Close Area Suppression Weapon (was Company Area Suppression Weapon)

[McG]

Yes, but ... how many rounds should be carried with the weapon vs those dispersed through the platoon & company?

 

[Kirkhill]

Not a new problem......WW2 standard Para Rgt, 37 Pattern Webbing,  1x 2" Mor Rd per man to be dropped off at a point designated by the Pl Comd or Sgt as the platoon deployed.

 

[vonGarvin]

Yes, but ... how many rounds should be carried with the weapon vs those dispersed through the platoon & company?

IMPO 4 is enough.  But that's just me. 


(Assume time of flight is 20 seconds.  5 seconds from "splash" to adjustment and firing next round.  That gives over a minute to get more rounds in before they run out)


Or 8. 


But the point is moot where they are.  Each platoon will do it differently.  The point is this: you cannot carry nor break down those 20+ kg tins of 40mm ammo.  Pure and utter junk.

 

[KevinB]

When we ran a 60 tube for ex's my Mortar Det each carried 3rds on us.  For some certain point we carried a metric ton more - but those involved short movements, and the Pl would carry extra rounds on their rucks too.


I agree with TV breaking belted HV40mm is just not possible. 

 

[GK .Dundas]

IMPO 4 is enough.  But that's just me. 


(Assume time of flight is 20 seconds.  5 seconds from "splash" to adjustment and firing next round.  That gives over a minute to get more rounds in before they run out)


Or 8. 


But the point is moot where they are.  Each platoon will do it differently.  The point is this: you cannot carry nor break down those 20+ kg tins of 40mm ammo.  Pure and utter junk.

There is reason the US Marines MK 19's are carried by the Heavy weapons company mounted on Humvees along with a mission mix of .50 cal. and TOWS .You don't suppose it's because they're (DUH! ) heavy?

 

[OldSolduer]

Like I said in the rucksack thread, the better kit you have, the more the numpties think you can carry, totally forgetting that the human body is not a machine that can be fixed by merely replacing a worn out back or knee, or shoulder.
The doctrine will be written by those who will never carry it, and that doctrine will be ignored by those that do.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Not a new problem......WW2 standard Para Rgt, 37 Pattern Webbing,  1x 2" Mor Rd per man to be dropped off at a point designated by the Pl Comd or Sgt as the platoon deployed.

And imagine how much more effective we'd be with that amount of ammo in the form of 'smart' munitions.... even I'd be able to get it on target in a oner!

 

[Troopasaurus]

Australia just canceled their order...

“Defence has cancelled contract negotiations with the preferred tenderer because it became clear that the company was not going to deliver what Defence had assessed it had promised,”

http://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/land-40-ph-2-cancelled

 

[a_majoor]

It just occurs to me that while this army spent a decade pissing away time and resources, the XM-25 has reached limited service in Afghanistan. Add a bipod and a drum magazine to that and you have the 80% solution which is also man portable....

(While the picture is for a 90 round 5.56 magazine suitable for m-16 family weapons, it should give you the idea of what I am getting at)

 

[KevinB]

Dude the XM-25 is a dud.
Lets rememebr that the LV 40MM is pretty marginal outside point targets -- and the XM-25 has even smaller payloads...

It also centers around a advanced fire control system -- which in the C16 is on a tripod -- on a XM-25 its in handheld mode...
  How easy is it to hold something offhand for precise results -- answer its nigh impossible.

As for limited service -- there are THREE (3) XM-25 systems in Afghan, each with a Maj/Capt and SGM/MSG and staff walking around with it offering sound bites and crowing its effectiveness.


The USMC with its 6rd M-32 GL is IMHO a better option than the XM-25.



Frankly I have no issues with the C-16, I just want it on vehicles, and I want to get a new 60mm Mortar...

 

[Michael OLeary]

Maybe we need to send some people here to actually get caught up on the state of modern mortars:

The Mortar Systems Conference
16th & 17th May 2011
The Royal Aeronautical Society
London

The Mortar Systems Conference - PDF

(The attendees list actually says that the Infantry School is sending someone.)

 

[dapaterson]

Don't be ridiculous.  The mortar's time has passed.  Just like the tank.  Remember - we're buying the MGS because we'll never, ever, ever need tanks again.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Frankly I have no issues with the C-16, I just want it on vehicles, and I want to get a new 60mm Mortar...

What he said!

 

[vonGarvin]

Maybe we need to send some people here to actually get caught up on the state of modern mortars:

The Mortar Systems Conference
16th & 17th May 2011
The Royal Aeronautical Society
London

The Mortar Systems Conference - PDF

(The attendees list actually says that the Infantry School is sending someone.)

Actually, that part just highlights past attendees.  Last year, the Infantry School sent a dashing, handsome and rather brilliant officer to speakl.  There were rumours of a marked increase in techno music during his stay, but those rumours haven't been confirmed...

 

[s23256]

This thread seems to have stagnated just as the system actually gets in the hands of the lads at the pointy end. 

Based on my recent experience with the C16 here are a few points that may stimulate some additional conversation.

Weight:  Yes, its extremely heavy and the ammo adds even more.  That being said let's weigh this cost against capabilities.

Capabilities:  In the hands of an untrained firer coached by an instructor I've seen the gun put a first round hit on an AFV hull at over 700m.  The airbursting munition is outstanding and the anti-armour effectiveness of the standard HEDP round is out of all proportion to its size.  If I were on the wrong side of this thing I would be extremely worried or more likely dead.

Tactics:  Combine the factors above and draw your own conclusions.  First impressions from across a relatively comprehensive user group are that as a defensive weapon its a game changer.  Offensive employment is not impossible but requires a deliberate planning process.

Further discussion encouraged.

 

[Michael OLeary]

I don't think that anyone has argued that it doesn't perform admirably within its capabilities. The principal point of argument has been that it doesn't fill the role of the weapon it was purported to replace (i.e., the 60 mm mortar), thus leaving a perceived capability gap between what was achieved before it and what can be achieved with it. The result is that it has the potential to follow the Eryx into the back corner of the CQ stores, and then quietly disappear because we never develop a manning and tactical model that takes advantage of its capabilities.

 

[s23256]

I don't think that anyone has argued that it doesn't perform admirably within its capabilities. The principal point of argument has been that it doesn't fill the role of the weapon it was purported to replace (i.e., the 60 mm mortar), thus leaving a perceived capability gap between what was achieved before it and what can be achieved with it. The result is that it has the potential to follow the Eryx into the back corner of the CQ stores, and then quietly disappear because we never develop a manning and tactical model that takes advantage of its capabilities.

No arguments here and I won't take responsibility for the info ops campaign which was attached to the procurement. 

That being said there does seem to be a general sense of dissatisfaction with the system from those with a sum total of 0 experience with it.  This is certainly in some part in response to the assumptions/justifications used in the acquisition process. 

The concern is that these preconceived notions may inhibit the integration of the system resulting in the fate you describe above whereas a more enthusiastic reception would support the TTP and doctrinal development indicated and allow the full capability (which is considerable) to be realized.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Unfortunately the procurement PR campaign focused on selling it to people who will never use it, instead of selling it to those who will use it. Unanswered questions created doubts. Hopefully it will prove to be everything predicted and more. But there remains the issue of answering what will fill the gap in dismounted ops when a 60 would have been carried but a AGM cannot be brought within manning and operational limitations, or the question of semi-indirect and indirect applications of fire into dead ground the AGM munitions cannot reach where a 60 would have succeeded. Perhaps if we had a better conceptual model of the infantry platoon as a fighting system, within which support weapons are one component, then any future was developments can be shown to be effective within the system model and that could have mitigated some of the internal PR damage.

But, to be fair, we've never effectively studied the section or platoon as a fighting system - a balance of manning, weapons, mobility, etc. - and created a capability baseline we wish to maintain, accepting decreases in one capability component when offset by an advantage elsewhere. Instead, for procurement purposes, we try to argue the validity of swapping out individual items one for one, and failing to show the mitigating elements within the organizational system where shortfalls are perceived.

 

[s23256]

Excellent points.  The CDEx process may (hopefully) address some of the deficiencies you have noted.

 

[AmmoTech90]

By CDEx do you mean concept development?  If so why are developing a concept for something in service?  Should that not have been done during the coceive stage, even before development?