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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

E.R. Campbell said:
I repeat, "America will not, because it cannot, intervene militarily to save Taiwan."

Mr. Campbell,
In spite of your saying that the US "cannot do anything militarily to save Taiwan," in at least two of the past few Taiwan/ROC presidential elections since 1996, the US has moved carrier groups into or near the Taiwan Strait to essentially signal Beijing to "back off". The first time, during the 1996 election of Lee-Tung Hui, the island's first native Taiwanese/ben sheng ren president, was in response to the PLA holding a series of unprecedented wargames; China had also lobbed a few missiles over Taiwan which crashed into the sea the year before that. The second time, at least one CVBG was moved during Pres. Ma Ying Jieou's election, if I can recall correctly.

There was even a precedent before these two recent examples. In 1950, not long after Chiang's Guomindang forces fled to Taiwan, just as the PLA attempted to capture the Guomindang stronghold of Kinmen (pronounced Jinmen) just off the mainland coast, the US 7th fleet entered the Taiwan Strait to deter any mainland invasion of Taiwan proper. This would soon become a regular occurrence from the 1950s onward until the US switched its "One-China" recognition from Taiwan to the mainland in 1979, if I can recall correctly.

Also, as this headline shows, Taiwan isn't holding its breath on peaceful reunification in spite of recent peaceful overtures from the mainland...

Defense News


Key excerpt:
(...)
"With the continued arms buildup, the Chinese communists will be able to take Taiwan by force before the end of 2020," it said.

The report also cited China's growing military capability to deter foreign intervention, in contrast to the US Pacific pivot policy which it said had been "stifled" due to budget constraints.

The United States is Taiwan's main ally. In 1996 it sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to waters near the island after China lobbed missiles into the sea to try to deter Taiwanese from voting for President Lee Teng-hui.

The report said China's military, known as the People's Liberation Army, has a total strength of 2.27 million of which the army accounts for 1.25 million. About one-third of its army is deployed directly opposite Taiwan.

(...)
 
Taking Taiwan by force is counterproductive.

Taiwan is Chinese. The Kuomintang, like the Chinese Communist Party, has, consistently, argued that there is only one China: the only question is which of two systems, Beijing's or Taiwan's, is the legitimate government of that one China.

Carrier battle groups are very useful and they are a legitimate deterrent ~ or, at least, they would be if China had any intention of attacking. But it doesn't, so carrier battle groups are useless.

But: Could China be provoked into attacking? Yes ... a ROC unilateral declaration of independence, essentially saying that it is not and never will be part of China, would force the PRC's hand. An invasion, even against US active combat, would be quick and bloody. China would not go nuclear, not preemptively, anyway; but it would use chemical weapons, I think.

But again: China is patient. It will continue its "charm offensive" and it will offer more and more concessions to convince the Taiwanese that reunification is in their best interests.

The fly in the ointment is in Beijing. There is a faction, currently weak but still vocal and influential, that doesn't like "one country, two systems," and wants to see both Hong Kong and, eventually, Taiwan as ordinary provinces, "comme les autres," in Canadian terms. Every time this faction succeeds in upsetting Hong Kong it sets back the reunification process.


 
China's media outlets such as Xinhua and CCTV taking advantage of the current US shutdown to comment on what they see as the inevitable American superpower decline:

from the AFP via the Jakarta Globe

‘De-Americanized’ World Needed After US Shutdown: China Media

By Agence France-Presse on 5:28 pm October 13, 2013.

Beijing. While US politicians grapple with how to reopen their shuttered government and avoid a potentially disastrous default on their debt, the world should consider “de-Americanizing,” a commentary on China’s official news agency said Sunday.

“As US politicians of both political parties [fail to find a] viable deal to bring normality to the body politic they brag about, it is perhaps a good time for the befuddled world to start considering building a de-Americanized world,” the commentary on state news agency Xinhua said.

In a lengthy polemic against American hegemony since World War two, it added: “Such alarming days when the destinies of others are in the hands of a hypocritical nation have to be terminated.

“A new world order should be put in place, according to which all nations, big or small, poor or rich, can have their key interests respected and protected on an equal footing.”

Negotiations over how to end the budgetary impasse have shifted to the US Senate after House Representatives failed to strike a deal with President Obama on extending borrowing authority ahead of an October 17 deadline.

Beijing has in recent days issued warnings as well as appeals for a deal, all the while emphasizing the inseparable economic ties that bind the world’s two biggest economies.

(...)
 
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Xinhua is the artcle to which S.M.A.'s post referred:

logo.gif

Commentary: U.S. fiscal failure warrants a de-Americanized world

English.news.cn  2013-10-13

By Xinhua writer Liu Chang

BEIJING, Oct. 13 (Xinhua) -- As U.S. politicians of both political parties are still shuffling back and forth between the White House and the Capitol Hill without striking a viable deal to bring normality to the body politic they brag about, it is perhaps a good time for the befuddled world to start considering building a de-Americanized world.

Emerging from the bloodshed of the Second World War as the world's most powerful nation, the United States has since then been trying to build a global empire by imposing a postwar world order, fueling recovery in Europe, and encouraging regime-change in nations that it deems hardly Washington-friendly.

With its seemingly unrivaled economic and military might, the United States has declared that it has vital national interests to protect in nearly every corner of the globe, and been habituated to meddling in the business of other countries and regions far away from its shores.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government has gone to all lengths to appear before the world as the one that claims the moral high ground, yet covertly doing things that are as audacious as torturing prisoners of war, slaying civilians in drone attacks, and spying on world leaders.

Under what is known as the Pax-Americana, we fail to see a world where the United States is helping to defuse violence and conflicts, reduce poor and displaced population, and bring about real, lasting peace.

Moreover, instead of honoring its duties as a responsible leading power, a self-serving Washington has abused its superpower status and introduced even more chaos into the world by shifting financial risks overseas, instigating regional tensions amid territorial disputes, and fighting unwarranted wars under the cover of outright lies.

As a result, the world is still crawling its way out of an economic disaster thanks to the voracious Wall Street elites, while bombings and killings have become virtually daily routines in Iraq years after Washington claimed it has liberated its people from tyrannical rule.

Most recently, the cyclical stagnation in Washington for a viable bipartisan solution over a federal budget and an approval for raising debt ceiling has again left many nations' tremendous dollar assets in jeopardy and the international community highly agonized.

Such alarming days when the destinies of others are in the hands of a hypocritical nation have to be terminated, and a new world order should be put in place, according to which all nations, big or small, poor or rich, can have their key interests respected and protected on an equal footing.

To that end, several corner stones should be laid to underpin a de-Americanized world.

For starters, all nations need to hew to the basic principles of the international law, including respect for sovereignty, and keeping hands off domestic affairs of others.

Furthermore, the authority of the United Nations in handling global hotspot issues has to be recognized. That means no one has the right to wage any form of military action against others without a UN mandate.

Apart from that, the world's financial system also has to embrace some substantial reforms.

The developing and emerging market economies need to have more say in major international financial institutions including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, so that they could better reflect the transformations of the global economic and political landscape.

What may also be included as a key part of an effective reform is the introduction of a new international reserve currency that is to be created to replace the dominant U.S. dollar, so that the international community could permanently stay away from the spillover of the intensifying domestic political turmoil in the United States.

Of course, the purpose of promoting these changes is not to completely toss the United States aside, which is also impossible. Rather, it is to encourage Washington to play a much more constructive role in addressing global affairs.

And among all options, it is suggested that the beltway politicians first begin with ending the pernicious impasse.

Although the last line attempts to come to the rescue, the commentary is in poor taste and it is premature.

China has good reason to be concerned with US fiscal irresponsibility; as a Trillion Dollar creditor it is entitled to make a bit of noise. Traditionally China has spoken softly and (relatively) privately. This is too much, it is too loud and it is too soon.
 
Interesting piece fron "The American Interest". Although the idea of rapid "de industrialization" and the failure of developing nations to develop something analogous to the "Blue Model" is a global issue, China will be one of the hardest hit nations, so this seemed to be the best fit for the article. The implications are pretty staggering, and we already see some of the potential outcomes with the "Arab Spring", as a demographic surge puts millions of youths into the job market in small and stagnent economies (coupled with fairly rigid social structures) where they don't have the opportunity to become employed:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/10/11/are-developing-countries-missing-out-on-the-blue-model/

Are Developing Countries Missing Out on the Blue Model?

Developing countries may be transitioning to service economies too quickly, says Dani Rodrik in an excellent new piece for Project Syndicate. Most western economies got where they are by industrializing and then shifting to a service economy over the course of two centuries. Many developing countries today, by contrast, are skipping straight to services. Even purported manufacturing behemoths like China have only a small percentage of their workforce in manufacturing—the bulk of new growth is actually in services. Rodrik thinks it a disconcerting trend:

An immediate consequence is that developing countries are turning into service economies at substantially lower levels of income. When the US, Britain, Germany, and Sweden began to deindustrialize, their per capita incomes had reached $9,000-11,000 (at 1990 prices). In developing countries, by contrast, manufacturing has begun to shrink while per capita incomes have been a fraction of that level: Brazil’s deindustrialization began at $5,000, China’s at $3,000, and India’s at $2,000.

The economic, social, and political consequences of premature deindustrialization have yet to be analyzed in full. On the economic front, it is clear that early deindustrialization impedes growth and delays convergence with the advanced economies. Manufacturing industries are what I have called “escalator industries”: labor productivity in manufacturing has a tendency to converge to the frontier, even in economies where policies, institutions, and geography conspire to retard progress in other sectors of the economy….

The social and political consequences are less fathomable, but could be equally momentous. Some of the building blocks of durable democracy have been byproducts of sustained industrialization: an organized labor movement, disciplined political parties, and political competition organized around a right-left axis.

So, while developed countries are worrying about the breakdown of the blue social model based on mass manufacturing jobs and lifetime employment, the real story is that developing countries may never get to the blue model. Automation and global competition mean than manufacturing jobs and their wages aren’t going to grow enough to support a middle class in China and other countries as they did in the US, Europe and Japan.
If this is true, the implications are enormous: social stability in countries like China could be much more tenuous than many think, and developing countries may have a much harder time reaching the levels of affluence found in the advanced world. Since we’ve never seen a global industrial revolution before, much less one that is taking place at the same time as a global information revolution, nobody really knows how it will all shake out. But it is trends like this, not budget fights in Washington, that will shape the future of the human race.
 
I have a hunch that both Dani Rodrik and Walter Russell Mead are misinterpreting the data or, equally possible, that the data is inconsistent in how it defines the manufacturing vs. service sectors. The question is: where do you put functions like distribution? Is it part of manufacturing or is it a service. I think that, fifty years ago, we put e.g. distribution in the manufacturing process or, rather, we defined services very narrowly. I recall learning that the service sector was restricted to a very few elements: banking, insurance, and so on. Even the HUGE records management field was, largely, considered to be a subset of the sector it served: manufacturing, transportation or services, now, as far as I know, we can and do count management support as a service even when it is within e.g. the manufacturing or transport sectors.
 
Apparently, Shanghai is still a lot more prudish than Hong Kong...  ;D

As reported by Canada's National Post:

Chinese police hunting mysterious female streaker posing nude at Shanghai tourist traps

Chinese police are hunting a female streaker who has ruffled feathers in Shanghai by using the cover of darkness to pose nude at some of the city’s best-known tourist spots.

Online photographs of the unrobed and so far unidentified woman have been circulating for at least a week, causing a mixture of disgust and amusement among Chinese Internet users.

City officials appear to be unimpressed. The state-run Global Times announced that police were investigating the nocturnal antics of the woman, whom it labelled the “Bum on the Bund” – a reference to Shanghai’s historic waterfront district.


(...)
 
China tries to silence an outspoken economics professor from "Bei Da/北大" (Chinese acronym for Peking University):

Yahoo News

Chinese university fires outspoken economist amid crackdown on dissent
By Michael Martina

BEIJING (Reuters) - A liberal Chinese economist who had been an outspoken critic of China's ruling Communist Party has been expelled from the elite Peking University, amid a broader crackdown on dissent.

Professor Xia Yeliang, 53, had drawn the ire of school officials for his blog posts calling for democratic reforms and rule of law in China. Xia said he was told on Friday that professors and school leaders had voted to end his contract.

Chinese liberals and intellectuals had hoped the new government under President Xi Jinping that took over in March would be more tolerant of calls for reform but it appears authorities won't tolerate any challenge to their rule.

Journalists, lawyers and rights activists have been detained and arrested in recent months.


"They insisted that it was not a political decision, but I believe it is," Xia told Reuters by telephone. "They told me if I keep telling people it is a political issue, then my situation will get worse. They think I have damaged the image of the school of economics and Peking University."

Xia said he is allowed to teach until the end of January.
 
It is important for outsiders to understand that Xi Jinping is not a dictator. He rules as the head of a team, but a divided team. Xi may me a liberal moderate but there are several hardliners in the Politburo Standing Committee, the Central Military Committee and the Secretariat ~ all of which govern China. What Xi does, or doesn't do, and in which direction(s) he may nudge China is, always, a compromise between his views and the competing views of his leadership team.

There are (relative) liberals in China but they are exceptions that prove a deeply, deeply conservative (Confucian) social rule.

Dissent is tolerated and considered but it must be made in the proper way. In my opinion taking one's arguments out of China, into foreign media, including the Internet, especially, is always a mistake. China provides fora for dissenting opinions - often in the English language Chinese newspapers, which are closely followed by the staffs in the Secretariat. But one may not express public dissent about the Party, per se. It is fine to criticize policies, but not the Party. Xia crossed a line ~ one I'm sure he understood.
 
While the Chinese proverb "Don't waste good iron for nails or good men for soldiers ('好铁不打定,好汉不当兵')" is sometimes quoted by pacifists, anyone would be fool to think that China has always been a "peace-loving nation" as Meng Xiangqing portrays his country. While Parker already points out instances where the PRC attacked Tibet, India and Vietnam in the past, one need not look far enough in China's history to look for an example.

The Dutch once had a small colony and fort in what is now Danshui in northern Taiwan. When China's Ming Dynasty was overthrown by the Manchus/Qing Dynasty in the 1600s, some of these Ming Chinese loyalist forces led by Zheng Chenggong (aka Koxinga) retreated to Taiwan and took Danshui away from the Dutch. This was probably the only time in pre-20th century history when a western country's forces was defeated by a Chinese force.

William J. Parker III: Meng Xiangqing's Chinese Dream Eludes Reality
October 17, 2013


"The truth is, China has always been a peace-loving country and it firmly pursues the path of peaceful development and will never seek hegemony and expansion... the West has nothing to worry about the modernization of China's military. Unlike former colonial powers, China has never invaded another country. On the contrary, it has always advocated (and still does advocate) harmonious coexistence, seeking common ground and shelving differences."


This statement is factually inaccurate and makes several bad assumptions.

Has China always been "peace-loving"? For Meng to state that China has always been "peaceful" fails to take into account the Sino-Indian War of 1962 when China attacked India in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line. Similarly, it does not account for the 1969 PLA attack on Soviet border guards on Zhenbao Island or the PLA's 1979 invasion of Vietnam. Additionally, China's Sui and Tang dynasties attacked Korea. And as we continue back through history, it becomes clear that Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia were also invaded by China. And in fact, the Qin dynasty (221 BC to 207 BC) invaded significant territories and neighboring states to establish the first dynastic leaders of this vast nation under Emperor Qin Shi Huang.


Will China "never seek hegemony and expansion?" This assumption by Meng has several pitfalls:

- First, and as explicated above, China has sought and asserted its interests in other nations in the past.
- Second, to state that China will never take a certain action is unfounded and unreasonable.
- Third, a threat, hegemonic or otherwise, has two fundamental factors for consideration:

a) The first factor is the potential enemy's capability.
b) The second is the potential enemy's intent.

China's intent is unclear; and articles like the one written by Meng Xiangqing do nothing more than muddy the waters. But even Meng agrees that it is the intent of the Chinese to build a military that continues to grow alongside its economy.

"In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 where a rising power emerged to challenge a ruling power, war occurred."

"Thucydides's Trap has been sprung in the Pacific" - by Graham Allison

These were all cases where capability potentially shaped intent. Based on past history, there is a good chance that a challenging power, like China, may eventually use its growing military might.


Do nations with the most powerful militaries have the strongest economies? Meng states that China must build a military that is at the same level as its economic standing in the world. The nations with the largest militaries have the largest economies; but not currently the strongest.


The Chinese Dream includes building China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, powerful, democratic, and harmonious.
It entails the goal of national reunification and requires China to help maintain world peace and facilitate the development of the human race. The "one China" policy is as flawed as China, a hegemon seeks domination through power. In one case, the PRC would like to regain control over Taiwan. Taiwan and China, through the "one China" policy, do not recognize each other's governments (PRC or ROC). Neither world peace, human rights, nor the development of the human race can result from the actions Meng Xiangqing suggests.

The United States, and the rest of the world, cannot prevent China's march towards military modernization, but it can take actions to ensure the PRC unambiguously understands the United States' and her friends and allies capability to deter war. And if deterrence fails, to fight and win.


Council on Foreign Relations
 
China escalates its "media war" against its neighbours over its territorial disputes:

From Kyodo News

All Chinese journalists to be taught not to write in favor of Japan

China's Communist Party has begun ordering all Chinese journalists not to be supportive of Japan when writing about territorial and historical issues between the two countries, participants of an ongoing mandatory training program said Saturday.

About 250,000 journalists who work for Chinese media organizations need to attend the nationwide training program to learn about such topics as the Marxist view on journalism, laws and regulations and norms in news gathering and editing.

The unified program started in mid-October and will run through the end of this year.

In addition to Japan, instructors of the program taught them that the United States is "trying to undermine our country" and criticized the Philippines and Vietnam, which have territorial disputes with China, the participants said.

They were also told to reject the ideas of democracy and human rights, saying that these values claimed by "the West as universal are targeting China's Communist Party."


This second headline is directly aimed at the Philippines' recent deal to get 12 of the new F/A 50 Golden Eagle fighter jets made in South Korea:

Chosun news

China Asked Korea Not to Sell Jets to Philippines

China asked Korea not to sell FA-50 fighter jets to the Philippines, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported Saturday. The daily said Beijing made the request ahead of a summit in Seoul between President Park Geun-hye and Philippines President Benigno Aquino on Oct. 17.

Korea declined, saying it cannot accept "interference" in arms exports, an issue of its national interest, according to the daily.

Furthermore, here's a Chinese defence-oriented magazine cover that depicts one of its Jiangkai II class frigates firing at one of the Philippines' two recently acquired ex-USCG Hamilton class cutters.

1016794_10201427963561984_1675528295_n.jpg
 
S.M.A. said:
The Dutch once had a small colony and fort in what is now Danshui in northern Taiwan. When China's Ming Dynasty was overthrown by the Manchus/Qing Dynasty in the 1600s, some of these Ming Chinese loyalist forces led by Zheng Chenggong (aka Koxinga) retreated to Taiwan and took Danshui away from the Dutch. This was probably the only time in pre-20th century history when a western country's forces was defeated by a Chinese force.
In point of fact, Zheng defeated the Dutch at Fort Zeelandia, in present day Tainan, in southern Taiwan. Here the Dutch presence was far greater than it had ever been at Danshui, where the fort had indeed first been established by the Spanish.
 
More on the "ghost cities" mentioned earlier in the thread:

China's Ghost Cities... Are Multiplying
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 09/21/2013 20:16 -0400

Zero Hedge link

The fact that China has an unprecedented excess capacity glut, also known as an epic overinvestment/construction bubble, is by now well-known and acknowledged by even the most ardent Chinaphiles. Perhaps nowhere is China's outlier nature in this regard more obvious than in the following chart showing per capita cement consumption vs GDP.

Yet nowhere is China's historic misallocation of capital (resulting from a pace of credit creation that makes even the most fervent Keynesian western central banker green with envy) more evident and tangible, than in videos showing the tumbleweeds floating down the main streets of its ghost cities. We did that first in 2009, then followed up two years later only to find nothing has changed. Today, on yet another "two years later" anniversary, we go back to the scene of the excess capacity crime, to find out if thing may have finally normalized. For that we follow SBS' Adrian Brown who back in 2011 did an extensive report on what were some of the then unknown ghost cities dispersed across the mainland.

< Edited >
 
Even if there was radiation at this site, I doubt that would deter Sinopec...


Reuters

Soviets conducted nuclear blasts at oilfield to be tapped with China
By Vladimir Soldatkin

MOSCOW (Reuters) - A Siberian oilfield that Russia and China plan to develop together was the site of Soviet nuclear blasts in the 1970s and 1980s, Russian officials said on Friday.

The government and state oil firm Rosneft said the field was safe, rejecting environmentalists' concerns that oil extracted from it could be contaminated with radiation.

But the revelation raises questions for a strategic joint venture announced a week ago in which Russia, the world's top energy producer, ceded a share of its oil wealth to China, the leading consumer.

At least seven "peaceful" nuclear detonations were performed at the Srednebotuobinskoye oilfield, according to a report published by the environment ministry of the Republic of Sakha, a remote region in Eastern Siberia also known as Yakutia.

"Yes, indeed, there were nuclear explosions performed at the site," a ministry spokeswoman told Reuters from the city of Yakutsk. No radiation leaks were reported, she said.

(...)
 
From the New York Times a very well done article, with some photos, of the Chinese military and the South China Sea.

" A Game of Shark and Minnow

By JEFF HIMMELMAN

The shell of a forsaken ship has become a battleground in a struggle that could shape the future of the South China Sea and, to some extent, the rest of the world."

http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/








 
A look at how a currency transition might happen. I think that the situation is not quite so clear cut, since we are dealing with several "known unknowns" and one "unknown unknown". The known unknowns include China's credit bubble, as experessed in such things as ghost cities and the frankly unknown quantity of non performing assets (such as State owned companies) that are still on the books. We might stop to think of how Japan's credit bubble deflated in the early 1990's when the government rushed to prop up its financial sector from the real estate melot down. Non performing loans were not allowed to be written off in order to prevent a panic or crash, but the economy began contracting and Japan underwent a lost decade and is still suffering from a persistent deflation.

The other known unknown is the effects of a US financial crisis or default. China could simply be caught in the undertow if that happens. A similar issue could arise from similar problems in the EUZone.

The unknown unknown is the arrival of alternative financial systems. Digital currency is one example, and I predict it will take off the same way Napster and P2P networking did; because it empowers individuals. Alternatives to banks like PayPal to disintermediate financial transactions will also become popular for the same reasons. This will make the use and nature of reserve currencies much different than today, probably the same way the economy in the "Free Banking" era was much different from the one domonated by central banks today.

http://nextbigfuture.com/2013/10/transition-to-renmembi-as-worlds.html

Transition to Renmembi as the world’s reserve currency on track for sometime in the 2020s

In Arvind Subramanian book, Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance, Arvind Subramanian argued that the renminbi could overtake the dollar as the world’s premier reserve currency sometime during the next decade. His prediction was based on an econometric analysis of the fundamental economic determinants of a reserve currency (chapter 3) and applying the lessons from the sterling-dollar transition.

At the time, his prediction elicited three criticisms:

1) It took nearly 60 years after the US economy overtook the UK economy for the sterling-dollar transition to occur. This was said to imply that even if the fundamentals were moving in China’s favor, the renminbi’s ascendancy was some long way off.

2) deep and liquid financial markets, and especially an open capital account were essential for maintaining a reserve currency, and China did not fulfill these requirements.

3) Perhaps most important, even if China fulfilled them, reserve currency status for the renminbi was nowhere close to imminence because that status is fundamentally based on trust—and not just any trust, but the trust of foreign investors and traders that China would not misbehave, especially in hard times, by expropriating or defaulting on its obligations to foreigners

The sterling-dollar transition was effectively only 10 to 15 years even without the United Kingdom inflicting demonstrably self-destructive costs as the United States is today. Moreover, in the last three years, the renminbi has displaced the dollar as the dominant reference currency in Asia.

China today looks more likely to fulfill the requirements for running a reserve currency. The creation of Shanghai as a free trade zone with full renminbi convertibility and the designation of London as an offshore renminbi center attest to China’s intentions to gradually open the capital account. While the financial system is still neither liberalized nor developed, policies to move in that direction may well be announced at the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party later this year.

China needs to make the necessary changes not immediately but over the next five years or so to create the conditions for a reserve currency.

A reserve currency does not need an American-style, turbo-charged and sophisticated financial sector. It needs a reasonably open, reasonably transparent, reasonably liquid, and reasonably well-regulated financial system. China can also achieve that over the next decade.

The Simon Johnson critique that the United States has unusual trust among investors has been turned on its head. Can investors now trust the United States not to default on its obligations (and thereby on the very instrument that provides the financial plumbing for the depth and liquidity important for a reserve currency)? Will this new distrust persist beyond the bad times, even in normal times?

Making matters worse, the US problem leading to investor uncertainty and mistrust is not a one-off breakdown but a structural problem of ongoing dysfunctional politics.

As Michael Clasey, arguing for a downgrade of the US credit rating, put it: “Triple-A credits do not behave like this.” Only a change in the underlying politics can restore the attribute that China does not currently have but that the United States is squandering away.
 
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, is a pretty good look at the rise and fall of Bo Xilai with some Canadian context, too:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/the-inglorious-exit-of-bo-xilai-canadas-closest-ally-in-chinas-power-structure/article15097314/#dashboard/follows/
gam-masthead.png

The inglorious exit of Bo Xilai, Canada’s closest ally in China’s power structure

MARK MACKINNON AND NATHAN VANDERKLIPPE
CANNES, FRANCE AND BEIJING — The Globe and Mail

Published Friday, Oct. 25 2013

As China’s biggest political scandal in decades came to its unsurprising conclusion – with a court dismissing Bo Xilai’s final appeal and upholding the former Communist Party star’s sentence of life in prison – the red-roofed villa that was central to his downfall sat empty, wasting its idyllic view of the Mediterranean coast.

The silence hanging over No. 7 Boulevard des Pins on the French Riviera speaks to the gutted ambitions of a man whose plummet from power mesmerized China for the past year and embarrassed the ruling elite as never before. Mr. Bo, who was convicted of three charges, including bribe-taking related to the ownership of the villa, went to jail China’s most charismatic and controversial politician, factors many believe turned the Communist Party apparatus against him. He was also admired abroad, openly courted by corporate Canada and successive Canadian governments.

Until his downfall last year – sparked by his wife’s admission that she murdered British businessman Neil Heywood – Mr. Bo was counted as a friend by Montreal’s powerful Desmarais family, which cultivated the Bo family for decades and saw its businesses in China grow as Mr. Bo rose in power. Canadian politicians also sought him out: Prime Minister Stephen Harper and former prime minister Jean Chrétien were among the last high-profile foreign visitors to Chongqing, the southwestern Chinese city Mr. Bo governed until his arrest on corruption charges.

Mr. Bo was seen as Canada’s closest ally in China’s power structure, a relationship that was expected to bear even more fruit if – as many had expected – he rose to the very top, the seven-man Standing Committee of the Politburo. With his pro-business policies and command of English, he looked to some like a reformer to whom Canada could attach its China policy.

“We sort of hunger for a Chinese leader who is open and easy to communicate with,” said David Mulroney, a former Canadian ambassador to China who said he’d met Mr. Bo repeatedly over the past two decades and was one of those “who believed in him as a reformer.”

“Over his career, [Mr. Bo] met a lot of Canadians – he was the most Canadian-friendly of all [the senior Communist Party leadership],” Mr. Mulroney said.

Sergio Marchi, who was a minister of international trade under Mr. Chrétien before serving as president of the Canada China Business Council, personally met with Mr. Bo eight or nine times. He defended Mr. Bo as “a friend of Canada.” Many in the Canadian business and political establishment “were genuinely cheering” for Mr. Bo to achieve high political office in China, he said.

That seems impossible now. Mr. Bo’s appeal of his September conviction was dismissed by the Shandong Provincial Higher People’s Court in just an hour on Friday. State television showed images of Mr. Bo standing in court, hands cuffed before him, bearing a wry smile.

Ties between Mr. Bo and corporate Canada are rooted in the long friendship between the Bo and Desmarais clans, which stretches back to the 1970s, when Mr. Bo’s father, vice-premier Bo Yibo, visited family scion Paul Desmarais Sr. on his way to Washington to help prepare for Richard Nixon’s breakthrough trip to China.

There’s no evidence that the Desmarais family or Power Corporation, the massive holding firm they control, profited directly from their friendship with the Bo family, although it clearly gave them high-level access to decision-makers.

But the relationship appears to have been a fruitful one. A 1996 Team Canada trade mission to the coastal city of Dalian while Mr. Bo was mayor there yielded no local deals for Canadian companies, but the following year France’s massive Total SA oil major – in which the Desmarais family is the largest known shareholder – signed a deal to up its stake in China’s largest oil refinery, West Pacific Petrochemical Corp., to 22.4 per cent. The refinery is located on an island just off Dalian.

When Mr. Bo was promoted to Beijing in February of 2004 as commerce minister for the central government, the Desmarais fortunes also gained, with Power Financial winning coveted status eight months later as one of the first foreign companies designated a Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor, allowing them to buy and sell yuan-denominated shares on Chinese stock exchanges.

The activities of the Bo and Desmarais clans have at times intersected. Power Corporation channels most of its investments in China through Hong Kong-listed CITIC Pacific Ltd., where André Desmarais has been a non-executive director since 1997. Mr. Bo’s younger brother, Bo Xicheng, served as an independent director of the CITIC Group’s investment banking arm, CITIC Securities, from 2003 to 2006.

“André [Desmarais] himself made a huge effort to court as many senior people as he could – he’s very good at that – and Bo Xilai, when he was mayor of Dalian, began a close relationship with André that André never dropped when [Mr. Bo] was [provincial governor of] Liaoning, when he was minister of commerce, when he was in Chongqing,” said Howard Balloch, another former Canadian ambassador to China who is now an investment banker based in Beijing.

The Desmarais’ courting of Mr. Bo carried on right up until his spectacular fall. Eight days after Mr. Heywood was found murdered in a Chongqing hotel, André Desmarais and his father-in-law, Mr. Chrétien, arrived in the same Yangtze River metropolis as the head of a delegation from the Canada China Business Council, an organization founded by Paul Desmarais Sr. André Desmarais and Mr. Chrétien were greeted by Mr. Bo like old friends.

In photos still posted on the website of the Chongqing government, Mr. Bo is smiling widely as he clasps hands with Mr. Chrétien and Mr. Desmarais. However, the same pictures, and all mention of the visit to Chongqing, have been belatedly scrubbed from the website of the Canada-China Business Council.

Observers say it is clear Mr. Bo’s trial was less about taking bribes or meddling with the investigation into the death of Mr. Heywood – whose murder earned his wife, Gu Kailai, a suspended death sentence – and more about a consolidation of power by China’s new President, Xi Jinping, as he asserts leadership over the country.

“The denial of Bo’s appeal serves notice to both sides of the political spectrum in China,” said Russell Leigh Moses, dean of the Beijing Center for Chinese Studies. To those on the left, “their cause needs to be larger than just one man. And to those who want reform, it holds out the hope that changes in the system will continue to proceed in an orderly fashion, but driven from the top – with the law firmly in the hands of the Communist Party.”

The case against Mr. Bo centred heavily on the villa on Boulevard des Pins, though only a rusting metal sign on the door reading, “Residences Fontaine St. Georges” provides any hint of the mystery surrounding the place, which also has a Canadian connection.

Residences Fontaine St. Georges was managed for several years by Mr. Heywood, the man whose murder at the hands of Mr. Bo’s wife, Ms. Gu, set in motion the entire scandal.

At Mr. Bo’s initial trial on charges of abuse of power, billionaire Xu Ming, who is also in custody, testified that he purchased the villa via intermediary companies and gave it to Ms. Gu with Mr. Bo’s knowledge. The transaction was central to the most serious charge that Mr. Bo was convicted of: corruption. In dismissing his appeal Friday, the Shandong Provincial Higher People’s Court referred again to the “complicated plan” to buy the $3.5-million villa via middlemen while putting it under the “real control and ownership” of Ms. Gu.

Part of that plan involved Investissements Custodian, a tiny firm controlled by Jean-Marie and Joanne Bergman of Montreal.

French records show that Investissements Custodian established Residences Fontaine St. Georges in 2001 for the specific purpose of managing the 4,000-square-metre Cannes villa. Investissements Custodian held shares in the villa until 2006, when its shares were transferred to Russel International Resorts, a company Chinese courts found was controlled by Ms. Gu.

Mr. and Ms. Bergman have said little about how their company ended up as part of China’s trial of the decade. Ms. Bergman told an interviewer this summer that they held shares of the villa in trust after being approached by what she called a “reputable intermediary” that she refused to name. She said they never knew who the real owner of the villa was.

In an e-mail exchange with The Globe and Mail this week, Ms. Bergman declined to explain how her company ended up purchasing property on behalf of Mr. Bo’s family. ”We have nothing further to help you in your research,” she wrote.

Even if Mr. Bo himself vanishes from view – a prospect that is not at all clear, given the strong likelihood his sentence will be reduced for medical or other reasons – there may be reason for the ruling elite to fear the shadow he leaves behind, Mr. Moses warned. “We should not ignore the possibility that the end of Bo’s legal options could be the beginning of him being seen as a martyr to those who are dismayed at the inequalities they see as still dominant in China,” he said.

Indeed, some of China’s legal leaders noted that Mr. Bo should have been afforded the chance to make his case publicly at appeal. But his provocative defence at his first trial made official China “very embarrassed,” said human rights lawyer Li Fangping. He was subsequently muted so he could not “take advantage of the chance to win back influence and gain more support, which would run counter to [Communist Party] expectations.”

Pu Zhiqiang, another prominent civil rights lawyer, added: “Anyone who says Bo’s case was tried independently knows nothing about China.”

Still, Mr. Bo’s own fate is unlikely to be one of pain and suffering. His sentence is likely to be served at Qincheng, a secretive prison for the political elite north of Beijing. In an interview with the South China Morning Post, it was likened to a “five-star hotel” by Bao Tong, a former policy secretary who served seven years there after standing against the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Beijing media have described conditions at Qincheng that include luxuries rarely afforded inmates, such as milk at breakfast, regular freedom to walk the grounds alone and the ability to wear clothing provided by family.

Mr. Bo serving time there also has a discomfiting historical ring to it. It’s the same prison where his father was sent for a time during the Cultural Revolution.


I think a little context might help.

From 1949 until 1976 China had a real left wing government. I don't know how to classify Mao Zedong other than as a charismatic revolutionary, but Zhou Enlai was a committed, even principled communist.
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From 1978 to 1989 China had a slightly right of centre, in economic terms, government under Deng Xiaoping. Deng was a staunch supporter of Zhou Enlai, especially of his social programmes (universal education and health care, etc) but he saw that communism is not a sound economic system and Zhou's vision needed money and that meant a free market economy.
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From 1989 to 2002 it had a hard right wing (again in economic terms) government under Jiang Zemin. Jiang's Shanghai Gang (as they are still called) is a real tooth and claw capitalist movement - they make George W Bush, Jamie Dimon  and Alan Greenspan look a bit like European social democrats.  :o
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
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Then, from 2002 until 2012 it had a slightly left of centre government under Hu Jintao. Hu did not dispute the market's role in the economy but he introduced some )only a few) "welfare state" artifacts. Under HU the minimum wage rose in ever single state, more than once in several of them.
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I expect the pendulum to swing back to wards the economic centre, maybe to a bit right of  centre under Xi Jinping.
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This all reflects internal divisions within the Chinese Communist Party which is not an ideological monolith. In fact, I would argue, the CCP is not ideological at all and Bo Xolai's sin was being more ideological than is tolerated by the leadership.
 
Mr. Campbell,

Having worked in at DFAIT's Chongqing consulate during Harper's visit there in Feb. 2012, I am well aware of Bo Xilai's former importance to Canadian relations. And I met Mark Mackinnon there since he was part of Harper's press gallery which travelled with the PM's staff aboard CF One.

However, in the above article Mackinnon seems to have omitted the fact that during the PM's state visit to China, Harper visited TWO rising party secretaries in two cities after meeting the CCP's national leadership in Beijing.

After Harper's 2012 Beijing visit, but before going to Chongqing, Harper visited Guangzhou, which as you well know is a manufacturing and industrial hub and, like Shenzhen, is just across the Chinese border from Hong Kong.

Guangzhou is important to Canada not only because of Guangzhou's economic importance in relation to other parts of China, but also because much of the Cantonese-speaking segment of the Chinese-Canadian diaspora also traces their roots to Guangdong province, where Guangzhou is located. And as you know, the Cantonese-speaking diaspora across the world outnumbers even the current population of France!

When Harper visited both Chongqing and Guangzhou, his aim was to secure Canada's relations with TWO of China's future leaders. One was Bo Xilai.

The other was Wang Yang(汪洋), the party secretary of Guangzhou and now one of China's Vice-Premiers.

Wang Yang is still active, and has REFORMIST credentials.


His Guangzhou model of development emphasizes free market principles in contrast to Bo Xilai's Chongqing model, which emphasized more state intervention, if I can recall correctly.

Clearly, Wang is not yet among the Politburo Standing Committee's 7 current members, but he is still a Vice-Premier on the Central Committee and thus in a influential position. Wang Yang, only or 58-59 years old now, might be within the next generation of standing committee members in the next leadership transition a decade from now. 

Thus, the fact that Harper cultivated Wang Yang as well with a direct visit to his city means Canada has another possible "ally" within China's top leadership.

Anyways, here's more about Wang Yang from Reuters, via the Huffington Post from earlier this year:

Wang Yang, China Reformer, Set To Become Vice Premier
Reuters  |  Posted: 03/15/2013 2:10 am EDT

By David Stanway and Benjamin Kang Lim



BEIJING, March 15 (Reuters) - Wang Yang, one of China's best-known reformers who was passed over for promotion last year, is set to become one of four vice premiers, sources said, a role that will see his credentials for change tested to the full.

The largely rubber-stamp National People's Congress, or parliament, will name the four vice premiers and cabinet ministers in a tightly scripted ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Saturday.

Wang made his name as the party boss of the export powerhouse of Guangdong province in south China, where he pushed for social and political reform. Despite later toning down his reformist agenda, he missed out on a seat on the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of power in China, at the party congress in November amid concerns of elders that he was too liberal.

At 58, Wang will be the youngest of the vice premiers, who assist Premier Li Keqiang run the world's second biggest economy, four independent sources said. Wang will be the third-ranked vice premier.


Zhang Gaoli, 66, who eked into the standing committee, will become No. 1 vice premier and help oversee the financial sector, said the sources, two of whom have ties to the leadership.

Liu Yandong, 67, will be the second-ranked vice premier and be responsible for culture, education, health and sports, the sources said, requesting anonymity to avoid repercussions for discussing secretive elite politics with foreign media.

Ma Kai, 66, one-time state planner, will be the fourth- ranked vice premier, the sources said.

Liu, Wang and Ma are members of the party's 25-member Politburo, one notch below the standing committee.

The sources were divided over whether the country's agriculture ministry, which reports to a vice premier, will be overseen by Wang or Ma. The other portfolios up for grabs will be industry, transport, production safety, state assets, telecommunications and railways.

Whoever gets the agriculture portfolio will have to try to steer through policies aimed at transforming China's sprawling agricultural sector and improving long-term food security.

China plans to spend 40 trillion yuan ($6.4 trillion) to bring 400 million people to cities over the next decade to turn the country into a wealthy world power with economic growth generated by affluent urban consumers.

"Li Keqiang is pushing for urbanisation. The countryside will be the main battlefield," one source with leadership ties told Reuters.


China needs to bring in the commercial and technological wherewithal that will allow its farms to feed an increasingly rich and urban population, even in the face of declining water supplies, land and rural labour.

But the vice premier overseeing agriculture will also need to ensure that the central government treads carefully, encouraging the transfer of land and the creation of advanced agribusinesses while addressing a widening urban-rural wage gap and protecting the interests of millions of small, subsistence farmers throughout the country.

Wang has experience dealing with rural protests against land grabs, winning praise for deftly handling a crisis in the coastal village of Wukan in Guangdong in 2011, but observers have said his instinct for reform has usually been frustrated.

Zheng Fengtian, a professor with the school of agricultural economics and rural development at Renmin University in Beijing, said the leader responsible for agriculture would likely have his hands tied.

"I think the new leader will continue the current agricultural policy mapped out by the (party's) previous Central Committee and the State Council (cabinet), which have clearly outlined ideas on agriculture development," he said.

"The key issue is urbanisation and I hardly expect any breakthrough beyond what has already been talked about."

Saturday's parliamentary session will also decide who will take over a number of key government ministries.

The sources said two front runners have emerged to take over as chairman of China's powerful state planner, the National Development and Reform Commission, including current vice-chairman Xie Zhenhua, also the country's chief climate change official, and Xu Shaoshi, the minister of land and resources.

Current vice-minister Pan Yue remains the main candidate to take over as minister of environmental protection, but incumbent Zhou Shengxian might stay on, the sources said. (Additional reporting by Niu Shuping; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan)
 
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