Continental Defence Corvette

[Czech_pivo]

Doesn't really answer the asked question. It is telling that, to my knowledge, the GoC (including the minister) has not weighed in, nor have the necessary policy steps been started to get TB approval.

A lot of the press coverage says something akin to "the CRCN wants..." Our system is (thankfully) not set up to respond to what one L1 "wants." It responds to what the people of Canada, through their elected officials, decide the nation needs. Hence the requirement to prove to TB that the requirement matches the policy (disfunctional as the process currently is, the intention is correct).

One of the sayings I've picked up somewhere along the way: "if you tell the military you have a large pot of gold for them to spend, everything suddenly becomes gold plated."

Time will tell whether this vision has staying power. I actually hope it does, because even though I may not agree with the RCN's priorities (as I understand them), I think this is an important step towards a well rounded mid-tier Navy.

15 River Class, all in the same config, I'm not as sure about anymore.

Could it be the case of the Minister not weighing in because of the rumors that he's in the process of being moved out and has decided that this is something that the new Minister can address once they are installed?

 

[Baz]

Could it be the case of the Minister not weighing in because of the rumors that he's in the process of being moved out and has decided that this is something that the new Minister can address once they are installed?

I don't think so... I think the government is wholly engaged elsewhere. They found a lot of money to make a particular defense problem go away for now, and they are leveraging the opportunities politically that spending it gives them, but don't have the capacity to work on that particualr policy file.

And to be fair, Defence policy follows Foreign policy, as it should. The PM is doing a relatively good job (in my opinion) of defining a vision of Canada in the current world, but Foreign policy hasn't really firmed up yet. Hopefully the CDS and DM is supporting the minister as best as possible under those conditions.

 

[KevinB]

would it not be simpler to just have a continuous order for one every 18 months with a life span of 20 years and not be concerned about the total number? I am certain that long before even the tenth hull is delivered that our requirements for the navy will have changed and to spend the time debating 10 or 15 is foolishness. Paraphrasing Trump, the principal task is to build baby, build. At the moment we need everything for today but in 10 years when we are ordering the 3rd lot we may be in need of a drone carrier or sub tenders. Also in 10 years the first of the Arctic vessels will be in need of replacement.

I’m pretty sure the the concept was batches (fleets?) of 3-4 in the same configuration, and adjust as needed.

I gather the ‘size’ doesn’t allow for a lot of flexibility in adding, unless something goes to make room. But again, down here we have notoriously grown Destroyers to ‘Cruiser’ size over various cycles.

So perhaps the River batches will have some additional length and girth (err beam?) to them?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I’m pretty sure the the concept was batches (fleets?) of 3-4 in the same configuration, and adjust as needed.

I gather the ‘size’ doesn’t allow for a lot of flexibility in adding, unless something goes to make room. But again, down here we have notoriously grown Destroyers to ‘Cruiser’ size over various cycles.

So perhaps the River batches will have some additional length and girth (err beam?) to them?

Hunter Class added a bit of length and beam to accommodate what the Aussies wanted. Most people think those changes are going to cost them in speed. But if they are successful, it's possible the last two batches of RCD's might see those hull form changes incorporated.

 

[Underway]

15 River Class, all in the same config, I'm not as sure about anymore.

I'm pretty sure the the concept was batches (fleets?) of 3-4 in the same configuration, and adjust as needed.

I don't think all the same config is in the cards either, however I expect evolutionary changes not revolutionary changes.

Batch 1 (flight one? block one?) are as currently defined.

Batch 2 is anticipated to be 6 ships of an evoloved configuration using lessons from the employment/build of the first three.

Batch 3 will be the final 6, again with further refinement or changes.

The reason for 6 is you maximize build efficiencies around ship 5. Hopefull the similarities in hull will remain.

Firstly, define what the policy is wrt the RCN’s focus on “Canada first.”

Secondly, define (properly) the need for a Canadian Task Group and what effects that formation will deliver.

Based on those two things, define how many task groups we need and can afford.

From Leadmark 2040 (10 year old document but most things haven't changed):

This will require a blue-water navy that is:

• Balanced—with an appropriate mix of ships, submarines, aircraft and unmanned vehicles in sufficient numbers to meet commitments at home and abroad, while retaining a naval task group at high readiness.
• Combat-effective—capable of combat at sea across all naval warfare disciplines, crewed for sustained high-intensity operations, able to contribute to operations ashore and highly interoperable with Canada’s allies and defence partners.
• Multi-purpose—across the spectrum of operations at sea and from the sea, ableto work effectively with a wide range of national and international defence and security partners among government and civil society.
• Arctic-capable—able to conduct sustained operations in each of Canada’s three oceans, including in the High Arctic.
• Globally deployable—with ships and submarines that are capable of independent ocean crossing, but enabled by support ships, operating together for the duration of any assigned mission, anywhere in the world.
• Forward-postured—a fleet operated and sustained in a manner that allows our ships and submarines to be deployed on an ongoing basis to regions of Canadian strategic interest.
• Survivable—with platforms that are designed for all physical and operating environments, able to sustain and recover from significant damage.
• Adaptable and agile—an institution imbued with the ethos to excel and the values to make Canadians proud, whose men and women are prepared for the complexities and ambiguities of future operations in the skills and knowledge they possess.

This is the navy that Canada needs.

That task group definition hasn't changed though the specifics may have (Protecteur not Queenston, replacement submarine, and we know what the CSC looks like now). I agree that this document needs a refresher, we've got a lot of water under the bridge since 2016.

Those numbers point to 15 RCD. You'll need 15 to have 4 high readyness at the same time. And you'll need CDC to cover off domestic requirements if the RCD leave the continental waters.

IF CDC becomes an actual thing then they may be able to sub into the HFX spot on that list in some circumstances (arctic response for example where they are likely more capable than an RCD in near ice situations). However in a full spectrum conflict the ideal would be 4 RCD and one AOR. Making a TG scalable is good strategy.

 

[Baz]

From Leadmark 2040 (10 year old document but most things haven't changed):

Most things haven't changed? The PM seems to disagree:

For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, we praised its principles, we benefited from its predictability. And because of that, we could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.

The multilateral institutions on which the middle powers have relied – the WTO, the UN, the COP – the architecture, the very architecture of collective problem solving – are under threat.

We are rapidly diversifying abroad. We have agreed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the European Union, including joining SAFE, Europe’s defence procurement arrangements.

We are working with our NATO allies (including the Nordic Baltic 8) to further secure the alliance’s northern and western flanks, including through Canada’s unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, submarines, in aircraft, and boots on the ground, boots on the ice.

The thing that isn't yet clear is what is the Government's defintion of "blue-water," and what is the Canadian people's view on "world-wide?" Hint: there is a very strong under current saying "the world at large" is no longer our problem.

As a very specific example... Taiwan. Is this now solely a "great-power" problem? If Canadian Foreign policy says it is, then it can no longer be used as a reason for anything.

I think the real problem is there are a lot of Canadians asking questions about where their money is going, and the RCN doesn't get to decide that on it's own. Even in this forum there has been a great deal of some asking questions and other's saying "the RCN already has the answers." I've said this before, but if the RCN doesn't understand who they work for they'll very quickly find themselves unemployed. Ask Adm Landymore (or evening Norman in a lesser way) how that works out.

I think I've very clearly said that I think 4 CTGs are eventually required, but they are not the top priority right now. In my mind, the PMs remarks would seem to indicate that's where his mind is (although he isn't, and shouldn't, dictate the how).

 

[Baz]

I was just re-reading Leadmark 2050, and two things jumped out at me (however, I may have been reading with a biased position):

• the main effect it seems it has the RCN delivering is "presence," with the ability to maintain it in the face of adversary. It doesn't envision the RCN delviering actual Joint effects. It doesn't even robustly speak to the need to get the Canadian army somewhere, even if contested, as that wasn't a thing when it was written.
• It openly says (bold, italicised, and underlined) "To defend the global system at sea and from the sea, both at home and abroad." The official policy of Canada is that global system is no longer working for us, as stated by the PM.
• It speaks about the need for Canada to operate within that Global system and protect it, including specifc examples such as Sino-American. Again, seems a little out of place, me thinks.

Not convinced by the argument.

 

[Underway]

Most things haven't changed? The PM seems to disagree:





The thing that isn't yet clear is what is the Government's defintion of "blue-water," and what is the Canadian people's view on "world-wide?" Hint: there is a very strong under current saying "the world at large" is no longer our problem.

As a very specific example... Taiwan. Is this now solely a "great-power" problem? If Canadian Foreign policy says it is, then it can no longer be used as a reason for anything.

I think the real problem is there are a lot of Canadians asking questions about where their money is going, and the RCN doesn't get to decide that on it's own. Even in this forum there has been a great deal of some asking questions and other's saying "the RCN already has the answers." I've said this before, but if the RCN doesn't understand who they work for they'll very quickly find themselves unemployed. Ask Adm Landymore (or evening Norman in a lesser way) how that works out.

I think I've very clearly said that I think 4 CTGs are eventually required, but they are not the top priority right now. In my mind, the PMs remarks would seem to indicate that's where his mind is (although he isn't, and shouldn't, dictate the how).

I would argue that makes having a naval task group as defined in my post even more important.

We'll need to enforce our own rules and protect our own trade. Sure the "global system" may be straining, but it doesn't mean that the ships themselves can't be employed differently to protect our own version of what we need from a trade perspective. Working within the global system is more of an ethical/moral employment not an actual force employment discussion.

A little inside baseball, there are new documents coming. The RCN is rewriting Leadmark (or whatever its going to be called) based on that. I don't suspect much will change except the wording and the urgency. Our naval strategic situation hasn't changed. All that has changed is that we're going to be expected to do more of it on our own.

 

[Lumber]

I was just re-reading Leadmark 2050, and two things jumped out at me (however, I may have been reading with a biased position):

• the main effect it seems it has the RCN delivering is "presence," with the ability to maintain it in the face of adversary. It doesn't envision the RCN delviering actual Joint effects. It doesn't even robustly speak to the need to get the Canadian army somewhere, even if contested, as that wasn't a thing when it was written.
• It openly says (bold, italicised, and underlined) "To defend the global system at sea and from the sea, both at home and abroad." The official policy of Canada is that global system is no longer working for us, as stated by the PM.
• It speaks about the need for Canada to operate within that Global system and protect it, including specifc examples such as Sino-American. Again, seems a little out of place, me thinks.

Not convinced by the argument.

The system he was referring to was the one where the US was the hegemon. He didn't mean that the system of disparate economies connected by world wide maritime trade was dead. He meant that we can't rely on the US to provide the blanket of security and stability; we have to go enforce it ourselves. Hence, a large ass Navy.

15 RCDs, 12-20 CDCs, 3-4 JSS, 12 CPS, 6 AOPS...who else wants to become the next maritime empire à la Britain during the 1800s?!

 

[Baz]

A little inside baseball, there are new documents coming. The RCN is rewriting Leadmark (or whatever its going to be called) based on that. I don't suspect much will change except the wording and the urgency. Our naval strategic situation hasn't changed. All that has changed is that we're going to be expected to do more of it on our own.

A little inside baseball, I've been doing this a long time, as have some other's on this forums in different specialties. My primary point of reference on these issues is not these forums, and my primary point of residual influence is also not here. The institutional barriers that will allow the RCN to wish this into existence have not disappeared.

As I've said repeatedly, I completely agree with the capabilities the CRCN is asking for, but not necessarily the priorities. History tells me there is unfortunately good chance the RCN has to try to learn the lessons again it should have learned with the original MacKenzie's, Unification, the Bonnie, the eventual 280s, the complete rust out of the steamers before replacement, the tortured history of buying just two tankers, and the drawn out timelines of the River Class (although, kudos where due, the Canadian version is arguably the best Type-26 there is, if we deliver),,,

 

[Underway]

The institutional barriers that will allow the RCN to wish this into existence have not disappeared.

The paradigm has shifted significantly and the main institutional barrier has collapsed (budget) at least in the short term. Aside from the CDC's and the extra AOR's the RCD, Subs and JSS are on the books or being built. Those are the priorities, because those are the core of a warfighting capability in the maritime domain.

 

[Kirkhill]

"Starting in 2027, the Patrol and Defense Group will be reinforced by a new class of vessels—the Sakura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPV). The Sakura-class has a standard displacement of approximately 1,900 tons, an overall length of 95 meters, and a beam of 12.0 meters. Its armament is limited to a single 30mm autocannon. These vessels are purpose-built for surveillance and monitoring missions—roles that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has not traditionally emphasized in dedicated platforms—and their equipment and capabilities are deliberately kept to the minimum required for such tasks.

"Despite their relatively light configuration, the Sakura-class maintains a maximum speed of around 25 knots, which is comparable to that of conventional destroyers. In addition, due to their limited mission set and compact hull design, the crew size is reduced to approximately 30 personnel. This high level of automation is reportedly supported in part by advanced bridge systems derived from reduced-manning technologies increasingly adopted in the commercial shipping sector. Construction costs are also relatively low, with the first four vessels budgeted at approximately ¥35.7 billion (about $238 million) in total—equating to roughly ¥9 billion (about $60 million) per ship."

"In terms of aviation capability, the aft multi-purpose deck allows for takeoff and landing operations by all types of helicopters currently operated by the JMSDF. However, the vessels lack the capacity to embark and sustain these aircraft. Instead, there are plans to equip the ships at a later stage with the V-BAT vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) unmanned aerial system developed by Shield AI. This addition is expected to significantly enhance wide-area maritime surveillance capabilities, including the ability to detect and track vessels operating at extended ranges."

Sakura-class patrol ship - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

....

"The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) implemented a major organizational reform at the end of March 2026. As part of this restructuring, it established the Patrol and Defense Group (哨戒防備群) and assigned some of its most modern surface combatants, including the Mogami-class frigates, to this formation."

"At present, each Patrol and Defense Unit is equipped with Mogami-class frigates (FFMs) and Hayabusa-class guided-missile patrol boats (PGs). The Mogami-class vessels were previously assigned to Escort Divisions 11 through 15—the so-called “two-digit escort divisions”—which were primarily responsible for coastal defense. Following the March reorganization, these divisions were disbanded and reorganized into the Patrol and Defense Group. Mogami-class frigates will be focusing on patrol duties following the organizational reform.

"The Mogami-class represents the JMSDF’s latest generation of stealth-oriented frigates. Their armament is relatively limited, consisting of a Mk 45 5-inch gun, anti-ship missiles, and SeaRAM. Although a modification program is underway to equip these ships with a 16-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS)—with ships from the seventh hull onward fitted from construction—this system is intended to deploy the Type 07 Vertical Launch ASROC (VLA), and does not include ship-to-air missile capability."

Mogami-class frigate - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Hayabusa-class patrol boat - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

....

JMDSF sets up Patrol and Defense Group with Mogami-class vessels - Naval News

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) implemented a major organizational reform at the end of March 2026. As part of this restructuring, it established the Patrol and Defense Group (哨戒防備群) and assigned some of its most modern surface combatants, including the Mogami-class frigates, to...

www.navalnews.com

Final state ca 2030?

12x Mogami (132 m, 3900 tonnes, 90 crew -
12x Sakura (95 m , 1900 tonnes, 30 crew -
6x Hayabusa ( 50 m, 200 tonnes, 21 crew -

All very lightly armed.

 

[Czech_pivo]

"Starting in 2027, the Patrol and Defense Group will be reinforced by a new class of vessels—the Sakura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPV). The Sakura-class has a standard displacement of approximately 1,900 tons, an overall length of 95 meters, and a beam of 12.0 meters. Its armament is limited to a single 30mm autocannon. These vessels are purpose-built for surveillance and monitoring missions—roles that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has not traditionally emphasized in dedicated platforms—and their equipment and capabilities are deliberately kept to the minimum required for such tasks.

"Despite their relatively light configuration, the Sakura-class maintains a maximum speed of around 25 knots, which is comparable to that of conventional destroyers. In addition, due to their limited mission set and compact hull design, the crew size is reduced to approximately 30 personnel. This high level of automation is reportedly supported in part by advanced bridge systems derived from reduced-manning technologies increasingly adopted in the commercial shipping sector. Construction costs are also relatively low, with the first four vessels budgeted at approximately ¥35.7 billion (about $238 million) in total—equating to roughly ¥9 billion (about $60 million) per ship."

"In terms of aviation capability, the aft multi-purpose deck allows for takeoff and landing operations by all types of helicopters currently operated by the JMSDF. However, the vessels lack the capacity to embark and sustain these aircraft. Instead, there are plans to equip the ships at a later stage with the V-BAT vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) unmanned aerial system developed by Shield AI. This addition is expected to significantly enhance wide-area maritime surveillance capabilities, including the ability to detect and track vessels operating at extended ranges."

Sakura-class patrol ship - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

....

"The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) implemented a major organizational reform at the end of March 2026. As part of this restructuring, it established the Patrol and Defense Group (哨戒防備群) and assigned some of its most modern surface combatants, including the Mogami-class frigates, to this formation."

"At present, each Patrol and Defense Unit is equipped with Mogami-class frigates (FFMs) and Hayabusa-class guided-missile patrol boats (PGs). The Mogami-class vessels were previously assigned to Escort Divisions 11 through 15—the so-called “two-digit escort divisions”—which were primarily responsible for coastal defense. Following the March reorganization, these divisions were disbanded and reorganized into the Patrol and Defense Group. Mogami-class frigates will be focusing on patrol duties following the organizational reform.

"The Mogami-class represents the JMSDF’s latest generation of stealth-oriented frigates. Their armament is relatively limited, consisting of a Mk 45 5-inch gun, anti-ship missiles, and SeaRAM. Although a modification program is underway to equip these ships with a 16-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS)—with ships from the seventh hull onward fitted from construction—this system is intended to deploy the Type 07 Vertical Launch ASROC (VLA), and does not include ship-to-air missile capability."

Mogami-class frigate - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Hayabusa-class patrol boat - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

....

JMDSF sets up Patrol and Defense Group with Mogami-class vessels - Naval News

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) implemented a major organizational reform at the end of March 2026. As part of this restructuring, it established the Patrol and Defense Group (哨戒防備群) and assigned some of its most modern surface combatants, including the Mogami-class frigates, to...

www.navalnews.com

Final state ca 2030?

12x Mogami (132 m, 3900 tonnes, 90 crew -
12x Sakura (95 m , 1900 tonnes, 30 crew -
6x Hayabusa ( 50 m, 200 tonnes, 21 crew -

All very lightly armed.

In their neighbourhood why would anything be lightly armed?

 

[suffolkowner]

"Starting in 2027, the Patrol and Defense Group will be reinforced by a new class of vessels—the Sakura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPV). The Sakura-class has a standard displacement of approximately 1,900 tons, an overall length of 95 meters, and a beam of 12.0 meters. Its armament is limited to a single 30mm autocannon. These vessels are purpose-built for surveillance and monitoring missions—roles that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has not traditionally emphasized in dedicated platforms—and their equipment and capabilities are deliberately kept to the minimum required for such tasks.

"Despite their relatively light configuration, the Sakura-class maintains a maximum speed of around 25 knots, which is comparable to that of conventional destroyers. In addition, due to their limited mission set and compact hull design, the crew size is reduced to approximately 30 personnel. This high level of automation is reportedly supported in part by advanced bridge systems derived from reduced-manning technologies increasingly adopted in the commercial shipping sector. Construction costs are also relatively low, with the first four vessels budgeted at approximately ¥35.7 billion (about $238 million) in total—equating to roughly ¥9 billion (about $60 million) per ship."

"In terms of aviation capability, the aft multi-purpose deck allows for takeoff and landing operations by all types of helicopters currently operated by the JMSDF. However, the vessels lack the capacity to embark and sustain these aircraft. Instead, there are plans to equip the ships at a later stage with the V-BAT vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) unmanned aerial system developed by Shield AI. This addition is expected to significantly enhance wide-area maritime surveillance capabilities, including the ability to detect and track vessels operating at extended ranges."

Sakura-class patrol ship - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

....

"The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) implemented a major organizational reform at the end of March 2026. As part of this restructuring, it established the Patrol and Defense Group (哨戒防備群) and assigned some of its most modern surface combatants, including the Mogami-class frigates, to this formation."

"At present, each Patrol and Defense Unit is equipped with Mogami-class frigates (FFMs) and Hayabusa-class guided-missile patrol boats (PGs). The Mogami-class vessels were previously assigned to Escort Divisions 11 through 15—the so-called “two-digit escort divisions”—which were primarily responsible for coastal defense. Following the March reorganization, these divisions were disbanded and reorganized into the Patrol and Defense Group. Mogami-class frigates will be focusing on patrol duties following the organizational reform.

"The Mogami-class represents the JMSDF’s latest generation of stealth-oriented frigates. Their armament is relatively limited, consisting of a Mk 45 5-inch gun, anti-ship missiles, and SeaRAM. Although a modification program is underway to equip these ships with a 16-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS)—with ships from the seventh hull onward fitted from construction—this system is intended to deploy the Type 07 Vertical Launch ASROC (VLA), and does not include ship-to-air missile capability."

Mogami-class frigate - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Hayabusa-class patrol boat - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

....

JMDSF sets up Patrol and Defense Group with Mogami-class vessels - Naval News

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) implemented a major organizational reform at the end of March 2026. As part of this restructuring, it established the Patrol and Defense Group (哨戒防備群) and assigned some of its most modern surface combatants, including the Mogami-class frigates, to...

www.navalnews.com

Final state ca 2030?

12x Mogami (132 m, 3900 tonnes, 90 crew -
12x Sakura (95 m , 1900 tonnes, 30 crew -
6x Hayabusa ( 50 m, 200 tonnes, 21 crew -

All very lightly armed.

Mogami is not that lightly armed. 16 Mk41, 8 ASM, 5" gun, SeaRam , 2 x RWS, torpedo launchers. Just short on deck height

 

[Kirkhill]

"Yes, the Japanese Mogami-class frigates are designed to have the Mk 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) fitted, but it was not equipped on the first six ships at their initial commissioning. Starting with the 7th ship, JS Niyodo, and subsequent vessels, they are being equipped with a 16-cell Mk 41 VLS for Type 07 anti-submarine rockets"

Type 07 vertical-launch anti-submarine rocket - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It carries one of two lightweight torpedos, one optimised for deep water and the other for shallow water,

 

[Kirkhill]

In their neighbourhood why would anything be lightly armed?

"In recent years, however, the rapid expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has led to a marked increase in the frequency and scale of Chinese naval activities near Japan. In response, the JMSDF has been compelled to deploy not only destroyers but also missile boats, replenishment ships, and even minesweepers to meet the growing demand for maritime domain awareness operations."

"To address this issue, the JMSDF established the Patrol and Defense Group as a specialized formation dedicated to missions such as monitoring the activities of foreign naval vessels in Japan’s surrounding waters. By consolidating peacetime surveillance and patrol duties within this group, the JMSDF can enable its broader fleet—including destroyers—to focus more intensively on their primary wartime roles and contingency preparedness."

....

I suppose that much of the Chinese probing is being done by Coast Guard aand fishing vessels, not heavily armed vessels.
As well, they will be operating in and around the home islands with cover from their Air Force, Coastal artillery and their bigger brothers.

They are looking for hulls to create presence. They are as short of recruitable bodies as any of us.