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I see that you did... 
;D
Coalition troops prepare major Afghan offensive
- Thread starter Scoobie Newbie
- Start date
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Great video thanks Teddy R for the link
- Reaction score
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Teddy Ruxpin said:
What type of rifle is being being carried by the US guy standing in the tank [using his cell-phone?]
- Reaction score
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Taliban commander defects after help from Canadians
Last Updated Fri, 16 Jun 2006 10:25:33 EDT
CBC News
http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2006/06/16/taliban-defection.html
A longtime Taliban commander treated by Canadian military doctors has renounced the hardline militant group and offered his support for Afghanistan's new government.
One month ago, Afghan police arrested Mullah Ibrahim, a Taliban official in the Kandahar region, where 2,300 Canadian soldiers are serving.
At the time, he was suffering from jaundice, fell into a coma and was brought to see Canadian doctors at the main military base at the Kandahar airfield.
Now recovered but in a wheelchair, Ibrahim credits God and the Canadians for saving his life.
He said he has renounced his Taliban ties and urged others to join him. Ibrahim said he wants to see peace and stability in his country.
Afghanistan's government has accepted him into a type of amnesty program which will see him monitored, but not prosecuted. Police will offer him some protection.
A spokesperson for the Canadian Forces said the program is a form of parole and participants can't set the terms of their participation.
"The objective of this program is to give an opportunity for former insurgents to reintegrate into Afghan society and live peacefully," said Capt. Julie Roberge. "It also provides an opportunity for exiles to return."
Ibrahim said he last fought for the Taliban in 2001, but Canadian Forces officials in Afghanistan said he continued to have a great influence in southern Afghanistan.
Last Updated Fri, 16 Jun 2006 10:25:33 EDT
CBC News
http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2006/06/16/taliban-defection.html
A longtime Taliban commander treated by Canadian military doctors has renounced the hardline militant group and offered his support for Afghanistan's new government.
One month ago, Afghan police arrested Mullah Ibrahim, a Taliban official in the Kandahar region, where 2,300 Canadian soldiers are serving.
At the time, he was suffering from jaundice, fell into a coma and was brought to see Canadian doctors at the main military base at the Kandahar airfield.
Now recovered but in a wheelchair, Ibrahim credits God and the Canadians for saving his life.
He said he has renounced his Taliban ties and urged others to join him. Ibrahim said he wants to see peace and stability in his country.
Afghanistan's government has accepted him into a type of amnesty program which will see him monitored, but not prosecuted. Police will offer him some protection.
A spokesperson for the Canadian Forces said the program is a form of parole and participants can't set the terms of their participation.
"The objective of this program is to give an opportunity for former insurgents to reintegrate into Afghan society and live peacefully," said Capt. Julie Roberge. "It also provides an opportunity for exiles to return."
Ibrahim said he last fought for the Taliban in 2001, but Canadian Forces officials in Afghanistan said he continued to have a great influence in southern Afghanistan.
- Reaction score
- 147
- Points
- 710
A letter just sent to The Sunday Times:
'Simon Jenkins, in his column, "Under the Afghan sun, a dark new reality is taking shape" (June 18),
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2088-2230703,00.html
writes that British troops are working with "some reluctant Canadians". That is an insult to the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. I doubt very much that Mr Jenkins has bothered to talk to them. They now number some 2,300 personnel; they are carrying out their mission with the utmost professionalism, with dedication, and with enthusiasm. There may be considerable reluctance about the mission amongst the populace in Canada but there is not amongst the troops in the field.
I might moreover point out that Canadian Brigadier-General David Fraser is now the Commander of Regional Command South in Afghanistan. Brigadier-General Fraser is in fact in operational command [Combined Task Force Aegis] of the UK forces engaged in Operation Mountain Thrust, a fact not mentioned by Mr Jenkins.
Indeed Mr Jenkins' ignorance of what is actually going on is further demonstrated in this phrase of his purporting to describe what will happen after the operation is finished: "When the troops return to the security of Kabul..." That is nonsense as the troops with be returning to their bases in Regional Command South, not to Kabul where they are not stationed.'
Hope I'm right about BGEN Fraser being in command.
Mark
Ottawa
'Simon Jenkins, in his column, "Under the Afghan sun, a dark new reality is taking shape" (June 18),
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2088-2230703,00.html
writes that British troops are working with "some reluctant Canadians". That is an insult to the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. I doubt very much that Mr Jenkins has bothered to talk to them. They now number some 2,300 personnel; they are carrying out their mission with the utmost professionalism, with dedication, and with enthusiasm. There may be considerable reluctance about the mission amongst the populace in Canada but there is not amongst the troops in the field.
I might moreover point out that Canadian Brigadier-General David Fraser is now the Commander of Regional Command South in Afghanistan. Brigadier-General Fraser is in fact in operational command [Combined Task Force Aegis] of the UK forces engaged in Operation Mountain Thrust, a fact not mentioned by Mr Jenkins.
Indeed Mr Jenkins' ignorance of what is actually going on is further demonstrated in this phrase of his purporting to describe what will happen after the operation is finished: "When the troops return to the security of Kabul..." That is nonsense as the troops with be returning to their bases in Regional Command South, not to Kabul where they are not stationed.'
Hope I'm right about BGEN Fraser being in command.
Mark
Ottawa
- Reaction score
- 147
- Points
- 710
A summary of the situation by Bill Roggio, embedded blogger with the Canadian Forces.
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/06/observations_from_southeastern.php
"- Pakistan's lawless tribal belts are a major source of Taliban support, including indoctrinating, funding, arming and training Pakistani and Afghan Taliban recruits...
- The Taliban is unable to stand up against the Western militaries when they attempt to mass in large formations (100 to 300 fighters, equivalent to company or battalion sized units). Their advantage is they know the local terrain far better than the Coalition forces. The solution is to get the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police trained, equipped and on the front lines in southeastern Afghanistan.
- The levels of effectiveness of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police varies from unit to unit. The Canadian soldiers trust the army units, but are very wary of police units...
- The Taliban's weapons are not as sophisticated as the media reports would lead you to believe. Their primary weapons are AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7s (the old variant of the RPG). Rarely are mortars brought to bear on the battlefield...
- The strength of the Taliban lies in their ability to blend in with the local population, and intimidate or coerce the local population when they must. There are small pockets of Taliban safe havens in southeastern Afghanistan...
- The poppy fields provide a major source of income for the farmers in southeastern Afghanistan. The Coalition and Afghan government made a serous mistake in its implementation of a poppy crop eradication program without providing an alternate source of income. The destruction of crops turned the local population to seek protection from the Taliban. A senior coalition officer indicated a major shift in the policy dealing with the poppy crops is in the works..."
Mark
Ottawa
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/06/observations_from_southeastern.php
"- Pakistan's lawless tribal belts are a major source of Taliban support, including indoctrinating, funding, arming and training Pakistani and Afghan Taliban recruits...
- The Taliban is unable to stand up against the Western militaries when they attempt to mass in large formations (100 to 300 fighters, equivalent to company or battalion sized units). Their advantage is they know the local terrain far better than the Coalition forces. The solution is to get the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police trained, equipped and on the front lines in southeastern Afghanistan.
- The levels of effectiveness of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police varies from unit to unit. The Canadian soldiers trust the army units, but are very wary of police units...
- The Taliban's weapons are not as sophisticated as the media reports would lead you to believe. Their primary weapons are AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7s (the old variant of the RPG). Rarely are mortars brought to bear on the battlefield...
- The strength of the Taliban lies in their ability to blend in with the local population, and intimidate or coerce the local population when they must. There are small pockets of Taliban safe havens in southeastern Afghanistan...
- The poppy fields provide a major source of income for the farmers in southeastern Afghanistan. The Coalition and Afghan government made a serous mistake in its implementation of a poppy crop eradication program without providing an alternate source of income. The destruction of crops turned the local population to seek protection from the Taliban. A senior coalition officer indicated a major shift in the policy dealing with the poppy crops is in the works..."
Mark
Ottawa
This is not related to Afghanistan so much as it relates to the actual reporting and information made available on what happened.
It is frustrating to read the bland, opsec'd reports, being able to partially visualize what happened, but seldom is there any detail.
Here is an example of the US Forces general reporting on an incident in Iraq. Granted it's slanted, but I'll take that over nothing
It is frustrating to read the bland, opsec'd reports, being able to partially visualize what happened, but seldom is there any detail.
Here is an example of the US Forces general reporting on an incident in Iraq. Granted it's slanted, but I'll take that over nothing
- Reaction score
- 147
- Points
- 710
NATO, ISAF command expansion, and the ROE problem: confusing article by Fred Kaplan.
http://www.slate.com/id/2144094/fr/nl
Excerpts:
'...
Problems have surfaced already. Spokesmen boast that 27 NATO nations are taking part in the operation. But, besides the United States, only four—Canada, Britain, the Netherlands, and Romania—have agreed to let their troops be stationed in Afghanistan's southern provinces, where almost all the fighting with insurgents is happening.
When NATO made plans to relieve the United States of command over all operations in Afghanistan (a gradual transfer scheduled to be completed this October[December or so for the east, I thought]), the assumption was that the military mission would shift from "counterterrorism" to "counterinsurgency"—from "going after bad guys for the sake of going after bad guys" (as one British officer snidely put it) to securing areas for the sake of promoting economic development...
Even the headiest multilateralists are beginning to wonder if the transfer of authority, from the United States to NATO, might be premature. So, a division of labor is materializing. When the transfer takes place this fall, about 7,000 Americans will join the roughly 11,000 troops now under NATO command [surely those are the troops in Regional Command South, to transfer start of August]. But another 13,000 Americans based here will remain under separate U.S. command [until the east comes under NATO, except for special forces etc--or is Mr Kaplan saying the east will stay under US for a lot longer?].
In other words, troops under NATO command (including those 7,000 Americans) will follow NATO rules of engagement, which allow "pro-active self-defense," a deliberately ambiguous term that permits commanders on the ground to fire when fired upon—and, at their discretion, to go after insurgents if, say, they're spotted on the other side of a hill. But these rules explicitly do not permit the initiation of offensive operations. By contrast, the U.S. rules, now and in the future, will allow offensive operations anytime, anywhere, with a special eye cast toward bombing the Taliban as they cross or gather along the Pakistani border.
NATO officers don't like to spell out this distinction. They want to convey an impression of a coherent and unified command. To a remarkable degree, they're succeeding. It's striking to see German, Dutch, British, and, yes, American officers working in the same room as if they were equals. But on a fundamental level, the Americans are still leading the pack, doing things that European politicians cannot agree among themselves to do. Quietly, many NATO officers prefer it this way. And this may be the best approach from an American standpoint as well. Better this, in any case, than having to pick up the entire burden, in cost, lives, and ill-fated stabs at legitimacy...'
Similar confusion from Max Boot (on the same trip, obviously):
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot21jun21,0,7078228.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions
'...
At first, the ISAF was limited to Kabul, but it gradually expanded to assume control of the relatively peaceful northern and western provinces. This August, it will take control of the far more dangerous areas in the south, where a major Taliban offensive is underway. If all goes well, the ISAF could take over the equally insecure eastern provinces as early as this fall. This would give NATO the lead role throughout Afghanistan, although more than 10,000 U.S. troops would continue to operate independently in the country as part of Operation Enduring Freedom...
This points to one of NATO's biggest challenges — getting members to volunteer troops, and to do so without placing too many caveats on their deployment. In addition to limits of geography (many troops won't operate in the south or east), there are also tactical limits. For instance, some soldiers are not allowed by their governments to use chemicals like tear gas to disperse unruly crowds. This can become a major headache for ISAF commanders when figuring out how to deal with riots of the kind that rocked Kabul in May.
In theory, the ISAF is supposed to concentrate on the softer side of counterinsurgency, providing development aid and security, while U.S. troops focus on hunting down bad guys. In practice, the distinction can be hard to draw. NATO troops in the south can engage in "proactive self-defense," whatever that means. Fleshing out this nebulous mandate will be up to commanders on the spot, and the widespread expectation is that British and Canadian troops will be more aggressive than their more cautious Dutch colleagues...'
Mark
Ottawa
http://www.slate.com/id/2144094/fr/nl
Excerpts:
'...
Problems have surfaced already. Spokesmen boast that 27 NATO nations are taking part in the operation. But, besides the United States, only four—Canada, Britain, the Netherlands, and Romania—have agreed to let their troops be stationed in Afghanistan's southern provinces, where almost all the fighting with insurgents is happening.
When NATO made plans to relieve the United States of command over all operations in Afghanistan (a gradual transfer scheduled to be completed this October[December or so for the east, I thought]), the assumption was that the military mission would shift from "counterterrorism" to "counterinsurgency"—from "going after bad guys for the sake of going after bad guys" (as one British officer snidely put it) to securing areas for the sake of promoting economic development...
Even the headiest multilateralists are beginning to wonder if the transfer of authority, from the United States to NATO, might be premature. So, a division of labor is materializing. When the transfer takes place this fall, about 7,000 Americans will join the roughly 11,000 troops now under NATO command [surely those are the troops in Regional Command South, to transfer start of August]. But another 13,000 Americans based here will remain under separate U.S. command [until the east comes under NATO, except for special forces etc--or is Mr Kaplan saying the east will stay under US for a lot longer?].
In other words, troops under NATO command (including those 7,000 Americans) will follow NATO rules of engagement, which allow "pro-active self-defense," a deliberately ambiguous term that permits commanders on the ground to fire when fired upon—and, at their discretion, to go after insurgents if, say, they're spotted on the other side of a hill. But these rules explicitly do not permit the initiation of offensive operations. By contrast, the U.S. rules, now and in the future, will allow offensive operations anytime, anywhere, with a special eye cast toward bombing the Taliban as they cross or gather along the Pakistani border.
NATO officers don't like to spell out this distinction. They want to convey an impression of a coherent and unified command. To a remarkable degree, they're succeeding. It's striking to see German, Dutch, British, and, yes, American officers working in the same room as if they were equals. But on a fundamental level, the Americans are still leading the pack, doing things that European politicians cannot agree among themselves to do. Quietly, many NATO officers prefer it this way. And this may be the best approach from an American standpoint as well. Better this, in any case, than having to pick up the entire burden, in cost, lives, and ill-fated stabs at legitimacy...'
Similar confusion from Max Boot (on the same trip, obviously):
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot21jun21,0,7078228.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions
'...
At first, the ISAF was limited to Kabul, but it gradually expanded to assume control of the relatively peaceful northern and western provinces. This August, it will take control of the far more dangerous areas in the south, where a major Taliban offensive is underway. If all goes well, the ISAF could take over the equally insecure eastern provinces as early as this fall. This would give NATO the lead role throughout Afghanistan, although more than 10,000 U.S. troops would continue to operate independently in the country as part of Operation Enduring Freedom...
This points to one of NATO's biggest challenges — getting members to volunteer troops, and to do so without placing too many caveats on their deployment. In addition to limits of geography (many troops won't operate in the south or east), there are also tactical limits. For instance, some soldiers are not allowed by their governments to use chemicals like tear gas to disperse unruly crowds. This can become a major headache for ISAF commanders when figuring out how to deal with riots of the kind that rocked Kabul in May.
In theory, the ISAF is supposed to concentrate on the softer side of counterinsurgency, providing development aid and security, while U.S. troops focus on hunting down bad guys. In practice, the distinction can be hard to draw. NATO troops in the south can engage in "proactive self-defense," whatever that means. Fleshing out this nebulous mandate will be up to commanders on the spot, and the widespread expectation is that British and Canadian troops will be more aggressive than their more cautious Dutch colleagues...'
Mark
Ottawa
Interesting article.
Unless the successes start getting promoted in the press, instead of all this gloom and doom prophesying presently going on by the media, it's going to be tough for Canada to stay.
Saying that, probably the best answer to Canada staying, is for the Conservatives to get a strong majority. At this point futher deployments become matter of course, and a lot of this deathbed reporting will die off. The mission will essentially go off the public's horizon. That's both a good thing (Lets some of the negative aspects lose their pedestal) or a bad thing (as long as opposition keeps the controversy hammering at the Conservatives).
NATO and the UN, in an effort to appease everybody, draw up some bloody stupid ROE's. I like the American's approach of leaving ALL their options open.
Unless the successes start getting promoted in the press, instead of all this gloom and doom prophesying presently going on by the media, it's going to be tough for Canada to stay.
Saying that, probably the best answer to Canada staying, is for the Conservatives to get a strong majority. At this point futher deployments become matter of course, and a lot of this deathbed reporting will die off. The mission will essentially go off the public's horizon. That's both a good thing (Lets some of the negative aspects lose their pedestal) or a bad thing (as long as opposition keeps the controversy hammering at the Conservatives).
NATO and the UN, in an effort to appease everybody, draw up some bloody stupid ROE's. I like the American's approach of leaving ALL their options open.
- Reaction score
- 2
- Points
- 410
GAP said:
Unless things have changed, it isn't really NATO nor the UN that are the problem. In fact, during ISAF VI we had very useful and powerful NATO ROE including launching air and ground attacks where required. The problem comes because each country, (including the US), puts specific national force employment limitations on their force contributions. These are called "caveats" and there can be lots of them. They can cover things such as use of force, types of operations, geographic area of employment, restrictions on command arrangements, operations at night, access to medical care, etc. ISAF VI, for example, had to wrestle with 34 separate sets of national caveats. These were totally separate from the ISAF levels of force.
Nations are not bound by any UN or NATO ROE if these conflict with nationally imposed ROE or caveats, because no nation gives FULCOM to NATO or the UN, so in the end national command and national policies remain ultimate.
Cheers
- Reaction score
- 1
- Points
- 410
PBI is exactly right.
The article confuses terminology. ROEs are one thing, operational concept is another. Canadian soldiers, for instance, are operating under virtually the same ROE as was initially drafted for OP APOLLO back in 2001/2. They are extremely robust, as are the ROE for many countries operating in Afghanistan.
However, as PBI points out, nations will put national caveats on the operational employment of their units in theatre. This is an operational decision that has nothing whatsoever to do with ROE. One country will permit its forces to undertake offensive operations anywhere in Afghanistan, while another will confine it's operations to a single police district in downtown Kabul. These are national decisions that are imposed upon NATO and they're a political reality that planners have to live with.
NATOs operational concept is to confine itself to stability operations, leaving counterinsurgency as a Coalition task. This is a political decision regarding force employment, not ROE. Whether NATO can successfully limit its operations is another point. We may well see (as we have in the past), some countries carrying the ball much more than others simply because their national political limitations are less.
TR
The article confuses terminology. ROEs are one thing, operational concept is another. Canadian soldiers, for instance, are operating under virtually the same ROE as was initially drafted for OP APOLLO back in 2001/2. They are extremely robust, as are the ROE for many countries operating in Afghanistan.
However, as PBI points out, nations will put national caveats on the operational employment of their units in theatre. This is an operational decision that has nothing whatsoever to do with ROE. One country will permit its forces to undertake offensive operations anywhere in Afghanistan, while another will confine it's operations to a single police district in downtown Kabul. These are national decisions that are imposed upon NATO and they're a political reality that planners have to live with.
NATOs operational concept is to confine itself to stability operations, leaving counterinsurgency as a Coalition task. This is a political decision regarding force employment, not ROE. Whether NATO can successfully limit its operations is another point. We may well see (as we have in the past), some countries carrying the ball much more than others simply because their national political limitations are less.
TR
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