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There's nothing classified in the simulation, so it doesn't matter what you enter... so no. Plus, my brain is too old; I don't remember it!Did you keep the original ASN-123 log in code?
CH-124 Sea King Historical Thread
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Neither do I. But I will bet that if I sat in front of an ASN-123, closed my eyes and just let my hands move, they would punch in the correct code from muscle memory…
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‘123456’?
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Nope…
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That's the combination for my luggage!
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I was wondering what the ASN-150 (a leter version of the ASN-123 which was installed in the CH-124 from early 90's to early 2010's) looked like:
My inital sim posted here isn't driving the TacPlot (yet, I'm going to have it an option in the 123 sim).
I had the Aircraft Operating Instruction for the SH-60F which had it (the 60B used Lamps Mk-III instead), but there wasn't much detail. I got them for the HH-60J (US Coast Guard) and SH-2G Sea Sprite (USN and others). The SH-2G version has all the menus.
Although the basic functionality is the same as the 123, it has some interesting capabilities:
Oh well, hindsight is 20/20...
My inital sim posted here isn't driving the TacPlot (yet, I'm going to have it an option in the 123 sim).
I had the Aircraft Operating Instruction for the SH-60F which had it (the 60B used Lamps Mk-III instead), but there wasn't much detail. I got them for the HH-60J (US Coast Guard) and SH-2G Sea Sprite (USN and others). The SH-2G version has all the menus.
Although the basic functionality is the same as the 123, it has some interesting capabilities:
- can have more than one computer (in the 60F it is used for redundancy)
- each computer can drive two screens
- better user input (I have a video of how much simpler it is than the 123 menus, but can't post it here)
- the screens can also do "normal" video instead of the TACPLOT (the SH-2G uses that for FLIR, radar, and a UYS-503 sonobuoy processor, which is the same processor as on the CH-124B, the 60F for FLIR and Hellfire)
Oh well, hindsight is 20/20...
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Speaking of independant ops on the Cyclone thread...
I've been trying to run to ground what happened to move from carrier controlled ops to "independant" ops in the Sea King around 1970... it's not entirely clear. Three things converged:
In any case, we ended up putting the 501 in the back with a nav, which opened the door to independant ops. This was unlike in the Tracker, where it was operated by the pilots up front. I would like to think that the community knew doing this while dipping wasn't such a great idea, but at least one crash around that time indicates otherwise. Or maybe that crash made them learn, quickly?
In any case, the 501 went in back, unlike the original requirement, which matched what the USN wanted, a robust tactical computer in front. The USN didn't really get that until the introduction of the ASN-123 in the '70s.
However, even though we had exchange people with the RN, they never seemed to consider the evolving RN Sea King HAS TANS (Tactical Air Navigation System), which was built to support an observer doing "battle management."
So we ended up using USN equipment that was meant for pilots to do what the RN was also doing with a more appropriate fit. Which meant far too much of the TACCO's capacity was eaten up by operating equipment which didn't properly support his supposed core role.
But, as always, hindsight is 20/20.
I've been trying to run to ground what happened to move from carrier controlled ops to "independant" ops in the Sea King around 1970... it's not entirely clear. Three things converged:
- the loss of Bonnie, and her dedicated control capbilities
- the "availability" of RCAF navs
- the availability of the ASN-501
In any case, we ended up putting the 501 in the back with a nav, which opened the door to independant ops. This was unlike in the Tracker, where it was operated by the pilots up front. I would like to think that the community knew doing this while dipping wasn't such a great idea, but at least one crash around that time indicates otherwise. Or maybe that crash made them learn, quickly?
In any case, the 501 went in back, unlike the original requirement, which matched what the USN wanted, a robust tactical computer in front. The USN didn't really get that until the introduction of the ASN-123 in the '70s.
However, even though we had exchange people with the RN, they never seemed to consider the evolving RN Sea King HAS TANS (Tactical Air Navigation System), which was built to support an observer doing "battle management."
So we ended up using USN equipment that was meant for pilots to do what the RN was also doing with a more appropriate fit. Which meant far too much of the TACCO's capacity was eaten up by operating equipment which didn't properly support his supposed core role.
But, as always, hindsight is 20/20.
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I had a discussion with one of the well known Sea King historians late last week on how we capture some of the details of the Cyclone acquisition in a factual, non-political, and unbiased way. It wasn’t the first time we talked about it; him wanting me to write some stuff down is one of the reasons I’ve been floating thought bubbles in this thread. It also Tues into some of the Sea King decisions that were made that got us here.
I shudder to think how we capture whatever might be going on right now, given the Comd RCN’s comments.
I shudder to think how we capture whatever might be going on right now, given the Comd RCN’s comments.
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Fossil
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I tried to press Lock Mart at DEFSEC as to what was happening, but I got no bites. I did say that at some point soembody is going to have to write the factual (ie non-political and not the "stories") account of what has happened, an it would be better that everything didn't have to be ATI'd. Contractors tend to play both sides of the fence; ie, they plead company proprietary even though it is 100% funded by the taxpayers.
FSTO
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Off topic somewhat:
The Sea King/EH 101/Cyclone saga would make Pentagon Wars look like a case study of proper procurement management. But this is Canada, a nation that never holds anyone to account for boondoggles, scandals, business screw-ups or even Mass Murder (Portapique) . Where other nations have a cultural industry that will write books or produce movies and or mini-series for wider awareness, Canada will just look the other way, consume US culture and tut tut about how bad things are there while our house burns down around us.
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The Sea King/EH 101/Cyclone saga would make Pentagon Wars look like a case study of proper procurement management. But this is Canada, a nation that never holds anyone to account for boondoggles, scandals, business screw-ups or even Mass Murder (Portapique) . Where other nations have a cultural industry that will write books or produce movies and or mini-series for wider awareness, Canada will just look the other way, consume US culture and tut tut about how bad things are there while our house burns down around us.
#1240 Rogers vs. Rogers
”You've got a father who never respected you, you've got a family who doesn't respect you, and you have all of this power available to you that your family assumes you will never use.” -Michael Healey, author of Rogers vs. Rogers
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Not directly part of the Sea King story, but...
What if the RCN had a plan for HMCS Bonaventure?
As far as I can tell, when the Banshee was retired in 1962 there were never any serious attempts to find a replacement, notwithstanding the abortive looks at the A-4.. As well, there seems to have been a disconnect with the building of the St Laurent class and the reality of the evolving threat. Other classes of the time were starting to incorporate air defense, and area air defense was in full development. Self defense examples are the Charles F. Adams class with Tartar, and the Leander class with the Seacat. Area air defense vessels included the Belknap class cruiser in the USN and the County class destroyer in the RN. Canada did not acquire a point defense capability until the Iroquois class, and an area defense capability until TRUMP, in the early '90s.
Why is this significant. Around the time of Bonnie's retiremnt in 1970, Soviet Naval Aviation were starting to acquire long range maritime strike, in particular the TU-22M Backfire, carrying the 320nm range Kh-22 Storm. Operating an ASW group centered around Bonnie in that threat environment would have been suicidal. Can the argument be made that the only reason that a Canadian ASW Task Group of that era have operated in wartime conditions is because it would have been "insignificant" enough that the Backfires' attention would have been elsewhere?
Air defence requires layers: the outer layer is a fighter CAP, the middle layer area air defence, and the inner layer the point defnce systems. In the case of the Backfire, it is desirable to attrit some of them before they launch. Hence the need for the fighter.
One option would have been what was considered in some measure. Actually obtain the A-4G Skyhawk which was developed for the RAN for fleet air defence operating from HMAS Melbourne. Additionally, the Improved basic point defense missile system (IBPDMS) could have been installed in the early 70's. Finally, could the Iroquois class have been given an area air defence capability from the start. Would these measures have kept Bonnie relavant as the center of an ASW TG?
Would such a plan have possibly led to consideration of acquiring 1-2 Invincible class through deck cruisers (aircraft carriers) and Sea Harriers to operate off them?
This thought bubble is not merely "what might have been." It also informs why the decision to dispose of Bonnie "as she was" in reality was driven as much by operational need, as it was by politics, unification, and down-sizing. Which in turn speaks to how we reconfigured the Sea King in the 70's.
And all this also speaks to how we went from 20 "cadillac" derivatives of the St Laurent class (incl the St Laurents, Restigouches, Mackenzies, and Annapolis') to 8 effective ones for ASW (the DDHs) that still couldn't defend themselves from air attack...
What if the RCN had a plan for HMCS Bonaventure?
As far as I can tell, when the Banshee was retired in 1962 there were never any serious attempts to find a replacement, notwithstanding the abortive looks at the A-4.. As well, there seems to have been a disconnect with the building of the St Laurent class and the reality of the evolving threat. Other classes of the time were starting to incorporate air defense, and area air defense was in full development. Self defense examples are the Charles F. Adams class with Tartar, and the Leander class with the Seacat. Area air defense vessels included the Belknap class cruiser in the USN and the County class destroyer in the RN. Canada did not acquire a point defense capability until the Iroquois class, and an area defense capability until TRUMP, in the early '90s.
Why is this significant. Around the time of Bonnie's retiremnt in 1970, Soviet Naval Aviation were starting to acquire long range maritime strike, in particular the TU-22M Backfire, carrying the 320nm range Kh-22 Storm. Operating an ASW group centered around Bonnie in that threat environment would have been suicidal. Can the argument be made that the only reason that a Canadian ASW Task Group of that era have operated in wartime conditions is because it would have been "insignificant" enough that the Backfires' attention would have been elsewhere?
Air defence requires layers: the outer layer is a fighter CAP, the middle layer area air defence, and the inner layer the point defnce systems. In the case of the Backfire, it is desirable to attrit some of them before they launch. Hence the need for the fighter.
One option would have been what was considered in some measure. Actually obtain the A-4G Skyhawk which was developed for the RAN for fleet air defence operating from HMAS Melbourne. Additionally, the Improved basic point defense missile system (IBPDMS) could have been installed in the early 70's. Finally, could the Iroquois class have been given an area air defence capability from the start. Would these measures have kept Bonnie relavant as the center of an ASW TG?
Would such a plan have possibly led to consideration of acquiring 1-2 Invincible class through deck cruisers (aircraft carriers) and Sea Harriers to operate off them?
This thought bubble is not merely "what might have been." It also informs why the decision to dispose of Bonnie "as she was" in reality was driven as much by operational need, as it was by politics, unification, and down-sizing. Which in turn speaks to how we reconfigured the Sea King in the 70's.
And all this also speaks to how we went from 20 "cadillac" derivatives of the St Laurent class (incl the St Laurents, Restigouches, Mackenzies, and Annapolis') to 8 effective ones for ASW (the DDHs) that still couldn't defend themselves from air attack...
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That is true, however...Off topic somewhat:
The Sea King/EH 101/Cyclone saga would make Pentagon Wars look like a case study of proper procurement management. But this is Canada, a nation that never holds anyone to account for boondoggles, scandals, business screw-ups or even Mass Murder (Portapique) . Where other nations have a cultural industry that will write books or produce movies and or mini-series for wider awareness, Canada will just look the other way, consume US culture and tut tut about how bad things are there while our house burns down around us.
#1240 Rogers vs. Rogers
”You've got a father who never respected you, you've got a family who doesn't respect you, and you have all of this power available to you that your family assumes you will never use.” -Michael Healey, author of Rogers vs. Rogers
As I've said, I've been doing quite a bit of primary source research on the Sea King. The problems started well before the contracts for the EH-101 were let. In particular, there was a lot of hubris around the thought that the Canadian MH "can do" attitude could mean we could make the jump to "the best Maritime Helicopter in the world." In hindsight, it was unlikely. Therefore we wrote a spec for a helicopter that didn't exist in an environment where we didn't have the skills to help create it. Hell, we didn't even have the skills to write the spec properly (I'm saying that as someone who participated in spec reviews and interpretations).
Right up to to demolition of the Officer's Mess (Wardroom!) at Shearwater a few years ago there was a sticker from an early '90s HS Symposium (we used to actually take the time to talk about doctrine, tactics, and procedures each year) that had a EH-101 nose on the left facing a Sea King nose on the right, with the caption "Can we get there... from here?" on it. Someone had wrote in pen "Hell, no." There were cracks showing right from the start.
FSTO
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FSTO
Army.ca Fixture
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I remember the HS Symposiums but never went. We were never encouraged to go and in hindsight that was very shortsighted thinking. It seems to me that at times the Air Det was an inconvenience to the ships company and we still treat the air asset on our ships as something to be tolerated and not exploited to its fullest.
Hopefully someone more current with operations can prove my comment wrong.
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My experience, also dated, was that was the case until:
- something bad happened, like an aircraft incident
- we were really busy doing something important to the ship
- we got the Christmas mail
- there was a reason for them to see it wasn’t easy (like being down to one TACCO and still flying 9 hour cycles)
It was especially depressing that after being told repeatedly we couldn’t do flight deck evolutions due to the required SOA, but still doing 2 or 3 hours of engineering delaying drills, you were summoned to the Captain’s cabin to explain why the air department readiness sucked…
My experience has been the RCN’s understanding of air power is somewhat, um, “limited,” at all levels. Good luck to them trying to switch to a heavier drone capability…
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