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The Huey is more fun! I do need a proper cyclic and collective at home though (working on it).
CH-124 Sea King Historical Thread
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armrdsoul77
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I got the ones I've used so far from various sources so I didn't have to create them, just modify and import:
- ModelConverterX to convery between formats
- Paint to modify textures
- Notepad for .txt and .xml files
- MSFS SDK to import into MSFS
For the three versions of Terra Nova I need to work on, the original St Laurents were done in SketchUp so I'll probably use that.
When I have to do full drawing, Blender.
I also have MSFS Livery Tools and X-Plane WorldEditor.
armrdsoul77
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I like to fly helicopters in Xplane 11 and often practice landing on the USS McInerney which always seems to be cruising just offshore from Yvr. I'd like to try modeling some vehicles for xplane and blender seems to be a popular option(albeit with a steep learning curve).
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We're providing info to a company developing a Sea King for MSFS. Developing aircraft for X-Plane requires two things; you need to do the models in Blender or another program, plus you need to do the flight model.
I seem to not be able to concentrate on one piece to get really good at it, but I have a lot of experience across a whole lot of simulation areas.
We do want to eventually do a more realistic simulation for deck landings. None of the current sims simulate the challenging part, which is the ship actually pitches and rolls. As well, the aircraft handles differently when it's on the wire.
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The backstory of 12421, which is sometimes (incorrectly) called a CH-124C in places like wikipedia.
The first passive (sonobuoy processing) aircraft was 12411. It's primary fit was the Calypso processing system (built by Computing Devices Canada, now GDMS-C) and the ASN-123 (but not connected to each other). We have quite a bit of original reference material on that fit.
When that aircraft ditched off Bermuda (Ruzgys the first) in 1989 any further development obviously came to an end. Two things happened:
Apparently, 12421's trials really revolved around the dipping sonar and issues with it, and then petered out.
Eventually the fleet was fitted with the 123, but it again was not connected to the sonar (or other things), as all the development had gone into the acoustic processor. This was corrected around 2001 with new ASN-123 software and some wiring mods. 12421 was eventually converted back to an 'A' because the changing world highlighted the "lack of need" for that type of development (until it was needed again, 25 years later; Cyclone acoustic knowledge isn't great).
The first passive (sonobuoy processing) aircraft was 12411. It's primary fit was the Calypso processing system (built by Computing Devices Canada, now GDMS-C) and the ASN-123 (but not connected to each other). We have quite a bit of original reference material on that fit.
When that aircraft ditched off Bermuda (Ruzgys the first) in 1989 any further development obviously came to an end. Two things happened:
- 6 aircraft in roughly that config, but with the UYS-503 (connected to the 123) and MAD were modified to the HELTAS (Helicopter Towed Array Support; not Gelicopter Twoed Array Sonar, as sometimes stated) standard (12401, 12424, 12430, 12434, 12437, and 12441). These were later stripped out for SCTF (Standing Contingency Task Force).
- 1 aircraft, 12421, was modified to HAPS (Helicopter Acoustic Processing System), with the intention of continuing development. This retained the 123, but added dual UYS-503 processors with the capability to process a Plessey wet end; in effect, combining Alphas and Bravos (which the USN and RN had been doing with other systems for a while).
Apparently, 12421's trials really revolved around the dipping sonar and issues with it, and then petered out.
Eventually the fleet was fitted with the 123, but it again was not connected to the sonar (or other things), as all the development had gone into the acoustic processor. This was corrected around 2001 with new ASN-123 software and some wiring mods. 12421 was eventually converted back to an 'A' because the changing world highlighted the "lack of need" for that type of development (until it was needed again, 25 years later; Cyclone acoustic knowledge isn't great).
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Some extra research on how we ended up with the ASN-501.
It's clear that the 501 wasn't a fall back from another plan, nor was it a result of Bonnie being taken out of service. It was "part of the plan" from the very start.
In the 127th Meeting of the Research Control Committee, 31 January 1963, item 127-3 "Navigation and Tactical Display System for ASW Helicopter" was presented.It specifically talked about having Sperry Gyroscope Company, who produced the ASN-501, investigate conversion of the ASN-30 (the USN nomenclature for the 501, first refered to as ASWTNS, Anti-subwarine Wareare Tactical Navigation System) for helicopter use. $80,000 was allocated for this work. There is a short briefing note attached to the minutes concerning this item.
Furthermore, the "Revised Staff Characteristics for an Escort Borne ASW Helicopter" dated 16 August, 1962, also includes a section labelled "Integrated Navigation and Tactical Display System. It is clear that it is written in such a way to indicate a system such as the ASN-501 (ASN-30). Notably, it also includes "it is desirable that an attack computer be provided to facilitate vectoring of surface or other air units to intercept the target." This was never provided per se, but the combination of the 501 and dedicated TACCO provided the capability eventually, although the radar was required to fully realize it.
Of note, I also bought a copy of the USN NAVAIR 01-230HLH-1 NATOPS Flight Manual SH-3D/H Helicopters, Ch 1 1 December 1984, which still included a description of the ASA-13, the system the USN had available when the CHSS-2 was acquired. The ASA-13, apart from reliability issues, would not have met the required characteristics. Its primary limitation was the inability to assist robustly in creating a plot. The ASN-501's red and green strobes are flexible enough to allow that and also other plotting functions, like the aforementioned attacks. However, to do so requires a heavier operator workload. The USN's eventual solution was the ASN-123, a digital computer which could do all these functions and more with a much lower workload (although optimized as a pilot information computer, not a robust battle management system; ASP and MDMS are the latter).
So, it is clear that from at least 1962 the RCN was intending the CHSS-2 to be an independent platform (there are other supporting documents) and seeking to fit it as such. They also were aware of the requirements to do so. The paperwork trail is there for them to understand the workload of doing so in a challenging flight environment (low altitude, IFR, other traffic). My next step is to find the documentation, if it still exists, as to why the decision was taken to add a TACCO with a dedicated console housing the 501. My gut feel is there isn't a single reason, but a convergence of events: need to have robust plotting capabilities, state of existing technology, availability of navs from the RCAF, impending disposal of Bonnie, and the RN model.
It is also not clear that when the RN model evolved into TANS (Tactical Air Navigation System), which was optimized for the use of a TACCO to do more robust battle management (primarily by integrating the radar with the plot), consideration was not given to acquiring it.
It does seem that the "accomplishment" of getting the "canadian" ASN-501 in the aircraft create a 25 year acceptance of that as "the best we could do."
It's clear that the 501 wasn't a fall back from another plan, nor was it a result of Bonnie being taken out of service. It was "part of the plan" from the very start.
In the 127th Meeting of the Research Control Committee, 31 January 1963, item 127-3 "Navigation and Tactical Display System for ASW Helicopter" was presented.It specifically talked about having Sperry Gyroscope Company, who produced the ASN-501, investigate conversion of the ASN-30 (the USN nomenclature for the 501, first refered to as ASWTNS, Anti-subwarine Wareare Tactical Navigation System) for helicopter use. $80,000 was allocated for this work. There is a short briefing note attached to the minutes concerning this item.
Furthermore, the "Revised Staff Characteristics for an Escort Borne ASW Helicopter" dated 16 August, 1962, also includes a section labelled "Integrated Navigation and Tactical Display System. It is clear that it is written in such a way to indicate a system such as the ASN-501 (ASN-30). Notably, it also includes "it is desirable that an attack computer be provided to facilitate vectoring of surface or other air units to intercept the target." This was never provided per se, but the combination of the 501 and dedicated TACCO provided the capability eventually, although the radar was required to fully realize it.
Of note, I also bought a copy of the USN NAVAIR 01-230HLH-1 NATOPS Flight Manual SH-3D/H Helicopters, Ch 1 1 December 1984, which still included a description of the ASA-13, the system the USN had available when the CHSS-2 was acquired. The ASA-13, apart from reliability issues, would not have met the required characteristics. Its primary limitation was the inability to assist robustly in creating a plot. The ASN-501's red and green strobes are flexible enough to allow that and also other plotting functions, like the aforementioned attacks. However, to do so requires a heavier operator workload. The USN's eventual solution was the ASN-123, a digital computer which could do all these functions and more with a much lower workload (although optimized as a pilot information computer, not a robust battle management system; ASP and MDMS are the latter).
So, it is clear that from at least 1962 the RCN was intending the CHSS-2 to be an independent platform (there are other supporting documents) and seeking to fit it as such. They also were aware of the requirements to do so. The paperwork trail is there for them to understand the workload of doing so in a challenging flight environment (low altitude, IFR, other traffic). My next step is to find the documentation, if it still exists, as to why the decision was taken to add a TACCO with a dedicated console housing the 501. My gut feel is there isn't a single reason, but a convergence of events: need to have robust plotting capabilities, state of existing technology, availability of navs from the RCAF, impending disposal of Bonnie, and the RN model.
It is also not clear that when the RN model evolved into TANS (Tactical Air Navigation System), which was optimized for the use of a TACCO to do more robust battle management (primarily by integrating the radar with the plot), consideration was not given to acquiring it.
It does seem that the "accomplishment" of getting the "canadian" ASN-501 in the aircraft create a 25 year acceptance of that as "the best we could do."
daftandbarmy
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Halifax Tar
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What a cool IG page. Thank you.
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It's the 35th Anniversary of the end of the First Persian Gulf War tomorrow. Shearwater Aviation Museum has configured the Interactive Display for the Op Friction mods:
This is screenshots of the four monitors running stitched together. You can't really see it, but there are 130 ships available to be plotted on the radar. Unfortunately, the overlay is generating properly for the ASN-501 tactical screen, and Google Earth is being finicky about providing the FLIR image. Oh well, we did our best on short notice.
This is screenshots of the four monitors running stitched together. You can't really see it, but there are 130 ships available to be plotted on the radar. Unfortunately, the overlay is generating properly for the ASN-501 tactical screen, and Google Earth is being finicky about providing the FLIR image. Oh well, we did our best on short notice.
OldSolduer
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Holy. Fucking. Fuck. Awesome
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I had the welcome opportunity to talk with 3 of the pillars of all things MH at the 35th for the Persian Excursion today, and my thoughts about how we got where we are firming up. None of them disagreed with me (although they don't totally agree...). There is a need to publish it (ie in a proper journal, not my Blog or Army.ca), but that isn't me, and we discussed who it might be.
I said to someone I respect, and is very well connected to the Cyclone acquisition, that "we (as a community) bit off more than we could chew," meaning that the the Canadian MH community, even properly supported by the RCN and RCAF (which they weren't, and aren't) did not have the institutional resources to pull off what they asked for. He said yeah, but it wasn't the community, it was the country...
So a direct line... we figured we'd do it "the Canadian way," but were digging a hole we didn't even know about, and then were surprised when it collapsed around us.
So, how to capture that...
I said to someone I respect, and is very well connected to the Cyclone acquisition, that "we (as a community) bit off more than we could chew," meaning that the the Canadian MH community, even properly supported by the RCN and RCAF (which they weren't, and aren't) did not have the institutional resources to pull off what they asked for. He said yeah, but it wasn't the community, it was the country...
- from the very start, we intended the Sea King to operate autonomously from small decks, even though the technology to support that didn't yet exist, with two pilots and two sensor operators
- we decided to stretch the success of the Tracker ASN-501 into the Sea King,even though it wasn't designed for two helo tracking and attacking
- we properly realized that two pilots couldn't deal with that computer and keep the aircraft out of the water, so decided to add a nav; however, the utility of a nav as a battle manager was completely eaten up being in effect a radar plotter (a NCM job everywhere else; eg front row in the CPFs, or GCI/AWACS ACOps for fighters)
- by the time we figured all this out it was the ealry seventies, and we still needed to figure out the radar 10 years later. In the meantime technology had marched on and the USN had a digital computer small enough for ther H-3 by the mid 70s
- we then decided to buy MHP, and spec'd a battle managment platform (the Merlin) with no real experience doing battle management, and certainly none on Link (and like the Aurora, somehow decided that Link Management is part of Battle Management, so had the officer doing unlike everywhere else)
- realizing we were behind, because all we were doing was keeping two in the screen 24 hours a day, we made efforts to get better, by concentrating on acoustics; but still thought we understood the battle management piece without any experience
- the Gulf War came along, we made herculean efforts to get an appropriate aircraft out there, and did some excellent work, but...
- MHP was cancelled (we were told not the Cadillac) we then spent the 90s and early 2000s doing anything but ASW with crews and equipment either marginally effective for the dipper, or ok acoustically, but not tactically, for the sonos. And we continued to spec the Cadillac even though told not to and with no real experience on the core piece, all the while congratualting ourselves on how great we did in 91.
- we overdeployed for the GWOT, Hillier distracted us with Standing Contingency Task Force, our core skills collasped, and readiness / bodies went with them; we somehow went to contract with an underfunded Cadillac
- the Wing tried to prepare by putting an interim system to start to learn battle management. but it was too little too late
- Cyclone went to sea, all the politicians and GoFos said "look, we have the best MH in the world," and then were surprised that not paying for a one off best means something had to give, and it was tactical development, training and sustainment.
So a direct line... we figured we'd do it "the Canadian way," but were digging a hole we didn't even know about, and then were surprised when it collapsed around us.
So, how to capture that...
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Which leads me straight to the crewing question, informed by Battle Management, and influences where we go from here:
My takeaway: 3 officers are overkill, but two AESOPs should be present if space allows to build the plot for you with their sensors. You can never have too much connectivity.
Whether it is two pilots up front, or one nav and one pilot, is open for debate. Two pilots is expensive but allows master / apprentice.
- what the nav done historically on the Sea King was not battle management, it was plot compilation (and would have also included link management, if we had link). That is not an officers job.
- the MH community has had an overinflated view of the role of a single helicopter in battle management for a long time, largely driven by not having link; the force can distribute battle management over link without having the aircraft do it as robustly.
- the USN realized this; they put a simple computer in the cockpit, then tied it to the ships (SH-3D Sea King ASN-123). That allowed the pilots to act on battle management direction without being overloaded, and the guys in the back did sensors. As technology improved they put two computers, one up front and one in the back; the pilots made decisions and the enlisted guys developed a plot, which was shared directly with the ship (SH-60B and SH-60F). They then joined the Link (Link-16 on the R and S) and became truly part of the force; in addition, the tech allows the aircraft to fly itself and free up pilot time.
- the last years of the Sea King we were connected to the ship digitally and starting to learn this. Meanwhile, Cyclone is still struggling to join a link. We knew the pilots would be under utilized so decided to start getting them to help the back with sensors.
My takeaway: 3 officers are overkill, but two AESOPs should be present if space allows to build the plot for you with their sensors. You can never have too much connectivity.
Whether it is two pilots up front, or one nav and one pilot, is open for debate. Two pilots is expensive but allows master / apprentice.
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As an aside, 10 years ago the PM MHP was in my lab. He wasn't really interested in what we were doing; he was trying to sell the Wing they were making the right decisions. He said to me "by staying with Cyclone and not cancelling and buying Romeos we keep control of our aircraft." Turns out his comment didn't age well and we can't afford it.
FSTO
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While I enjoy listening to this podcast. These fuckers and their cohorts over the years have laid the groundwork for the lack of support for the CAF by the Canadian public. They don’t give a shit that their recommendations resulted in piss poor gear at double or triple the price and not being replaced in a reasonable amount of time.
podcasts.apple.com
You get a jet! And you get a jet!
Podcast Episode · Curse of Politics · February 23 · 1h 18m
podcasts.apple.com
Halifax Tar
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Your mention of sustainment is an interesting from my stand point.
I watched and participated in this going from what we had with the SK to what we have now for the Cyclone. I'm not sure if your talking about the adoption of ISSC.
Interesting side note, I'm hearing the RCAF will not be joining ships for deployments, until the Cyclone (MH) situation can be sorted.
CRCN is pretty blunt in his assessment of the helo and it's juice V squeeze metric.
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Incorrect. Cyclones are currently/planned to be embarked on RCN ships for deployment.
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While I enjoy listening to this podcast. These fuckers and their cohorts over the years have laid the groundwork for the lack of support for the CAF by the Canadian public. They don’t give a shit that their recommendations resulted in piss poor gear at double or triple the price and not being replaced in a reasonable amount of time.
You get a jet! And you get a jet!
Podcast Episode · Curse of Politics · February 23 · 1h 18m
Who are “these fuckers”? The podcast description doesn’t say. Thanks.
FSTO
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The host and the participants are communications advisors to their respective political parties. Their sole job is to get their bosses elected and damn the consequences of their actions.
I will always argue that Bev Oda’s $16.00 glass of orange juice (sounds so quaint now doesn’t it?) begat the “Cadillac Elicopters” campaign. That 10 cent glass has cost lives and billions of dollars to crown.
I will always argue that Bev Oda’s $16.00 glass of orange juice (sounds so quaint now doesn’t it?) begat the “Cadillac Elicopters” campaign. That 10 cent glass has cost lives and billions of dollars to crown.
Halifax Tar
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Very possible just what I am hearing from peers on upcoming deployers.
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