Close Area Suppression Weapon (was Company Area Suppression Weapon)

[McG]

I raise the Bullshit flag on that, given that it is not man-portable, and it brings nothing to the table that isn't already there.

and I'll suggest you are ignoring what does not fit your conclusion so that you can pretend you've not been answere3d.

Would some one please tell me, what would an AGLS bring to the table that is not already available in an infantry platoon?

Here is one answer:

• On the AGL vs MG comparison - in addition to just HE (or HEDP, or HEI, etc), the modern AGL can have airbursting munitions.  Neither MG nor LAV cannon do this.

1.  Why "deliver direct fire HE onto the enemy to suppress and destroy him"?  Why HE?  Why not kinetic energy? 

Why do tanks carry both kinetic & chemical energy rounds?  Because there are different terminal effects.  If you are trying to kill an AFV, a MG can force the cerws heads down to impare the crews ability to locate and return fire.  However, that machine gun will not reliably strip the AFV of its optics - blinding the vehicle and making it impotent to its pending destruction.

An AGL with airbursting munitions can deny an enemy nature cover from kinetic machine gun fire, and higher rate of fire will ensure greater frag casualties that in the beaten zone than would be achieved with mortars.

6.  Since you brought up what weapons do, "destroy" is not one of the things that the weapons in the infantry platoon do...

B-GL-300-007/FP-001, Chapter 1, para 1, first sentance states that firepower is used to destroy, neutralize, suppress and harass the enemy.

GDLS will be upset, but the only weapon that satisfies the "man portable" "tripod mounted" criteria is:

AGS-30 Automatic Grenade Launcher System

This raises an interesting question.  Did the CASW project go wrong because we constrained it to NATO standard ammunition?  A few years back, the US was looking at a 25 mm intermediate velocity weapon between a MG and an AGL.  The vision was that it would replace both the .50 cal and the AGL.  The US project was to deliver a weapon able to deliver both KE and CE rounds, to have an air-burst capabilty, and to be lighter than the .50.  Maybe this is the way CASW should have gone - replacing the .50 with a 25 to 30 mm intermediate velocity cannon.  At the same time, maintaining the company mortar.

 

[Kirkhill]

Funny thing Thucydides, as soon as the FCS notion cropped up I immediately thought of the CLASS system as well.  Basically it was a binocular sized laser range finder system that could be clipped onto any DF weapons system from MGs to ATGMs and CG84s.

Howizzit that a system fielded 20 years ago with US Rangers (as I recall) seems to have drifted off into the blue while its capabilities are stil being "developed" and it costs mega bucks more than it did then?

The Navy seems to have similar problem with its AOPS.  An 80,000,000 Norwegian ship is due to become a 250,000,000 Canadian ship after suitable delays and posturing.

Likewise the Mk19 becomes the CASW at some indeterminate time in the future, equipped with "developmental" technology that was available off the shelf some time back and will be authorised only for the only role for which it makes minimal sense.

Is there a pattern there?

CLASS is a full-solution fire-control system which improves the range and performance of direct fire weapons. CLASS is interchangeable between weapon systems and has been successfully used on the 84 mm Carl Gustaf RCL, the 106 mm RCL rifle, the 25 mm M242 cannon, the 30 mm ASP-30 combat support weapon, the Mk19 40 mm Automatic Grenade Launcher, the .50 calibre M2 HMG and the M190 155 mm towed howitzer (direct fire).Following successful trials, Computing Devices Canada received a contract from the Canadian Forces in October 1995 for an initial 50 CLASS sights for their Bofors Carl Gustav rocket launchers. CLASS has also been included in the 1998 US Joint Lightweight 155 mm Howitzer project Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI) providing the direct fire sighting function

  Source, Janes

 

[vonGarvin]

and I'll suggest you are ignoring what does not fit your conclusion so that you can pretend you've not been answere3d.

And I suggest that your suggestion isn't called for, especially considering that you're DS here.

Here is one answer:Why do tanks carry both kinetic & chemical energy rounds?  Because there are different terminal effects.  If you are trying to kill an AFV, a MG can force the cerws heads down to impare the crews ability to locate and return fire.  However, that machine gun will not reliably strip the AFV of its optics - blinding the vehicle and making it impotent to its pending destruction.

An AGL with airbursting munitions can deny an enemy nature cover from kinetic machine gun fire, and higher rate of fire will ensure greater frag casualties that in the beaten zone than would be achieved with mortars.
B-GL-300-007/FP-001, Chapter 1, para 1, first sentance states that firepower is used to destroy, neutralize, suppress and harass the enemy.

....
Tanks?  F**king Tanks?    As in this : :tank2:  ?
Are you serious?

I ask "why HE" and you ask "Why do tanks carry both kinetic & chemical energy rounds?"  I am talking about the infantry platoon, and you talk about tanks?  OK, I'll answer.
Tanks are required to kill everything on the battlefield.  I do know a thing or two about terminal effects.  But I did acknowledge that we already have THREE systems (for a total of ELEVEN* weapons) in an infantry platoon that are capable of delivering HE.  But, in the case of the infantry firing at shit, that shit is mostly human.  Tanks fire at other tanks, at people, at bunkers, etc.  Apples and handgrenades (pun intended) is what you are comparing.

Now, reference firepower, please add the rest of that paragraph, the opening one.  Okay, I will:

Firepower effects occur at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and must be synchronized with other attack systems. Maximum firepower effects require the full integration of army and joint service systems and procedures to determine engagement priorities, locate, identify, and track targets, allocate firepower assets and assess battle damage. Firepower should be viewed as a joint concept as it includes conventional land, air and maritime weapons effects. It encompasses the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition data from all sources, direct and indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft of all types, and other lethal and non lethal means against air, ground and sea targets.

So, the firepower of an infantry platoon is to DESTROY?  When it "...should be viewed as a joint concept"?  As I've stated in another post, the only arm that can DESTROY by FIREPOWER on its own, is the Artillery (and again, I'm not sure of the conditions or limitations, but unless firepower is nuclear or artillery or joint, then it's not destroying without manoeuvre).

Finally, I do agree that airbursting ammunition is awesome: we already have airbursting ammo.  Yes, I read about the higher rate of fire, and all things being equal in that (smaller) beaten zone, more casualties.  Perhaps.  Maybe.  But going back to first principles: you have to lug that thing to within range.  Right now, just blast away with what you have, fix them there long enough to enable either firepower to destroy the enemy, or for the infantry and armour to manoeuvre to destroy the enemy.

If an AGS-30 were brought in, it can be carried much like a C6 SF, but that point is moot.  We are getting H and K, it will be ground mounted, and only the infantry will get them.  (Unless things change, anyway)

*4 x 25mm Chain guns, 1 x 60mm Mortar, 6 x M203 grenade launchers.

 

[Infanteer]

And I suggest that your suggestion isn't called for, especially considering that you're DS here.....

The fact that he called you on your line of reasoning has nothing to do with his status as a mod.  Your free to continue the discussion (which is interesting) or not, but don't making a "modding" issue where there is none.  For some reason, you are the only person in here that is getting wrapped around the axle and defensive by a good discussion on weapons.

 

[Infanteer]

1.  Why "deliver direct fire HE onto the enemy to suppress and destroy him"?  Why HE?  Why not kinetic energy?  Why blast energy and fragmentation?  But, if we must, then the 60 mm does that already, as do the 4 x M242s in the platoon.

....because the effects of falling HE on a target are different than falling shot.  If you are in a bunker or a building, me putting a 10 round burst of 40mm grenades into the window would be much different than me putting a 10 round burst of 7.62, no?  Be pedantic and try and find the execeptions, but the basic principle applies.  Yes the 60mm can do it, but not in the fashion of an AGL (as your direct/indirect distinction above made clear).

3.  I only speak of Mech Infantry, because we have no other kinds according to our Force Employment structure.  And Infantry are the only ones getting the C16, so talk of other arms and services is moot.
5.  It's not going on vehicles.  Dismounted on tripods only.  Talk of going on a vehicle in any way, shape or form is moot.  *IF* the brain trust at DLR (short on both if you ask me, but that's just my opinion) were to suddenly fund a vehicle mount for this thing, for the LAV sans turret, then we could. (Side note: when did they term a LAV without turret as "ISC"?  As I recall, "ISC" referred to "Infantry Section Carrier" to denote the configuration in the back, as different from say CP variant)

I'm speaking in terms of general applicability of a weapon across a wide spectrum (they appear useful), as we tend to use stuff in ways never imagined by the Kingston braintrust.  Mea culpa on the ISC (a 7 seater with a turret) - I meant RWS (which I guess is what the name for the turretless LAVs is).

6.  Since you brought up what weapons do, "destroy" is not one of the things that the weapons in the infantry platoon do: the infantry do that themselves.  The weapons* suppress so that the infantrymen can close with and destroy.  I'm digging way back in my furthest recesses of my memory here, but I do believe that only the **King of Battle can destroy targets on its own.

Sheesh.  If I hose a section of 8 guys down with a AGL, turning all of them into a fine pink mist, they and the square on the map they represent have been destroyed.

This raises an interesting question.  Did the CASW project go wrong because we constrained it to NATO standard ammunition?  A few years back, the US was looking at a 25 mm intermediate velocity weapon between a MG and an AGL.  The vision was that it would replace both the .50 cal and the AGL.  The US project was to deliver a weapon able to deliver both KE and CE rounds, to have an air-burst capabilty, and to be lighter than the .50.  Maybe this is the way CASW should have gone - replacing the .50 with a 25 to 30 mm intermediate velocity cannon.  At the same time, maintaining the company mortar.

Video of the AGS-30 here.  Around the 1:20 mark, you see a single soldier lugging it up the stairs about as easy as hauling a C9.  (Yes, C9, not C6).
If THAT were the "C 16 AGLS", then I could very well see it to provide the platoon with fire support when not using the LAV.

Now we're cooking with gas (and perhaps have identified the key problem with the AGS project)!  How heavy is the ammo?

 

[Oh No a Canadian]

Video of the AGS-30 here.  Around the 1:20 mark, you see a single soldier lugging it up the stairs about as easy as hauling a C9.

There is also a video on youtube of a Russian soldier shooting a 12.7mm machine gun while standing, Russian propaganda videos aren't exactly what I would call a primary source of information.

How heavy is the ammo?

http://world.guns.ru/grenade/gl22-e.htm

This site says it weighs 16 kg with tripod, 30 kg loaded with 29 rounds of ammunition.

 

[vonGarvin]

Now we're cooking with gas (and perhaps have identified the key problem with the AGS project)!  How heavy is the ammo?

I would offer that the mass of the ammo alone isn't the key problem, it is one of the key problems.  Perhaps mass of the weapon system is.

Now, when looking at getting something "new" for any arm, and if that new thing isn't a replacement (eg: the FN C1A1 is aging, so we get a new rifle), "they" look at what capabilities it provides.  It should provide a key capability that is lacking.  What I tried (and apparently failed to do) is to show the main capabilities of each weapon system within the infantry platoon.  Now, knowing this, I do get that for example rifles can be used in the anti-aircraft mode, and the 25mm can be used for point fire in certain situations, but we must remember that the infantry platoon's main job isn't to destroy by firepower alone (though in some cases, it can be done, if luck is on our side, if the wind is right, if Mars/Ares smiles upon us, etc).  So, all things being equal, we have to look at something and say "this is its main job" and "that capability is currently lacking".  It's not up to DLR to buy us stuff and shrug their shoulders and say "they'll figure out how to use it", or "they'll improvise in ways we never imagined".

An AGLS is an awesome weapon system, don't get me wrong.  But it is being given to an element that already has every capability it offers.  Yes, 40mm grenades are larger than 25mm HEI-T rounds, but I would offer that given the external ballistics of the 25mm and the fact that there are four systems in every platoon, they can create the effect of suppression on an enemy better than a single AGLS.  In short, an AGLS offers nothing new to the platoon. 


(Pedantic note: you used "direct/indirect" fire where I think you mean "low angle/flat trajectory vs.  high angle", but I know what you meant)

 

[KevinB]

AGS for RWS and non RWS vehicle mounting...

  Add it to a Gwagon (whatever its called now) and RG31 - some RWS (for higher threat AOR's) and non RWS for the more DART/NEO/IRU duties.

  Its NOT a Dismounted Inf weapon by any stretch of the imagination, but they are good for FOB defense.

 

[vonGarvin]

AGS for RWS and non RWS vehicle mounting...
Add it to a Gwagon (whatever its called now) and RG31 - some RWS (for higher threat AOR's) and non RWS for the more DART/NEO/IRU duties.
Its NOT a Dismounted Inf weapon by any stretch of the imagination, but they are good for FOB defense.

I agree that for an RWS (or any vehicle mounted system as you laid out above) is ideal for an AGLS.  I also agree that they are good for FOB defence; however, given that we already have GPMGs and HMGs, does it warrant this loooooooooooong drawn out procurement process to have a weapon that fits such a unique (and single-purpose) capability? 

The problem is this: "they" in their infinite wisdom, have decreed that there is a capability gap (false), that the 60mm is a "millstone around the neck of the infantry" (with all apologies to the former CDS, but again, a false statement) and that the AGLS is a dismounted infantry weapon system (again, false).

 

[OldSolduer]

I will follow this with interest. Not being an expert on the grenade launcher, I'll keep my thoughts about it to myself for now.

 

[dapaterson]

Finally, an explanation for the CASW/AGLS.

 

[a_majoor]

Dredging through the memory bank, the reason CLASS was never adopted seems to be (and I could be very wrong here) that the internal optics were easily knocked out of alignment by the recoil or blast effects of the larger calibre weapons. It is great to hit the first tank at 800m with your Carl G, but not so much when when you have to re-zero before his angry team mates get you....

However, this is pretty much like one of my other favorite hobby horses. Radio and communications equipment has advanced light years beyond the AN/PRC 522, but cost, bureaucracy and inertia keep me carrying 1980's vintage technology on my back when I could spend $400 and carry a GARMIN RINO in my pocket (with FM voice/GPS/SAS and map display capability built in, plus it floats when you drop it in water...). I suppose since the design for CLASS is pretty old you *might* be able to licence it for a song from CDC or whatever successor company has it and fix whatever the flaw was for the production "CLASS II".

I think the idea of being able to get first round hits with DF systems would add a great new capability to the table (speed of engagements, being able to open up at vastly greater ranges, logistics, etc), and is probably a far better place to put our resources.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I love it when all you guys get hung up in here. It makes it so peaceful for the rest of us outside on the boards ;D

 

[Infanteer]

An AGLS is an awesome weapon system, don't get me wrong.  But it is being given to an element that already has every capability it offers.  Yes, 40mm grenades are larger than 25mm HEI-T rounds, but I would offer that given the external ballistics of the 25mm and the fact that there are four systems in every platoon, they can create the effect of suppression on an enemy better than a single AGLS.  In short, an AGLS offers nothing new to the platoon. 

Except for the Battlegroup Rifle Platoon we had overseas with a LAV RWS' overseas - an AGL would have been nice to have on that. 

The employability, not the capability, of an AGL is - to me - the severe limiting factor of this project at this time.   

To be a worthwhile project this would be better off looking at other places in the Army - something like the TAPV screams AGS.  I'd have an Infantry unit take it, but not at the expense of other systems with a different capability/employability mix, not as a "Company Area Suppression Weapon" (A Rifle Company needs other things first please), and, in my opinion, on a lower priority than other items which offer a more versatile mix of capability/employability.

Then again, I think we said this 5 pages ago.

 

[SeanNewman]

The extremely drawn out procurement process for a relatively easy weapon is because of two things:

1.  The made the requirement one all-inclusive system (GMG + FCS), not two separate procurements; and

2.  An administrative mistake that meant the competition had to be re-opened even though there was still only one real option, but a left field second competitor attempted (failed) to compete.

The School of Cool has the skeleton draft PAM written and has had it for several months, just awaiting final word to hit print.  An upcoming conference will tell more.

 

[vonGarvin]

Except for the Battlegroup Rifle Platoon we had overseas with a LAV RWS' overseas - an AGL would have been nice to have on that. 

Agreed.  But it's not going there, sadly.  A LAV 3 APC with the 25mm would have been preferable in my opinion, but an AGLS would have been better than what's there.


I maintain that the AGLS is a white elephant for a few reasons.  Two main reasons:
1.  It's being given to the wrong element (eg: infantry platoons)*
2.  Some idiot somewhere seriously thinks we (the infantry) can carry this thing.  And by carry, I mean either in a LAV APC or on some poor slob's back.

*I agree that a LAV RWS screams out "PUT AN AGLS ON ME!", but the LAV APC (with 25mm) with its GM Delco Turret is even better than that (in terms of firepower.  In terms of troops in the back, I believe that a LAV RWS carries more troops)


Now, as an aside, I understand that my initial (and now deleted)** post failed to satisfy the pedants out there, with such arguments as "a skilled rifleman can suppress large groups of troops" or "a burst of 40mm vaporising 8 guys will destroy that section", but my point was this: you give the element (in this case, the infantry platoon) the tools it needs to do the jobs you can give it, and expect success.  For example: consider an infantry platoon dug in on the defensive.  It will not have the task to "destroy", even though it may "destroy" (doctrinal definition) enemy sub-sub units as it "blocks" or "fixes" or whatever.  The company commander will expect it to be able to achieve its task by suppressing the enemy in the objective ("fix") or yes, maybe even destroy sub-sub-sub units (eg: sections of engineers attempting to breach) in order to achieve the objective to block, thus allowing countermoves to destroy by fire (artillery) or manoeuvre (armour and infantry). 
On the attack, if a platoon were tasked to "destroy" (which it can), and if a platoon commander back briefed his OC with a plan to destroy the enemy using the firepower of his platoon, the OC would send the young subaltern back to the drawing board.  Again, with luck and Ares on his side, the platoon commander may get lucky and catch the enemy in the open and sit back and drop M203s on him, hitting an Ammo Depot and vaporising them all. 

But don't bank on it.

Yes, I acknowledge that firepower alone can destroy (doctrinally), but as I pointed out earlier, the only arm that is expected to be able to do that on its own is Artillery, and even then it takes a massive amount of firepower to have a reasonable expectation of success.  Same with putting HE into a window.  That is but one specific situation, and right now, there are 11 individual weapons in the platoon that can do that: 4 x LAV APCs, 6 x M 203s and 1 x 84mm.  And the 84 is the only one that can be expected to make a new window, if need be (depending on construction of said house).

So, though my explanations may have been flawed in that they weren't complete and failed to acknowledge every single improvisation or adaptation of all weapons, I stand by my argument that even if the AGLS weren't so bloody difficult to move about the battlefield, let alone employ, it offers no new capabilities to the infantry platoon that aren't already there.  In short, the weapons that are there (from rifles to 25mm Chain Guns) allow infantry platoons the ability to manoeuvre against virtually any opponent on its own (given proper force ratios, naturally), and if those force ratios aren't there, those weapons allow that platoon to at least begin, rather effectively, to win the fire fight.  At least long enough to allow the really heavy hitters (eg: Artillery) to free that platoon (and company, etc) to maneouvre with a view to destroying.


Those are my points on it.  DLR?  You get a big fat freddy for this one.  Now it's up to the PBI to figure out how to deal with it.  Thanks for that. 

**No conspiracy folks: I asked for it to be deleted.

 

[OldSolduer]

I see the debate going two ways:

Infanteer - pro
Techno - con

SO, you two being of much larger and younger brain than I, where would you employ this, who would be issued with it etc.

 

[Infanteer]

Those are my points on it.  DLR?  You get a big fat freddy for this one.

Which I agreed with when I said " not at the expense of other systems with a different capability/employability mix, not as a "Company Area Suppression Weapon" (A Rifle Company needs other things first please), and, in my opinion, on a lower priority than other items which offer a more versatile mix of capability/employability".

The AGL is another tool in the toolbox - I'll take it.  A big fat freddy is, in my opinion, the "System of Systems Armoured Regiment".

 

[vonGarvin]

The AGL is another tool in the toolbox - I'll take it.  A big fat freddy is, in my opinion, the "System of Systems Armoured Regiment".

I wouldn't.  It adds nothing (to the infantry platoon) that isn't already there.

Now, if we need to divest something, then the .50 cal is most like the AGLS in terms of employment, characteristics, weight, etc.  And that's not an infantry platoon weapon, so I'll let the other arms and services pretend to talk about that, because they aren't getting it: we're saddled with it.

 

[McG]

Tanks?  F**king Tanks

Are you serious?

I ask "why HE" and you ask "Why do tanks carry both kinetic & chemical energy rounds?" 

Actually, you asked: why HE - why not KE?  In your rush to be theatrical, you casually dismiss what the analogy illustrates.  KE and CE projectiles bring different capabilities to the equation – they have different terminal effects against different targets and they are each affected differently by various natural/man-made covers from fire.  Every other platoon-level rapid-firing flat-trajectory weapon that is not locked into a vehicle currently only launch KE projectiles down range.  No other platoon-level flat-trajectory weapon offers air-bursting ammunition.  No other platoon-level rapid-firing weapon engages with CE projectiles out to the same range band.

If the enemy has a linear cover from fire (mud/brick wall, elevated road/railway, drainage ditches, etc) or a network of such cover, then all the KE weapons of the platoon may effectively keep enemy heads down but they will not fix the enemy who has freedom to manoeuvre behind that cover with the KE projectiles harmlessly passing above.  Even with HEI, the LAVs will suffer the same limitation.  At the Coy level range band, the M203s will not contribute and the one solitary platoon mortar will at best harass. 

Since we state that we want broad spectrum of overlapping capabilities with diverging limitations, there should be at least two types of weapons capable of hitting that enemy via different means.  An AGL with the airburst capability gives us this.  Where detonation range is automatically varied & the weapon slewed across the target area, an equal size beaten zone can be saturated with a higher rate of smaller fragmentary projectiles.  There will be higher frag casualties and greater suppression/fixing achieved.

… I did acknowledge that we already have THREE systems (for a total of ELEVEN* weapons) in an infantry platoon that are capable of delivering HE. …

*4 x 25mm Chain guns, 1 x 60mm Mortar, 6 x M203 grenade launchers.

Of course, range is also a component of capability and when you look at what can reach-out to influence in the company range-band, those six M203 fall out of the equation.

… and the four 25 mm cannons are not a given.  Contrary to previous suggestions, this is true more often than just when the infantry are flown in or have walked in.  Those 25 mm cannons do not dismount from the LAVs, and if somebody decides there is a higher importance for those platforms to be providing the capability of the vehicle then they can be out of the fight – making the weapons unavailable.  I have seen this in situations out of contact, and have heard second hand from others who have experienced it while in contact (with LAVs being dispatched to other duties after the shooting had already started – to move casualties one way, bring ammunition another way, reinforce out-of-contact patrols with a mobility casualty, etc).

I also agree that they are good for FOB defence; however, given that we already have GPMGs and HMGs, does it warrant this loooooooooooong drawn out procurement process to have a weapon that fits such a unique (and single-purpose) capability? 

Not just FOBs, but also platoon houses or dispersed Pl/Coy strong points. I recall a little platoon house way out  north by itself in bandit country with help typically being 30 min to hours away.  If that house were hit by a determined enemy, it would have needed the ability to destroy (make combat ineffective) the attacker.  My time there was exceptionally minimal & others here may tell me that my observations were the exception as opposed to the norm, but to do its business half the platoon (-) would head-out in the LAVs for the day to conduct ops in the area while the rest remained back to hold the position with the dismounted weapons.  I suspect regular tenants of that house would have loved the addition of an AGL in their platoon.  On the topic of the .50 though …

… if we need to divest something, then the .50 cal is most like the AGLS in terms of employment, characteristics, weight, etc.  And that's not an infantry platoon weapon, so …

of course, there used to be a time where every section had an HMG, and the tripods existed so that such weapon systems could be dismounted if the situation called for it.  With the arrival of the LAV, this heavier dismountable MG firepower largely went away without too much discussion (possibly because the weapon never fully retired).  This brings us back to asking – is there a role for something heavier than a GPMG/MMG in a platoon or company?  Was the failing of CASW that it constrained itself to NATO standard 40 mm high velocity grenades & thus made itself too heavy for what is required?

… my point was this: you give the element (in this case, the infantry platoon) the tools it needs to do the jobs you can give it, and expect success.  For example: consider an infantry platoon dug in on the defensive.  It will not have the task to "destroy", even though it may "destroy" (doctrinal definition) enemy sub-sub units as it "blocks" or "fixes" or whatever.  …

It may not have the mission to destroy … but I have seen many sets of orders produced by infantry officers tasking platoons or companies to destroy entities one magnitude larger in a designated KZ from an assigned battle position.  Usually, this is to hang-up an even larger force to be hammered by other means in a KZ farther back into the enemy.

… even if the AGLS weren't so bloody difficult to move about the battlefield, let alone employ, it offers no new capabilities to the infantry platoon that aren't already there. 

I am still not convinced that it offers no new capabilities.  When the full range of capability is considered, it clearly does offer new things.  You might be able to sell the idea that the capabilities offered by an AGL are not worth any of the trade-offs we might make in order to fit it within our resources.  Should the project staff have chosen to sacrifice a little hitting power per round in order to get a lighter weapon?