Canadian Military/Defence procurement process (Mega Thread)

[Kirkhill]

Our project managers don't help either. Writing SORs that rule out everything but one supplier just sets us back further. Write what we need, and rule the crappy ones out in testing.

You can start the weeding out a bit earlier than that by generating short lists of qualified suppliers and get yourself down to three vendors.  It doesn't matter if all of the vendors meet all of your requirements.  You pick three vendors with solid track records, preferably with you, but if not with people you trust, and allow them to provide their best option within the price and delivery constraints you have.

Then it becomes a relatively simple comparison of the compromises each vendor's solution requires you to make and which set of compromises you are willing to live with.  And you end up picking among the 75%, the 80% and the 85% solutions and making the selected solution work for you.

 

[The Bread Guy]

A bit of a briefing note snapshot on the process ...

The bureaucracy at National Defence helped scuttle two attempts by the Harper government to acquire helicopter landing ships over the last few years, documents show.

The most high-profile of the cases involved the sale by France of two Mistral-class warships, which had originally been built for Russia, but were on the auction block after the Kremlin's annexation of Crimea.

Documents obtained by The Canadian Press under access to information legislation show former defence minister Jason Kenney received conflicting advice from top civilian and military commanders, but decided to ignore it and made a last-minute, personal pitch to French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.

Defence experts say the memos and briefings makes the current defence policy review by the Liberals more important because they underscore how the lack of clear direction can lead to in-fighting among bureaucrats with competing visions of what is necessary.

Kenney and Le Drian held a teleconference last June, a few months before President Francois Hollande's government decided to sell the 21,000-tonne vessels to Egypt.

The former Conservative government was interested in acquiring landing ships, which can carry troops, equipment and helicopters, as a way to boost the military's ability to respond quickly to trouble spots and humanitarian disasters around the world.

The documents reveal that, prior to discussions with the French, the Conservatives examined the idea of acquiring large, surplus British Bay-class amphibious ships — a proposal defence bureaucrats also shot down.

In his advice over the Mistral sale, deputy defence minister John Forster acknowledged that having such a capability would be a "strategic asset" to Canada, particularly in the Arctic, and allow the country to be "more self-sufficient in international operations, reduce dependency on allies, and assume greater leadership roles."

But then he went on — in a June 19, 2015 briefing — to provide a litany of reasons why the Conservative government should not go ahead, notably because the ships did not fit within the existing defence investment plans and would put unforeseen money pressures on National Defence "in the magnitude of billions of Canadian dollars." ...

 

[Kirkhill]

The most aggravating sound ever heard:  "You can't do that!"

 

[jmt18325]

The most aggravating sound ever heard:  "You can't do that!"

They weren't saying it couldn't be done.  They said it couldn't be done with money allocated - and they were right.

 

[Good2Golf]

The most aggravating sound ever heard:  "You can't do that!"

Well...perhaps second to "The Most Annoying Sound in the World."  :nod:

 

[Kirkhill]

They weren't saying it couldn't be done.  They said it couldn't be done with money allocated - and they were right.

So tell me how much it would cost.  Let me decide if I can find the money, new or reallocated.

Plans are meant to be changed.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

They weren't saying it couldn't be done.  They said it couldn't be done with money allocated - and they were right.

No, they weren't saying that jmt18325. Better read again.

They said two things (according to the article, which is all we have to go on):

"... notably because the ships (1) did not fit within the existing defence investment plans and (2) would put unforeseen money pressures on National Defence "in the magnitude of billions of Canadian dollars." ".

Number (1) is obviously true: Anything that is not already in the investment plan does not fit within the investment plan by definition. However, that is not a valid financial reason not to modify an investment plan, and any such change is the purview of the elected politicians, not the permanent officials whose job it is to advise only.

Number (2) is, simply put, complete civil service bullshit. First of all, this very  "billions" of pressure are "unforeseen", which is another way for the civili servant to say : we ain't got a clue but will hypothesize you could spend extra billions, its possible, just as you may not - who knows? We don't. And the civil service hasn't a clue unless they talk to the uniformed personnel on what is involved in the Navy manning and getting up to speed on those ships within its current framework (which in any event had been lightened by the retirement of two destroyers and two AOR's). The Navy must have thought they could do it because, as you may recall from earlier posts in this thread, the CDS was of the view and wished to advise the government that we should acquire them. You may rest assured that the CDS did not come up with such view without first consulting with the Admiral, who himself must have sounded the Naval Board informally.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Blah, blah, blah.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[jmt18325]

No, they weren't saying that jmt18325. Better read again.

They said two things (according to the article, which is all we have to go on):

"... notably because the ships (1) did not fit within the existing defence investment plans and (2) would put unforeseen money pressures on National Defence "in the magnitude of billions of Canadian dollars." ".

That's exactly how I read that - we don't have the money.  If you want the ships, allocate more. 

Beyond that, the Conservatives underfunded the plan they already had.  The idea that we could have had things outside of that plan without sacrificing even more inside of the plan.

 

[jmt18325]

So tell me how much it would cost.  Let me decide if I can find the money, new or reallocated.

Plans are meant to be changed.

You and I would have found the money to buy those ships.  Jason Kenney would have found the money.  Stephen Harper...not so much.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'll assume you are voicing an opinion.

 

[jmt18325]

I'll assume you are voicing an opinion.

DND, as broken as it is, was right (in my opinion) to protect itself from yet another expense that it couldn't afford within the framework it was given.

 

[Good2Golf]

DND, as broken as it is, was right (in my opinion) to protect itself from yet another expense that it couldn't afford within the framework it was given.

Unless an amphib capability, such as it could have been, was deemed by the Government of the day to be worthy of reprioritization within the Department's capabilities and concomitant re-allocation of monies within the Investment Plan.

Regards
G2G

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The amphib and helicopter support these ships could have given us, would have payed dividends down the road and would force a change in focus even for the army and to an extent the air force. The ships could be a secure transport for NATO forces even without Canadian troops/helicopters aboard, not to mention a mobile base of operations for a variety of missions.

 

[Kirkhill]

The amphib and helicopter support these ships could have given us, would have payed dividends down the road and would force a change in focus even for the army and to an extent the air force. The ships could be a secure transport for NATO forces even without Canadian troops/helicopters aboard, not to mention a mobile base of operations for a variety of missions.

Amen, said the choir.

But, and there is always the but, I continue to wonder if all of our defence establishment is on board with a capable expeditionary force, or are there elements within the structure that see their role as one of limiting or governing or even restricting that capability.

After all, there was an element opposed to the C17s.  Their acquisition, together with the CC-130s and CH-147s and the arming of the CH-146s led the CAF down a new, in my opinion, more useful trail.

The amphibs would do the same, this time bringing the RCN into the mix.

 

[dapaterson]

It is the Government that decides.  Not the staff.  If staff say "This isn't in the plan", Government can say "Yes, you're right, so we won't do it" or "Well then, change the plan".

 

[Retired AF Guy]

A bit of a briefing note snapshot on the process ...

Link to article seems to be dead. Here is an updated one.

 

[jmt18325]

Unless an amphib capability, such as it could have been, was deemed by the Government of the day to be worthy of reprioritization within the Department's capabilities and concomitant re-allocation of monies within the Investment Plan.

From their perspective, there wasn't money to reprioritize.  The plan is already underfunded due to years of cuts.

 

[Kirkhill]

It is the Government that decides.  Not the staff.  If staff say "This isn't in the plan", Government can say "Yes, you're right, so we won't do it" or "Well then, change the plan".

Agreed but....

If the Government gets the word from the Staff, the experts, that the price is high and the timeline is long, then the Government is less likely to do anything other than what the Staff wants.

I believe the process is variously known as situating the estimate or gilding the lily.

 

[MilEME09]

At the end of the day it is a loss for the Navy, and the CAF, because a group of bureaucrats didn't want it to happen, even when the military and the minister did. Kinda tells you who has the real power in the department.