CH-124 Sea King Historical Thread

[Kirkhill]

Not directly part of the Sea King story, but...

What if the RCN had a plan for HMCS Bonaventure?

As far as I can tell, when the Banshee was retired in 1962 there were never any serious attempts to find a replacement, notwithstanding the abortive looks at the A-4.. As well, there seems to have been a disconnect with the building of the St Laurent class and the reality of the evolving threat. Other classes of the time were starting to incorporate air defense, and area air defense was in full development. Self defense examples are the Charles F. Adams class with Tartar, and the Leander class with the Seacat. Area air defense vessels included the Belknap class cruiser in the USN and the County class destroyer in the RN. Canada did not acquire a point defense capability until the Iroquois class, and an area defense capability until TRUMP, in the early '90s.

Why is this significant. Around the time of Bonnie's retiremnt in 1970, Soviet Naval Aviation were starting to acquire long range maritime strike, in particular the TU-22M Backfire, carrying the 320nm range Kh-22 Storm. Operating an ASW group centered around Bonnie in that threat environment would have been suicidal. Can the argument be made that the only reason that a Canadian ASW Task Group of that era have operated in wartime conditions is because it would have been "insignificant" enough that the Backfires' attention would have been elsewhere?

Air defence requires layers: the outer layer is a fighter CAP, the middle layer area air defence, and the inner layer the point defnce systems. In the case of the Backfire, it is desirable to attrit some of them before they launch. Hence the need for the fighter.

One option would have been what was considered in some measure. Actually obtain the A-4G Skyhawk which was developed for the RAN for fleet air defence operating from HMAS Melbourne. Additionally, the Improved basic point defense missile system (IBPDMS) could have been installed in the early 70's. Finally, could the Iroquois class have been given an area air defence capability from the start. Would these measures have kept Bonnie relavant as the center of an ASW TG?

Would such a plan have possibly led to consideration of acquiring 1-2 Invincible class through deck cruisers (aircraft carriers) and Sea Harriers to operate off them?

This thought bubble is not merely "what might have been." It also informs why the decision to dispose of Bonnie "as she was" in reality was driven as much by operational need, as it was by politics, unification, and down-sizing. Which in turn speaks to how we reconfigured the Sea King in the 70's.

And all this also speaks to how we went from 20 "cadillac" derivatives of the St Laurent class (incl the St Laurents, Restigouches, Mackenzies, and Annapolis') to 8 effective ones for ASW (the DDHs) that still couldn't defend themselves from air attack...

Could the argument be made that the Bears and Backfires were improved Kondors which did so much to suppress the convoy system in the early days of WW2. As I understand it that threat drove the rise of the catapult launched Hurricane (the Hurricat) and the jeep or escort carriers.

....

Second point

On WW2 Canada was making its own decisions but was strongly guided by the RN. And the RN left Canada to manage its own theaters which meant that Canada had to manage all threats in those theaters. It truly had to embrace a combined arms philosophy.

That was less true of the Army which slotted into the British Army and the Air Force which slotted into the RAF.

Canada has always had the luxury of supplying boutique capabilities within someone else's constructs.

Building bubbles, or onions, requiring both co-operation and self-sustainment has never been a requirement.

The Army can't figure out how to get the PPCLI to march with the RCR and Vandoos, how to get the infantry to co-operate with the cavalry and guns, what to do with everybody else, and how to raise and manage a useful reserve.

...

Canada has never experienced an imperative that demanded learning how to act to survive independently.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I remember the HS Symposiums but never went. We were never encouraged to go and in hindsight that was very shortsighted thinking. It seems to me that at times the Air Det was an inconvenience to the ships company and we still treat the air asset on our ships as something to be tolerated and not exploited to its fullest.
Hopefully someone more current with operations can prove my comment wrong.

It goes both ways, I have sailed with Air Depts that are great facets of the ships coy and really mesh, and I have sailed with others that were down right disruptive and combative, refusing to take up their portion of ship board duties.

I have also done a deployment without an air department.