Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[McG]

"Anywhere"? I can think of three places where PRes would be possibly faster getting to than Reg F, simply due to location location location ...

Hopefully we don't get the opportunity to see who is right.  I have watched and been part of more than a few DOMOPS on on both east and west sides of the country and places in between.  The first foot on the ground is a mix of Cl B and Reg F liaison and recce, then the RegF vanguard closely followed by Reg F echelon and then, on call, follow-on forces which could be a mixture of components depending on timelines.

We had similar experiences in the 2013 floods.  We had a few travelling pers (RegF and PRes) join in with us to help out, but the two RegF organizations in the city  stayed out of the operation altogether.  One organization stayed home because their building was in the evacuation zone, and the other maintained their 9-5 routine.

There was also 1 CMBG all over that part of the province.  I hope you are not confusing those floods as a PRes show.

 

[mariomike]

In addition to rescuing various shut ins, assisting the ambulances do their thing and ferrying hospital workers to and fro, < snip >

That winter when Mayor Lastman called in the army, a couple of Reservists shovelling snow saw us struggling with a stretcher patient and gave us a hand back to the bus ( an actual 36' bus ). They, and their shovels, rode with us for a while. 

 

[Loch Sloy!]

Reservists will show up, regardless, as noted above, of their own situation, flooded basement, etc.. It's our community, and if it needs help, we'll be a part of it.

I was one of those who was an evacuee in the Calgary 2013 floods (tucked my family in safely with the in-laws just prior to the fan-out) but reported for duty regardless. Through the course of our deployment I had no idea if my house was intact or not, despite being just blocks away at one point. There were many other soldiers who also lived in the evac zone and who also responded to the fan-out.

There was also 1 CMBG all over that part of the province.  I hope you are not confusing those floods as a PRes show.

The military contribution in the Calgary AO was pretty much entirely PRes. I believe 1 CMBG was responsible for High River and a few other places, and my recollection is that we were deployed and ready for operations way before 1 CMBG was able to get down from Edmonton. Admittedly we were fortunate that Mewata armoury was not flooded and that the Calgary ASU/ brigade HQ were well outside the flood zone.

 

[mariomike]

The military contribution in the Calgary AO was pretty much entirely PRes.

For those of us who were not there,

Alberta floods 2013
http://army.ca/forums/threads/111031.25.html
5 pages

 

[RCPalmer]

There was also 1 CMBG all over that part of the province.  I hope you are not confusing those floods as a PRes show.

Not at all.  I was just commenting on two local organizations, echoing Daftandbarmy's experience.  It was clearly 1 CMBG's show, and as Col Anderson noted in the AAR, it was a great example of the "get in fast, be awesome, and get out" model that we should be looking for in DOMOPS generally.  I think that it was a great example of RegF/PRes cooperation, particularly so considering that we do not conduct CT together at all, nevermind for CT for DOMOPS. 

On that vein, I would encourage you to have a look at the official CAF record of the event:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-past/op-lentus-13-1.page

Somehow we went from being the largest (in excess of 500 pers) and arguably busiest unit deployed as part of 1 CMBG on the operation to, "41 Territorial Battalion Group assisted the Calgary Fire Department by supplying four assault boats to move through affected neighborhoods and identify anyone still remaining in the evacuation area."  Boy, it sounds like those reservists were really earning their pay...

As the rest of the text in the record was simply copied from 1 CMBG consolidated sitreps, the drafter would have had to have taken the time to physically delete our actual contributions. It is a very small matter, but indicative of broader corporate culture.  Later in the year, a communication was circulated (unofficially) around the division, harshly criticizing 41 TBG's performance, primarily with regards to pers admin readiness.  Most of it was true, but quite misguided considering the resourcing realities, entitlements and conditions of service in the PRes generally which ironically are largely in the hands of the organization from where the communication originated.  Stuff like this is pure morale poison for a volunteer organization, and I only bring it up because the damage has long since been done. 

I have touched on this point in some of my earlier posts.  In the current construct, PRes soldiers and leaders could worship the earth the RegF walks on or hate their guts. It doesn't matter. However, the attitude of RegF soldiers and leaders towards the PRes is very important because they control all of the resources and set the rules of the game. I have included a few other examples of this in earlier posts in this thread of how that power dynamic plays out. 

If we are to move forward in a positive way, the first step is to establish a culture (which is largely a command function) based on mutual respect, trust, and support.  There are many individuals of all ranks in the RegF and the PRes who do precisely that. However, the broader trend appears to be a continuation of a deep split that disappoints me greatly.

 

[mariomike]

Yep, another great example.  It is quite an interesting discipline, and a lot of skill sets to maintain:
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rbn-srch-rsc/index-eng.aspx

Our city HUSAR is Task Force 3. Calgary TF2 and Vancouver TF1 also have Heavy Urban SAR.

There also probably some great cross training opportunities which would allow us to back up the technical specialists as needed.

Probably. I saw HMCS York involved in a training exercise with our Marine SAR crews.

I like the way New York City handles Urban Rescue.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Another proposal is to do what the Germans have done.....They cascade their equipment down, as opposed to putting it out as targets on the ranges, or sold off as scrap.

Or do the occasional bargain hunting , You will note I said occasional bargain hunting. Other wise our erstwhile Masters will have us running around in SUVs and pick up trucks .......oh wait I forgot . :
Cascading could be a good idea does anyone know if there are (aside from the T-LAVS ) any M  113s left ? Solves a fair bit of your infantry mobility problems .
Then there is the problem of training armour crews , probably not enough Leo C2 s to train with so  perhaps  we could strike a deal with the Americans for these
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/raytheon-can-turn-old-american-made-m60a3-tanks-killing-16142

Of course all of the above is dependent on money .And a Canadian Government that actually give a Gerbil's Backside about Defence and by extension about a Regular Force that does the same. 

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I think you under estimate reservists, during the floods in 2013 in calgary we had guys who's homes were under 6 feet of water who still showed up. Not the case for everyone but to assume in a disaster no reservist is going to show up is a bit much.

"Showing up" and being able and tasked to do something aren't always hand in hand.  After Hurriance Juan hit Halifax, the IRU (Gagetown) was in location, and running while the local CBG was trying to org itself into a TF or some kind.

Aside from the ingrained "res force" problems that always happen, there is the question of what forces is the provincial government, EMO or whoever asking for and how is the local commander (such as JTF-A) going to order/authorize to be boots on the ground.

Things to consider....

 

[Eye In The Sky]

"Anywhere"? I can think of three places where PRes would be possibly faster getting to than Reg F, simply due to location location location, if the call were to be made, and it's a real DOMOPs scenario. Cape Breton NS; PEI; and NFLD. We all live in the communities where we train. We know the areas, we know who to call and what to call to get something done.

And let's say it is a perfect DOMOP scenario. PEI is cut off from the Mainland in the middle of winter. How long will it take for 4 AR (GS) to mobilize and get here from Gagetown should an RFA be submitted, when the bridge is out, the Northumberland Straight is frozen solid, and the airports are closed? Same for Cape Breton, with a closed causeway, etc.

But $hit, what do I know, I've only lived here for 20 plus years, and not been able to get off the Island mid-winter for days straight...or have fresh food delivered...or fuel...

Alas, as someone else has pointed out in regards to their own situation: a laughable supply of IMPs, no storage capacity for food stuff, and no CAF-held equipment for DOMOPs on PEI... There's a DOMOPs kit sea container in Sydney Cape Breton and another in NFLD somewhere...yet someone, when looking at "isolated areas" (isolatable?) didn't think PEI could be isolated and, ergo, was unworthy of a DOMOPs sea container...

So I do bristle somewhat at the comment. As well, if and when the call is made, Reservists will show up, regardless, as noted above, of their own situation, flooded basement, etc.. It's our community, and if it needs help, we'll be a part of it.

PEIR (whats left of it) and the Sqn from the Sig's over at Brigthen (if they're still there...) aren't going to be capable of anything.  How are they going to get 'too' the QCA?  What are they operating to get 'out' of the QCA, and to do what?  If that Day After Tomorrow situation every happened, the people making decisions in the military around the maritimes would likely be looking for choppers from 403 and 413, Hercs from 413, a '140 to take a look at 'whats what', and heavy lift in to, say, Summerside.  They can land a Globemaster in Alert, I'd bet they can put them down in Summerside too if they needed to.  8 ACCS could go in and set up shop if the towers were taken out by...anything.  But for the purpose of this we'll say I am the 1 Cdn Div Comd, shit, I just can't land even a Herc in Summerside, or Chtown.  Damn, looks like those folks who fly things like Hercs and C-17s are going to have to airdrop stuff.  Anywhere they want to (zero threat environment, no concern for SAMs, etc, right?). 

Loyalty and all taken into consideration, there needs to be a consideration given to realities in terms of # of troops, kit that can operate in the scenario you suggested, etc.  If I was a JTFA type, in that scenario I'd be looking for mobility and that is airborne.  I need an 'ambulance' to get someone to emerg.  Do I hope a patrol of PRES folks can get there with a toboggan or GWag behind a plow or do I send a Cormorant with a few SAR Techs.  That kind of thing.   

If PEI is ever 'snowmagedoned", the biggest asset the provincial government/EMO can tap into?  Right here.  ---->  http://www.peisa.ca/  Far more capable in the winter than 5 G-Wags are ever going to be.  No offense intended, but we need to be realistic in cap's and lim's.

You'd be surprised how many bug smasher parking lots there are all over.  Herc's can land on unprepared.  Choppers can do all kinds of neat and wonderful things fixed-wing folks dare not try.  If I were a betting man, I'd bet I could put my light elements from my IRU on the ground PDQ if push came to shove and someone called the Div up for no-duff DOMOPs. 

 

[RCPalmer]

"Showing up" and being able and tasked to do something aren't always hand in hand.  After Hurriance Juan hit Halifax, the IRU (Gagetown) was in location, and running while the local CBG was trying to org itself into a TF or some kind.

Aside from the ingrained "res force" problems that always happen, there is the question of what forces is the provincial government, EMO or whoever asking for and how is the local commander (such as JTF-A) going to order/authorize to be boots on the ground.

Things to consider....

I don't think anyone is advocating that any PRes organization just "show up".  There must always be an RFA from provincial authorities, and an order to assign the relevant forces to the RJTF based on the mandate of the operation.  The TBG (just like the IRU) is just another tool in the toolbox. 

DOMOPs planning (particularly for the PRes) has improved a lot since 2003 and your experience with Juan.  You might get a better result today, but I would still expect that the IRU to be able to deploy more quickly in most circumstances.  That shouldn't come as a surprise.  That said, as has been noted here, there have been some circumstances where the PRes element was able deploy quite quickly as well. 

However, if the TBG concept isn't resourced properly, (radios and vehicles are particularly problematic at the moment), then its capability will be very limited. 

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

However, if the TBG concept isn't resourced properly, (radios and vehicles are particularly problematic at the moment), then its capability will be very limited.

True, which goes back to the original problem of units not being able to be called out complete and not having standing tasks aside from "provide pers" type things. If the task us to provide IRU for PEI and the PEI R can be called out as a whole than by all means give them the kit. Aside from that, why have kit just sitting somewhere to be used a couple times a month that us needed elsewhere?

 

[RCPalmer]

True, which goes back to the original problem of units not being able to be called out complete and not having standing tasks aside from "provide pers" type things. If the task us to provide IRU for PEI and the PEI R can be called out as a whole than by all means give them the kit. Aside from that, why have kit just sitting somewhere to be used a couple times a month that us needed elsewhere?

While I would love to have some element of compulsory service (for both training and operations), I think that the Army Reserve has a reasonably good track record using the volunteer model, generating the capabilities we have been asked to generate for domestic and international operations.  We just don't know exactly who we are going to get, though we have more predictability with regards to the "who" when it comes to leaders as opposed to troops. For example, 41 CBG is around 1000 pers, and the TBG build is only about 350.  In the 2013 floods, we exceeded that requirement by 150, putting 500 pers in the field.

The common yardstick applied with regards to PRes capabilities are the major summer CT exercises, and admittedly attendance at those is (generally) quite light at the moment.  However, I would offer that is a structural deficiency based on competing IT demands. 

With regards to equipment, the same argument could be made about every RegF unit that isn't in a collective training cycle or tasked as the IRU.  While they don't need as much equipment as a unit in R2HR, they still need some to conduct IT, IBTS, and generate basic capabilities for a DOMOP.  We are talking about a some pretty basic stuff here, and its absence has implications for PRes IT, IBTS and CT in addition to the DOMOPs consideration.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

While I would love to have some element of compulsory service (for both training and operations), I think that the Army Reserve has a reasonably good track record using the volunteer model, generating the capabilities we have been asked to generate for domestic and international operations.  We just don't know exactly who we are going to get, though we have more predictability with regards to the "who" when it comes to leaders as opposed to troops. For example, 41 CBG is around 1000 pers, and the TBG build is only about 350.  In the 2013 floods, we exceeded that requirement by 150, putting 500 pers in the field.

The common yardstick applied with regards to PRes capabilities are the major summer CT exercises, and admittedly attendance at those is (generally) quite light at the moment.  However, I would offer that is a structural deficiency based on competing IT demands. 

With regards to equipment, the same argument could be made about every RegF unit that isn't in a collective training cycle or tasked as the IRU.  While they don't need as much equipment as a unit in R2HR, they still need some to conduct IT, IBTS, and generate basic capabilities for a DOMOP.  We are talking about a some pretty basic stuff here, and its absence has implications for PRes IT, IBTS and CT in addition to the DOMOPs consideration.

Most reg force units not in R2HR or IRU are stripped of equipment minus specialist equipment.

At the end of the day, the reserves suffer from the inability to be called out as a formed body. Without that, justifying equipment, train above platoon level, and pers will remain difficult. Why train a reserve group to level 4-5 when that group won't be called out as a formed group and doesn't add much to 1-1 augmentation of the reg force, particularly at the critical cpl/pte level?

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I don't think anyone is advocating that any PRes organization just "show up".  There must always be an RFA from provincial authorities, and an order to assign the relevant forces to the RJTF based on the mandate of the operation.  The TBG (just like the IRU) is just another tool in the toolbox. 

DOMOPs planning (particularly for the PRes) has improved a lot since 2003 and your experience with Juan.  You might get a better result today, but I would still expect that the IRU to be able to deploy more quickly in most circumstances.  That shouldn't come as a surprise.  That said, as has been noted here, there have been some circumstances where the PRes element was able deploy quite quickly as well.

Agree and points taken.  I think in some geo areas it would work better; CAF politics and everything taken into consideration.   

However, if the TBG concept isn't resourced properly, (radios and vehicles are particularly problematic at the moment), then its capability will be very limited.

And this is the problem the entire CAF deals with, not just the Reg or Res.  I don't see this changing before I am CRA (2030) either.

 

[daftandbarmy]

  The TBG (just like the IRU) is just another tool in the toolbox. 

And I don't get why we have them at all, still. There's nothing they are required to do that can't be managed and led by the usual Bde HQ setup IMHO.

 

[blackberet17]

PEIR (whats left of it) and the Sqn from the Sig's over at Brigthen (if they're still there...) aren't going to be capable of anything.  How are they going to get 'too' the QCA?  What are they operating to get 'out' of the QCA, and to do what?  If that Day After Tomorrow situation every happened, the people making decisions in the military around the maritimes would likely be looking for choppers from 403 and 413, Hercs from 413, a '140 to take a look at 'whats what', and heavy lift in to, say, Summerside.  They can land a Globemaster in Alert, I'd bet they can put them down in Summerside too if they needed to.  8 ACCS could go in and set up shop if the towers were taken out by...anything.  But for the purpose of this we'll say I am the 1 Cdn Div Comd, crap, I just can't land even a Herc in Summerside, or Chtown.  Damn, looks like those folks who fly things like Hercs and C-17s are going to have to airdrop stuff.  Anywhere they want to (zero threat environment, no concern for SAMs, etc, right?).

Globemaster requires 3,000 feet with a 160,000 lbs load. Landing distance for a Herc (numbers vary) at a weight of 130,000 lbs is 2,300 feet, for the C-130E. I couldn't find landing specs for the C-130J.

Charlottetown Airport runways are 5- and 7,000 feet respectively, and it was announced just last month the second runway would get a 2,000 foot extension.

Ye Olde CFB Summerside has three runways (only two are - somewhat - maintained), the longest of which is 8,000ft. And Hercs have landed there a number of times, including last year's Air Show at the old base airport.

I'm not disputing some of your other points. Our lack of vehs is PRes-wide, not just affecting the Sigs in Brighton and PEIR. We can shake the tree as much as we like, and our COs can raise (polite) hell up the chain. Until someone higher realizes we are at a critical point CAF wide in terms of vehs and equipment, it's not going to be pretty when something "Day After Tomorrow" DOES happen.

Or, hell, we'll just show up in our pj's and wait for the civies to dig us out, too.

 

[George Wallace]

And I don't get why we have them at all, still. There's nothing they are required to do that can't be managed and led by the usual Bde HQ setup IMHO.

Empires.  Once someone has created an Empire or Empires, it is hard to get rid of it/them.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Empires.  Once someone has created an Empire or Empires, it is hard to get rid of it/them.

You mean, like, 'Ottoman Empires', right?

 

[blackberet17]

(says the guy who hasn't missed a TBG ex in five years...)

 

[RCPalmer]

And I don't get why we have them at all, still. There's nothing they are required to do that can't be managed and led by the usual Bde HQ setup IMHO.

We do love our interlocking, interwoven, and interjumbled organizational structures....so there's that.  [

But seriously, the reason we have TBGs is that the government directed that we establish them, though they never took the form of the 100 RegF and 300 PRes pers originally specified.  It would be an interesting case study to follow the Government-CAF-DND communications loops to see how that concept evolved.  A bizarre concept developed with little to no stakeholder engagement, directed by the government of the day, but not tied to any resource envelope, and then not implemented... 

However, I will go the other way with this. One useful byproduct of the TBG system is that we created set of units that actually look like real units with crazy things like multiple sub-units, BHQs supported by Sigs Pls, and Admin Coys.  To me, that structure looks a lot more viable than our current "core" structure of 100+ embryonic units organized into 10 tiny CBGs.  Why would we reach into a PRes Svc Bn to generate an Admin Coy when we could just build an organic Admin Coy?  If that was our core structure, we could assign the TBG tasks to those units on a rotating basis (like the IRU), or maybe the DOMOPs task is just a standing task for all of the PRes battalions with a uniform level of readiness across the board.

What I would much prefer to see would be 12-15 PRes combined arms battalions organized into 3-5 Brigades. If we moved the BTLs into depots as others have suggested here, leaving only trained pers in the battalions, I see no reason why you couldn't/wouldn't consistently field a 400 pers unit for DOMOPS and CT if the "effective" strength of the unit was 8-900. 

Beyond that, I would be open to some dedicated CS and CSS units, but only after the integral capabilities in the core battalions were fully fleshed out.  For example, we would not consider re-establishing PRes Arty Regiments until the unit level organic capabilities (such as a Mortar Pl) were well established in the core battalions.  The same concept could equally be applied to Armd Recce, Engineers, Sigs, CSS, and even HSS if the Army could convince them to play along.  The guiding concept would be to build a robust capability from the ground up, and stop when we run out of troops, not a hollow one from the top down.