Canada's tanks

[dapaterson]

Lots of equipment exists in the marketplace without a thought to the need, or employment practicality.

But jobs in the right risings / districts...

 

[KevinB]

But jobs in the right risings / districts...

Green/ Blue welfare and pork barreling drives me berserk

 

[GR66]

Whatever tank we end up getting we're sure to need more than we currently have...

Ukrainian tank units face shortage of combat-ready vehicles

Ukrainian armored warfare specialist Mykola Salamakha says the current state of Ukraine’s and Russia’s tank forces is “roughly the same – grim,” with most frontline tank battalions operating at a fraction of their intended strength due to heavy attrition and drone threats. In an interview with...

defence-blog.com

Ukrainian armored warfare specialist Mykola Salamakha says the current state of Ukraine’s and Russia’s tank forces is “roughly the same – grim,” with most frontline tank battalions operating at a fraction of their intended strength due to heavy attrition and drone threats.

In an interview with Radio Svoboda, Salamakha explained that operational battalions rarely field more than a handful of functioning tanks. “Instead of 30 or 40 tanks per battalion, at best five or six are combat-capable, sometimes only two or three,” he said.

Units that don’t understand the tank’s role often misuse them, resulting in unnecessary losses. “They send a tank forward just to show the infantry they have support — we lose them in such operations,” he said.

Salamakha said tank deployments are vulnerable from as far as 10 kilometers behind the front line. “The moment tanks are spotted, drone attacks follow quickly, using various tactical techniques and drone types,” he said.

Salamakha emphasized that drone saturation, persistent surveillance, and deep reconnaissance are now the primary challenges for tank crews. “Even rear columns are within reach,” he said, adding that armor alone no longer guarantees survivability in a battlespace constantly scanned from above.

I'm hesitant to assume that a NATO-Russia conflict will look like the Russia-Ukraine war but I do think that serious thought needs to be given to the future role of tanks on the battlefield and what a tank and tank unit need to look like.

One think that I'm confident of however is that we need to massively increase our indirect fire capabilities. One Reg Force Fires Brigade to three Maneuver Brigades I'm sure is a completely wrong ratio.

 

[KevinB]

Whatever tank we end up getting we're sure to need more than we currently have...

110%

Ukrainian tank units face shortage of combat-ready vehicles

Ukrainian armored warfare specialist Mykola Salamakha says the current state of Ukraine’s and Russia’s tank forces is “roughly the same – grim,” with most frontline tank battalions operating at a fraction of their intended strength due to heavy attrition and drone threats. In an interview with...

defence-blog.com

I'm hesitant to assume that a NATO-Russia conflict will look like the Russia-Ukraine war but I do think that serious thought needs to be given to the future role of tanks on the battlefield and what a tank and tank unit need to look like.

I fully agree with you.
I'm of the opinion (and I know many folks will disagree) that the Tank Platoon and Company need to have more than just Gun Tanks in their makeup. Which is another reason I like the CAB approach, and the ABCT composition as opposed to Infantry heavy Bde's.
But I think that in addition to main gun tanks, and APS systems for them, that a 35-40mm Air Defense turret (like the Geopard) and a DE C-UAS turret should be considered, in addition to VSHORAD and DE C-UAS turrets for a IFV (tracked) as part of a combined arms force.

One think that I'm confident of however is that we need to massively increase our indirect fire capabilities. One Reg Force Fires Brigade to three Maneuver Brigades I'm sure is a completely wrong ratio.

That is a pretty standard Divisional Artillery setup -- the issue is more what the Fire Bde consists of.
I am adamant that each Bde major maneuver unit (Armor, Inf, Cav) needs a minimum of a 6 gun 155mm BTY in close support (ideally 8 gun for 2x4 gun troops). So if you have 2 Infantry and 1 Armour in a CMBG, then it needs an 18 gun CS Reg't.
Assuming the 3 Maneuver units for a CMBG and 3 CMBG's then you need 3x 18 gun CS Reg'ts and a GS Regiment of HIMARS.
With the addition of the Light Infantry Regiment (or Light Infantry Brigade) to the Reg Force Div - you need a 4th 18 gun CS Reg't (and a role for the M777's once the SPA program gets moving).

I'm also a big fan of adding the M1287 AMPV Nemo Mortar carrier to the Mech Infantry BN's to give them a 120mm Mortar Platoon.

 

[FJAG]

One think that I'm confident of however is that we need to massively increase our indirect fire capabilities. One Reg Force Fires Brigade to three Maneuver Brigades I'm sure is a completely wrong ratio.

That is a pretty standard Divisional Artillery setup -- the issue is more what the Fire Bde consists of.

Bingo.

Start by thinking of the arty brigade and even the regiment as merely a fires coordination element - i.e. the battalion, brigade and division FSCC. That's critical. Think of the close support regiment as providing the intimate advisor and effector of fires by way of the battery commanders and their FOOs.

Then add guns rockets, sensors etc as required.

@KevinB's rules of thumb are a good place to start with fires delivery systems. One CS battery with its FSCC, FOOs and guns per battalion builds the foundation. One CS regiment with its FSCC, sensors by way of an STA battery and STACC creates the flexibility to control fires to where it is needed the most. The thing builds at the divisional level even more.

I personally would reorganize a "FOO Battery/tactical group" to include some of the CS STA sensor resources (LCMR) and reallocate many of the PYs from the STA battery into a general support launcher battery for a variety of UAVs including loitering munitions useable at the brigade level.

Over and above the need for a general support regiment of rocket launchers at the division I would add an EW/MI/loitering munitions launcher regiment. In order to properly fight the divisional deep battle you need a coordination element for fires to the forward cavalry force. You then need to add a deep UAV recce element (essentially the cavalry's airborne FOOS) and more sensors, radar and acoustic. These need to be linked to a robust intelligence/analysis cell within its FSCC and rapid effector teams including EW, rockets and longer range loitering munitions.

I personally prefer a two brigade division (one or two tank and two or one mech infantry bns [three total] per bde) for the close battle and a very strong cavalry regiment for the deep. The cavalry doesn't need to be a full brigade, just enough resources to properly cover the div's front with sensors and effectors.

That brings me to two CS gun/loitering regiments; one per brigade but none for the cavalry. The cavalry, with an arty tactical group is primarily supported by the GS loitering munitions and rockets. They don't need guns per se. During the deep fight, the two manoeuvre brigades are generally unengaged in a close fight so their guns can be given at "priority call" to the cavalry. Range becomes an issue here.

Don't forget that in NATO theory there are also extra arty brigades with general support guns and rockets. These can and will reinforce the division during its fight.

Oh. Then there's air defence.

There are several shortfalls in our tactical thinking.

1) we've gotten better at the coordination game by having upped our battery tactical parties but it's still not good enough. Every manoeuvre tank squadron, rifle company, cavalry squadron needs a FOO and every manoeuvre regiment/battalion need a dedicated/organic a BCs FSCC. We don't have that yet;

2) we've only had a fledgling STA battery concept since the early part of this century. It's often an unattractive and undesirable posting. STA matters. It matters a lot. We need to strengthen it and better integrate it with intelligence analysis and EW. We also need to strengthen the STA's (and cavalry's) ability to strike deep. That means rockets and loitering or FPV. We need to put much more horsepower behind these concepts with both people and equipment and practical experimentation. We're way to slow doing this;

3) people. Artillery has been the poor man out for many decades (hell since the 1960s) It has barely enough people to man three very thin CS regiments and one equally thin GS regiment without any air defence arm for almost two decades. Assuming there is a wake-up call that seriously takes hold in our infantry-centric army and funds become available, then we need to bu y the equipment and create the people necessary to man it. There are two thousand or so reservists who could easily fill in on many of the base skills - running guns and launchers and ammo resupply - to allow the regs to more adequately man the harder skills - FSCCs, FOOs, JTACs, STACCs/EW/MI, leaders at all levels etc etc. But when I look at what little is coming out about army modernization, all that I see is same old same old.

4) air defence - need I say more?

 

[GR66]

110%

I fully agree with you.
I'm of the opinion (and I know many folks will disagree) that the Tank Platoon and Company need to have more than just Gun Tanks in their makeup. Which is another reason I like the CAB approach, and the ABCT composition as opposed to Infantry heavy Bde's.
But I think that in addition to main gun tanks, and APS systems for them, that a 35-40mm Air Defense turret (like the Geopard) and a DE C-UAS turret should be considered, in addition to VSHORAD and DE C-UAS turrets for a IFV (tracked) as part of a combined arms force.

Fully agree

That is a pretty standard Divisional Artillery setup -- the issue is more what the Fire Bde consists of.
I am adamant that each Bde major maneuver unit (Armor, Inf, Cav) needs a minimum of a 6 gun 155mm BTY in close support (ideally 8 gun for 2x4 gun troops). So if you have 2 Infantry and 1 Armour in a CMBG, then it needs an 18 gun CS Reg't.
Assuming the 3 Maneuver units for a CMBG and 3 CMBG's then you need 3x 18 gun CS Reg'ts and a GS Regiment of HIMARS.
With the addition of the Light Infantry Regiment (or Light Infantry Brigade) to the Reg Force Div - you need a 4th 18 gun CS Reg't (and a role for the M777's once the SPA program gets moving).

I'm also a big fan of adding the M1287 AMPV Nemo Mortar carrier to the Mech Infantry BN's to give them a 120mm Mortar Platoon.

That's fine for the direct support of the maneuver units but I think that Ukraine has shown that additional indirect fires capabilities - with a mix of guns, rockets, loitering munitions and UAVs - as well as significant EW and AD/C-UAS capabilities (both within the maneuver units and in dedicated units) are also required in order to isolate the enemy front at the point of attack.

 

[Lumber]

Bingo.

Start by thinking of the arty brigade and even the regiment as merely a fires coordination element - i.e. the battalion, brigade and division FSCC. That's critical. Think of the close support regiment as providing the intimate advisor and effector of fires by way of the battery commanders and their FOOs.

Then add guns rockets, sensors etc as required.

@KevinB's rules of thumb are a good place to start with fires delivery systems. One CS battery with its FSCC, FOOs and guns per battalion builds the foundation. One CS regiment with its FSCC, sensors by way of an STA battery and STACC creates the flexibility to control fires to where it is needed the most. The thing builds at the divisional level even more.

I personally would reorganize a "FOO Battery/tactical group" to include some of the CS STA sensor resources (LCMR) and reallocate many of the PYs from the STA battery into a general support launcher battery for a variety of UAVs including loitering munitions useable at the brigade level.

Over and above the need for a general support regiment of rocket launchers at the division I would add an EW/MI/loitering munitions launcher regiment. In order to properly fight the divisional deep battle you need a coordination element for fires to the forward cavalry force. You then need to add a deep UAV recce element (essentially the cavalry's airborne FOOS) and more sensors, radar and acoustic. These need to be linked to a robust intelligence/analysis cell within its FSCC and rapid effector teams including EW, rockets and longer range loitering munitions.

I personally prefer a two brigade division (one or two tank and two or one mech infantry bns [three total] per bde) for the close battle and a very strong cavalry regiment for the deep. The cavalry doesn't need to be a full brigade, just enough resources to properly cover the div's front with sensors and effectors.

That brings me to two CS gun/loitering regiments; one per brigade but none for the cavalry. The cavalry, with an arty tactical group is primarily supported by the GS loitering munitions and rockets. They don't need guns per se. During the deep fight, the two manoeuvre brigades are generally unengaged in a close fight so their guns can be given at "priority call" to the cavalry. Range becomes an issue here.

Don't forget that in NATO theory there are also extra arty brigades with general support guns and rockets. These can and will reinforce the division during its fight.

Oh. Then there's air defence.

There are several shortfalls in our tactical thinking.

1) we've gotten better at the coordination game by having upped our battery tactical parties but it's still not good enough. Every manoeuvre tank squadron, rifle company, cavalry squadron needs a FOO and every manoeuvre regiment/battalion need a dedicated/organic a BCs FSCC. We don't have that yet;

2) we've only had a fledgling STA battery concept since the early part of this century. It's often an unattractive and undesirable posting. STA matters. It matters a lot. We need to strengthen it and better integrate it with intelligence analysis and EW. We also need to strengthen the STA's (and cavalry's) ability to strike deep. That means rockets and loitering or FPV. We need to put much more horsepower behind these concepts with both people and equipment and practical experimentation. We're way to slow doing this;

3) people. Artillery has been the poor man out for many decades (hell since the 1960s) It has barely enough people to man three very thin CS regiments and one equally thin GS regiment without any air defence arm for almost two decades. Assuming there is a wake-up call that seriously takes hold in our infantry-centric army and funds become available, then we need to bu y the equipment and create the people necessary to man it. There are two thousand or so reservists who could easily fill in on many of the base skills - running guns and launchers and ammo resupply - to allow the regs to more adequately man the harder skills - FSCCs, FOOs, JTACs, STACCs/EW/MI, leaders at all levels etc etc. But when I look at what little is coming out about army modernization, all that I see is same old same old.

4) air defence - need I say more?

I'm finding this discussion fascinating, but I'm getting lost in the acronyms. You don't need to describe them (unless you want to), but could you spell out the following:
CS
GS
BC
STA
STACC
FSCC
LCMR
PY

Thanks.

 

[FJAG]

I'm finding this discussion fascinating, but I'm getting lost in the acronyms. You don't need to describe them (unless you want to), but could you spell out the following:
CS
GS
BC
STA
STACC
FSCC
LCMR
PY

Thanks.

CS = Close support - usually gun regiments with a full complement of the coordination resources - Fire Support Coordination Centre (FSCC) and forward observers etc - needed to support a brigade sized formation.

GS = general support - usually gun and rocket regiments which do not support any given bde but a larger formation in general. It ususally comes with limited coordination elements and liaison officers but not battery level FSCCs or forward observers.

BC = battery commander. A major who is the principle fires advisor to a battalion level commander. He directs the various forward observers assigned to his battalion. In the old days he actually commanded the gun battery. Administratively in Canada he still does but his equivelent in many NATO organizations (usually called a fire support coordinator or some such term) he does not.

STA = Surveillance and Target Acquisition. Usually made up of counter fire radars that detect projectiles in flight and through their arc of fire determine their point of origin, acoustic sensors that detect and located weapon systems location by sound, and unmanned aerial vehicles for detecting system by visual means.

STACC = STA Coordination Centre. a small team located within a CS regiment and deploying with a regimental FSCC to coordinate information received by the STA resources into an appropriate counter response with fires from the FSCC

FSCC = Fire Support Coordination Centre. These are located at every level of command from battalion on up that needs to employ indirect fires. At brigade level it is run by the commanding officer of the bde's allocated CS regiment. At division it is run by the commander of the division's artillery brigade. It is a smal team of staff that coordinate all the fires resources, including air, available to the formation.

LCMR = Light Counter Mortar Radar. Picture a beer keg on a tripod. It is a small radar capable of tracking the flight of a mortar round to determine point of origin. They are located in the STA battery of our three CS regiments. It's big brother is the MRR (medium range radar aka muti-role radar) a large radar located with Canada's GS regiment capable of tracking mortars, artillery, rockets and air craft

PY = person year. In general, the regular force is authorized a certain number of PYs which are funded by the government for employment on a full-time basis. The CAF has a certain level of discretion as to how those are allocated. It is an ongoing process that PYs are reallocated to higher priority roles. Accordingly each organization has a constant struggle to justify the way it uses people and thus keep them allocated. For the artillery it has been a constant fight since the turn of the century to maintain PYs for air defence and find PYs for STA and rockets. The adoption of the M777 was a problem as the gun requires a crew of 10 whereas the L5, G1, C3 and M109 all made do with 7. In simple and dreadful terms, the fact that a CS arty regiment now can only operate two batteries of four guns each is PYs which in 2005 went from guns to FSCCs and FOOs and STA. 4 GS Regiment (its GS STA arm) is made up of the PYs that used to belong to the army's air defence arm. The arty's PYs have shifted changed very little over the last 25 years while its capabilities have grown - guns suffered.

 

[Kirkhill]

Adding to the discussion and reinforcing some of Watling's article poste up thread is this article from the Telegraph.

Inside Ukraine’s fortress belt, where Nato doctrine no longer applies

It emphasises a frontline that is now a zone kilometers deep and one inhabited by what I would have characterized as dispersed listening posts with overhead armour and inhabited by stay-behind teams of 3 to 5. They are in place for weeks on end and resupplied by any means available. Medical extraction may not happen, probably not in a timely fashion and definitely not within the "Golden Hour" target.

it also notes that after laughing at Russian cope cages and motorcycle charges both sides have now adopted variants of both. Tanks are being employed in the contact zone in penny packets because larger groups are attrited as they advance through the middle zone. The survivors are very useful but, like the artillery, struggle to find targets against which to concentrate.

There is a graphic that describes a contact zone 25 km wide in which both sides operate. This zone is dominated by FPVs and it is the zone in which tanks, mortars, towed howitzers and EW assets operate.

This 25 km zone exists within a 40 km zone. Outside the 25 km zone but inside the 40 km zone is the band in which the self propelled guns and rocket launchers roam.

Watling differs some on dimensions. He describes the contact zone as being 15 km instead of 25 km.
The larger zone which he calls the middle zone is described as the contact zone plus 30 km in both directions. That makes the larger zone 75 km wide rather than 40 km. Both papers describe the dominance of recce UAVs across the entire field.

Inside Ukraine’s fortress belt, where Nato doctrine no longer applies

Drone warfare has turned the line of contact with Russia into a ‘grey zone’ several miles wide

www.telegraph.co.uk

The battlefield appears to be replicating the evolution of the German WW1 Western Front.

Phase 1 - War of manoeuvre and race to secure the flanks
Phase 2 - Establisment of linear defences in the form of open trenches
Phase 3 - Digging in and establishing overhead protection together with wire, obstacles, minefields and killing grounds
Phase 4 - Replacing linear defences with mutually supportive engineered strongpoints.

The difference seems to be that while the WW1 strongpoints were held by platoons the new "strongpoints" are held by teams with UxVs.
And the zone is deeper and the UAVs make infiltration of Stosstruppen harder.

 

[FJAG]

It's articles like this one and Watlings writings on Ukraine that make wonder about the tank at times.

Bill Owen discusses the army one can afford to buy and lists tanks as one of those things that has become unaffordable. He thinks in terms of light and heavy cavalry and I take it to him, the heavies are something in the nature of a CV90120. I think they, with appropriate add-on reactive armour and "cages" would do well in Ukraine.

I'm not sure how much a CV90120 costs vis a vis a Leo 2A7/8 or a K2 or a KF51. My guess is substantially less and even better if joined to other CV90 chassis-based vehicles.