Difference between Mech and light bns

[devil39]

For what I might be able to add to this thread I will.

C Coy 2PPCLI was a Coy that never made the transition to LAV prior to its deployment on OP APOLLO.  Our training prior to deployment focused on "Light Infantry" skill sets.

I was blessed, as Coy Comd with a congruence of capabilities that made a deployment with 3 PPCLI much easier than would be possible today.

1.  Soldiers.  I had a company of soldiers who had very extensive experience in JRTC and NTC in "Light Infantry" roles in the 3 or 4 years preceding me, under some really excellent Coy level leadership.  They were a relatively experienced bunch, with outstanding multiple skill sets, especially wrt weapons, tactics and terrain.

2.  Primary Leadership.  The leadership from the Cpl/MCpl/Sgt and WO level were a diverse combination of leaders with Abn Regt/AMF (L)/ Light Bn/etc experience, who had in many cases led their soldiers in gaining the above mentioned skill sets, and who completely understood the requirements and necessity for fitness, wpn skills and tactical knowledge to accomplish the task at hand.

3.  My officers were among the best I have ever worked with.  3 excellent Coy 2ICs (over the term) and 3 excellent Pl Comds.  Fit, smart and above all tactically competent.

4.  My CSM was a incorrigible Light Infantryman, ex Abn Regt, whose fitness and tactical sense and unwavering support was an incredible asset.

5.  I had experienced 1 PPCLI as a Pl Comd in the AMF(L) Bn where we spent our winters conducting multiple (Light) exercises in the mountains, and where our transition to Mech was relatively straight forward.  I had spent 3 years in 3 PPCLI prior to a posting to 2 PPCLI.  I therefore knew most of the officers in 3PPCLI and had worked with the CO of 3 PPCLI when we were both in 1 PPCLI (hmmmm strength of the Regimental System?).

C Coy 2 PPCLI was never a LAV coy in the 20 months that I commanded it.  We never made the transition from M113 to LAV III due to the APOLLO deployment.  

My personal belief is that the transition between Mech and Light Infantry will become increasingly difficult as formed sub unit, due to the complexities of LAV III training and manning.  That being said, we do not need two separate streams, we should continue to cross pollonize  our Infantry battalions to the benefit of the Corps as a whole.

 

[spenco]

I want to apoligize for my above post, it was badly worded and I have succeded in making an ass out of myself, so I offer my apoligies.  Kirkhill, I did look in the armoured section but I couldn't find anything relevant to my questions.  Mark C answered my first question quite well.  However I am still curious as to how the LAV performed in SFOR, I haven't been able to find anything about that.  If that is a question for another board then I will take it there.  I apoligize for derailing this thread and making an ass out of myself.

P.S.

2 replies while I was typing, so sorry if this seems out of place

Edit: Thanks for your reply Mr. O'Leary.

Happy birthday Kirkhill.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks Spenco.

Cheers.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Mark C I wasn't aware of the steep learning curve you have alluded to now (vs 3 years ago) and that makes sense.
Also I agree that throwing all the light guys in the back of a carrier is a waste if its for a short term and I think you missed my point that running out of the back of a vehicle doesn't require much of leap in training (I agree that the 3rd could do this just fine).
I only hope that the progression the light units are doing also means a progression in the mech units (which I have yet to see).
The only problem I can see is if Afghanistan turns into a Bosnia like commitment then we would certainly exhaust our light units very quickly (assuming we still marched into the mountains and did ops in a mech-unfriendly environment) and it is because of this that perhaps the mech units should keep some ties with there light brothers and continue to pursue light inf training.

 

[spenco]

I only hope that the progression the light units are doing also means a progression in the mech units (which I have yet to see).

What do you mean by progression in the mech units?   More ops or training?

The only problem I can see is if Afghanistan turns into a Bosnia like commitment then we would certainly exhaust our light units very quickly (assuming we still marched into the mountains and did ops in a mech-unfriendly environment) and it is because of this that perhaps the mech units should keep some ties with there light brothers and continue to pursue light inf training.

So, you would have mech inf re-roled into light for a period of time while deployed?   If mech unit have recurring problems with mobility on deployments then why send them over at all?   Wouldn't it be more effective (not to mention cheaper) not to send the LAV over to the theater?   How did other armies that were/are in Afghanistan overcome this issue?

 

[Kirkhill]

As a civvy I am reluctant to get into this as it gets down to the short strokes.  This is very definitely a field for you professionals to come to terms with.  However I haven't been shy before so here goes...

I agree with Infanteer and pbi on the readiness and cross-pollination situations.

The way that I see this light mech discussion heading, what we are going to end up with is at least 9, maybe 18 Commandos after the fashion of the old CAR and 3 Mech Battlegroups masquerading as Cavalry with Armoured Cap Badges.  I don't think this would be good.

The Airborne succeeded, when it succeeded, as an "elite" - a home for well-trained soldiers and a place for others to aspire too.

I believe the Americans have demonstrated how difficult it is to recruit directly into an elite - witness the performance of the elite Rangers in Mogadishu.  Those youngsters, brave as they were, were overmatched by the situation IMHO, most of them never having been shot at before, even their NCOs therefore short of steadying influences.

Also the Commandos mean that we won't likely be taking on major projects and can't fight in a conventional battle field without significant re-training.

I think I still stand by the notion of Line Infantry, Commandos and Dragoons for the Cavalry.

Entry to the Infantry in Line Battalions that are 4 Light Companies  backed up by a Medium Support Company (LAVs instead of Bren Gun Carriers - the 1945 construct of a Recce Platoon, Anti-Tank Platoon, Mortars, Pioneers, and a Carrier Platoon to carry an integral assault force).  Brilliant for holding ground, static defence and local security.

Cavalry to be all LAV (Maybe with a heavy track Squadron per Regiment) and Dragoons integral.

Commandos (CAR style not JTF2 style) to be a separate entity for Raids and Rapid Reaction as well as SF Security.

Infanteers join one of the six line battalions, where they spend most of their time on foot but may be spend some time working with the Support Company largely manned by Blackhats wearing infantry badges.

Their career progression could then be either to the Dragoons, where they would wear Green lids with Cavalry Badges, or to the Commandos where they would get Maroon hats.

The Best of all trades would wind up in JTF 2 if they wanted.

This would result in a field force of 3 Cavalry Regiments capable of independent action concentrating on the Manoeuvre Battle.  6 Line Infantry Battalions capable of independent employment and particularly effective in Security/Stability ops as well as being useful in a variety of warfighting roles and Sovereignty ops.  As well there would be 9 Light Infantry "Commandos" capable of being employed as 3 Battalions but primarily oriented towards sub-unit operations, SF support and ops in complex terrain.  Then finally the JTF2 for LRP type ops, and SF and unconventional ops.

I believe that there has to be cross-pollination, career variety,  and room for experienced soldiers as well as keen youngsters that want to contribute but are short of skills and impatient for activity but need supervision while learning on the job.  And the structure has to be flexible enough that the institution can rapidly change course without reinventing itself when the threat profile changes.

Cheers.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

"What do you mean by progression in the mech units?  More ops or training?"
If what I have read is true and that the light units are doing a lot more specialized training ie. mountain warfare, helo training etc I hope that the mech units benefit from this embracing of their prospective roles and do more mech intensive training.  I can't remember the last time I did a leaguer or tactical harbor and that stuff is very basic. 

As to your second point, what I was trying to get across was that if the light units specialize so much now for their niche and a theater of operations like Afghanistan comes up and is ongoing it may become problematic because your best suited soldiers for that terrain will be used up quickly upon rotation (1 and 1/2 years).  That said I do realize that other non-light units have gone in their recently although I don't know what exactly their roles were.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

CFL,

I enter this particular thread at my peril, but I'll try and shed some light on LAVs (and Coyotes) in Afghanistan.  Their utility will depend on where they are employed and in what role.  One operation in Afghanistan is not necessarily the same as another.  The LAVs and Coyotes have been very effective (in my opinion) in Kabul on Op ATHENA.  There was a large amount of armour in the area and very little of it belonged to ISAF.  People were concerned about the size of the vehicles but I thought that they moved around well (some streets were a challenge).  They were also effective patrolling the countryside, although going into the mountains was problematic at best and impossible much of the time.  That being said our guys managed to get their Coyotes into some pretty remote spots using little better than goat trails.  The LAVs and Coyotes had greater freedom of movement at times than other forces who lacked armoured vehicles.  I think that a mixed force works best, and an ideal "task force" to cover an AOO in Kabul might have LAV III and light infantry in a 2:1 ratio.  The LAVs would patrol the AOO and the light infantry would be available for other actions as required.

If the mission is to have troops available to quickly deploy to remote locations (via someones else's helicopters) to nab suspected terrorists then of course light infantry will be the optimum force.  Again, use the correct tool correctly.

A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) might also have a mixed force as the ideal.  If there is any road movement required then LAVs will be very handy. 

Cheers,

2B

 

[pbi]

How did other armies that were/are in Afghanistan overcome this issue?

The Infantry that the US Army employs here consists of a combination of Active Army, ARNG and USMC light infantry battalions, re-roled to "motorized" using up-armoured HMMVWs. They can dismount as required, but in general the AOs are so huge that they must have some kind of integral lift. Airmobility is provided by Blackhawk, CH53 or Huey. There are no US mech or armoured forces in Afghanistan.

The various infantry elements in ISAF are a combination of motorized and mechanized, but as ISAF is a fairly static, local security-oriented force, they generally do very little "Infantry" work beyond foot patrolling.

The Afghan National Army consists of "light" infantry units, with a very limited ability to move troops by wheeled lift. There is work going on to develop a mech/armoured capability but IMHO that is some distance away yet.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

The main difference between Cavalry and SCB units in terms of TO&E would be the relative proportions of Infantry.Cavalry units would also load up with more mobility and protection elements and long range IF; whereas an SCB battalion would have a very high proportion of short range assets, many of which could have dual purpose capabilities. SCB battalions equipped with breach loading 120 mm turreted mortars would have the ability to both fire IF missions, and close up and blast bunkers and fixed defenses, for example. The AD element might best be served by "triple A" automatic cannons, giving the SCB unit a source of close in fire against ground targets as well.

http://army.ca/forums/threads/26009.0.html

Sorry a_majoor.  I didn't read this post of yours fully before I posted here.  I agree with you fully...makes my comments here redundant. 

Cheers.

 

[DELTADOG13]

Just read all the previous posts and thought I would throw myself into the fray. From experience as both a former mech bn member and current light fighter I see numerous good and bad things with some of the comments. First. Mech Infanteers can not be made over night. The LAV III is a labour  and crew intensive vehicle with many crew skill sets that fade with time. I was a Crew Comd 3 years ago and right now I would be dangerous in command of that weapons platform. Riding in the back as a troop there are few problems, save mech drills that could be mastered within a couple of months training. Coy/Pl/Sect Commanders, Gunners and Drivers require courses and practice. This vehicle is not a simple Bison or AVGP that required little training and practice with. I have experience with AVGP's from SFOR and KFOR days. Little training with varied experience base of soldiers. MISSION ACCOMPLISHED X 2.
However as a Light Infanteer presently with op experience in ISAF and TF Phoenix. These skill sets and battle tasks can't be trained for in a couple of months either. Case in point on return from Kosovo my Company gave up our AVGP's to the next Roto to Bosnia. We effectively were Mech Inf w/o vehicles. However or CO tried to employ us on a IRF(L) missions that we had not trained or did courses for. He did not even attempt to listen to advice of officers and NCO's who had served in such units as to training and tactics. The exercise was almost a complete disaster if it were not for these said officers and nco's.
Canada's shift to Task Forces tailored to the missions at hand seem to be the way to go. There needs to be more lateral movement of NCO's among the battalions in order to create a balanced understanding of these skill sets.
I am lucky to have both backgrounds with op experience and an understanding of the different missions that each can be employed. They both compliment each other.
As for differences wait and see for the next White Paper and Foreign Policy review. It should be interesting times ahead with the present CDS at the wheel!
 

 

[ArmyRick]

I am very familiar with the Grizzly and the M113. I had a chance to see the LAVIII up close and try the simulator for fun while working with 1 RCR.
There is a world of difference. If I were to try and lead a section from a current mech battalion, I think I would be lost.

My two cents with 6 % interest compounded each post equals...oh who cares.

 

[jc5778]

Worked both, mech now, Light in '02 tour.  As mech I feel it boils down to 2 things. 

1.    As mentioned above you cannot take a light inf guy and give him a Lav, sure he can get out BUT that's it.

2.    Mech guys can drive/gun/command, and get out of the back of the lav.  More combat effective (i.e. less humping).  Lastly, come on,  u think we have lots of money for gas?  No way, we train light anyways!

Fat mech Rocks!!

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Not to mention how small the maneuver box is in Shithole.

 

[jc5778]

lol, nice straight short stab runs.  Hooa  :threat:

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

not to mention its only up to platoon level

 

[Teflon]

As a serving member of the infantry with 15yrs under my belt in the infantry I can honestly say that I have done both light and mech operations including airmoble both here in Canada and overseas in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosavo and just recently in Afghanistan. I am also qualified mountain ops and desert warfare. But my experience is primarily mechanized and I am currently employed as a LAV Sgt in my Bn.

Both the Light and Mech Bns have their pros and cons and their use should be determined by the task at hand. Some operations will undoubtedly more suitable for troops of either type. Like operations in highly built up or heavily mountainous areas would be better operations for light troops. Operations in areas of wide open terrain, convoy escort or against a high veh threat would lend themselves to a mech organization.

The skill sets have many differences and just like I consider myself far from an expert in mountain, airmobile or urban operations, I would be able to complete my tasks I'm sure but my brethren in the 3VP could do it better. Likewise I sure they handle jumping out of the back of my LAV and assaulting an obj, but trained1VP dismounts could do it better, the dismounts in a LAV section do far more then "just comming running out the back" They support the veh as much as the veh supports them.

Each type of infantry Bn has it's place and it's role....

WHY CAN"T WE JUST GET ALONG *LOL*

;D

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Nice first post.

 

[Teflon]

Nice first post.

I do try to place my best fot forward in all tasks.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Good discussion.  I too have a mixed background: Pl Comd in 2 VP in 113s, Coy Comd in 1 RGJ in the UK in Saxons (a truly horrible vehicle) and Coy Comd again in 3 VP. 

I have learned that Light is different - not better, just different.  It takes specific skills, and more importantly, a specific mindset.  Having said that, I understand that the LAV is waaay different from M113 / Grizz days of old - also requiring specific skills, and a specific minddset.

Most in the Canadian Infantry are perfectly capable (if not willing) to do either, with the appropriate training - it is one of the benfits of our "generalist" approach.

As to cross-pollinization - I agreee with Devil39 - which is not something I am prone to do...   We need to keep the two streams intertwined, or we run the risk of a) creating unnecessary dissension b) losing critical mass as a Corps, c) losing some the flexibility inherent in our generalist approach, d) burning pers out, in both streams.

Dave