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Canadian Military/Defence procurement process (Mega Thread)

Journeyman said:
Which the RCAF says isn't required.  Either the government or the Air Force has a 'credibility gap.'

Given the length of the procurement cycle, is it reasonable to assume that a post 2019 decision would have aircraft in place in time to address the legacy Hornet replacement timeline?  Or is ordering an interim capability now a prudent measure?

Sort of like: We bought interim Chinooks for Afghanistan, when we could have just waited for 450 Sqn to be stood up and outfitted...
 
dapaterson said:
Sort of like: We bought interim Chinooks for Afghanistan, when we could have just waited for 450 Sqn to be stood up and outfitted...

You're equating people dying on roads because we didn't have integral helicopter lift to the current government changing how many fighters we need ready at any given time to justify their insistence to buy Super Hornets? Also the fact that the Chinook was literally the only medium lift helicopter around that wasn't Russian, whereas we can buy any number of Gen 4/5 aircraft to fit the bill?
 
So we picked the one most like the one we fly.  Why would we pick a different one?
 
jmt18325 said:
So we picked the one most like the one we fly.  Why would we pick a different one?

Or you stop screwing around and announce the actual replacement instead of raiding money from the replacement pot to pay for a political promise? The Liberals are scared the F-35 would win, so the "5 year" plan is out there to get it after the next election. They're going to legalize pot with a 6 month task force report, and do a "complete" defense policy review in less than a year, but we can't buy a fighter aircraft after 20 years without 5 more years of punting the football?

We could have announced any number of COAs that weren't buying the SH: Take over retiring USN/USMC aircraft, get old airframes for parts from Monahan, rebuilt old airframes from those at Monahan. All completely viable.
 
Wow!  An aeronautical engineer, a cost analyst, a project approval expert, and FMS case expert, and a project management expert all rolled into one.
 
jmt18325 said:
Why would we pick a different one?.

Because one of the different ones is superior and will be cheaper over its lifetime...?
 
Loachman said:
Because one of the different ones is superior and will be cheaper over its lifetime...?

But that would violate the Canadian Government Prime Directive; Spend 20 bucks to save 10 cents!
 
jmt18325 said:
So we picked the one most like the one we fly.  Why would we pick a different one?

:facepalm: holy fuck, over.  We aren't buying a new car for Granny. 
 
dapaterson said:
Given the length of the procurement cycle, is it reasonable to assume that a post 2019 decision would have aircraft in place in time to address the legacy Hornet replacement timeline?  Or is ordering an interim capability now a prudent measure?

An honest and logical decision could be made now and we could be accepting F35s by then.
 
Hitting the nail on the head

Matt Gurney: Australia is a grown-up country. We aren’t

Last week, my colleague Matthew Fisher, Postmedia’s senior international writer, had a column in the Post noting, correctly, that Australia has a lot to teach Canada about national security.

“What has evolved Down Under is an all-party consensus that robustly defending Australia is a top-level national interest,” he wrote. “Decisions on strategic policy, defence budgets and procurement policies reflect that. A common vision on security supercedes everything.”

In in other words, when it comes to defence matters, Australia is a grown-up country. Canada, sadly, isn’t. We have no coherent national security vision, haven’t upgraded our official defence plans through a white paper since I was in grade school, regularly reverse major military policies when we change governments, and can’t seem to organize a proper military procurement program to save our lives (or, more to the point, the lives of Canadian personnel who might have to go into action in outdated or inappropriate equipment — recall the Iltis jeeps we first sent to Afghanistan). The Canadian Forces work miracles with what they have, but they don’t have enough. Not enough equipment, not enough units, not enough manpower, not enough training time.

Fisher is right to note that Australia’s political culture is simply more advanced on these matters than ours. But the problem, as I see it, is more public than political. In Australia, I don’t know what came first: the chicken of political maturity or the egg of public expectations of same. But I do know that in Canada, our political immaturity isn’t a glitch or anomaly. It’s an entirely predictable and understandable, if unacceptable, byproduct of the Canadian public’s low literacy on military matters.

As Fisher notes in his column, the easy explanation for Australia’s comparative maturity is that it is isolated and alone, in a rough neighbourhood, far from its major Anglosphere allies. If Australia was suddenly threatened by one of its neighbours, even if its allies came rushing with aid, it could still take weeks or months to rally a major force (there are some U.S. units in the Pacific at all times, of course, and a contingent of U.S. Marines is always in Australia, as a tangible sign of U.S. commitment, but not enough to win a war). That’s the easy explanation, granted, and probably not the full one, but it’s actually probably true enough.

Canada, of course, is in the opposite position. Our closest ally and primary military partner is literally next door, and would protect us because our stability and sovereignty are essential to its own security. We don’t have to think about national defence, or invest heavily in it, so we don’t. We should, because that’s what sovereign countries and reliable allies do, and it would allow us to be a much greater force for good in a world that could indeed use more Canada. But you admittedly can’t make a case for a larger, more capable Canadian military force on the basis of literal need. So we don’t talk about it at all.

But there’s another issue at play here. It’s not entirely separate from having our big, heavily armed brother next door, but it’s distinct enough to note on its own: Canadians don’t understand the military because, in general, we don’t see it. It’s out of sight and largely out of mind. Canadians support their troops. They admire the military and respect the courage of our armed forces personnel. But it’s not a top of mind issue because the Armed Forces are generally tucked out of the way in remote areas of the country, far from our major population (and cultural) centres. With the exception of small arsenals, most of the military’s real estate in the big cities was sold off years ago. I’m sure it fetched a pretty penny.

We barely teach history at all in the schools, and what we do teach downplays our military conflicts. We don’t have officer training programs on post-secondary campuses, where students could get some exposure to the military and the kind of people who choose to serve in it (though some associates of mine are working to change that). And because our military has been very small since the end of the Second World War, there are many Canadians, including generations who came here after the 1940s, who may not have a single serving member or veteran in their families. Indeed, I recall the first time I ever saw a Canadian soldier in real life. I was probably 13 or 14 years old, and it was one poor guy walking home from a bus depot, hauling a gigantic backpack through frigid winter cold. I stared at the poor man. I was amazed to actually see a soldier, a real one, in public, in Toronto’s suburbs. It was unheard of.

If Canadians had more exposure to the Armed Forces, if they felt more of a sense of understanding and ownership of the military, and the incredible role it plays at home and abroad, we wouldn’t let the politicians get away with the shameful neglect that has been the reality of governments Liberal and Conservative. Recruitment shortfalls would be big news. Military procurement debacles would be public scandals, not fodder for mostly ignored auditors-general reports and the odd oped or column, a distressing proportion of which are written by Fisher and me, along with a few other colleagues.

But we don’t. And our politicians will continue to treat the military like an afterthought for as long as there’s no public demand for better. If our friends in Australia have any advice on how to change our entire cultural perspective on this matter, I hope they don’t keep it a secret.

National Post
mgurney@nationalpost.com
Twitter.com/MattGurney
 
Just wondering, are there any countries (NATO or other developed, democratic nations) that people feel have a functioning / ideal model for military procurement? And how does their model work?

I have heard something about the Netherlands literally waiting for NATO partners to do their procurement and then essentially buying the stuff they liked best. Not sure the truth behind this or the details of how it actually works though.
 
Aussies aren't bad, and the Kiwis are following fairly well. :nod:

Regards
G2G
 
Good2Golf said:
Aussies aren't bad, and the Kiwis are following fairly well. :nod:

Regards
G2G

What is the jist of how theirs works?

I was at a conference where a woman from the industry spoke about how our system worked and the problems its caused for everyone including the companies trying to meet the needs of the SOR. Question period came at the end and I never thought of it at the time, but I wish I would have asked her if she had a "model" country and how their system worked.
 
It is however, easier for Australian and New Zealand to make major equipment purchasers because they don't have the in-country military/industrial complex that we do. 
Our politicians are unlikely to ever allow the purchase of a major piece of equipment simply because it is the most appropriate; the buy also has to bring substantial economic benefits into the correct ridings.  And in this risk-adverse era, the fact that awarding any major contract is likely to lead to legal challenges from the losing companies gives the high-priced help cold feet. Far easier to waffle and push necessary buys to the right rather than assume the risk.
 
AK said:
It is however, easier for Australian and New Zealand to make major equipment purchasers because they don't have the in-country military/industrial complex that we do. 

For the Aussies, you're partially right.  They do have a shipbuilding industry - hence why their ships are built in Australia and their attendant issues (the Collins-class sub replacement program, for one).  They don't really have much in the way of a MIC like us in other things though.
 
Dimsum said:
For the Aussies, you're partially right.  They do have a shipbuilding industry - hence why their ships are built in Australia and their attendant issues (the Collins-class sub replacement program, for one).  They don't really have much in the way of a MIC like us in other things though.

Thats's correct about shipbuilding, but not so much the latter.  A few other examples of Australian defence industry: small arms production, radar design and construction, conversion of A330 into KC-30s, E-7A integration, component manufacture for F-35, design and manufacture of vehicles eg Bushmaster and Hawkei.
 
Now maybe this is a crazy Idea but given our track record vs our allies in procuring equipment, would it not be maybe a good idea to invite our allies in and say "here is our system, give us a fresh set of eyes on how to make it better" because if you ask me everyone on that file was trained by the previous people, and it has not turned out well.
 
MilEME09 said:
Now maybe this is a crazy Idea but given our track record vs our allies in procuring equipment, would it not be maybe a good idea to invite our allies in and say "here is our system, give us a fresh set of eyes on how to make it better" because if you ask me everyone on that file was trained by the previous people, and it has not turned out well.

It would work up until the moment Govt optics thinks "the military doesn't trust us" or worse, "they would rather another country fact-check our processes".

ie. makes sense on paper, hence why ego/politics would never allow it.  They'd also take one look at the Irving/Quebec issues and say "well, you're screwed."
 
MilEME09 said:
Now maybe this is a crazy Idea but given our track record vs our allies in procuring equipment, would it not be maybe a good idea to invite our allies in .....
Not required. There is no shortage of analyses (and outright, but informed, rants) on causes and solutions.

One of the better ones is available via Amazon.ca for as little a $7.69: 
Kim Richard Nossal, Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada  (2016).

Knowing and addressing what's wrong has never been the problem;  the stumbling block has persistently been...... well, go to the Amazon site, click on LOOK INSIDE!, and read the available parts of the conclusion (p.166-169).  You'll see that it's nothing new. 

What is required is the government of the day -- regardless of party  -- to make hard decisions, accepting that some constituencies will be unhappy. 

And good luck getting that to happen.


Fine print:  The author is a friend;  I did not, however, get paid for recommending this book.  ;)
 
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