Difference between Mech and light bns

[spenco]

Hi, I was wondering if anyone could explain to a ignorant civvie the difference between a mech and light infantry bn.  Are light bn's the same as mechs minus the ride?  If this has been discussed before I apoligize but I couldnt find anything on the search function.  Thanks in advance.

 

[pbi]

In the Canadian Army today, "Light" no longer means "mech without the ride". It does not mean just "dismounted", and Reserve Infantry units are not exactly "Light" in the way we are coming to understand the term today.

Instead, the current trend in our Army appears to be that "Light" will have a distinct meaning of an Infantry force that is oriented towards operations in complex terrain (but not so much in urban areas....), has very high standards of fieldcraft and individual combat skills, and is "SOC": Special Ops Capable. Our Light Inf are not "SF"-that is reserved for the JTFII-but they are capable of conducting ops that in most other countries would be assigned to units such as Rangers or Commandos. Skills such as parachuting, mountain ops and amphibious ops are trained in these battalions.

The Light battalions have far fewer integral vehicles, and may be adapting a somewhat different configuration in order to offset a current lack of integral firepower in the companies. IMHO our Light Infantry is a great thing but it is also an evolving thing.

Cheers

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

You forgot to add "Clear as Mud"?

 

[Fusaki]

Are light bn's the same as mechs minus the ride?

Light and Mech battalions are organized along similar lines, but the use of the LAV3 in the Mech units creates a HUGE difference. While the light fighters are humping through the woods, the mech troops are sleeping under the protection of the LAV's armour, communications equipment, sensors, and 25mm cannon. The LAV not only goes farther and faster then the light troops, but when the mech infantry dismount they are totally fresh, pumped, and ready to rock.

Of course, the Light Infantry Battalions do have their place. But make no mistake, the Light and Mech units fill very different roles on the battlefield.

 

[Bartok5]

The LAV not only goes farther and faster then the light troops, but when the mech infantry dismount they are totally fresh, pumped, and ready to rock.

This statement presumes that the terrain is suitable for wheeled (or even tracked) vehicles, which is the single biggest limiting factor for the employment of mechanized forces.   Along with the dramatically increased vulnerability of lightly armoured (eg. LAV-based) forces when operating in complex urban or forested terrain.

Your statement mixes apples and oranges to arrive at the common misconception that light infantry are slow and limited in their radius of action.   This is a complete fallacy.   Regarding the issue of speed, helicopter or para-delivered light infantry can deploy far greater distances and with considerably greater rapidity than any mechanized force.   In this sense, Light forces offer a flexible range of reach from the tactical to strategic levels, that mechanized forces cannot hope to match.  During Operations HARPOON and ANACONDA, 3 PPCLI deployed over 100 Nautical Miles from Bagram FOB to the Shah-i-Kot Valley and Tora Bora (respectively) in approximately 1 hour.   To provide a direct contrast, during Op CHEROKEE SKY, the road move component of 3 PPCLI BG's "air-mechanized recce in force" of Zabul Province took 12 hours to cover 120 km (due to the very rudimentary Afghan roads).   The Air Assault component of that operation covered the exact same distance in under an hour, and inserted light infantry onto the top of mountains that were completely inaccessible to vehicles.  Given the above "real world" examples of deployment speed for Light Infantry versus Mech Forces, I'd say that your point regarding "rapidity of action" is entirely fallacious.

As for the question of LAVs going "farther"?  Well, your point is entirely moot if the terrain is impassible to vehicles.   During the first 2 of the 3  offensive operations conducted by 3 PPCLI during Op APOLLO there was ZERO use for mechanized forces - much to the dismay of the LdSH Recce Squadron.   The terrain was such that the only practical methods of movement were by helicopter and on foot.   Even ATVs were useless in those mountains, as we quickly discovered in an aborted effort to use them.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but "farther and faster" comparisons are irrelevant in the many situations where LAVs cannot even cross the starting line.....    And it is during THOSE operations in unique environments that highly trained and physically robust Light Infantry can perform feats that conventional mech forces (and the vast majority of basic infantry) cannot.   This is the reason we require both light and mechanized forces within the Canadian Army.   They offer distinct, but complimentary capabilities within the Army's overall "kit-bag".   If you confuse the unique characteristics of each, you do so at your own professional peril.  

I will conclude with 3 contrasting situations which hopefully illustrate my point.   If you were to pit a mechanized combined-arms team against a light infantry company group in complex terrain, the light infantry would have a distinct tactical advantage.   The exact opposite would hold true if you were to match the same forces against one another in wide-open terrain.   Put them against one another In mixed/broken terrain?   Then it would likely be an even match, ultimately decided by sheer tactical competence.

   

 

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

You neclect to mention that 1/3 of 3VP was made up of Mech troops (2VP C Coy).  Other then that small oversite your post is illuminating for those of us stuck in a LAV.

 

[2 Cdo]

Ghostwalk it is obvious that you have never done "light" ops. I completely agree with Mark C as I was one of the 2VP guys who augmented them. LAV III's, while a nice vehicle would have been useless on the op's that we did. I have done both jobs being mech and light(4 yrs in the CAR) and both have a place within the CF.
You forgot to add though that being on foot will attract some attention, ref small arms fire, while driving around in a giant armored vehicle will attract somewhat more attention, ie AT fire and missiles!
Also might add that Murphy's law says something to the effect that anything mechanical will break down when you most need it! Have a nice day!

 

[Bartok5]

You neclect to mention that 1/3 of 3VP was made up of Mech troops (2VP C Coy).   Other then that small oversite your post is illuminating for those of us stuck in a LAV.

No "oversight" nor neglect of 2VP's contribution was intended.  I simply viewed C Coy 2 VP as an integral sub-unit within 3rd Battalion at the time, which for all practical intents and purposes they were.  The fact is that there wasn't any practical distinction between C Coy or the rifle coys of 3 VP at the time.  C Coy underwent final work-up training as "light infantry" with 3 VP, and were considered an intergral part of the battlegroup from that point onwards.  They had no LAVs during work-up training or in theatre, so their mech background is irrelevant to the discussion.  The had re-roled to "light" from mech, as have most members of the light battalions at some point in their careers.  It certainly didn't hurt that their OC (Devil39) had just spent 3 years posted to 3 VP and therefore already had the "light" mind-set....

Based on the above, I am not sure what your point is regarding C Coy's role.  Is it resentment at my failure to single them out?  Or are you trying to make the point that "mech" troops can do "light ops"?  If it is the latter, I fully concur - assuming that the mech troops are given "light training", are instilled with the "light" mindset/spirit, and provided leadership with "light" experience as part of their re-roling.  I do NOT agree that mech troops can simply dismount and perform the full range of light infantry tasks.  Some perhaps, but not all.  There is a definite transition required, which entails both additional training and a significant change of mindset. 

But that is just my view, having served as both mech and light infantry....   

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

My point was the latter.  That with a little more time a mech solider can re-role into a light role and perform their duties well.  I just got the impression (perhaps the wrong impression) from your intital post that a light soldier was superior then their mech brothers and wanted to highlight 2VP contribution to the end goal.  If I got the wrong impression I apoligize.

I'm quite sure the light could re-role mech (as far as the dismounting goes anyway) fairly easily although I have noticed they tend to get car sick on the battle runs quite easily.

 

[Infanteer]

So, this begs the question - how should the Infantry as a whole be set up.

Should we designate "Light" and "Mech" roles (and corresponding TO&E, doctrine, etc)?  Reroling mech-to-light (2VP's coy in OP APOLLO) or light-to-mech (say 3VP using Grizzlies in OP PALLADIUM?) during work-up training as needed? 

Or, should we give the LAV's to the Armour and have a strait "Infantry" set up - which can be "modularized" a bit and mixed with the LAV-equipped Armoured squadrons if the mech role is needed?

The underlying question is whether we have the numbers and resources to specialize.  My instinct tells me "no" - something like the second option may be more desirable.  But will moving away from the LAV's lead to a bit of "institutional degradation" for the soldiers and leaders of the Infantry with regards to mech skills?

Thoughts to chew on.

 

[Kirkhill]

Infanteer, I think that fat has been exceptionally well chewed on this board and others.

From MarkC's post I take that with time and training any schema can be made to work and troops can be selected/adapted/trained to cover a variety of roles and kit can be integrated in a variety of ways.

Some "light" missions might benefit from the addition of a troop of LAVs with or without dismounts.  Sometimes a LAV Battalion might only need a reinforced coys worth of vehicles if working out of a static base.  As to the Recce/Mech/Cav debate.........

The secret to 3VP/2VPs success seems to have been well trained, physically fit, long service soldiers with good leaders and a flexible mindset.  No doubt broadly true throughout the CF.

 

[Fusaki]

The point of my original post was that Mech and Light units fill different roles. I will admit, however, that I might have been a bit off on the issue of speed. If I could write that post again I would have said that Mech units provide a different kind of mobility. While LAVs are limited to the terrain they drive on, under proper conditions they can bring more firepower at greater speeds to bear against the enemy.

 

[spenco]

If you will permit me I would like to ask a few questions about the LAV III itself, according to CASR, we were going to order them as both an infantry section carrier and a forward observation post.   Now, the latter part seems a bit confusing to me because don't we have recce vehichles designed specifically to be a observation post?   So why would we need more of them?   Is this why that component of the order was cancelled?   I also noticed that the primary weapon on the LAV is a 25mm turrett; how effective would this be in a battlefield situation?   Would it only be useful on ground troops?

I also have a question regarding the mobility of these vehichles in Afghanistan, would having tracked vehichles made any difference whatsoever (forgive me if this is a stupid question) or would they just be even slower?  

Regarding light and mech infantry, it seems the concenses was that light infantry was more effective in Afghanistan, so how viable would it be to (if need arises) to redeploy the mech bn's?   Could they simply send them over w/o the LAV and operate as a light bn to be more effective?   Is this even possible?   If so then what could the role of the mech bns be? How operationally effective could they be if they are deployed in another enviornment similar to Afghanistan?   On a side note were they (mech bns)  deployed in SFOR?   If so how well did they do there?   Thanks for your time.

 

[Bartok5]

Fellows,

Based on the posts above, several of us seem to be missing the extant point.  And that point is that in accordance with the extant Army Strategy voiced by the CLS (now CDS), "Mech" and "Light" Infantry will continue to grow apart.  Perhaps not to the point (like the Armoured  Corps) where we are talking baseline "Occupational Specialities" (Recce) versus sub-set "Occupational Speciality Specifications" (Direct-Fire) but within our heretofore "homogenous" Infantry corps we are certainly envisioning a evolutionary distinction between mech (conventional) and light (specialized, SOC) capabilities, units and soldiers.  

The FEC says that light infantry skills will continue to develop, and at the end of the day "mech" will not be expected to re-role to "light" without substantive training.  Nor vice versa.  The infantry corps will de-facto grow apart based on the recognized need for 2 comparatively distinct subsets of the basic infantry trade.

CFL:  I am sure that light infantrymen would be able to pile into the back of a LAV and play "mech inf" if required.  But at the end of the day, that would represent a fundamental waste of capability.  Could you take a "pure" light battalion within the current Army environment and suddenly re-role it to LAV-III based Mech Infantry in terms of Crew Commanders, Platoon Commanders, etc, etc, etc?  The answer is yes - if you really, really had to.  But let's face it - the price of doing so for a single op deployment would constitute a grotesque waste of both efficiency and economy.  Just imagine trying to re-train everyone within that "Light" unit on the LAV - from Driver, to Gunner, to Crew Comd.  What a horrific waste of operationally-oriented money that could have been better spent on fully-qualified mech troops.  

The exact same argument applies in reverse.  How do you suddenly take a re-roled mech coy and instantaneously produce PIs, JMs, Pathfinders, MOIs, etc?  Not to mention enhancing the basic qualifications (eg. moutain ops) of every single soldier within the unit?  And then try to manage the fundamental expections and mindset of the formerly mech soldiers within the "light" requirements of the unit in question...  

The fact of the matter is that the further we go down the road of "Light" being distinct (for validated reasons) from "Mech" Infantry, the opportunity for "mix and match" fulfillment of one another's roles will become increasingly untenable.  In other words, the further we pursue satisfying the Army's "Force Employment Concept", the more we will face a situation where generic "Plug and Play" infantry simply do not work within the current Field Force construct.  C Coy 2 PPCLI were able to integrate and perform exceptionally well within 3 PPCLI 3 years ago.  If we follow the anticipated "way ahead" for the Army where the FEC dicates that mech infantry will not do light infantry tasks (without additional training) and vice versa, then mech/light compatability will inevitably cease to exist.  For those who hang their hats on math, 9 becomes 6 + 3 - and rarely shall those numbers deviate.  

If the existing Light Battalions continue to evolve in line with the Army Commander's stated "SOC" intent, then the "delta" between mech and light infantry will only continue to grow at an exponential rate.  The past ability of "C Coy" 2 PPCLI to integrate with 3 PPCLI after a very short light-infantry work-up period will become increasingly null and void.  The respective "Specialist skills gap" will simply become too great when the light infantry begin to depart from the "common denominator" infantry skill-sets in favour of producing a SOC organization.  And the same applies in reverse.  Even within the same Occupational Specialty, one has to wonder if there ought not to be "Light" and "Mech" Infantry OSS.  After all, if (according to the Army Strategy), mech and light infantry forces are entities with fundamentally different capabilities and associated training requirements, do they not necessitate distinctive qualification requirements?  Perhaps an 031 (Mech) OS, with an 031 (Light) OSS is the way ahead?  

The 3 x Canadian light infantry battalions are moving towards specialization to an ever greater degree based upon clear direction contained in the SORD, the FEC, and the results to date of the Army Light Forces Working Group.  Our light battalions are clearly headed towards "Special Ops Capability".  This ought not be a surprise to anyone who had the opportunity to view 3 PPCLI's comparative performance within TF Rakassan/187 BCT in Afghanistan.  Truth be told, within the coalition/NATO context 3 PPCLI BG was already quite "Special Ops Capable".  

At the same time, the increasing "specialization" of the "light fighters" suggests that their interchangability with the mech infantry is increasingly untenable.  The SORD calls for the light infantry to specialize.  It should therefore come as no surprise to anyone that the rather "free-wheeling" "3rd Battalions" have already set the ball in motion (to varying degrees).  Indeed, most of the "Light Battalions" are already significantly ahead of the rather obvious Land Staff direction.  Just don't expect them to suddenly transition to LAVs.  And (one would truly hope) vice-versa.....

Sorry, but I don't have the time this evening to address multiple contributors to this rather fascinating thread.  For CFL specifically however, I would argue that your contention is increasingly untenable.  You stated that "with a little more time a mech solider can re-role into a light role and perform their duties well".  That may have held true back in 2002 when the light battalions were still feeling their way through the light role, but it is no longer the case.  The re-roling "gap" could be readily bridged back in 02.  But let's face it - there were extenuating cricumstances, not the least of which was the fact that OC C Coy had just left 3PPCLI after 3 years of service within the unit with the "light" mindset.  Devil39 can speak for himself, so I will say no more.  

As time marches on, if the Army Strategy and Force Employment Concepts take effect then the differentiation between mech and light infantry will likely continue to grow.  The FEC already says that neither will be expected to perform the function of the other without additional training.  Mech verus Light infantry will become defacto OS versus OSS skill-sets.  Not necessarily separate from a corps perspective, but certainly distinct.  It won't be something that either side can easily "pick up" given a couple of weeks' training.  They will (and are already fast-becoming) very distinctive skill-sets within the overall Infantry Corps.

The days of relatively simple sub-unit-level mech/light cross-pollinization are pretty much over.  We lived it at a particular point and place in time, and it worked spectacularly (eg. C Coy 2 VP with 3 VP). But that was because the "Light" Infantry construct was not yet fully defined and implemented.  The minute we divorce our light battalions from the inanity of "conventional WW III mech ops" and focus their efforts on typical SOC tasks, the disparity between the "LAV soldier" and the "Light Soldier" will become increasingly pronounced.  To the point (I would argue) that we as a common corps may not be able to bridge the gap between the two with a simple OS versus OSS fix.  Certainly, we will no longer be able to take a mech pl or coy and "re-role" it as "light".  Or, vice-versa.  The specialized skill-sets simply will not exist in either direction.

Anyhow, enough thinking for this evening.  It is time to imbibe (more).

Cheers,

 

[pbi]

Amen to all MarkC has said. The days of our Inf being "jack of all trades" are going, fast. Our Lt Inf are already very close to/equal to Ranger level of capability, and may go beyond that in some areas. Using them as "GIBs" (Guys In the Back) would be a waste. Maybe ("big maybe") we are looking at the best split being most RegF Inf being roled as Light (say six battalions), with a few "Inf" (the remaining three bns) being transferred to Armour and becoming "dragoons" much like the "black hat" Inf Sqn in a Norwegian Panzer battalion configuration, or as an expansion of what, pre-Transformation, we called "Assault Troop". They would be oriented on "jump out and fight" and would not pretend to have the same skill sets as Lt Inf. LAVs would be the sole premise of the Armour. Just a thought, and one that I know has been flung around before.

Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

MarkC and PBI - good stuff.   This is the issue I think many of the threads have been dancing around for sometime.   Now that it is confirmed that we're moving to a dedicated split in the Infantry world a few questions seem to come to mind.

1)   Are we going to demand Officers do both Phase III and Phase IV courses before being qualified as a platoon commander?   If there is going to be a division, will career patterns for both Officers and NCMs be locked in?   How will this play out for Light Infantry soldiers who right now are confined to a single battalion of their Regiment.

2)   Will Mech be further integrated with an Armoured Corps that is out of the close battle/MBT game now (As explored in the "Cavalry" thread as well as here)?  

2)   A primary issue that Kirkhill has touched on before concerns readiness.   What will this do to our readiness?   We will now essentially have two "flavours" in the cupboard - are we going to split the ATOF cycle into two "mini-cycles" in order to allow both capabilities (Light/Mech) to be rotated through a readiness cycle?   Is this feasible with our "hollow Army"? 

As an approach, perhaps 6 of the current Infantry Battalions can be dedicated to the "Light Infantry" side, while the remaining 3 can be combined with the 3 Armoured Regiments to give us 6 dedicated "Cavalry/Mech" units - this would enable us to have two battalions of "Light" and two Battalions of "Mech/Cavalry" on each step of the Readiness Cycle (Workup, Deploy, Reconstitute) .

 

[spenco]

Well thanks for ignoring my question guys.

 

[Infanteer]

Being snotty about it won't help your cause.

If your question was about Tracks or a Recce vehicle, go to the Armoured forum and you'll find a plethora of information posted by those in the know.

If your question was about LAVless infantry, Mark C has answered it.  Reread the thread.

 

[Kirkhill]

Sorry spenco,

I'll take the liberty of answering on behalf of most members here I think.  

Your questions, all of them, were excellent questions.  Some of them have been dealt with at length and I would suggest that you check around the Armour, Infantry, Combat Arms and Equipment boards to get a sense of how thoroughly they have been covered.  And its fair to say that as soon as an opinion is offered there are many to offer a contrary opinion.

Some of your other questions, like the role of mech and lt troops, as you have no doubt determined by now, are still the subject of vigorous debate with a lot of us waiting to see whether or not the Foreign Policy and Defence Reviews as well as the budget will support the Doctrine that has been developed and is still developing.

No slight was intended, it is just that your questions largely covered much ground that this board has been debating for a number of years.

Hope you stick around and enjoy reading some of the earlier discussions.

Cheers.


Or not Infanteer 

 

[Michael OLeary]

Well thanks for ignoring my question guys.

Spenco,

if you are referring your questions about Observation post vehicles:

The recce and surveillance variants of the COYOTE are crewed by the Armoured Corps. They have equipment and capability to be employed as OP vehicles specific to that corps' roles and to direct fire as required within the scope of their training and responsibilities.

The OP vehicles you were referring to are LAV IIIs designated for use by the Artillery as Observation Post vehicles by the Forward Observation Officers (FOO) who are attached to the infantry/armour combat teams and have a primary responsibility to coordinate and direct indirect for resources of the artillery.

the existence of both is not an unnecessary redundancy.

The 25 mm cannon is principally designed for use against light amour and other priotected targets. It is effective, but inefficient against dismounted troops. That's why the vehicle also mounts machine guns.

I will let Mark C or pbi address the effectiveness of reroling Mech bns in light roles; but keep in mind that one operational environment is not sufficcient justification to focus entirely on one organization and employment concept.