vulnerability. It does mean acting decisively when the situation is set.

We have tanks in our eFP BG which is part of an eFP Bde. So our tanks will do their part in their area of operations. We are not responsible for the entirety of NATO. Indeed, we have partners just in Latvia and they also have tanks.
 
This may come as a shock, but we just moved a Leopard Sqn to Europe by sea. We also moved the initial eFP BG by sea. We moved a CMBG HQ, Svc Bn, Light Battalion and associated support to Norway in 2018 by sea from near Valcartier.

We are part of STEADFAST DEFENDER 24 this spring which practices moving forces to Europe from North America.

I have no doubt. Now do that when the sea lanes are contested. FYI I am also part of Steadfast Defender Jan to Mar. I'll let you guess which part I will be part of.

Things easy to do in peace time, shouldn't be expected to be that way in war time.
 
I have no doubt. Now do that when the sea lanes are contested. FYI I am also part of Steadfast Defender Jan to Mar. I'll let you guess which part I will be part of.

Things easy to in peace time, shouldn't be expected to be that way in war time.
Sure, which is the whole point of STEADFAST DEFENDER.
 
This may come as a shock, but we just moved a Leopard Sqn to Europe by sea. We also moved the initial eFP BG by sea. We moved a CMBG HQ, Svc Bn, Light Battalion and associated support to Norway in 2018 by sea from near Valcartier.

We are part of STEADFAST DEFENDER 24 this spring which practices moving forces to Europe from North America.
As HT mentions below two issue pop up with any scheduled exercise, the fact that you have uncontested waters, and can pre-book your carriers.

Given the RCN doesn’t have any RoRo type transports, you are relying upon an external source for that. Something that you cannot do in wartime, as:
1) no controlling them means you may not get them if they are even willing to do #2
2) they may not want to go into a potentially hazardous area

To me if Canada was serious about the movement of materials to anyway other than North America, there would be some serious efforts on the part of the CA (and even RCAF) to ensure the RCN had some transport ships capable of roll on, roll off.
 
Any fight in Europe will 100% live and die on NATO holding the North Atlantic sea lanes.

Booking sea lift in peace time is an exercise in contracting. I wouldn't get too excited about it.
Meh, there are like 4-5 countries (if that), that can project power through sealift without national seconding or contracting so I am not so upset we have to go that route. Happy for the RCN to get into/maintain the sealift business, not sure they would want too though :)
 
Meh, there are like 4-5 countries (if that), that can project power through sealift without national seconding or contracting so I am not so upset we have to go that route. Happy for the RCN to get into/maintain the sealift business, not sure they would want too though :)

If that's the case and we really cant do more than preposition ground forces by air prior to conflict there is no reason for heavy ground forces. If we can't get them to the fight or sustain them in the fight then they are just a golden cow sucking up precious resources that should be done away with.

For what it's worth I'm 100% sure the RCN would love to be able to pick up, move, protect and sustain a brigade. But for that to happen the CAF needs to stop it's fixation with all things green and start looking at light and dark blue tasks.
 
Except Leopards are not TAPVs. We use our Leopard as Leopards. This doesn't mean we drive around without a care in the world asking to get shot. Tanks move tactically, bounding from feature to feature using covered approaches supported by other tanks. We use turret downs, hulldowns etc.

Now, by "we" I mean people in the field force. Its been almost a decade since I was in a turret in the field, but you get the idea.

The doctrine note has Aggressiveness as a fundamental. Aggressiveness does not mean throwing caution to the winds or ignoring vulnerability. It does mean acting decisively when the situation is set.

We have tanks in our eFP BG which is part of an eFP Bde. So our tanks will do their part in their area of operations. We are not responsible for the entirety of NATO. Indeed, we have partners just in Latvia and they also have tanks.

In keeping with that thought, aggression is a trait. A reasonable balance of caution and aggression is always required. Even an infanteer on their belly can be aggressive.

Perhaps we are saying the same thing? A tank commander can display their aggression differently than a TAPV commander or a light infantry section leader but all are required to be aggressive. "Offensive Action" etc.

A matter of how far forward can you push and how fast.
 
As HT mentions below two issue pop up with any scheduled exercise, the fact that you have uncontested waters, and can pre-book your carriers.

Given the RCN doesn’t have any RoRo type transports, you are relying upon an external source for that. Something that you cannot do in wartime, as:
1) no controlling them means you may not get them if they are even willing to do #2
2) they may not want to go into a potentially hazardous area

To me if Canada was serious about the movement of materials to anyway other than North America, there would be some serious efforts on the part of the CA (and even RCAF) to ensure the RCN had some transport ships capable of roll on, roll off.

At very least Canada would have a civil merchant marine with a stock of ships that could be expropriated in war time.
 
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