Canada's tanks

[suffolkowner]

Boxer Armoured Vehicle — Details and Variants - Think Defence

The ARTEC Boxer is a wheeled or tracked armoured vehicle, this article describes its capabilities, modules and variants

www.thinkdefence.co.uk

On the plus side the Boxer is an 8x8 Pick Up truck with a Camper in the bed.

View attachment 88262

The camper can be changed and modified. The pickup remains the same.

View attachment 88263

Saw a video of a module swap out. Seemed almost too easy if you get my drift. Maybe could have used another couple of bolts to hold it together. Is it likely that module swapping is a thing or more that it makes manufacturing process easier

 

[FJAG]

Just came across this on "Line of Sight." Not exactly "Canada's Tanks", but these days with the cavalry concept they seem to meld into each other.

Discussion Paper: Canadian Light Armoured Cavalry Concepts

Since the 2023 Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) Board, there has been much discussion within the RCAC, and in late September 2023, the Canadian Army Doctrine Centre published Doctrine Note 23-01 The Armoured Regiment in Battle which is “a ‘stand-alone’ document until a full rewrite of The...

www.canada.ca

 

[GK .Dundas]

As far as I can tell we have been working on a doctrine and TO&E for a light armor regiment since roughly 1946 .
We have yet to deploy one although we've come close. I think back in the early 70's and again in the eighties.

 

[FJAG]

As far as I can tell we have been working on a doctrine and TO&E for a light armor regiment since roughly 1946 .
We have yet to deploy one although we've come close. I think back in the early 70's and again in the eighties.

Early on in my career we had CAMTs which were doctrine. For the last 40 or so all I ever saw were
"Interim" CFPs (later B-GLs) which never seemed to make it to prime time until around 1999/2000 for the gunners. Nonetheless, even before that, we used the interim manuals as doctrine.

Interestingly some of the key organizational points published for the artillery in 2000 only lasted five years until "arty transformation" hit. Fiscal crises eat doctrine for lunch.

 

[CBH99]

We aren't talking about Canada's tanks anymore, but hey.

For the Canadian Armed Forces, doctrine is the set of underlying principles that guide our actions. Doctrine is rather broad at higher levels, and tends to get tighter as it gets to lower levels. If we are discussing the Canadian Army's primary armoured fighting vehicles, I am not sure how the Leopard 2 or LAV 6 somehow exist outside of our written (or unwritten underlying) doctrine?

As a former Canadian Army Command and Staff College instructor (Directing Staff), the goal of the Army Operations Course is to develop the ability of seasoned Captains to plan operations at the battle group and brigade level. They use the formal estimate at the battle group level and the Operational Planning Process at the brigade/formation level. There is an order of battle that is used to develop those skills. The battle group when I taught there was fleshed-out, but it had three rifle companies with LAV 6, a tank squadron with Leopard 2s, an artillery battery with M777, an engineer squadron, a combat support company and a combat service support company. I think the only real deviation from existing field BGs on an MR would have been that the staff college LAV companies had ALAWS in them and the combat support company had TOW. ALAWS was an actual program, and ,lo and behold, we are getting something through UOR. So I am not seeing the big problem? The brigade level tutorial has a fleshed out CMBG. For the purposes of teaching you could substitute allied battlegroups and capabilities (which is done for the higher-level enablers), but having a CMBG allows the students to explore Canadian doctrine and organizations.

I thought it made sense to teach students with a fulsome tool-kit. They are learning to consider factors and make deductions. The process is the important part at that stage. At their units on exercise and operations as Ops Os etc they then use the planning process to consider the tools that they have at hand. When assigning tasks to sub-units on an MR, the Ops O would have to consider their weapons just like they did on AOC.

I think with collective training it is more important to have the training match the actual organization. Which is certainly done in field training - CAXs can have some variations.

Back to tanks, we have world-class ones. It would great to have more, but there it is. As for the next tank? Who knows. I am an amateur in google trawling, but I am not seeing a paradigmatic breakthrough in tank technology. APS will likely shift to dealing with FPV drones, and I think they will have more success against those than some other threats. I think many other changes we are seeing in future tank concepts are changes for their own sake with no real bump in combat capability - like the failed Future Combat Systems program of two decades ago. But I am naturally skeptic.

As for training and equipment, I would have liked to have seen ALAWs finalized in 2015 but dismounted TOW was put into the eFP and there were allied capabilities. The CA is working on some formation-level capabilities. Nothing is ever perfect and the bag only holds five pounds, but I am not seeing any real training shortfalls for our forces.

It's refreshing to read a post from a 'glass is half full' kinda guy

Boy we ex-military (and currently serving) types can be some crusty buggers when it comes time to 'Talk Military'

 

[GK .Dundas]

Early on in my career we had CAMTs which were doctrine. For the last 40 or so all I ever saw were
"Interim" CFPs (later B-GLs) which never seemed to make it to prime time until around 1999/2000 for the gunners. Nonetheless, even before that, we used the interim manuals as doctrine.

Interestingly some of the key organizational points published for the artillery in 2000 only lasted five years until "arty transformation" hit. Fiscal crises eat doctrine for lunch.

During one my deeper dives into both paper and electronic references. Not to mention the tapping one or two people's memories . In the early 70's we were looking at either the Sheridan and the Scorpion .
The eighties saw talk of using the C-1 Leopard as the pseudo light tank as well as the Lynx combined into something along the lines of a German recce Battalion .
However the Government cancellation of a contract for roughly 300 Abrams put paid to all of thought of the concept.

 

[FJAG]

However the Government cancellation of a contract for roughly 300 Abrams put paid to all of thought of the concept.

That's not the first time that I've heard about a possible Abrams purchase. I'd be interested in that if anyone has some background on it.

 

[GK .Dundas]

So would I , I remember at the time reading about it and hearing stories about it .
I seem to recall it being discussed in the RCAC's history
And seem to recall possibly an article by Sean Moloney.

 

[KevinB]

That's not the first time that I've heard about a possible Abrams purchase. I'd be interested in that if anyone has some background on it.

As I understand it there where two times this was explored the first wasn’t a purchase.

It was at the time of the CFE treaty reduction.
The US Army needed to drastically drop the number of troops in Europe, and Canada was significantly under its allowance.

So America was offering the GoC an Armored Division in Germany basically lock stock and barrel, with the agreement that Canada would keep move 4 CMBG into a Armored Bde, and other units in Canada would be dedicated to “1 CDN Armoured DIV”
- I’ve heard several different takes on if the entire DIV of equipment needed to stay in Europe, and I’m unsure of how far the discussions went.

However Canada at the time was hoping to bring 4 CMBG home, and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq led to a large movement of American equipment from Germany to Saudi Arabia.

I’m not 100% exactly what occurred between 2 Aug 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait - and Nov 19 1990 when the CFE treaty was signed / but American pressure on Canada to keep forces in Germany decreased and the offer of equipment seemed to vanish.

Yugoslavia was starting to erode in the late 80’s, but the fault line wasn’t really noticed till 1989, and mostly ignored until summer 1991.

The Second occurred after Canada committed a BattleGroup to UNPROFOR, but I believe it was more that DND was realizing that 1) it had no money 2) operations in FYR where going to expand. I’m not sure if there was an attempt at a purchase or just a suggestion to America that Canada wanted to talk again about US Equipment in Europe.

I understand at that point the M1 Abram’s were being upgraded to M1A1 and the M2 Bradley was getting the A1 upgrade (getting rid of the swim kit etc). So I guess DoD also seeing the belt tightening was a lot less interested in supporting Canada, given that Canada had elected to sit out the Ground side of the Gulf War.

 

[GR66]

Not sure if this has been posted already here or in one of the other Armoured-related threads but this article from the Canadian Army Journal pushes back against the RCAC's concept of a single "Cavalry" doctrine across the Heavy/Medium/Light Armoured spectrum and argues that Formation Armoured Recce is a role distinct from the Heavy Armour role of tanks.

 

[FJAG]

Not sure if this has been posted already here or in one of the other Armoured-related threads but this article from the Canadian Army Journal pushes back against the RCAC's concept of a single "Cavalry" doctrine across the Heavy/Medium/Light Armoured spectrum and argues that Formation Armoured Recce is a role distinct from the Heavy Armour role of tanks.

It's a good article, IMHO. I think the issue is well stated in the first para:

... but it is also clear that there is a decided lack of consensus within the Canadian Army about the conduct of formation reconnaissance.

The reason for that is that operationally, the Canadian army's focus is at the battle group and not the formation level. Canada's soldiers certainly train at the formation level - at least on CAXs - and do plan for the deployment of a brigade headquarters, but only very recently are we deploying a brigade headquarters to NATO again where it actually commands a brigade. We did so for brief periods as well in Afghanistan.

There is a world of difference, however, between the ad hoc deployments in Afghanistan and in Latvia and having a national policy and a doctrine which calls for the use of a brigade or division and funding them so that the army can purchase, man and train the appropriate reconnaissance assets. The situation is not unlike that facing the artillery where the focus is on ad hoc batteries assembled from troops of various natures. The regimental capability is allowed to atrophy and it's constitution and doctrine becomes merely an academic exercise with occasional forays into trying to exercise it.

I won't try to discuss which way the debate in the armoured corps should go. Suffice it to say that Figure 10 (Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron 1979) is the one that I was brought up with and supported as a FOO in training many times. I was taught and understood the doctrine behind it (as well as that respecting the rest of the armoured regiment, the mechanized brigade and their corresponding artillery support). I'm not saying that it's the model we revert to but it was right for the equipment in vogue at the time. Today's brigade - and divisional - doctrine will be much different because the equipment available to it has changed dramatically and will continue to change.

I get it though. We aren't investing in the equipment so we put a lot of emphasis on the career management of the few armoured and arty troops that make up their respective branches. How do you manage a career for a handful of troops that need to learn a wide variety of skills to operate yet need to come together at the higher level of offr and NCM leadership. You can't. Not anymore than you can bounce around between field, air defence and STA artillery. There are practical components to the proper development of higher level NCO and offr that need to be learned academically and practiced in the field in order to build competence. It's nigh impossible to build Swiss Army Knife crewmen and gunners.

Unfortunately, I think the Canadian army's doctrine will remain relegated to academic debate at the theoretical level as long as it isn't properly organized and equipped as a brigade (of whatever ilk), within a divisional context, which is a fully functioning force employer rather than merely as a force generator of variable smaller components.

 

[GR66]

Not sure if this has been posted already here or in one of the other Armoured-related threads but this article from the Canadian Army Journal pushes back against the RCAC's concept of a single "Cavalry" doctrine across the Heavy/Medium/Light Armoured spectrum and argues that Formation Armoured Recce is a role distinct from the Heavy Armour role of tanks.

Further to the article attached above is this account (from the same CAJ edition) of a LdSH squadron (attempting) to follow the new Cavalry doctrine with TAPV's and LAVs in MR21. Their determination that in order to have any chance of being successful there is a need for dismounted troops, attached IDF capability and likely Engineering assets (mine laying in particular) would seem to support the conclusions of the first article.

 

[Kirkhill]

Just came across this on "Line of Sight." Not exactly "Canada's Tanks", but these days with the cavalry concept they seem to meld into each other.

My problem with that paper -

The author wants lots of strategically deployable cavalry squadrons, largely because light cavalry can be rapidly deployed at short notice with limited transport.

Then he proposes manning those light squadrons with Reservists that are at 2 years Notice To Move.

....

If he were serious then two of the Reg regiments would be Light Cavalry and one Medium Cavalry.

Or each of the Regiments would have two Light Cavalry Squadrons and a Medium Cavalry Squadron and a Support Squadron with Tanks.

....

Having said that I like the idea of lots and lots of troops mounted in light vehicles covering the spaces (roads, flanks and rear) where the fight isn't. Each of those Jock Columns should be Combined Arms efforts - with integral dismounts, fire support and aerial assets - capable of managing small scale probes and intrusions.

The basis for the Jock column was a battery of six 25-pounder and a troop of 2-pounders, supported by a squadron of tanks and a company of infantry, along with several anti-aircraft artillery guns. Having suffered heavily in the Battle of Greece and in Crete, the mobility of the Jock column allowed the British to compensate for their equipment losses by deploying artillery where needed. On the defensive, Jock columns could effectively harass the enemy, or attack their rear areas, but the columns' decentralized nature made them ill-suited for stopping a major attack.

Add in Lay Force, the LRDG, the SAS and Popski's Private Army and you have an Economy of Effort programme for dominating a large area with a small army.

 

[FJAG]

I've got some problems with it too.

I'm actually quite happy to leave the detailed discussions of how an armoured or cavalry regiment should look and be organized to the folks who do "armour" for a living.

But I'm quite happy to pipe in on such things as numbers of squadrons and Canadian army in general.

I think any organizational structure needs two primary foundational factors: 1) what is the force that I need to keep operationally active on a day to day peacetime basis and what structure is required to support that? and 2) what's my all-in force that I'm prepared to pay for equipment and personnel to have on stand-by and be ready to go on reasonable notice in case the worst case scenario happens?

You have to start with those two questions and then work backward to the force structure. I don't see that analysis in his paper.

My analysis has always brought me to the two division model based on the current size of the Canadian army and the rough level of equipment we hold and could reasonably expect to be acquired. One division is the largest force I see deployed and my own model would require all the personnel (whether RegF or ARes) and equipment to field that while the second division provides both for the defence of Canada and the sustainment elements of both personnel and equipment for the deployed division. Everything else comes out of that organizational structure.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Simpson's article is a good one.

The recent shift to "Cavalry" or "Armour" is an attempt to streamline training, making it easier to move between different squadrons that have different equipment. There is also talk of "mind-set" in the cavalry work. The choice of the term "cavarly" was a little unfortunate as it meant that people unpacked the word in different ways.

The proponents of the concept argue that armoured units would use the same tactics, techniques and procedures regardless of what equipment they had, but their tasks would depend on the the threat. So a squadron with four troops of LAV LRSS would fight the same as a a squadron with four troops of Leopard 2s. You just wouldn't put the LAV squadron up against tanks.

I suppose I am a skeptical traditionalist, but I have a hard time with this idea. I have been in both tank and recce organizations, and they fight differently. They have different roles. Some have argued that the reconnaissance role is no longer relevant with UAS etc, so we shouldn't worry about it. There may be some merit in that argument, but I don't know that we can make such a bold pronouncement.

Some are arguing that our new concept calls for a medium AFV. Perhaps something tracked with a 90mm gun. Maybe an M10 Booker. Sounds cool, but maybe a answer in search of a question? The old-school US Army answer to the question of how to fight for information and conduct security operations (cover, guard and screen) was to marry tanks and reconnaissance vehicles in the same organizations with some fire support. Maybe I am trapped in 1998, but such a squadron in a Canadian context would fill a role. I am not as sure about a squadron with tracked AFVs that all have 90mm guns or 105mm guns that themselves cannot survive similar incoming fire. But I am happy to be proved wrong.

I always liked seeing the Centauros overseas in the Italian Battlegroup. Could we, though, have M10s (which could likely be built at GDLS London) and Leopard 2s? Not sure if that is in our means. So the worry is that you end up with something that is neither fish nor fowl. I guess the Cavalry folks are saying that fish and fowl don't exist anymore. So maybe a platypus.

As an aside on Jock Columns in the 8th Army, they were not an unqualified success. They could contribute to being overwhelmed by the Germans and Italians when the DAK concentrated at decisive points- which they usually did. Decentralizing artillery gave away pretty much the only advantage that the 8th Army had. I think that Monty squeezed out that practice and concentrated his artillery as per doctrine. Some have argued, though, that Jock Columns were an adaptation as the result of inadequate mobile AT guns with the 25 pounders being pressed into direct fire.

Ass a covering force? Sure! As a way of doing business all the time? Probably not.

 

[quadrapiper]

Some are arguing that our new concept calls for a medium AFV. Perhaps something tracked with a 90mm gun. Maybe an M10 Booker.

Is an M10 or equivalent a better answer to "direct fire in a LAV setting" than mounting that armament on a LAV?