• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

Michael, you've stolen my thunder.

Mr. Daly, I believe that Michael is dead right in suggesting that you are situating the estimate in order to justify your choice of a P-51 knock-off for the mission.  Personally I have always been a fan of the DH Mosquito - a larger two seater aircraft in the medium weight range (11 tonnes) that could move fast, carry useful payloads, had long legs, could fight and was cheap to build.

I am sure that we could cobble together something similar today and maybe have it take over some other roles as well.  Perhaps a Buffalo replacement......

But that is an opinion.

First of all I need to be convinced that there is a sufficiently wide capability gap to justify diverting resources to make a specialized plug.  Perhaps if you went back to square one and focused less on the platform and more on the battlefield we might get a clearer picture of why you think we need such a piece of kit.   

And no, consideration of the battlefield environment is not tangential to discussions  about the kit to be employed thereupon.

Cheers.
 
Steve Daly said:
CDN Aviator, I'm not going to wander afield just because your sensibilities demand answers. If the issue is important to you, start a thread. If the issue is unimportant, don't start a thread. I really couldn't care much one way or another, I used the idea as an example only... if the example was rejected I would normally just look for another, better, example.

I wouldn't think of lecturing folks on what is proper form within this forum. I will, however, remain bound by the acceptable behavior required at the majority of forums where I've been a member. This forum is nowhere near as active as others where I've been a member or a mod, perhaps things can be somewhat looser here and still work out OK.

And now back to our regularly scheduled discussion, already in progress...

And with that i will assign zero credibility to anything you have to say and put you on ignore.

Have a great evening.
 
This forum is nowhere near as active as others where I've been a member or a mod, perhaps things can be somewhat looser here and still work out OK.

Not as active, hmmm? Well 21,000+ members is nothing to sneeze at in my opinion. We have nowheres near the numbers like militaryphotos.net(for which I am glad) but frankly I think our well regarded reputation Forces wide speaks for itself.
 
Steve Daly said:
It's basic forum manners to not drag a thread off-topic and this was getting way out of hand.
I believe I may be one you direct this comment to.  You took the thread in that direction while you pontificated from your soapbox.  You ventured into a lane where some of us, who know a thing or two within that lane, had to question your assertions.  If you want to be a know-it-all and wander afield yourself, don't whine that the thread is going somewhere else.  I don't appreciate being called rude.
 
OK, in order... if I miss anyone, just remind me.

OldSolduer: An upgraded bipe works for me as long as it's open cockpit, painted in garish colours and the aircrew wear white scarves. Please note, the scarves must be silk, none of this new-fangled synthetic stuff. ;D

SupersonicMax : The AT-6B already has a MIL Standard 1553 databus built in and computer/display capabilities for the new sensor. Added weight would be a factor, but primarily in increased structure for the mount, power/datalines for the radar and possibly a larger alternator. Based on similar mods I've taken part in, the increase would be 300 Lbs for the APG-76, maybe 350 if the alternator required upgrade. That's inclusive of the radar itself. Both radars are designed for small airframes and small electrical loads. Fitting, as previously stated would probably need to be similar to the Corsair or Hellcat night fighters. Check out http://modelingmadness.com/reviews/korean/cleaverf4u5n.htm It's a model of a Corsair night fighter, but does give a good idea of how the radar was fitted. Not ideal, as I said previously there would probably be limitation on the radar field of view.

Michael O`Leary:
and now are busily waving away any suggestion that your argument isn't fully developed from a task assessment or capability requirement perspective.
Exactly where have I done that? The only thing I have waved away is the sidetrack discussion of the CP-142. That isn't, and never was part of the discussion. It was an example only, on a separate point. Perhaps a bad example, but as something not on topic in the first place it's something that should be ignored or left for a different discussion. As for selection of airframe, I haven't selected one... I've suggested that the BA SABA comes close, or that the Piper Enforcer is close (with one huge obvious drawback), but haven't selected any airframe as being truly suitable. For you edification, I did read the passage you quoted. I ran into a basic problem though in compliance... as I haven't identified a platform that might fit the perceived need, it isn't yet possible to start trying to generate numbers.
If this is such a great idea, then lay down the basics of the estimate showing why we need it, and how we can afford it. If it's not worth that effort, then it's just another wild-assed wish list idea.

Fair enough. Please excuse me if I keep this short at this juncture. The basic question underlying my concept is this: "What does the Air Force bring to the rear-area security table?" There are loads of front-line assets (but never enough), but can the Air Force only contribute by diverting those assets just as they are needed at the front? I considered the possibility that a role-specific rear-area asset might actually free more front-line assets to the main fight rather than divert resources. Force balance would require careful assessment, at what point does it become a diminishing return?

I selected a new acronym early in order to avoid the rather extensive baggage associated with COIN. As you are, no doubt, aware there has been a rather large amount of resistance in First World air forces to acquiring COIN-type aircraft. Most of that has centered, IMHO, on the lack of insurgents to counter. The platform has an inherent capability of doing other things, but COIN aircraft get swept under the COIN rug and those 'other things' get done by higher value units. This has lead to accelerated use of things like USAF F-16's in roles where a lower value unit would be suitable, if available. Citation available upon request.

Kirkhill: The potential of a 'modern' Mosquito is very high, perhaps ideal for the role envisioned. My only concern would be maneuverability on the air-air side. A twin engine configuration solves the radar fit question ideally, but cost might make the diminishing return point very low. As for selecting a Mustang knock off... haven't done it, haven't any idea how you might have got that idea. I said the Enforcer would be a better match (than the CF-156B), but immediately qualified that by discounting a tailwheel configured aircraft.

CDN Aviator: Says he has me on ignore, so this space intentionally left blank.

Ex-Dragoon:
Not as active, hmmm? Well 21,000+ members is nothing to sneeze at in my opinion.

Not a derogatory statements, just a simple statement of fact. I'm currently active in communities that have far more frequent posts. In one case the forum has generated approx 950K posts in the last 4-4 1/2 years (I was a mod there, but stepped down to get more free time.). In another case the forum has generated only 15K posts, but that counter was reset when the software crashed and was unrecoverable... on the 27/Sept/2008. My most active forum was while working as a flight-simulation administrator for one of the premier online gaming leagues... that place was a madhouse, generating 3000 posts/day! Almost made a killing there on the buyout, damn tech crash. :( My Air Force background, coupled with a life-long involvement with Flight Sim had lead to an ownership stake in a company that was being targeted for potential takeover by Microsoft. The opening moves had been made when the bubble burst and our company, like a great number of others folded. Don't take me to mean those places are better, but it does require a somewhat more stringent enforcement of staying on topic. I've been involved with places like that since I got my first Internet connection and doubt that I'll be changing using that form of conduct anytime soon.

x-zipperhead: Nope, wasn't you I was referring to. I always appreciate a free exchange of ideas, but do try to limit myself to one conversational topic per thread. I notice that your user-image is a CP-140. If anything I said here, by way of example, makes you want to discuss a patrol-related topic with me... sure ( Why do I have a feeling the CP-142 leaps to mind?). But how about we do it elsewhere than a thread about CAS? I'm not as conversant on patrol issues as I might be, but my time in 414 (EW) did teach me more than a few things concerning how to conduct combined training and operational taskings. 414 had to train all it's Navs to the task, there really wasn't any assets available to do that training other than what we had flying, and the only spares that might have been used as training aids were there as well. We also had to convert pilots to the CT-133, train transport guys to fly the CC-117 in a fighter-type environment and train ground crew to the rather unofficial "tech crewman" ideal. That unit also deployed... a lot. I lost count of exercise deployments when I crossed 50. I went to Cool Pool so often during the initial Hornet workups that Base Flight Cold Lake thought I worked there. A unique Sqdn leads to unique problems and unique solutions... and we all know just how well received any suggestion from the new guy in the unit is when he starts with "At my last unit...". Some of that stuff may never have been spread throughout the rest of the military, EW was always the red-headed bastard stepchild of Fighter Group.

I think that covers it, apologies to anyone I might have missed.
 
Steve Daly,

If you are only going to select single sentences to address in the responses put forward to you, then why should we bother to engage you?

Take your proposal to NDHQ and stop wasting our time in presumptions of "debate.".

Michael O'Leary


Edited to add:

In case you missed the points in my post, instead of just choosing to ignore them, here is a concise listing:

1. A reasoned argument to justify the expense and efforts to develop a modified capability.

2. What, exactly, makes you so well positioned to be the inventor/champion of this concept which you seem to imply has been ignored by the existing establishment?

3. Lets start with your arguments to prove a deficiency exists that cannot be met by existing resources. 

4. Source data would be welcome to help shape your argument.

5. What capability(ies) get cut to fund this new one? 

6. And how do you demonstrate that your proposal is of greater value?

7. Tasks and roles to be conducted.

8. Aircrew training requirements.

9. Aircraft maintenance lifecycle.

10. Number of airframes required, based on your assessment of tasks.

11. Expected lifespan of "new" airframes, compared to expectation of available manufacturer and principal nation support.

12. Requirements and costs to retrain and retool all required maintenance facilities and maintainers.

13. Infrastructure costs to support new aircraft in all Wing locations.


 
You know the wings are used for fuel.  If you put the radar on the wing, you reduce the fuel you can carry (kinda critical for a CAS airplane).  I really don't see why you need a radar on that airplane.  CAS is all about aquiring visually a target and hitting it usually via FAC (even for radar equipped aircraft).  Plus, you wouldn't use any weapons that require a radar.  If you put on a radar, you totally change the aircraft and its structure.  (By the way, there is no alternator on the aircraft.).

I have flown the CT-156 and while it is an extremely nice training aircraft, I think it would lack excess power with the added weight could cause some problems.  Put a bigger engine?  I believe we already have the most powerful of the PT-6 serie engines.  Something bigger isn't really an economical solution (plus, the AT-6B is going to use the PT6A-68, the engine we currently have on the Harvard). Adding aftermarket items to an aircraft just doesn't make any sense to me on a NEW aircraft, when you can buy something off the shelve that will do the job just fine.  IMHO, the Hawk would be a much better CAS platform than the AT-6B.  While it may lack in endurance, you can have a probe on it (the Hawk 127 already has that) for AAR.  The Hawk is already used by some countries as a light attack aircraft.

Also, reading from posts on other sites, you seem to suggest that the backseat is raised, giving a good visibility to the backseater.  You obviously have never flown in the backseat.  There is no step up whatsover (or very little) giving a fairly bad forward visibility from the backseat.  Plus, you are sitting where the wing roots are, so your visibility below is almost nil.  Furthermore, you suggest the AT-6B and the Harvard II will be similar aircraft.  I would think they would be very different, from structure to avionics and electronics.  I assume that flying it would be different as well.

You know, I wouldn't count your "flight simulation" equivalent to real world experience.  Even though simulators these days are more "realistic", they are still games.

You suggestion may be a good one, however it is certainly not a practical one.  The AT-6B has yet to fly and nowhere it mentions its payload (which I would suggest is very low)  Plus, to make it to our standards, you suggest to add aftermarker items to it, which doesn't make any sense, especially when you can buy an airplane off the shelve with all the stuff you want.

Anyways, my 2 cents.
 
Well, I guess Steve Daly (now "He who talks to walls ... ") was unable or unwilling to actually try and convince us that he has a worthy idea.  There's few things worse than throwing around ideas that would affect CF organizations, equipment, doctrine, training, etc., without actually having done the homework for a complete solution.  Too bad, it might have been an interested debate if there was any real information to be contributed.


 
Sneaking back into the discussion (heh)

I have found a reference at the ever interesting "Chaos Manor" which demonstrates the enhanced FAC leg of any "Green Airforce" is right here right now. While "Magic Eyes" is not platform centric, anyone going down to get eyes on the target is going to attract a lot of attention, so had best be in a powerful, well armoured airframe. The two seat "OV-10" derivative of the A-10 would be ideal in this context, and suggests that the second leg of the "Green Airforce" (CAB RANK type support) would go hand in hand using a similar airframe (the A-10 itself). Given there are no A-10's to be had and the production line is long closed, this limits the choices somewhat, unless there is the will to create an up to date "A-x/OV-x", possibly in collaberation with allies like Australia and the UK.

Further growth of the "Green Airforce" idea is possible if fixed wing logistical support to deployed troops and CAB RANK FARPs is considered desirable, using a twin engined STOL tactical transport, which then leads to the question "why not carry troops in these planes as well?" Of course resource availibility is the real show stopper here. Even getting a dedicated OV-x will probably be a non starter, unless modifying the CT-115 Hawk can be considered suitable. Assuming the answer is "yes", the Canadian A-x may well be armed UAV's under direction or control of the FAC.

Magic Eyes:

http://www.jerrypournelle.com/mail/2008/Q4/mail540.html#Swiss

JTAS magic eyes

Dr. Pournelle,

I don’t know how long the Army has been pursuing that magic eyes project but the USAF has for a long time been working on equivalent “wish them dead” systems. Similar concept, except that the necessary weapons are carried by the guy who has eyes on the target and the system weight is a huge issue because a smart reticle must be mounted in a helmet carried by a person who may have to pull 9 Gs (or eject) with all that extra weight in the helmet. Look at a target, push a few buttons, and wish it dead. Precision attack planning reduced from a matter of hours to a matter of seconds, and that’s really important to the guys on the ground that we’re supporting. We’ve had the tech AND the system integration issues worked out for a while, but they’re not terribly high on the budget priority list. Done properly, that magic eyes system could be integrated into the tactical datalink network and the coordinates could be passed to ANY system able to achieve the desired effects. That would be a perfect implementation of a joint system that is platform-agnostic… Why does it HAVE to be artillery (or a fighter or a bomber or a UAV) if it could be something else that happens to be available and has the required capability?

This could be one more major step away from the old school platform-specific-mission mindset if the Army doesn’t use it just for artillery spotting. Junior USAF officers nowadays have no delusions about any particular platform being tied to a specific mission, so this ought to be one more step down the road towards effects based ops. Aim magic eyes at target, push a couple of buttons, and a short while later the target blows up, and who cares where the weapon came from. An extension of the concept – a software tool hanging on the network at the AOC could compare the target coordinates against the do not strike or high value target list, so an abort command could come down in time if there is a reason to not destroy that target.

Sean

 
I wonder if thats the same Jerry Pournelle who used to write some sci fi?
 
I am thinking outside the box but what of an updated and armed version of the Buffalo?
 
Ex-Dragoon said:
I am thinking outside the box but what of an updated and armed version of the Buffalo?

Americans are already developing a gunship version of the C-27J......why not jump in on that rather that pay more to start our own program ?
 
CDN Aviator said:
Americans are already developing a gunship version of the C-27J......why not jump in on that rather that pay more to start our own program ?

That would make more sense.
 
Since the vastly more powerful AC-130 has been regulated to fly only at night due to the threat of anti aircraft fire, I am a bit leery of advocating a smaller and less capable gunship as a CAS platform. There are economy of scale arguments that can be made (if this is part of a larger fleet of light logistics/patrol/observation planes), but unless the gunship can really outgun the enemy (a plane mounting a powerful laser comes to mind) I suspect that the flexibility offered by a high performance airframe or a dedicated CAS airframe will outweigh any advantages of weight of fire.

The positive side of the argument is that a fleet of logistics/patrol and observation planes is a major part of the "Green Airforce", so if the gunship is part of the package, then we can adjust our TTPs to reflect the strengths and weakness of the platform. Maybe a FAC seated on a C-27 observation plane will use a powerful sensor turret to mark targets, and also have the FSCC on board with him.

There are many different possibilities opened up by this idea; lots to think on.

 
Thucydides said:
Assuming that we or our allies (more likely) will provide and maintain air superiority over the AOR ...
Perhaps a dangerous assumption.  Once again, I'm not aware of another western nation with as much political support for the idea of going into Sudan.  There is an air threat and, if we ever find ourselves there, we may be alone in fighting for air superiority.  This will not be instantaneous and therefore our own CAS capability must not be established in the assumption that air superiority will exist.

Thucydides said:
... there are few arguments against "FOB CAS" ...
As the only argument for "FOB CAS" is that it will be more responsive (and I doubt this), I think your statement may be backward.

There is already CAS in the air, orbiting, waiting for a fight and ready to fly off in the direction needed on order.  FOB CAS, while potentially closer to the fight, will have its own delays as pilots on the ground zip zippers & fasten buckles before scrambling to planes, then getting into the sky, climbing and finally making their way to the fight in (potentially much) slower aircraft.  Further aggravate this by recognizing that, if the FOB itself is the location requiring CAS, it may be impossible to get FOB CAS in the air with fires onto the airstrip.  In many cases, existing CAS is faster, farther reaching and carrying a much larger payload than budget platforms being proposed here.  If there is nothing more than wild assumption that FOB CAS can be more responsive than conventional CAS, then I am not convinced there is value in reducing the number of superior platforms in order to put those pilots into FOB CAS.  Especially when the related problems are many.

"FOB CAS" would impose a large administrative footprint into the FOBs, and place increased demands onto the sustainment lines supporting the FOB (someone has to bring forward the parts, additional fuel, ammunition, additional rations, etc).  Resources currently used to support the fight would become consumed in supporting mini airbases.  These airbases will not come without a foot print.

You will need space for maintenance, fuel, ammunition, aircraft, parts, air crews, ground crews, etc.  If you are not prepared to dump a lot of the parts forward, then be prepaired for greater periods of unavailability while waiting for parts to be pushed forward (in which case you've just lost the responsiveness intended in FOB CAS).  Through this, FOBs start getting bigger.

Bigger FOBs require more manpower for security (and so you are tying more personnel to the FOB and away from the work outside that is the FOB's reason to exist) and more engineering resources to build (and again these are taken from those supporting the manoeuvre fight and from those supporting reconstruction activities).  All of a sudden, we find CSS, Engineer and Infantry resources taken away from the current fight in order to support the mini-airbases. 

Should our land element ever decide that it wants to free itself from FOBs, it will be unable as the new method of air support will require we remain fixed to the FOBs they operate from (without the land element in the FOB, it cannot be kept secure for air operations).

He who talks to walls.... said:
"What does the Air Force bring to the rear-area security table?" There are loads of front-line assets (but never enough), but can the Air Force only contribute by diverting those assets just as they are needed at the front? I considered the possibility that a role-specific rear-area asset might actually free more front-line assets to the main fight rather than divert resources.
While "cheap multi-role aircraft" may require less in financial resources to buy, there are still other resources you are over looking.  Pilots and ground crew are also in finite supply.  Putting these human resources into a cheap dedicated RAS CAS will deny their use other roles (thus denying the commander flexibility).

If there are already not enough "front-line" assets but those front line assets are capable of supporting RAS, then why would you propose permanently redicing the number of "front-line" assets to staff a role-specific platform unsuited to supporting the "front-line" fight?

Thucydides said:
.... and also have the FSCC on board with him.
I'm not clear on the value of putting the FSCC in an observer aircraft.  It seems to me they are better in a location where they can think on the larger fight, and probably where they can talk across the room to do coordination with the ASCC and TACP.
 
Well surprise, surprise, the Iraq airforce is due to get Grand Caravans armed with Hellfire missiles for it's first ground attack aircraft, I have never considered them, will be interesting to see how they work out.

http://groups.google.com/group/rec.aviation.military/msg/422f4c3520b4390f


http://www.cessna.com/caravan/special-missions.html

 
I really, really, really hate this thread, and consequently have avoided posting in it for a long time. Jut too many bad ideas.

MCG said:
Perhaps a dangerous assumption.  Once again, I'm not aware of another western nation with as much political support for the idea of going into Sudan.  There is an air threat and, if we ever find ourselves there, we may be alone in fighting for air superiority.  This will not be instantaneous and therefore our own CAS capability must not be established in the assumption that air superiority will exist.
As the only argument for "FOB CAS" is that it will be more responsive (and I doubt this), I think your statement may be backward.

There is already CAS in the air, orbiting, waiting for a fight and ready to fly off in the direction needed on order.  FOB CAS, while potentially closer to the fight, will have its own delays as pilots on the ground zip zippers & fasten buckles before scrambling to planes, then getting into the sky, climbing and finally making their way to the fight in (potentially much) slower aircraft.  Further aggravate this by recognizing that, if the FOB itself is the location requiring CAS, it may be impossible to get FOB CAS in the air with fires onto the airstrip.  In many cases, existing CAS is faster, farther reaching and carrying a much larger payload than budget platforms being proposed here.  If there is nothing more than wild assumption that FOB CAS can be more responsive than conventional CAS, then I am not convinced there is value in reducing the number of superior platforms in order to put those pilots into FOB CAS.  Especially when the related problems are many.

"FOB CAS" would impose a large administrative footprint into the FOBs, and place increased demands onto the sustainment lines supporting the FOB (someone has to bring forward the parts, additional fuel, ammunition, additional rations, etc).  Resources currently used to support the fight would become consumed in supporting mini airbases.  These airbases will not come without a foot print.

You will need space for maintenance, fuel, ammunition, aircraft, parts, air crews, ground crews, etc.  If you are not prepared to dump a lot of the parts forward, then be prepaired for greater periods of unavailability while waiting for parts to be pushed forward (in which case you've just lost the responsiveness intended in FOB CAS).  Through this, FOBs start getting bigger.

Bigger FOBs require more manpower for security (and so you are tying more personnel to the FOB and away from the work outside that is the FOB's reason to exist) and more engineering resources to build (and again these are taken from those supporting the manoeuvre fight and from those supporting reconstruction activities).  All of a sudden, we find CSS, Engineer and Infantry resources taken away from the current fight in order to support the mini-airbases. 

Should our land element ever decide that it wants to free itself from FOBs, it will be unable as the new method of air support will require we remain fixed to the FOBs they operate from (without the land element in the FOB, it cannot be kept secure for air operations).
While "cheap multi-role aircraft" may require less in financial resources to buy, there are still other resources you are over looking.  Pilots and ground crew are also in finite supply.  Putting these human resources into a cheap dedicated RAS CAS will deny their use other roles (thus denying the commander flexibility).

If there are already not enough "front-line" assets but those front line assets are capable of supporting RAS, then why would you propose permanently redicing the number of "front-line" assets to staff a role-specific platform unsuited to supporting the "front-line" fight?
I'm not clear on the value of putting the FSCC in an observer aircraft.  It seems to me they are better in a location where they can think on the larger fight, and probably where they can talk across the room to do coordination with the ASCC and TACP.

BINGO!

Pretty much exactly my feelings, but less ranty.

On the last point, Kiowa crews functioned as Air OPs and FACs, which was adequate. The only downside to that was shortage of guns with which to engage at times, which illustrates the absolute necessity for decent armament on reconaissance helicopters. Putting a segment of a staff into an aircraft would be courting disaster for a bunch of reasons.
 
MCG said:
I'm not clear on the value of putting the FSCC in an observer aircraft.  It seems to me they are better in a location where they can think on the larger fight, and probably where they can talk across the room to do coordination with the ASCC and TACP.

Actually, I should have added a smiley to that comment: using a large or medium transport for the FAC is a bit of overkill.

Well surprise, surprise, the Iraq airforce is due to get Grand Caravans armed with Hellfire missiles for it's first ground attack aircraft, I have never considered them, will be interesting to see how they work out.

http://groups.google.com/group/rec.aviation.military/msg/422f4c3520b4390f

http://www.cessna.com/caravan/special-missions.html

The Grand Caravan isn't the first plane that would have come to mind for me either, but it seems to have a lot of the features a "Green Airforce" would be looking for. This aircraft served as a ground attack plane during the Nigerian Civil War, so size, speed and power are not always the key factors (although I would go for the more powerful aircraft if I could).
 
Here is a news release from the Finnish government regarding their BAE Hawks 50s:

      Poland Keen on Finnish Hawks -YLE
 
 
(Source: STT Finnish government news; issued Dec. 10, 2008)
 
 
 
Poland has expressed interest in buying some of the Finnish Air Force's inventory of British Aerospace Hawk advanced jet trainers, the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE) reported on Wednesday.

The public broadcaster added that the issue had been raised last week when Bogdan Klich, the Polish defence minister, visited Finland.

Poland is in the process of procuring 16 trainer jet aeroplanes and aims to close the deal by the end of the year.

Some of the FAF's fleet of 65 Hawks are becoming redundant as Finland's plans to found an international air combat school in Kauhava have come to nothing.

-ends-

 
Back
Top