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Continental Defence Corvette

To be fair that is a political level eff up. That is if the RCN did their job and laid out a detailed reason to said political type, why they needed to go with this idea. If they didn't, then it falls back onto the RCN brass.
Trying to recall 'cause that was a long time ago but didn't Ottawa agree to finish off Ottawa on condition that St. John's would shut down and never build another?
 
Trying to recall 'cause that was a long time ago but didn't Ottawa agree to finish off Ottawa on condition that St. John's would shut down and never build another?
That would be a monumental stupid idea and totally in line with government thinking.


Also for the good citizens of New Brunswick its Saint John. St. John`s is full of people who talk funny. ;)
 
Trying to recall 'cause that was a long time ago but didn't Ottawa agree to finish off Ottawa on condition that St. John's would shut down and never build another?
Yes, the government gave them money to ‘Make It So”. (TNG fan boy here)
 
It's important to remember that there was supposed to be a batch III of Halifax's, IIRC stretched from the original to have 24 VLS Mk41 cells in front of the bridge for SM2's, but when the Mulroney government put out his White paper on defense calling for nuclear attack submarines, that batch was cancelled to be replaced with the subs. Then the wall fell down, the world changed and the White paper - in the middle of a recession - was forgotten, but the Batch III never reinstated. Mulroney retired, Kim and her conservatives were wiped out by Chretien, and he was just has happy as could be to not reinstate the ships the Navy then said they should get back since the submarines were canned, to placate his finance minister that was tasked with cutting the deficit.
 
Actually. The SM2 version might have been one option. There was another option, and the ships were actually fitted/wired for some of the other option.

Option 2 was a mid-ships extension with an extra set of 8 Sea Sparrow launchers on each side added. How do I know? If you visit the EIC compartment, and look at the power panels for the Static Frequency Converters, they had an 'expansion' slot marked on one of the panels for the extra 400Hz power systems for the extra missiles.
 
The ICT for PRO class is pretty cool.

Basically an FPS with out the S.

Any news on if we are doing KYSBs for them ?
That reminds me, i owe you an answer and error file for the ICT.

KYSB have been developed (by PRO Ships Staff) but they are very large. Once we figure out printing we'll share.
 
It isn't an either/or debate. The last time Canada considered seaborne operations was the CAST combat group and that basically soured DND on the concept.

Thanks for mentioning this, I'd never heard of the CAST group before.

From what I've read, it sounds like it was a halfhearted attempt at mimicking the American ARG / MEU concept, but without the critical ingredient of proper amphibious ships.

I wonder if this is something that could be resurrected in partnership with the JEF group?

It'd be a big stretch for Canada to operate an ARG on its own right now, but I think its a worthy goal for a nation that's trying to become a genuine 'middle power'

Some learned experience with some Brit and/or Dutch amphib vessels would go a long way to figuring out how to make the Arctic Mobile Base concept more viable. (An idea I like, but acknowledge is a generation away in terms of tech and doctrine)

Maybe working with the SouKs on an ice class design of the Makassar class would be a reasonable first step, and valuable contribution to JEF?
 
Thanks for mentioning this, I'd never heard of the CAST group before.

From what I've read, it sounds like it was a halfhearted attempt at mimicking the American ARG / MEU concept, but without the critical ingredient of proper amphibious ships.

I wonder if this is something that could be resurrected in partnership with the JEF group?

It'd be a big stretch for Canada to operate an ARG on its own right now, but I think its a worthy goal for a nation that's trying to become a genuine 'middle power'

Some learned experience with some Brit and/or Dutch amphib vessels would go a long way to figuring out how to make the Arctic Mobile Base concept more viable. (An idea I like, but acknowledge is a generation away in terms of tech and doctrine)

Maybe working with the SouKs on an ice class design of the Makassar class would be a reasonable first step, and valuable contribution to JEF?

I was in Norway with the AMF (L) in the winter of '86 when we got word that the Canadians' CAST had 'chickened out'. One of the three Bns in the AMF Bde was an RCR unit, but still... the scorn was palpable.

Meanwhile, the USMC were offloading crap tons worth of tanks, APCs etc ...
 
Thanks for mentioning this, I'd never heard of the CAST group before.

From what I've read, it sounds like it was a halfhearted attempt at mimicking the American ARG / MEU concept, but without the critical ingredient of proper amphibious ships.

I wonder if this is something that could be resurrected in partnership with the JEF group?

It'd be a big stretch for Canada to operate an ARG on its own right now, but I think its a worthy goal for a nation that's trying to become a genuine 'middle power'

Some learned experience with some Brit and/or Dutch amphib vessels would go a long way to figuring out how to make the Arctic Mobile Base concept more viable. (An idea I like, but acknowledge is a generation away in terms of tech and doctrine)

Maybe working with the SouKs on an ice class design of the Makassar class would be a reasonable first step, and valuable contribution to JEF?
I was in Norway with the AMF (L) in the winter of '86 when we got word that the Canadians' CAST had 'chickened out'. One of the three Bns in the AMF Bde was an RCR unit, but still... the scorn was palpable.

Meanwhile, the USMC were offloading crap tons worth of tanks, APCs etc ...
The CAST CG was actually viable. Ex Brave Lion planning wasn't. In fact the combat group did deploy to Norway - it didn't chicken out - and once there operated adequately. There's an old Maloney article in the Army's Doctrine and Training Bulletin called "Purple Haze" which discusses CAF J Staff planning issues (It also discusses RV 81 - the first of the RV exercises and my last one with the RegF)

CAST CG was changed from the Norway role to being the reinforcing brigade with 1 Cdn Div in CFE in 1989 however the actual implementation of that sputtered and then slowly died.

The funny thing is that General Simonds had predicted back in the 1950s that sending an armoured/mechanized brigade to Europe by ship was a tremendously difficult task (this after having just done it for years during WW2). His opinion led to the forward deployed 27th Inf Bde (ultimately 4 CMBG). The concept of forward deployed equipment and war stocks with flyover personnel was successfully done by the Americans for years under REFORGER. 4 CMBG had flyover reinforcements including my G Bty 3 RCHA/Z Bty 1 RCHA for several years. That worked brilliantly and, to an extent we do that in Latvia with the light battalion.

🍻
 
I was in Norway with the AMF (L) in the winter of '86 when we got word that the Canadians' CAST had 'chickened out'. One of the three Bns in the AMF Bde was an RCR unit, but still... the scorn was palpable.

Meanwhile, the USMC were offloading crap tons worth of tanks, APCs etc ...
If Canada "chickened out" due to conditions it would be an exception... In my experience in both the European and Indo-Pacific theatres, Canada tends to assume more environmental risk than our partners. We do things with helos and small boats at sea that our allies won't, and we do it regularly.
 
If Canada "chickened out" due to conditions it would be an exception... In my experience in both the European and Indo-Pacific theatres, Canada tends to assume more environmental risk than our partners. We do things with helos and small boats at sea that our allies won't, and we do it regularly.

I agree with this. It's probably one of the contributing reasons our ships are in the state they are.

We sail through what everyone else goes around and we stay out while everyone else goes to home.
 
That is true. Lord knows that our risk management needs re-evaluation.

There is also the consideration that this might be because we operate in worse conditions because our normal sailing conditions are harsher.

We had an Aussie onboard once when we were RASing and they pointed out that they would never have done a RAS in such low visibility conditions. Our response was that if we didn't do them in these conditions we would likely never do them!

The army calls this patrolling spirit. Its in their doctrine. It's not in the RCN doctrine. Its in the DNA. For right and for wrong.
 
Thanks for mentioning this, I'd never heard of the CAST group before.

From what I've read, it sounds like it was a halfhearted attempt at mimicking the American ARG / MEU concept, but without the critical ingredient of proper amphibious ships.

I wonder if this is something that could be resurrected in partnership with the JEF group?

It'd be a big stretch for Canada to operate an ARG on its own right now, but I think its a worthy goal for a nation that's trying to become a genuine 'middle power'

Some learned experience with some Brit and/or Dutch amphib vessels would go a long way to figuring out how to make the Arctic Mobile Base concept more viable. (An idea I like, but acknowledge is a generation away in terms of tech and doctrine)

Maybe working with the SouKs on an ice class design of the Makassar class would be a reasonable first step, and valuable contribution to JEF?
You can almost hear the keystrokes now as someone is typing out that we don't do Amphibious warfare.
And we shall remain a Frigate and a Destroyer navy as God intended and until the heat death of the sun.
 
You can almost hear the keystrokes now as someone is typing out that we don't do Amphibious warfare.
And we shall remain a Frigate and a Destroyer navy as God intended and until the heat death of the sun).

Here they are, but they didn't start until you posted this. How's about we do the regular navy jobs properly first before we start faffing about with the most complicated combined naval, army and logistical military operation that have ever existed?

Amphib capability is a useful capability, but its not existential (like it is in Australia's case). I'm all about building capability in the correct order. Get the Canadian Task groups that can defend Canadian waters and add to allied defence. With the submarine and air assets needed to do that (likely arriving sooner than the surface ships!). And the logistical sustainment for those. So that's going to take about 20 years to sort out. Then we can do the Australia thing and spend another 10 years of very dedicated and expensive work to develop amphib capability.

Given limited resources I would rather spend amphib capability money on cyber, space, EW, logistical or intelligence capabilities that can augment/assist the core capabilities the CAF is required to do, instead of creating an entire grouping of capabilities for its own mission.

Not quite the heat death of the sun, but given the current state of the CAF and the goal for a proper army division, the defence of Canada emphasis and the rearmament push going forward we're going to be ready for "flair" capabilities sometimes around 2060.
 
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The Swedish Corvettes.


And the Canadian companion piece


 
The army calls this patrolling spirit. Its in their doctrine. It's not in the RCN doctrine. Its in the DNA. For right and for wrong.

Spoken as the god honest truth.

We've done boardings in Rhibs in sea state where the other NATO partners wouldn't even consider launching theirs, let alone try to climb aboard another vessel from the said Rhibs.
 
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