Canada's tanks

[Colin Parkinson]

I am not sure that recruiting and retention really factor?

I think that certain weapons should be permanently distributed at a fairly low level. Infantry platoons and companies should be able to destroy small numbers of enemy tanks without requiring assistance from higher. I think that man-portable ATGM like Javelin should belong to the infantry battalion and pushed down to platoon/section level.

If a support weapon is so complex as to need very specialized training then perhaps that belongs in specialized units. The CA has tried various organizations for mobile TOW, ranging from battalion platoons to brigades companies. I think it belongs with infantry battalions, but if something like Javelin is widely distributed within the battalions then perhaps a Bde ATGM company makes sense. Somebody would have to run it in garrison. Not sure.

I am all for more ATGM with the infantry if it means that tanks can be seen as something other than a system to "protect the infantry from enemy tanks."

Has the events in Ukraine reinforced your opinion on ATGM deployment or altered it?

Also is a FPV suicide drone a ATGM or a UAS? In regards to who owns it, deploys it?

 

[Kirkhill]

Has the events in Ukraine reinforced your opinion on ATGM deployment or altered it?

Also is a FPV suicide drone a ATGM or a UAS? In regards to who owns it, deploys it?

Re the FPVs - angle of attack as well?

ATGMs tend to be direct lines from launch to target. FPVs can approach from any quadrant and any altitude. They can even circle the target.

 

[KevinB]

Has the events in Ukraine reinforced your opinion on ATGM deployment or altered it?

Not 2TB, but I think the main aspect is everyone needs ATGMS’s.
Not at the same scale, but generally every unit needs some anti armor capability.

Also is a FPV suicide drone a ATGM or a UAS? In regards to who owns it, deploys it?

UAS. They for the most part aren’t ’real’ Anti Armor Weapons. Some may have a HEDP warhead but the typical ones aren’t going to do much to a tank other than maybe damage the optics and remove the antenna.

I see those as just another variation of a payload capable UAS, the who does what with them depends on size, range, altitude.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not 2TB, but I think the main aspect is everyone needs ATGMS’s.
Not at the same scale, but generally every unit needs some anti armor capability.


UAS. They for the most part aren’t ’real’ Anti Armor Weapons. Some may have a HEDP warhead but the typical ones aren’t going to do much to a tank other than maybe damage the optics and remove the antenna.

I see those as just another variation of a payload capable UAS, the who does what with them depends on size, range, altitude.

HERO-120 - Uvision

The Hero-120 is medium range anti-armored system, designed to provide front-line forces with organic capabilities that allow them to operate independently,

uvisionuav.com

Any reason why the Hero-120 could not be supplied with an FPV controller?

As I understand it FPV is less about the vehicle being flown and more about the virtual reality goggles worn by the pilot.

 

[KevinB]

HERO-120 - Uvision

The Hero-120 is medium range anti-armored system, designed to provide front-line forces with organic capabilities that allow them to operate independently,

uvisionuav.com

Any reason why the Hero-120 could not be supplied with an FPV controller?

As I understand it FPV is less about the vehicle being flown and more about the virtual reality goggles worn by the pilot.

FPV does something’s well, but one also looses SA on other things.

I’m not a pilot and have no experience with flying things with VR, but for something that has a decent payload, I’m not sure VR is the best at this point - but I’m not experienced at all with it to have an informed opinion.

 

[Kirkhill]

FPV does something’s well, but one also looses SA on other things.

I’m not a pilot and have no experience with flying things with VR, but for something that has a decent payload, I’m not sure VR is the best at this point - but I’m not experienced at all with it to have an informed opinion.

My sense is that there are a fair number of people taking their FPV skills from the video games to the battlefield and gaining a lot of experience. I believe I saw one article where they reported 30 sorties by one FPV pilot in a day. Resulting in total exhaustion.

WRT SA - there seems to be indications of teams being formed with overwatch drones, reaction drones as well as strike drones.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Has the events in Ukraine reinforced your opinion on ATGM deployment or altered it?

From the sidelines, I observe that it's a strange war being fought in penny-packets. Hard to see what should be concluded.

 

[GR66]

From the sidelines, I observe that it's a strange war being fought in penny-packets. Hard to see what should be concluded.

Very true. If you try to turn yourself into the Ukrainian Army based on what is working there you might find yourself totally unprepared for the next conflict. Watch, learn and account for what you're seeing but also keep yourself flexible enough to face very different situations.

 

[Kirkhill]

From the sidelines, I observe that it's a strange war being fought in penny-packets. Hard to see what should be concluded.

Except, perhaps, that the next war may be fought in penny-packets?

Armies aren't as big as they were but the globe hasn't got any smaller.

 

[KevinB]

Except, perhaps, that the next war may be fought in penny-packets?

Armies aren't as big as they were but the globe hasn't got any smaller.

The lesson learned should be not to ignore capabilities that you don’t need right now.

If the Ukrainians could they would have used larger formations, but due to their own lack of experience/knowledge/skill could not bring larger formations to bear.

The lesson to be learned from that for the CAF to me is, maybe an RV everyone and then isn’t a bad idea, as well as true joint operations beyond the Bde level.

 

[Kirkhill]

The lesson learned should be not to ignore capabilities that you don’t need right now.

If the Ukrainians could they would have used larger formations, but due to their own lack of experience/knowledge/skill could not bring larger formations to bear.

The lesson to be learned from that for the CAF to me is, maybe an RV everyone and then isn’t a bad idea, as well as true joint operations beyond the Bde level.

I don't disagree except to point out that many countries have downsized their armies since 1945.

And in Ukraine's case they had to put up with governments friendly to Moscow actively downsizing their capabilities and allies promising that they would support them if they downsized.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Except, perhaps, that the next war may be fought in penny-packets?

Only by the armies that can't mass and coordinate effectively above unit level.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Has the events in Ukraine reinforced your opinion on ATGM deployment or altered it?

Also is a FPV suicide drone a ATGM or a UAS? In regards to who owns it, deploys it?

Much of what we see/read is curated, but in general my thoughts on the need for ATGM as the anti-tank framework for an infantry battalion remains. It is very hard to buy ATGM right now - they are in demand in Ukraine.

As for Loitering Munitions that have anti-tank uses, they do seem to have a place. For what its worth, I don't think of them as ATGM. Whether they would be held in specialized units or pushed down to sub-unit level would, to me, depend on the complexity of use/maintenance and range. If they only require a few days of training, have a short range and can survive being lugged around by infantry platoons then by all means push them down. The more complex, capable and longer range they are then the more they should be used by specialized troops/elements. But I could be wrong. I've been wrong before.

Bringing this back to tanks, all things have countermeasures. ATGMs face their countermeasures that have been developed over the decades. Loitering munitions are facing their own countermeasures now, and relying on them as a magic bullet to kill tanks could lead to hot tears of disappointment. I figure they are hear to stay though.

 

[Kirkhill]

Only by the armies that can't mass and coordinate effectively above unit level.

My concern is that even if an army is competent in concentrating and orchestrating mass there are a lot of places where that mass may have to be concentrated.

What happens in the spaces between and behind the concentrations?

We have generated a small number of exquisites that are anticipating battling a similar number of exquisites.

Our enemies appear to be doing everything possible to deny those exquisites useful targets.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

My concern is that even if an army is competent in concentrating and orchestrating mass there are a lot of places where that mass may have to be concentrated.

What happens in the spaces between and behind the concentrations?

We have generated a small number of exquisites that are anticipating battling a similar number of exquisites.

Our enemies appear to be doing everything possible to deny those exquisites useful targets.

If one tries to be strong everywhere then one will end up weak everywhere. Commanders use economy of effort troops to cover gaps - this is one thing that Light/Medium Cavalry forces can do well, especially when supported by air/aviation/UAS. This allows concentration of heavy forces at decisive points to achieve a breakthrough (or counter one).

I am, perhaps, going a little far but drawing conclusions from this phase of the war could be similar to making force development decisions based on the Iran-Iraq War.

 

[Kirkhill]

If one tries to be strong everywhere then one will end up weak everywhere.

Understood and agreed.

Commanders use economy of effort troops to cover gaps - this is one thing that Light/Medium Cavalry forces can do well, especially when supported by air/aviation/UAS. This allows concentration of heavy forces at decisive points to achieve a breakthrough (or counter one).

Ditto. And I agree that that is an area where Light Cavalry / Mounted Infantry excel.

I think my greater concern is that while the defender is forced to stretch while maintaining a reaction force in reserve the aggressor can launch incursions and raids at whim that force the defender to stretch further and eat into their reserves.

I am, perhaps, going a little far but drawing conclusions from this phase of the war could be similar to making force development decisions based on the Iran-Iraq War.

If you will allow me to go a little farther....

Suppose we were facing an enemy that took a long view, say one of decades and not months. With that thought in mind CRINK (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea - George Bush's Axis of Evil) could be seen as having waged a pin prick campaign of insurgencies that have significantly deteriorated the West's ability to respond. 20 years in Afghanistan and Iraq have done none of the West's major armies any favours. Not only are the armies worn but their support base is weakened - their traditional recruit bases have deteriorated, their popular support. Loss of faith in command, both civil and military.

Meanwhile the CRINKs have sufficient reserves in being that they can tie down the West's available conventional forces while continuing to wage an international insurgency campaign that places continuing demands on the West's forces.

And the engagement, as described by the jargon of the day, crosses domains and works everything from legitimate political dissent, through lawfare, through protests to violence that is kept below the threshold that would prompt a state to declare war. Violence that can be politically or criminally motivated.

In that world I see no distinction between a person in a police uniform or a military uniform. The fight crosses from the military to the civil and back again. The nice clean line that the British system has relied on has been erased and the police have become more like a standing army while the army has become more like a constabulary. In Canada there are something like 70,000 police officers and a roughly equivalent number of military personnel. Both groups are ultimately Kingsmen that serve the Monarch for the governments of the day.

A brawl in Concordia, a convoy in Ottawa, a battle in Panjwai, operations in Syria and Mali - all of them have a wearing effect that makes it more difficult for a government to sustain a force capable of assisting in repelling an assault on Taiwan.

I appreciate the need for and the capabilities of a heavy force applied to a schwerpunkt. I just think that the advantage lies with the dispersed force that acts like water, seeking weaknesses, washing over strengths and using time to advantage.

As the man said... slow and quiet versus quick and noisy.


Iraq saw tanks massed and used professionally for a month long campaign. Then the crews were forced to leave their tanks and act like Gendarmes for a 20 year campaign that ultimately was lost when people lost their patience.

.....

I know that a heavy force is necessary and that it has its uses. And we should probably have more of them. I am just not convinced that you can beat water with a baseball bat.

 

[KevinB]

Commanders use economy of effort troops to cover gaps - this is one thing that Light/Medium Cavalry forces can do well, especially when supported by air/aviation/UAS. This allows concentration of heavy forces at decisive points to achieve a breakthrough (or counter one).

Would you accept a LAV based Infantry entity - or a mixed "CAV" force for that role?

 

[KevinB]

If you will allow me to go a little farther....

Suppose we were facing an enemy that took a long view, say one of decades and not months. With that thought in mind CRINK (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea - George Bush's Axis of Evil) could be seen as having waged a pin prick campaign of insurgencies that have significantly deteriorated the West's ability to respond. 20 years in Afghanistan and Iraq have done none of the West's major armies any favours. Not only are the armies worn but their support base is weakened - their traditional recruit bases have deteriorated, their popular support. Loss of faith in command, both civil and military.

I think you miss what those years did for the Military - the Western Armies have all been combat proven, and where military successful outside of the botched Politician end results.

Meanwhile the CRINKs have sufficient reserves in being that they can tie down the West's available conventional forces while continuing to wage an international insurgency campaign that places continuing demands on the West's forces.

You miss the authoritarian regime can do pretty much they please, unless confronted by an opponent.
The West has sufficient might to confront Militarily any and all of those entities.

And the engagement, as described by the jargon of the day, crosses domains and works everything from legitimate political dissent, through lawfare, through protests to violence that is kept below the threshold that would prompt a state to declare war. Violence that can be politically or criminally motivated.

That is not a Military issue - that is an issue with the majority of the Western governments, and the populations who continue to vote for them.

In that world I see no distinction between a person in a police uniform or a military uniform. The fight crosses from the military to the civil and back again. The nice clean line that the British system has relied on has been erased and the police have become more like a standing army while the army has become more like a constabulary. In Canada there are something like 70,000 police officers and a roughly equivalent number of military personnel. Both groups are ultimately Kingsmen that serve the Monarch for the governments of the day.

You are drawing some fairly poor conclusions IMHO - you are looking at some of the recent conflicts and using them as a blueprint for the future.

A brawl in Concordia, a convoy in Ottawa, a battle in Panjwai, operations in Syria and Mali - all of them have a wearing effect that makes it more difficult for a government to sustain a force capable of assisting in repelling an assault on Taiwan.

I appreciate the need for and the capabilities of a heavy force applied to a schwerpunkt. I just think that the advantage lies with the dispersed force that acts like water, seeking weaknesses, washing over strengths and using time to advantage.

As the man said... slow and quiet versus quick and noisy.

When you are taking about dispersed forces, keep in mind that the US Army MDO concept has armor units dispersing as well...
Western Forces don't really have the luxury of time - voters want results (and yes inaction is sometimes the result of the desired result).

SOF can do a lot of things in the time of confrontation before conflict breaks out - but when hits the fan, you need a heavy force to ensure you are not dislodged, and to take the fight to the enemy head on.

Iraq saw tanks massed and used professionally for a month long campaign. Then the crews were forced to leave their tanks and act like Gendarmes for a 20 year campaign that ultimately was lost when people lost their patience.

Even in late 2008 in Iraq when I left, there where still tanks -- their crews where not out acting as anything but Tankers -- there where a number of offensive uses of Armor after the invasion and "Mission Accomplished" - as well as their usage at OP's and Checkpoints as Bunkers with FCS.

The argument could work for the Arty and AD folks, but not on the Armor.

.....

I know that a heavy force is necessary and that it has its uses. And we should probably have more of them. I am just not convinced that you can beat water with a baseball bat.

IMHO if Canada had 4 real Bde's - then two should be Armor, 1 LAV med, and 1 Light, with one of the Armor units redeployed to Europe.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think you miss what those years did for the Military - the Western Armies have all been combat proven, and where military successful outside of the botched Politician end results.



You miss the authoritarian regime can do pretty much they please, unless confronted by an opponent.
The West has sufficient might to confront Militarily any and all of those entities.


That is not a Military issue - that is an issue with the majority of the Western governments, and the populations who continue to vote for them.


You are drawing some fairly poor conclusions IMHO - you are looking at some of the recent conflicts and using them as a blueprint for the future.


When you are taking about dispersed forces, keep in mind that the US Army MDO concept has armor units dispersing as well...
Western Forces don't really have the luxury of time - voters want results (and yes inaction is sometimes the result of the desired result).

SOF can do a lot of things in the time of confrontation before conflict breaks out - but when hits the fan, you need a heavy force to ensure you are not dislodged, and to take the fight to the enemy head on.



Even in late 2008 in Iraq when I left, there where still tanks -- their crews where not out acting as anything but Tankers -- there where a number of offensive uses of Armor after the invasion and "Mission Accomplished" - as well as their usage at OP's and Checkpoints as Bunkers with FCS.

The argument could work for the Arty and AD folks, but not on the Armor.


IMHO if Canada had 4 real Bde's - then two should be Armor, 1 LAV med, and 1 Light, with one of the Armor units redeployed to Europe.

With respect

I am looking at history and my perspective is that wars and battles do not resolve conflicts. That doesn't make me a pacifist. It just makes me appreciate that there are many things that need to be done that cannot be done with artillery.

 

[KevinB]

With respect

I am looking at history and my perspective is that wars and battles do not resolve conflicts. That doesn't make me a pacifist. It just makes me appreciate that there are many things that need to be done that cannot be done with artillery.

Unfinished Wars don't resolve conflicts, but you can most definitely finish a war with Artillery

There is a need to also break the population from it's original bend that led to the conflict - sometimes a change of leadership (and a lot of casualties can do it), sometimes there just needs to be way more casualties...