Canada's tanks

[TangoTwoBravo]

Where do attack helicopters fit on the light - medium - heavy spectrum?

All of them. Attack Helicopters are found in US Heavy and Light divisions. They also have impressive logistical tails and require quite a bit of shipping to deploy.

I think its a bad practice to rely on AHs for anti-tank work. They are great to layer-over an existing anti-armour plan and can be a key feature of a formation-level anti-armour plan, but I wouldn't want to base my anti-armour for ground manouevre elements on having AHs.

In this thread, though, when I talking about Light, Medium and Heavy AFVs I am doing so in the framework of the recent Doctrine Note which is focused on AFVs and Armoured forces. They do need to be considered in the context of the wider force, but that is the focus.

 

[Fabius]

How does the force plan on using the armoured units ( not sub units)?
Does it envision an armoured regiment of 40 plus MBTs fighting as a unit with the Cdn Bde?

 

[Halifax Tar]

How does the force plan on using the armoured units ( not sub units)?
Does it envision an armoured regiment of 40 plus MBTs fighting as a unit with the Cdn Bde?

Also what do we intend to replace destroyed tanks with ? Or is it a use until they are consumed and then the crews become infantry ?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Also what do we intend to replace destroyed tanks with ? Or is it a use until they are consumed and then the crews become infantry ?

Judging by Ukraine, you can expect tanks at least two tanks are disabled by drone/artillery/mines per attack with a large formation. These tanks may or may not be recovered before being destroyed by further strikes. Also your engineering vehicle and ARV's are prime targets, so expect them to lost fairly quickly. 40 tanks gives you about a month of intense fighting before your force is at 50% effectiveness, assuming we have the ammunition and spare parts support to keep them going.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

How does the force plan on using the armoured units ( not sub units)?
Does it envision an armoured regiment of 40 plus MBTs fighting as a unit with the Cdn Bde?

Are you asking about the eFP Bde or a CMBG in a hypothetical conflict? The former is not my tea to spill here.

If its about doctrine then B-GL-321 Brigade Tactics (issued 2017) has an Armoured Regiment in it.

The Doctrine Note I have referred to is part of the rewrite of The Armoured Regiment in Battle.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Also what do we intend to replace destroyed tanks with ? Or is it a use until they are consumed and then the crews become infantry ?

There are things like War Stocks (which are limited), but our ability to simply replace all of our tanks in our inventory is indeed limited. This is true for most major items including ships and aircraft.

For context, towards the end of the Cold War we had all but one squadron of Leopards in Germany. So if that Regiment had been in a major fight there was only one more squadron back in Canada.

In our current situation there is a Sqn in R&O in New Brunswick and two Sqns will be out West once the dust settles (there has been a lot of movement these days).

 

[GR66]

Curious, in the Army's review of the Armoured Regiments was there any consideration given to moving to Combined Arms Battalions? Obviously that's the way the US Army has gone in its ABCT's.

The lessons from the Ukraine War so far (to be taken with caution) seem to suggest that concentration of forces on a modern battlefield is difficult. Would that not suggest moving combined arms units further down the ORBAT?

Of course we are capable of regrouping our existing units to create various configurations of combined arms units, but might not a formalized structure be better suited to more dispersed operations - in particular the CSS support?

 

[KevinB]

Judging by Ukraine, you can expect tanks at least two tanks are disabled by drone/artillery/mines per attack with a large formation. These tanks may or may not be recovered before being destroyed by further strikes. Also your engineering vehicle and ARV's are prime targets, so expect them to lost fairly quickly. 40 tanks gives you about a month of intense fighting before your force is at 50% effectiveness, assuming we have the ammunition and spare parts support to keep them going.

You can’t use Ukrainian data to make a comparison to how a NATO formation would fare.

The Ukrainians are missing a lot of combat enabling material and doctrine that result in greater losses.

That said, theere is a reason there are 2 Corps worth of equipment for V Corps…

 

[KevinB]

Curious, in the Army's review of the Armoured Regiments was there any consideration given to moving to Combined Arms Battalions? Obviously that's the way the US Army has gone in its ABCT's.

The lessons from the Ukraine War so far (to be taken with caution) seem to suggest that concentration of forces on a modern battlefield is difficult. Would that not suggest moving combined arms units further down the ORBAT?

Of course we are capable of regrouping our existing units to create various configurations of combined arms units, but might not a formalized structure be better suited to more dispersed operations - in particular the CSS support?

Keep in mind the structured ABCT is dust under the treads.
The term ABCT in an Armored or Armored (Reinforced) Division isn’t the same as what the ABCT’s once where for GWOT -2022.

The CAB’s however continue, with the 2 Armor Heavy Bn’s and 1 Infantry Heavy Bn.

 

[Infanteer]

Curious, in the Army's review of the Armoured Regiments was there any consideration given to moving to Combined Arms Battalions? Obviously that's the way the US Army has gone in its ABCT's.

The lessons from the Ukraine War so far (to be taken with caution) seem to suggest that concentration of forces on a modern battlefield is difficult. Would that not suggest moving combined arms units further down the ORBAT?

Of course we are capable of regrouping our existing units to create various configurations of combined arms units, but might not a formalized structure be better suited to more dispersed operations - in particular the CSS support?

You essentially have enough to make two of those, and the units that would fill those tasks have buildings 300m away from each other. Save parking the tanks in a different compound, what are you actually achieving here?

 

[GR66]

You essentially have enough to make two of those, and the units that would fill those tasks have buildings 300m away from each other. Save parking the tanks in a different compound, what are you actually achieving here?

Nothing in barracks. In deployed ops IF the expectation is that in future combat forces will be typically be deployed in smaller, more dispersed groupings does a formalized combining of arms at the Battalion level provide more responsive command and control and logistical support than two widely dispersed infantry battalions and an armoured regiment regrouping on the fly?

 

[Fabius]

Are you asking about the eFP Bde or a CMBG in a hypothetical conflict? The former is not my tea to spill here.

If its about doctrine then B-GL-321 Brigade Tactics (issued 2017) has an Armoured Regiment in it.

The Doctrine Note I have referred to is part of the rewrite of The Armoured Regiment in Battle.

I am not asking about either the eFP nor doctrine either I suppose, I have read the doctrine note and the old Armoured Regiment in Battle.

I am interested in what the field forces will actually do in practice.

During the many Ex MRs I have seen and participated in I have only seen the MBTs split and assigned to Infantry BGs, never used as a Armoured Regiment with 2-4 MBT squadrons.

Outside of the doctrine the force generation and collective training all seems to focus on the provision of a MBT sub unit to an Infantry Bn.
Hence my curiosity if the Army sees a need to train to employ an MBT unit as a cohesive unit IAW doctrine.

For what it’s worth I see your comments about AH applying in some measure to MBTs as well, unfortunately the gutting of the Inf Bns in the early 2000s I think has led to the armour being used solely to support the Inf Bns vs being used as an actual armoured fist with Inf in support.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Would that not suggest moving combined arms units further down the ORBAT?

It's easier to produce combined arms groupings by detaching sub-units from a unit than it is to try to form a "unit" from sub-units not accustomed to working together.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am not asking about either the eFP nor doctrine either I suppose, I have read the doctrine note and the old Armoured Regiment in Battle.

I am interested in what the field forces will actually do in practice.

During the many Ex MRs I have seen and participated in I have only seen the MBTs split and assigned to Infantry BGs, never used as a Armoured Regiment with 2-4 MBT squadrons.

Outside of the doctrine the force generation and collective training all seems to focus on the provision of a MBT sub unit to an Infantry Bn.
Hence my curiosity if the Army sees a need to train to employ an MBT unit as a cohesive unit IAW doctrine.

For what it’s worth I see your comments about AH applying in some measure to MBTs as well, unfortunately the gutting of the Inf Bns in the early 2000s I think has led to the armour being used solely to support the Inf Bns vs being used as an actual armoured fist with Inf in support.

Good questions/observations. We have been locked into the FG of single tank squadrons for MR since, well, BTE 03 I suppose! We had two tank squadrons in that exercise.

The understanding in the 2010s was that a war would likely involve a surge, so the thought was there that the CA would organize and train for that war. So something like DESERT STORM but where Canada contributes a CMBG. A big push with reinforcements/replacements but not rotations of CMBGs in high-intensity combat. You've seen this expressed, no doubt, on UNIFIED RESOLVE serials and AOC exercises. So in that context an Armoured Regiment with three or four squadrons is a possibility.

In 2011, I was a tank squadron commander on a Capability Development Exercise (JCATS/VBS) which had a Canadian BG in the far-future of 2020 operating in the Horn of Africa in a stability operation. We had a tank squadron and four infantry companies. Since the infantry of 2020 would not have anti-armour weapons outside of 84mm and 25mm, the desire was to give a tank troop to each company to protect them from threat tanks. So we had an element defeated in detail because our tanks were not concentrated.

The lack of dedicated anti-tank weapons for the infantry which then forced the dispersion of our tanks was one of the takeaways from that capability development experiment. I will be very happy once that gap is addressed! Infantry anti-tank (ATGMs) should be the framework of the anti-armour plan onto which tanks and other assets can be overlaid as required.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

You can’t use Ukrainian data to make a comparison to how a NATO formation would fare.

The Ukrainians are missing a lot of combat enabling material and doctrine that result in greater losses.

That said, theere is a reason there are 2 Corps worth of equipment for V Corps…

Assuming the USAF does what it promised to do. Even if we went in with other European partners, that force would lack a lot of the enablers as well. Even the US army lacks a lot in the SHORAD department, they are likley good on the engineering vehicle side. Not sure how good the US Army EW warfare team is, but without that capability any force will suffer.

 

[Kirkhill]

Curious, in the Army's review of the Armoured Regiments was there any consideration given to moving to Combined Arms Battalions? Obviously that's the way the US Army has gone in its ABCT's.

The lessons from the Ukraine War so far (to be taken with caution) seem to suggest that concentration of forces on a modern battlefield is difficult. Would that not suggest moving combined arms units further down the ORBAT?

Of course we are capable of regrouping our existing units to create various configurations of combined arms units, but might not a formalized structure be better suited to more dispersed operations - in particular the CSS support?

Funny. I was just thinking about Combined Arms Battalions this morning.

My context was a bit different though. I was contemplating the Canadian Infantry Battalion of 1982 as a Combined Arms construct.

Four Rifle Companies define the body of the battalion (three define a perimeter and the fourth acts as a reserve/QRF)

The Support Company included

A Cavalry element in the form of the Recce platoon
A DFS element in the form of the Anti-Tank platoon (supplemented with lots of machine guns throughout the battalion)
An Arty element in the form of the Mortar platoon (two platoons if comparing to some NATO countries)
An Engineering element in the form of the Pioneer platoon

Add in the sigs, the maintenance and the log types and that appears to me to be a fairly well rounded combination of all arms capabilities.

RCAC regiments, I believe, also used to incorporate those elements but instead of 4 infantry sub-units and a cavalry sub-sub-unit they had 4 "cavalry" sub-units and an infantry sub-sub-unit in the form of the Assault Troop in the Support Squadron.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Good questions/observations. We have been locked into the FG of single tank squadrons for MR since, well, BTE 03 I suppose! We had two tank squadrons in that exercise.

The understanding in the 2010s was that a war would likely involve a surge, so the thought was there that the CA would organize and train for that war. So something like DESERT STORM but where Canada contributes a CMBG. A big push with reinforcements/replacements but not rotations of CMBGs in high-intensity combat. You've seen this expressed, no doubt, on UNIFIED RESOLVE serials and AOC exercises. So in that context an Armoured Regiment with three or four squadrons is a possibility.

In 2011, I was a tank squadron commander on a Capability Development Exercise (JCATS/VBS) which had a Canadian BG in the far-future of 2020 operating in the Horn of Africa in a stability operation. We had a tank squadron and four infantry companies. Since the infantry of 2020 would not have anti-armour weapons outside of 84mm and 25mm, the desire was to give a tank troop to each company to protect them from threat tanks. So we had an element defeated in detail because our tanks were not concentrated.

The lack of dedicated anti-tank weapons for the infantry which then forced the dispersion of our tanks was one of the takeaways from that capability development experiment. I will be very happy once that gap is addressed! Infantry anti-tank (ATGMs) should be the framework of the anti-armour plan onto which tanks and other assets can be overlaid as required.

Is there, in a modern Army not constrained by low budgets and an inability to recruit and retain people, a role, in a formation, for a dedicated anti-armour unit?

Support weapons were concentrated in divisional level support battalions in WWII and I guess one of the lessons learned, by Korea, was that was not the best way to go. In the late 1960s we had, in service, a broad range of anti-armour weapons, with the infantry battalion having both man pack MAWs and vehicular mounted ATGMs while heavier ATGMs were 'brigaded" in a (largely notional) divisional anti-armour battalion (3R22R). There was one "working" ATGM coy of 3R22R in 4CMBG but some of us wondered if the organization was about anti-armour or having some role for a 13th infantry battalion in a 4 brigade army.

 

[suffolkowner]

Also what do we intend to replace destroyed tanks with ? Or is it a use until they are consumed and then the crews become infantry ?

might be an idea to share a platform with our closest ally and neighbour who coincidentally is the only one that has lots of stock

 

[Halifax Tar]

might be an idea to share a platform with our closest ally and neighbour who coincidentally is the only one that has lots of stock

Heresy!

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Also what do we intend to replace destroyed tanks with ? Or is it a use until they are consumed and then the crews become infantry ?

We sit beside it until the SSM comes by and picks us up.

Besides, if the tank is totally destroyed, beyond repair, the crew likely is also.