Canadian soldiers return to Kandahar

[from darkness lite]

As a member of the PRT I can tell you that there will be no "racking their weapons and snoozing in the backseat"  Every single member of the PRT knows that this is an active combat zone and when a patrol goes out, they will be a very well equipped, loaded for bear, "hard target".  Everyone know the threat so yes "the best force protection you can have is to look too formidable to take on in the first place."  

No one, from the Inf Pte, to the truck driver, to the Col, has any illusions this is not a war zone.  As such, everyone is approaching this, and was trained to approach this, as soldiers first, tradesmen second.

FDL  

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

well that is good to hear FLD.  I hope they maintain that posture the whole time they are there and come back in one piece.

 

[paracowboy]

With a PRT, there are likely to be civilians in the mix - from DFAIT, CIDA or a variety of NGOs.   Looking for trouble in such a situation is likely to bring just that - trouble.  

all the more reason for actively seeking the trouble BEFORE it gets to the civies. That's my job description: "to close with, and destroy, the enemy." The more aggressively I do so, the less likely (and less able) they are to engage those in my charge.

I'm no expert, but I believe the infantry's role within a PRT is to provide force protection for the remainder of the team

yep. By conducting framework patrolling, as well as convoy escort, camp security, establishing OPs, and other assorted baby-sitting tasks.

I know the OC of the coy assigned to the PRT very well - they're in good hands; he's hardly a shrinking violet.

I know him professionally, and he is that: professional. However, even if he were Patton, Monty, and Rommel all rolled into one, it wouldn't make any difference in the attitude and responses of the cpl/ptes in the Coy. That's where I come in. Senior officers really have very little impact on the troops. I've had dozens of OC's over the years, I can remember two. I remember every jack and sgt I've ever worked for. Fortunately, he's got several very good NCO's to ramrod the show. Aggressive lot. Fun at parties, too!

There is a difference, however, between an aggressive posture designed to deter attacks and to respond quickly to threats and actively seeking out contact.  I would suggest that the latter would not be appropriate in the context of a PRT.

I agree almost completely. Only one caveat: once an enemy is identified, it would be best for the non-combat arms to hole up in the fort, and for the grunts to go and kill the bad guys. Immediately. Sets the proper precedent, and eliminates a potential threat before it can get to those under the ground-pounder's protection.

A PRT would not be SCALED for such ops, but should work hand-in-hand with the force that IS.  There cannot be JUST a PRT presence.  We (meaning the 'allies') must must have both Cbt and PRT to complement each other, and if there is only a PRT, it must have it's integral 'ODA' or similar (JTF?) with bigger assets on call.

what he said. (But with more vulgarity.)

No one, from the Inf Pte, to the truck driver, to the Col, has any illusions this is not a war zone.  As such, everyone is approaching this, and was trained to approach this, as soldiers first, tradesmen second.

I know, I was there for the training. Now, it's up to you guys to constantly re-inforce that. We have to guard against complacency, and by stating that "we're not looking for trouble" we give the impression that we'd rather have sand kicked in our faces than poke the bully in the lips. I realize that the Col's speech was for the media, and so had to be scaled down (after all, we certainly wouldn't want to give Canada the impression that Her soldiers actually fight), but that one line touched my sorest nerve.

I'll shut up now. We're all saying the same thing, anyway.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

I'll shut up now. We're all saying the same thing, anyway.

Yeah, in the end, we are.    Besides, I'd rather be working with soldiers straining at the leash to get at the enemy than to work with those who require a severe kick in the a** just to leave the camp.

 

[KevinB]

paracowboy for CLS 

 

[scm77]

A little follow up to the article...

Canadian troops aren't allowed to act like soldiers

Re: Forces brace for Afghan casualties, July 4.

The comments of Col. Steve Bowes, commander of the Canadian troops deploying to Kandahar, indicate the unrealistic outlook of the Canadian government in its conduct of the war on terrorism.

Rather than see it as a "war," they believe that the application of good intentions in the form of defence, diplomacy and development will make things right in Afghanistan.

What they overlook is that without defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda first, reconstruction teams and other soft measures hold little chance of success. There is a clear implication that Canada wishes to let others fight and die, such as Americans, Britons and Australians, while it arrives later and conducts what is busywork.

Col. Bowes's remark that "Canadian soldiers never go out looking for a fight" is the ultimate insult to members of the Canadian Forces. The remark ties in with another point in his remarks, the "security sector reform." Those who champion this concept, with Canada in the lead, ultimately wish to make it a criminal act for armed authority agencies (the military and the police) to kill people other than in clear cases of self-defence. Canada is well along the road towards implementing this concept as indicated by the details of the new defence policy statement and in evolving missions, such as in Afghanistan. In 2002, Canada did conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, but this aroused such an outcry within the Liberal caucus and among foreign-affairs bureaucrats and various interest groups, that a commitment was made to avoid combat and killing in the future.

Hence we see the Canadian Forces transforming into a robust constabulary, and Canada's international reputation sinking into further disarray and irrelevance.

Sean Henry,

Ottawa,

Colonel (retired)

http://server09.densan.ca/scripts/showfile.asp?URL=/Archivenews/050706/cit/050706b7.htm

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Col Henry (good 'ol black hat that he is) has been out of the loop for a long time.  Again, the comments are off base.  There is a distinct difference in mission between the PRT (which Col Bowes will command) and the force we're likely to place in Kandahar in 2006.

There is a clear implication that Canada wishes to let others fight and die, such as Americans, Britons and Australians, while it arrives later and conducts what is busywork.

I really don't know where he gets this, given the role of PRTs, including American and British ones, in theatre.  All are engaged in security sector reform and in a variety of "nation building activities".  The PRT deployment must be viewed in the context of the longer-term plan for CF involvement in Afghanistan.  We are likely to take command of a multi-national brigade conducting operations along the Afghan frontier, with a Canadian infantry battle group in the thick of it early next year.  Hardly "busywork"  :

Frankly, to vent a bit, I'm getting a bit tired of the media and/or retired people telling me what an "insult" things are to serving members when they have completely failed to conduct adequate research or to place things in proper context.  This letter was a perfect example.

 

[from darkness lite]

Teddy Ruxpin beat me to the punch. Some out there do not really understand the concept of PRTs - all PRTs - be they American, British, German or Canadian (No PRTs conduct direct combat, or kinetic, operations).   The PRT concept is not Canadian, as a matter of fact the US is a big pusher of the PRT concept.   They view combat operations in two lights.   Kinetic, ie direct action against the enemy, and non-kinetic, ie indirect action against the enemy.   If you take away the enemy's support-base, defeating the enemy is only a matter of time.   That is the role of the PRT.   No PRT in Afghanistan goes looking for trouble (ie busting down doors, etc), however all are prepared to meet it and defeat it.   The TF Bayonet commander (173d Airborne Bde commander) views the PRTs as his non-kinetic weapons.

As for security sector reform, it is not a plan to disarm/neuter militaries/police.   Its far from that.   The goal is to make the ANA and the Afghan National Police professional enough to take care of their own problems.   The people of Afghanistan have to see that their government is working before they'll be fully confident in it's ability. Until that goal is met, Afghanistan has no chance of coming out of chaos.

For those who prefer direct combat actions, I hear you, however we don't get the luxury of choosing our missions.   As Teddy Ruxpin alluded to, wait for TF 01/06!!

FDL  

 

[McG]

I agree almost completely. Only one caveat: once an enemy is identified, it would be best for the non-combat arms to hole up in the fort, and for the grunts to go and kill the bad guys. Immediately. Sets the proper precedent, and eliminates a potential threat before it can get to those under the ground-pounder's protection.

Yes, and as a military member of the PRT you protect the fort while the military element responsible for destroying the enemy in that AO does its buisness.

For now, that military element in the US.  It should be a Canadain BG by Feb 06.

 

[pbi]

I have to agree with Teddy on some of these superannuated "warriors",( many of them denizens of the pages of Esprit de Corps magazine): it's really quite sickening sometimes to read their utterly ill-informed comments, and to see how the media gives full play to their "expert" opinions. Such as, if I recall correctly, the comment that appeared from one of these worthies saying that the PPCLI soldiers killed at Kandahar died because they were undergoing in-theatre training, which was a sign of how poorly trained the unit was. Anybody who knew anything at all about that mission knows how well trained 3PP was, and anybody with a schmick about training for war knows that in-theatre training is a normal part of the game-it is how a force adapts to changing tactical circumstances.

Cheers

 

[Gunner]

Such as, if I recall correctly, the comment that appeared from one of these worthies saying that the PPCLI soldiers killed at Kandahar died because they were undergoing in-theatre training, which was a sign of how poorly trained the unit was. Anybody who knew anything at all about that mission knows how well trained 3PP was, and anybody with a schmick about training for war knows that in-theatre training is a normal part of the game-it is how a force adapts to changing tactical circumstances.

Michel Drapeau made the comments.  Although I don't agree with Sean Henry's comments (I assume on behalf of CDA), I loathe to lump him in the same category as Drapeau.

 

[Redleg1971]

We wrestled with the posture of our force while I was at the Kandahar PRT, and finally decided that first and foremost, we had to protect ourselves.  The Afghan people respected that.  Whenever we left the gates of the compound, we were locked and loaded and ready to fight and defend ourselves.  Being some 25km from the airbase when you are in the city, you cannot count on the grunts to get there to back you up.  Remember that your enemy will look for the weakest link to attack.  Don't look like that weakest link, even if your mission is reconstruction.

Kerry

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Well said.

 

[TCBF]

I think Col Drapeau should have known better.  Had he read LCol Schrieber's "Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last Hundred Days of the Great War", he would have been reminded that an Army must constantly learn, re-train and develop itself both between and during operations.

We all trained at Kandahar.  Had that bomb been dropped the night before or the night after, it would have hit guys from TF 64, or some 4 digit ODA.  We even ran a Surv Opr course over there, as well as  firing everything we had.  As well, we don't even see a lot of kit until we hit the ground overseas and some bean counter grudgingly tell's a bin rat in Canada to take it off her shelf and ships it to us.  The Norgie 77mm MBGD DP Smoke Grenades are an example.

Tom

 

[from darkness lite]

Remember that your enemy will look for the weakest link to attack.   Don't look like that weakest link, even if your mission is reconstruction.

Roger that, and that is Col Bowes' intent.

FDL  

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

"As well, we don't even see a lot of kit until we hit the ground overseas and some bean counter grudgingly tells a bin rat in Canada to take it off her shelf and ships it to us."

That is truly a shame and I hope its being addressed as best it can at the highest levels.

 

[KevinB]

That is truly a shame and I hope its being addressed as best it can at the highest levels.

Best solution - force a deployment of all supply techs and Fin Officers - with augmentation by civil servants at DND and politicians...

 

[paracowboy]

Best solution - force a deployment of all supply techs and Fin Officers - with augmentation by civil servants at DND and politicians...

everybody wins!

 

[Haggis]

Best solution - force a deployment of all supply techs and Fin Officers - with augmentation by civil servants at DND and politicians...

Maybe with them all gone, the rest of us would get some real work done....

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

To put things into perspective, a couple of facts might be in order:

-  We bought over $13 million in new kit for the ground portion of OP APOLLO.  This is not counting the new natures of ammo procured. Often, we would react to items found online by the BG itself.

-  Until the last week of Dec 01, we thought the BG would be deploying to Kabul as part of ISAF (we were formally stood down for Xmas on the night of 24 Dec - I know, I was at work.  1 CMBG leaned a bit forward to give 3 VP more of a break).  The combat ops order was received on 7 Jan 02 and the BG was launched three weeks later - with a totally different TO&E than was originally discussed (thankfully, the Strathconas had continued to keep Coyotes at a higher readiness level).  You can imagine the frenzy in the interim, which affected all sorts of things - including delivery of new equipment, ammo loading, flight timings, order of march for entry to theatre, delivery of ROEs, etc..

-  Concurrent with a shift to Kandahar was a shift to the exclusive use of USAF airlift.  The USAF uses a totally different system and our movements people had to jury-rig everything just to get flights organized.  The USAF tended to ignore our order of march recommendations and messed with our load plan, leading to problems at the APOD.  This was complicated even further in cross-loading in Germany.

-  Because of the difficulty of the theatre, we relied entirely on the US transport system and on ILOC (the NATO Log system) to get our stuff to Kandahar.  The Yanks would often bump even IOR items in favour of their own, leaving our IOR items, parts, etc. sitting in Dover or Germany or points in between (or in Kuwait, or Oman, or Bahrein...).

In other words, there is much more to this than meets the eye.  Yes, there were problems with the bureaucracy - I lived it too.  However, I have to note that in 99% of cases, I was surprised by the "can do" attitude shown by people all over the CF.  As one example, CFAD Dundurn crossloaded tons of ammo over the holidays, trying to keep up with all the changes.  They repacked the entire ammo load three times as we changed scales over and over again - a huge amount of work, all on spec.  In fact, the basic load for infantry ammo was given up by Wainwright, in order to reduce delivery timings.

What got to me were the stupid fights:

- calls from NDHQ about troops camming their equipment by spraying it tan
- calls from NDHQ about troops wearing webbing rather than tac vests
- the "cast in concrete" 100 vehicle cap
- the unwillingness to stand down those units that would obviously not be deploying

Those who were in Kandahar undoubtedly can add to the list - it is a long one.  But, I have to say that aside from a couple of individuals, I never encountered anyone that said no just for the sake of saying no.  I still remember the feeling that I got when I read in the op order:  "conduct combat operations against Al Qaida and Taliban forces"...

The good news is that the PRT has two senior individuals that lived all of this in 2001 and 2002 - and who well remember what everyone went through.

Enough from me...I've ranted enough and think I still have "issues" surrounding this op... ;D