Close Combat Vehicle: Canada to buy another AFV (& keeping LAV III & TLAV)

[McG]

Remember the cartoons of the Grizzlies ...
... them drag a 5/4 ton CP behind a M113

Of course, a LAV III is neither an AVGP nor a truck.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

TLAV and LAV III are where we should be investing the money that will be flushed into CCV.  Extend the LAV III upgrade to the whole fleet, buy a few more LAV III (include support variants & Bison replacement), and upgrade the TLAV family with a single (not a mix of RWS and 1 m turret) stabilized weapons system with thermal and II sights.

This is definitely not my lane so I'm going to try to set this up as more of a question...

It appears that there's a strong difference in opinion over the need for CCV. 

Since it appears unlikely that Canada will be involved in a large armour-on-armour clash any time soon (especially since air power appears to now be the dominant force in anti-armour operations), can those involved elaborate on why the view the CCV as essential/non-essential given the probability that our forces will continue to be deployed in 'Failed States' operations where the primary threats are IED's.

Second question is something that I posted early on in the Afghan operations which is that I didn't understand why we would spill blood to clear a road, then not have the assets to maintain 24-hour surveillance over that space following the clearance.  At the time I had hypothesized tethered blimps, towers, UAV's as the surveillance tools.  In that context, and again in the context of stabilization op's, would the money for CCV be better spent on a combination of LAV/TPAV upgrades and surveillance tools than CCV's which in essence just become a larger more expensive IED target if you continually allow your roads to be re-mined?

I apologize that I think I crossed into a point-of-view at the end of this, but I'm looking for experienced opinions as these are things way outside my lane and the only way I'll learn is if I ask.


Thanks guys, Matthew.

 

[GnyHwy]

Nah, LAV's were not even a pipe dream when I was playing silly bugger, but here are some guys who probably do.

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf


If we are looking for an infantry vehicle that  can keep up with and fight with the Leo2s, tracks would appear to be the better options.

I think you've made their point.  You're bringing a 20 year old argument. 

I know this has been done to death, and I am not suggesting that wheels are better.  All I am suggesting is that tracks being better than wheels isn't a hard fact anymore, and it's certainly not a safe assumption.  Suspension systems, tire design, central inflation systems, and sensors tighten that gap up quite a bit.

 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Assuming track tech has stood still in that time? What is the growth potential of tracks vs wheels in regards to ground pressure? What is on the doable retrofit horizon for both techs? I don't want to do a "combatreformtardmoment" between the 2. I think having both will serve our purposes well for the next 20 years. God knows where they will send us(collective) next.

 

[Kirkhill]

Assuming track tech has stood still in that time? What is the growth potential of tracks vs wheels in regards to ground pressure? What is on the doable retrofit horizon for both techs? I don't want to do a "combatreformtardmoment" between the 2. I think having both will serve our purposes well for the next 20 years. God knows where they will send us(collective) next.

And the related question: How will you get them there?

 

[ringo]

The Netherlands selling 44 used CV9035NL Canada bought used MBT's why not used CCV's, if Canada were to buy the JSS Karel Doorman maybe The Netherlands would throw in the CV9035NL for free.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

And the related question: How will you get them there?

For you special deal.... 8)

 

[GnyHwy]

What is the growth potential of tracks vs wheels in regards to ground pressure?

Growth potential is nil for tracks unless you make the surface area bigger or make the vehicle lighter.

For wheels, tire inflation systems can lower tire pressures to create plenty of surface area. 

Another feature are nitrogen struts, giving the ability to go gangsta, and raise up, away from the threat.  Further, by raising the rear shocks and lowering the front ones, you can peek over hill in a hull down position, better than a track, where your barrel will be pointed at the sky.

Once again, I am not saying wheels are better.  I am just bringing the other side of the argument, which a lot of people don't believe exists; I am here to tell eveyone that it does.

Your welcome.


 

 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

sorry, badly worded my post (such as ground pressure reduction) But also what is the growth potential of tracks in regard to weight creep? In other words I suspect that tracks will handle weight creep better than wheeled. Not to mention that tracks are continuing to evolve as well as wheels. 

 

[OldSolduer]

Let's try this:

Let's decide what kind of Army we want to be first, then kit it out :facepalm: accordingly,.

Just my cynical 2 cents.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Same for RCN and RCAF:
http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/mark-collins-what-is-the-rcn-for/
http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2013/09/19/mark-collins-shrinking-nato-navies/
http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2013/04/29/mark-collins-french-defence-white-paper-cuts-and-canada/ [see end]
http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2013/08/15/mark-collins-defence-capabilities-vs-resources-the-middle-power-conundrum-canada-in-particular/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[GnyHwy]

Let's decide what kind of Army we want to be first, then kit it out :facepalm: accordingly,.

We do know what kind of Army we want to be.  A multi-role net-centric multi-faceted technologically advanced adaptive diverse modern and flexible force.  ;D

 

 

[dapaterson]

We do know what kind of Army we want to be.  A multi-role net-centric multi-faceted technologically advanced adaptive diverse modern and flexible force.  ;D

You left out JIMP-enabled.

 

[a_majoor]

Growth potential is nil for tracks unless you make the surface area bigger or make the vehicle lighter.

For wheels, tire inflation systems can lower tire pressures to create plenty of surface area. 

Another feature are nitrogen struts, giving the ability to go gangsta, and raise up, away from the threat.  Further, by raising the rear shocks and lowering the front ones, you can peek over hill in a hull down position, better than a track, where your barrel will be pointed at the sky.

Once again, I am not saying wheels are better.  I am just bringing the other side of the argument, which a lot of people don't believe exists; I am here to tell eveyone that it does.

Your welcome.

Any technology that reduces weight will work when upgrading any platform (for example, using lightweight ceramic composite materials for hatches, the ramp and interior partitions), and of course can be incorporated in new builds right from the start. The Korean K-21 has a hull built from some sort of composite material that allows it to shrug off 30mm across the frontal arc and 14.5mm HMG at all aspects in a 25 ton package. A vehicle similar in size and shape to a LAV built from the same materials would be considerably lighter if provided the same protection as the current LAV, or have much better protection at the current weight.

Ground pressure and wheel travel count for a lot; one reason the ACHZARIT can move at a considerably faster speed than the base T-55 (despite being heavier) is the upgraded track and suspension, using hydraulic dampers to control wheel motion. The Swedish "S" tank demonstrated the ability to "Kneel" in the 1950's, the Russian BMD could "kneel" to be fitted aboard an aircraft, and the Korean K-2 MBT can control the position of each individual roadwheel to kneel, stand up or do whatever else the driver wants to do.

Technology does change, and we should be aware of how it can not only affect current designs through upgrades and refits, as well as how it can be incorporated in new construction. IF the entire Canadian AFV fleet were to go on a diet by replacing components with equally strong but much lighter composite parts, there would be better cross country mobility and a considerable saving in fuel consumption, for example. Of course, there are so few examples of most types of vehicles that each hatch and fitting would almost be handmade by a skilled artisan (another reason to go for larger fleets and families of vehicles).

Just glancing at the statistics, I am amazed that the Koreans were not invited to demonstrate the K-21 (it also has advanced sensors and a 40mm cannon, in addition to impressive mobility and protection), or that they were not interested in putting the K-21 up for tender.

 

[The Bread Guy]

A little something from out of left field - an American analyst with a blog post in support of the CCV.  Here's the interesting part for me:

.... I write all this in preview of some forthcoming work. Earlier this summer, my team received some funding to study the historical and economic basis for a Canadian CCV. We had generally been of the opinion for some time that a heavier IFV would be valuable for the Army, and our research soundly confirmed this view for us. Later this fall, we plan to publish our final report, Canada’s Close Combat Vehicle: Evaluating the Need in Light of Campaign Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, to help make that case.

Wonder where the $ came from?

A hat tip to Canadian Defence Matters blog for spotting & sharing this.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Any technology that reduces weight will work when upgrading any platform (for example, using lightweight ceramic composite materials for hatches, the ramp and interior partitions), and of course can be incorporated in new builds right from the start. The Korean K-21 has a hull built from some sort of composite material that allows it to shrug off 30mm across the frontal arc and 14.5mm HMG at all aspects in a 25 ton package. A vehicle similar in size and shape to a LAV built from the same materials would be considerably lighter if provided the same protection as the current LAV, or have much better protection at the current weight.

Ground pressure and wheel travel count for a lot; one reason the ACHZARIT can move at a considerably faster speed than the base T-55 (despite being heavier) is the upgraded track and suspension, using hydraulic dampers to control wheel motion. The Swedish "S" tank demonstrated the ability to "Kneel" in the 1950's, the Russian BMD could "kneel" to be fitted aboard an aircraft, and the Korean K-2 MBT can control the position of each individual roadwheel to kneel, stand up or do whatever else the driver wants to do.

Technology does change, and we should be aware of how it can not only affect current designs through upgrades and refits, as well as how it can be incorporated in new construction. IF the entire Canadian AFV fleet were to go on a diet by replacing components with equally strong but much lighter composite parts, there would be better cross country mobility and a considerable saving in fuel consumption, for example. Of course, there are so few examples of most types of vehicles that each hatch and fitting would almost be handmade by a skilled artisan (another reason to go for larger fleets and families of vehicles).

Just glancing at the statistics, I am amazed that the Koreans were not invited to demonstrate the K-21 (it also has advanced sensors and a 40mm cannon, in addition to impressive mobility and protection), or that they were not interested in putting the K-21 up for tender.

From what I have read some of the more exotic armours don't stand up well to repeated hits, so they may shrug off the intail attack, but start to fail faster on the next, so you still need a base armour to mount the fancier stuff to, so it's replaceable.

 

[a_majoor]

This is true for some sorts of armour, but AFAIK the K-21 IFV has an all composite vehicle shell, and I have posted several examples of experimental technologies on the Recent warfare Technologies thread that also have the potential to make unitary structures out of strong and lightweight materials. My particular favorite is using a wet layup process to manipulate a titanium compound, then processing it so the finished product is metallic titanium, which is as strong as steel but weighs 1/3 as much.

Realistically, even an "old" vehicle like a Leopard 1 with a 105mm cannon will strike a target with 13 million foot pounds of energy, so really your main effort is to dissipate the strike so the crew can survive and possibly exit the vehicle. I suspect that there is no realistic materials science solution to hits from 40mm+ projectiles, and especially not for multiple strikes (the ARES 75mm automatic cannon of the 1980's and an Israeli 60mm automatic cannon firing 3 round bursts used that principle and could kill typical Soviet tanks from that period).

Lightwight vehicles built from high strength materials offer other advantages besides protection, including better fuel economy, better cross country performance and potentially longer service lives (outside of combat) because of their intrinsic strength and (in the case of composites) resistance to corrosion.

 

[Kirkhill]

Another bolt from the bleu....

What is the degree of commonality between the GDLS Piranha 5 and the LAV III Up?

Initially it made no sense to me to put the Piranha 5 into a "tracked" vehicle competition but now? Lemonade from lemons?

IF the requirement for a CCV is a lower priority now than it was when you were busting through mud walls and poppy fields (the Afghan bocage?)

BUT you are still stuck spending 2.1 BCAD on a CCV

And IF the wheeled vehicles are an 80% solution

And IF the Bisons need replacing

THEN, what about this?

Buy the GDLS - Piranha 5, 

Add them to the mix of vehicles (in the same manner the Bisons are scattered)

Have GDLS remove the Delco turrets from a suitable number of LAV IIIs for Bison roles and then have DEW add the Delco Turrets to the TLAVs.

OR if the Delco turrets are deemed still serviceable have them transferred to the Piranha 5s.

Meanwhile, in exchange for all the extra work GDLS can give you a sweetheart deal on some Bronco MTVs.

 

[a_majoor]

I don't think the Piranha 5 is any more compatable with the LAV III (any version) than a LAV III is with a Coyote or Bison. The other thing about the offer was the Piranha 5 was being offered with a much different turret carrying a 35mm cannon, so swapping turrets would not really solve a lot of issues.

The Piranha 5 solution wold simply ensure another incompatable mini fleet exists in Canada, and would be the worst of all possible worlds for operational purposes, even if it supplies bucketloads of corporate crony capitalist gravy to GDLS.

Since it seems higher is going to blunder through with this, we may as well take a note froms Shakespear " If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well , it were done quickly"

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Surprised no one had printed this earlier. Reprinted under the usual caveats of the Copyright Act.

Byers & Webb: Putting politics before soldiers

Michael Byers and Stewart Webb, National Post | 23/09/13 | Last Updated: 19/09/13 4:37 PM ET

The Air Force has almost been grounded by botched efforts to replace Sea King helicopters, search-and-rescue planes and fighter jets. The Navy has nearly been sunk by ham-fisted efforts to build new support vessels and Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships, and refit second-hand submarines. Now it’s the Army’s turn, as the Harper government prepares to burden our soldiers with Close Combat Vehicles they neither want nor need.

After the Cold War, the Army’s mission shifted from preparing for a “symmetric” war with the Soviet Union, to confronting “asymmetric” threats from terrorists and insurgents. As part of this shift, the Army decided to retire its Leopard tanks. As Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier explained in 2003: “Tanks are a perfect example of extremely expensive systems that sit in Canada because they are inappropriate to the operations we conduct daily around the world.”

Three years later, Stephen Harper appointed a former tank commander as his first minister of National Defence. Gordon O’Connor immediately ordered that the tanks be kept in service.

In September 2006, Canadian soldiers led Operation Medusa — a more-or-less conventional offensive aimed at re-taking areas of Kandahar Province under Taliban control. More than 400 insurgents were killed in battles in which they engaged the Canadians directly. O’Connor, thinking the rest of the war would be fought on similar terms, deployed some of Canada’s Leopard tanks to Afghanistan. He also acquired 120 newer tanks from Germany and the Netherlands, and sent some of them as well.

It was a bad decision. The Taliban soon switched from stand-and-fight to guerrilla tactics. They also adopted a new weapon of choice — the improvised explosive device (IED).

Tanks have flat underbellies that do not deflect the blast from an IED. This weakness is compounded by the fact that most of the armour is located in the front and side sections, not underneath. Nor are there satisfactory solutions to these problems, since the low-slung design of a tank makes it difficult to add more amour and impossible to add a deflective V-shaped hull.

O’Connor’s error was exacerbated when the United States published a new field manual on counterinsurgency in December 2006. The lead author was General David Patraeus, who was appointed head of U.S. forces in Iraq in 2007 and head of U.S. Central Command in 2008. Central Command includes both Iraq and Afghanistan, and the new “Petraeus Doctrine” was implemented in both theatres. The doctrine calls for soldiers to engage with and support local people so as to erode any incentive they might have to side with insurgents.

It is difficult to “win hearts and minds” from behind heavy armour. When the Afghan government expressed a desire to acquire tanks, General Adam Findlay, the deputy chief of operations for the International Security Assistance Force, dismissed the request: “We are making a counter-insurgency force and we have our Afghan partners asking for things we would call ‘high-end war fighting’ – tanks and what have you.”

But the Harper government, instead of moving away from heavy armour and towards modern counterinsurgency, is stuck in the rut that Gordon O’Conner carved out. It is preparing to spend $2-billion on 108 Close Combat Vehicles (CCVs) that are designed to accompany tanks into conventional battles.

According to the government’s specifications, the CCVs must be able to carry at least five infantry for at least 450 km at a maximum speed of at least 60 km/h, and provide protection against heavy machine gun fire and IEDs of up to 10 kg. They must be equipped with a cannon having a calibre of at least 25 mm.

Remarkably, Canada already has vehicles that can do all this and more,in the form of 550 LAV (Light Armoured Vehicle) IIIs that are currently undergoing $1-billion in upgrades at the General Dynamics plant in London, Ont.

The LAV IIIs, built in the late 1990s, have a maximum range of 450 km and maximum speed of 100 km/hr. They can carry seven infantry and are equipped with a 25 mm cannon. They provide protection against heavy machine gun fire and, as part of the upgrades, are being equipped with a double V-shaped hull to protect against IEDs. The upgrades will extend the lifespan of the LAV IIIs to 2035. On top of the LAV IIIs, the Army is about to receive 500 new, lighter and faster Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicles — as the result of a $1.25-billion contract signed in 2012.

All of which raises the question: Why spend another $2-billion on 108 CCVs that are designed to accompany outmoded tanks and would, in any event, add little to the Army’s capabilities?

    Is it really worth $2-billion to preserve an illusion of competence?

The Army, to its credit, has reportedly told the Harper government that it neither wants nor needs CCVs. It would rather use the funds for training, at a time when budget cuts are forcing such activities to be curtailed.

In May, the Ottawa Citizen reported that the Harper government was pressing ahead nevertheless, because it was “worried that the cancellation would give it yet another military procurement black eye.”

According to the Citizen: “Industry representatives have been told that a winning bidder has been identified. That winning company will be announced when it suits the Conservative government’s public relations plan.”

The announcement may be imminent. But before it’s made, the Tories must answer one question: Is it really worth $2-billion to preserve an illusion of competence, at the cost of an Army that cannot afford to train?

National Post

Michael Byers holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia. Stewart Webb is a visiting research fellow with the Rideau Institute. They are the authors of a report entitled “Stuck in a Rut,” published by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

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