Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[MilEME09]

Even if it is unpaid leave, it could be expensive for the employer if they have to pay other employees overtime to do your job.

One of the last pieces of legislation the cons passed was compensation for employers if reservists go overseas, had a briefing about it a few weeks ago, formula is based on a number of factors but can cover the cost of OT or even a potential new hire. Now if this could be extended to annual training and courses of over X number of days I think that would help.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

You want to make it look like benefit to hire a reservist, rather than an obligation on the employer.

 

[FJAG]

You need to read NDA SERVICE 33(2) and 33 (3).
and then 31 (1)

other wise the only time a Reserve Soldier has an actual obligation to training and or employment is when they sign a contract such as Class B or C, or they signed the Class A training day pay sheet. Reserve Soldiers have a moral obligation to attend training but that is it. Unless a Order of Council is done.

Not sure what you are getting at with this.

33(2) is the paragraph that allows the chain of command to order obligatory parading/training sessions. QE&O 9.04(2) limits that to 60 days Class A and 14 days Class B.

33(3) is not relevant to anything. The only reserve component whose terms of service limited them to only perform duties on active service was the Supplementary reserve (See QR&O 2.034(b)). 33(3) has no application as far as the Primary Reserve who remains subject to 33(2) vis a vis training.

31(1) relates to the power of the governor in council (cabinet) to place any unit, component etc on Active Duty in the specified circumstances. That's a whole long story in and of itself but has nothing to do with what we would call the run of the mill ordinary primary reserve force training. 31(1) is what you could call being mobilized or called up for obligatory full time service.

There is absolutely no requirement to sign a contract for Class B or C service to be liable under 33(2). Once you have been enrolled in the reserve force you are automatically liable to perform whatever training is ordered pursuant to 33(2). The legal obligation and consequences are there if in fact the provision is used.

The reality is that the various units rarely make the training obligatory pursuant to 33(2). The fact is that the units allow the training to be voluntary which, as you say, may trigger some moral obligation and not a legal one. That's not to say that the law isn't there. It most certainly is and as I said before, if you were to fail to attend a mandatory training session ordered under 33(2) you would be liable to being charged and fined in a civilian court under NDA 294(1)

:cheers:

 

[RCPalmer]

Not sure what you are getting at with this.

33(2) is the paragraph that allows the chain of command to order obligatory parading/training sessions. QE&O 9.04(2) limits that to 60 days Class A and 14 days Class B.

33(3) is not relevant to anything. The only reserve component whose terms of service limited them to only perform duties on active service was the Supplementary reserve (See QR&O 2.034(b)). 33(3) has no application as far as the Primary Reserve who remains subject to 33(2) vis a vis training.

31(1) relates to the power of the governor in council (cabinet) to place any unit, component etc on Active Duty in the specified circumstances. That's a whole long story in and of itself but has nothing to do with what we would call the run of the mill ordinary primary reserve force training. 31(1) is what you could call being mobilized or called up for obligatory full time service.

There is absolutely no requirement to sign a contract for Class B or C service to be liable under 33(2). Once you have been enrolled in the reserve force you are automatically liable to perform whatever training is ordered pursuant to 33(2). The legal obligation and consequences are there if in fact the provision is used.

The reality is that the various units rarely make the training obligatory pursuant to 33(2). The fact is that the units allow the training to be voluntary which, as you say, may trigger some moral obligation and not a legal one. That's not to say that the law isn't there. It most certainly is and as I said before, if you were to fail to attend a mandatory training session ordered under 33(2) you would be liable to being charged and fined in a civilian court under NDA 294(1)

:cheers:

I have heard these regulations noted in passing in various "what we are doing to strengthen the Army Reserve?" briefs and fireside chats, so maybe we will see them used, especially in the Provinces (like AB) with job protection for routine training.

That said, I don't think it would be fair to think of this legislation as a tool in every commander's kit. Are you aware of any instances where this legislation was used by the PRes, say in the last 20 years? I would be very surprised if a local commander (CO or CBG commander for example) would be able to declare any training mandatory without soliciting much higher level buy in, perhaps at the L1, CDS, or even MND level.

 

[FJAG]

I have heard these regulations noted in passing in various "what we are doing to strengthen the Army Reserve?" briefs and fireside chats, so maybe we will see them used, especially in the Provinces (like AB) with job protection for routine training.

That said, I don't think it would be fair to think of this legislation as a tool in every commander's kit. Are you aware of any instances where this legislation was used by the PRes, say in the last 20 years? I would be very surprised if a local commander (CO or CBG commander for example) would be able to declare any training mandatory without soliciting much higher level buy in, perhaps at the L1, CDS, or even MND level.

I do not know of any cases although I have heard of one anecdotally but have never been able to verify it.

I do know that I have spoken with the most senior leaders of the reserves as well as numerous unit COs, and there is generally no desire to use the legislation the way that it exists.

In some cases the issue is the administrative complexity of dealing with crown prosecutors and the civilian court system.

In others it's the view that heavy handed enforcement of obligatory training would result in loss of people, particularly at the officer and NCO levels where individuals are more likely to have more responsible and better paying civilian jobs that they would consider jeopardised.

Changing the NDA to bring s294(1) within the CSD would solve the first matter but not the second.

As I said several posts ago, the issue is really one of an attitude that has developed over many decades where throughout the entire forces system, leaders (both regular and reserve), at all ranks, have grown to accept a status quo that our people are free to opt in or opt out of military activities as they see fit.

Paradoxically, it is the same people who bemoan the fact that people do not show up for training and that the reserves as a whole are less effective than they could be. I've long been an advocate of the fact that the system is broken and needs a radical fix--that it can't be repaired with fine tuning. Unfortunately those views have fallen on deaf ears.

:cheers:

 

[RCPalmer]

I do not know of any cases although I have heard of one anecdotally but have never been able to verify it.

I do know that I have spoken with the most senior leaders of the reserves as well as numerous unit COs, and there is generally no desire to use the legislation the way that it exists.

In some cases the issue is the administrative complexity of dealing with crown prosecutors and the civilian court system.

In others it's the view that heavy handed enforcement of obligatory training would result in loss of people, particularly at the officer and NCO levels where individuals are more likely to have more responsible and better paying civilian jobs that they would consider jeopardised.

Changing the NDA to bring s294(1) within the CSD would solve the first matter but not the second.

As I said several posts ago, the issue is really one of an attitude that has developed over many decades where throughout the entire forces system, leaders (both regular and reserve), at all ranks, have grown to accept a status quo that our people are free to opt in or opt out of military activities as they see fit.

Paradoxically, it is the same people who bemoan the fact that people do not show up for training and that the reserves as a whole are less effective than they could be. I've long been an advocate of the fact that the system is broken and needs a radical fix--that it can't be repaired with fine tuning. Unfortunately those views have fallen on deaf ears.

:cheers:

Well, you'll get no arguement from me on the requirement for major change, and the significant institutional cultural factors holding us back.  I think that if the top level commanders wanted mandatory reserve training, we would have it.  Local commanders would adapt to the new reality, and while we might lose a few of our less motivated people I think most would adapt to the new expectations, provided that mandatory training was implemented in a judicious manner respectful of the requirement of members to maintain their civilian careers and a semi functional family life. For example, if we made 3-4 weekends (dedicated to individual training courses, exercises or teaching based on service requirements) per year and the annual week-long concentration mandatory, I don't think that would break anyone.

Unfortunately, a volunteer model also happens to fit in well with the prevailing RegF narrative that the PRes cannot be counted for anything more than a casual labour pool with few to no organic capabilities to offer, which continues to justify a lack of adequate equipment and institutional support.  This lack of support perpetuates that narrative as it sewers morale and retention, keeping the part time force on its back foot. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

Well, you'll get no arguement from me on the requirement for major change, and the significant institutional cultural factors holding us back.  I think that if the top level commanders wanted mandatory reserve training, we would have it.  Local commanders would adapt to the new reality, and while we might lose a few of our less motivated people I think most would adapt to the new expectations, provided that mandatory training was implemented in a judicious manner respectful of the requirement of members to maintain their civilian careers and a semi functional family life. For example, if we made 3-4 weekends (dedicated to individual training courses, exercises or teaching based on service requirements) per year and the annual week-long concentration mandatory, I don't think that would break anyone.

Unfortunately, a volunteer model also happens to fit in well with the prevailing RegF narrative that the PRes cannot be counted for anything more than a casual labour pool with few to no organic capabilities to offer, which continues to justify a lack of adequate equipment and institutional support.  This lack of support perpetuates that narrative as it sewers morale and retention, keeping the part time force on its back foot.

Obligartory training would be awesome.... if we had the resources to put our money where our charge parades are.

But, as usual, too bad our budget has been slashef and we have to scale everything back in a big way.

 

[MilEME09]

Obligartory training would be awesome.... if we had the resources to put our money where our charge parades are.

But, as usual, too bad our budget has been slashef and we have to scale everything back in a big way.

So basically we have rules that could help solve the problem (even if its a band aid fix) but CO's don't want to use them because of the admin? am I understanding that correctly? no wonder things are down hill.

 

[FJAG]

Obligartory training would be awesome.... if we had the resources to put our money where our charge parades are.

But, as usual, too bad our budget has been slashef and we have to scale everything back in a big way.

Well since we can all dream, my proposal would include the following:

1. develop a force structure end state that would comprise the maximum size organization that you need for your defence objectives (assuming we ever get any)

2. analyse what part of that structure needs to be full-time and which part could be served by a mobilizeable part-time force. (just as an example such skills as artillery gun line, infantry mortars and riflemen could easily be reserve force to ramp up reg force units which would have minimally manned subunits when not deployed on operations; as could transport companies in service bns, recce troops, etc) Fund equipment acquisition and maintenance for the total mobilized force establishment (plus a replacement scale) (Quite frankly much of the money to pay for ramped up reserve service and equipment could come from reallocating PY funds from regular force personnel that are not needed on a day to day basis and could be replaced by significantly greater numbers of mobilizeable reservists.)

3. eliminate from the part-time force the vast bulk of the leadership component and concentrate and fund primarily at the Maj and below and WO and below level (I'm one of those guys that feels that we need a lot more cpls and ptes and a lot less reserve Cols, LCols, CWOs, MWOs and staff weenies)

4. establish courses for the reserves that concentrate on the "must know" level (and fund accordingly) and leave the "should know" and "could know" levels to the reg force.

5. establish set piece, nationally established obligatory training requirements (both monthly and annual) with fixed parade days and fund accordingly. (In my dream world annual training exercises would all be combined reg force with their mobilized reserve force component events.)

6. amend legislation (and the command culture to use it) so as to a) put teeth into obligatory training, b) expand the Ministers powers to call out reservists on service under QR&O 9.04(3) (currently limited to "emergencies" i.e. war, invasion, riot or insurrection [for example under the current definition the Minister could not have called out reservists for Afghanistan even if he had wanted to - my position is that the Minister should be able to call out reservists for any government initiated operation without having to go to cabinet--something like the US National Guard and Reserve]) c) establish real job protection legislation that properly protect reservists under the new structure.

That's the kind of stuff I floated continuously at CRes&C council for some six-seven years but could never get anyone to leave the though process of business as usual with tiny steps that lead nowhere. So I expect the dream will always remain just a dream. On the other hand if things stay the way they are you'll continue to get a half days pay for your wild game dinner.  ;D

:cheers:

 

[MilEME09]

FJAG - lets say for a second your dream was implemented, do you think in that model it would be best to have PRes units as a deployable subunit? example say 1VP goes over seas and the Calgary Highlanders or the Loyal Edmonton Regiment are called up to provide 1 Coy to the battlegroup?

 

[FJAG]

So basically we have rules that could help solve the problem (even if its a band aid fix) but CO's don't want to use them because of the admin? am I understanding that correctly? no wonder things are down hill.

Not just admin.

There is a very large component that believes that if you start making things obligatory for the reserves then they will quit and/or not join up in the first place. That's not just academic. If you want to really make things obligatory then you need to have a backup plan to replace those of the senior leaders (both officers and NCOs) who will walk out.

In my mind reserve units should have a larger reg force cadre that both train and lead. In the very early part of my career I was an RSSO with a staff of three. With five more people I could have easily run the regiment which was really only a battery (Effectively a reserve battery strength organization (100 plus people) needs a Capt, a MWO/WO (BSM), a WO/Sgt (BQMS), a Sgt (CC), a Tech WO/Sgt, a gun line WO/Sgt, a MBdr (FOO tech), a General Duty (MBdr) and a GD (Bdr) to fulfil the essential core leadership and training functions - the rest can all be reservists) (Note There is also a need for equipment maintainers but I see that function coming from outside of the subunit and being primarily reg force)

:cheers:

 

[MilEME09]

Not just admin.

There is a very large component that believes that if you start making things obligatory for the reserves then they will quit and/or not join up in the first place. That's not just academic. If you want to really make things obligatory then you need to have a backup plan to replace those of the senior leaders (both officers and NCOs) who will walk out.

In my mind reserve units should have a larger reg force cadre that both train and lead. In the very early part of my career I was an RSSO with a staff of three. With five more people I could have easily run the regiment which was really only a battery (Effectively a reserve battery strength organization (100 plus people) needs a Capt, a MWO/WO (BSM), a WO/Sgt (BQMS), a Sgt (CC), a Tech WO/Sgt, a gun line WO/Sgt, a MBdr (FOO tech), a General Duty (MBdr) and a GD (Bdr) to fulfil the essential core leadership and training functions - the rest can all be reservists) (Note There is also a need for equipment maintainers but I see that function coming from outside of the subunit and being primarily reg force)

:cheers:

I would agree with you about a large reg force element, in my mind CSS can't be handled effectively by officers who practice it so little. CO's should be reg force LCol's instead of posting them to NDHQ, same with RSM, that way your most senior leadership is dedicated full time to the success of the organization. I also agree you would see a lot of people jump ship at mandatory training, but frankly in my mind if you are not about to show up to the best of your ability, and give full effort, you are a burden on the organization any way. Major restructuring will be required, how we run the PRes from the ground up must be reworked. No PRes unit to my knowledge has authorization to be more then an over or under sized Company asset, that means a Major at most in charge. If max maning increase to allow a second company to be stood up, and i do mean a full company, then do so, but our organization needs to stop over bloating it self.

 

[FJAG]

FJAG - lets say for a second your dream was implemented, do you think in that model it would be best to have PRes units as a deployable subunit? example say 1VP goes over seas and the Calgary Highlanders or the Loyal Edmonton Regiment are called up to provide 1 Coy to the battlegroup?

I'm up in the air on that primarily because I do not know what the needs of every type of branch of the service is. I have experience with both artillery and infantry (besides legal branch but that branch actually already has a very good reserve component and use model)

In the artillery, for example (because artillery regiments deploy on operations very infrequently) I would see that every artillery regiment wold have a regimental headquarters and much of the services battery would be reg f, one battery would be primarily reg f with minor reserve force augmentation and two batteries would be primarily res force with cadres of 10 to 15 reg f. The reservists to augment the regiment would be located close to the regiment (eg. for 2RCHA in Petawawa the batteries would be in Ottawa so as to have easy control and access to ranges)

In infantry battalions I would think that there should be several battalions that are primarily reg f because they have a higher need to deploy and do so more frequently (maybe elements such as mortars and other support groups could be reserve here). Other battalions with a lower readiness requirement could have a higher ratio of reservists and could even be similarly structured to my artillery model above.

I would think that the armoured corps (assuming we get back to having more tanks) could also be structured like the artillery again primarily because armour does not deploy operationally very often but when needed it is required it will have to have operational tanks ready to go.

What I do see is that the reserve bty/company does deploy as a sub unit within its regt/bn together with its cadre because to a large extent the cadre is the sub unit's key leadership. (I am greatly opposed to the concept of individual augmentation except in very limited circumstances). To a large extent it relegates reservists to second class citizen status and takes away from the impetus for both the CO and the cadre to train the subunit up to a deployable standard. The entire concept should be that the reserve sub units are part and parcel of the unit and that the CO is responsible and accountable to get his entire unit up to whatever readiness standard he or she is assigned.

I haven't made up my mind as to whether or not the cadre should furnish both the BC/CO and the BSM/CSM or whether those should be reserve force positions. It is certainly easier and more effective to make them reg f but that does limit the res f career structure to top out at Capt/WO which might be a bit limiting (insofar that it might keep good people from staying in or joining up in the first place)

I also think that it is very important that you have a sufficient base of  reg f people so that there is an adequate career development flow to the higher ranks needed to man the cadres and the regt/bn/bde headquarters.

:cheers:

 

[FJAG]

I would agree with you about a large reg force element, in my mind CSS can't be handled effectively by officers who practice it so little. CO's should be reg force LCol's instead of posting them to NDHQ, same with RSM, that way your most senior leadership is dedicated full time to the success of the organization. I also agree you would see a lot of people jump ship at mandatory training, but frankly in my mind if you are not about to show up to the best of your ability, and give full effort, you are a burden on the organization any way. Major restructuring will be required, how we run the PRes from the ground up must be reworked. No PRes unit to my knowledge has authorization to be more then an over or under sized Company asset, that means a Major at most in charge. If max maning increase to allow a second company to be stood up, and i do mean a full company, then do so, but our organization needs to stop over bloating it self.

As you can see from my previous post, I do not see there being any reserve units, but primarily res sub units or elements belonging to reg f units (I'm not dismissing out of hand any free standing res units or subunits - they might be quite appropriate in some circumstances)

I also do not see people who jump ship as a big loss. Under our current model we had many people who never had an intention to deploy except in the case of a major war which most believed would never happen.

The down side of the model that I'm advocating for is that it is a given that reservists will be called up with their units if the unit deploys (although even during Afghanistan almost every deploying BG was a hodge podge of attached sub units and augmentees that needed long predeployment training.

This means that reservists who join should do so with the understanding that should we again do a venture like Afghanistan, reservists will be called out to deploy and not merely be asked to volunteer to go. This is in fact the model that the National Guard worked under for the last twenty years. They still had recruits even though at one point programs had to be initiated to bolster recruiting. (As an aside I think that our six month deployment model and a long predeployment training cycle is not effective nor sustainable - we should have longer deployments -1 year- and shorter predeployment which should be possible if units are homogeneous and not ad hoced.

One thing that we should be striving for is to ensure that we create more units than the number of existing reg f units. Assuming for the sake of argument that we strip away 50% of the reg f personnel from each regt/bn and replace them with reserve subunits/pers then for every two regts or bns we should use 25% from each to form a third regt/bn and the remaining 25% from each to form the cadres of the res btys/coys required to lead/train all three regts/bns. The big trick is to decide on what the structure should be based on our defence needs and our commitments to ongoing funding.

Like I said, sometimes I still dream.

:cheers:

 

[Journeyman]

3. eliminate from the part-time force the vast bulk of the leadership component and concentrate and fund primarily at the Maj and below and WO and below level (I'm one of those guys that feels that we need a lot more cpls and ptes and a lot less reserve Cols, LCols, CWOs, MWOs and staff weenies)

Reading quickly, I read that as simply eliminating the higher-ranked clag; my mind immediately went to a range shoot:  "downrange, when you hear the whistle, start doing sit-ups; on the firing point, LOAD."

I'd be content if the tribal elders who are producing this endless stream of ass-covering mandatory briefings, tests, lectures, etc would realize that while the RegF has five days/week to go through all that nause, the Res has only one or two evenings/week.  And because most of it sucks rectum, the Res troops vote with their feet and attendance takes a hit.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Reading quickly, I read that as simply eliminating the higher-ranked clag; my mind immediately went to a range shoot:  "downrange, when you hear the whistle, start doing sit-ups; on the firing point, LOAD."

I'd be content if the tribal elders who are producing this endless stream of ***-covering mandatory briefings, tests, lectures, etc would realize that while the RegF has five days/week to go through all that nause, the Res has only one or two evenings/week.  And because most of it sucks rectum, the Res troops vote with their feet and attendance takes a hit.

My observation is that the 'clag' has been created to deal with the constant stream of chaos firehosed down to the Bdes and units.

There are a lot of capable people who would make excellent COs etc but can't take the 24/7 Crack-berry abuse.

 

[dapaterson]

Reading quickly, I read that as simply eliminating the higher-ranked clag; my mind immediately went to a range shoot:  "downrange, when you hear the whistle, start doing sit-ups; on the firing point, LOAD."

An entirely unreasonable proposal.



What are the odds those folks are capable of doing a sit-up?

 

[RCPalmer]

My observation is that the 'clag' has been created to deal with the constant stream of chaos firehosed down to the Bdes and units.

:rofl: That is a chillingly apt description of the state of play of planning efforts in the Army. It is inexcusable to force part time leaders to run that treadmill.  If a PRes unit can produce a fairly detailed calendar as part of its Op Plan and stick to it, why can't the Army commit to running critical career courses more than 45 days out? 

 

[Kirkhill]

:rofl: That is a chillingly apt description of the state of play of planning efforts in the Army, it is inexcusable to force part time leaders to run that treadmill.  If a PRes unit can produce a fairly detailed calendar as part of its Op Plan and stick to it, why can't the Army commit to running critical career courses more than 45 days out?

Because they create planners and planners must planify or else they aren't planners?

 

[childs56]

9.04 - TRAINING AND DUTY

(1) Subsections 33(2), (3) and (4) of the National Defence Act provide:

"33.(2) The reserve force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and non-commissioned members thereof

may be ordered to train for such periods as are prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council; and
may be called out on service to perform any lawful duty other than training at such times and in such manner as by regulations or otherwise are prescribed by the Governor in Council.
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.

(4) In this section, "duty" means any duty that is military in nature and includes any duty involving public service authorized under section 273.6."
(1 September 1999)

(2) Subject to any limitations prescribed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, a member of the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train each year on Class "B" Reserve Service prescribed under subparagraph (1)(b) of article 9.07 (Class "B" Reserve Service) for a period not exceeding 15 days and on Class "A" Reserve Service (see article 9.06 - Class "A" Reserve Service), for a period not exceeding 60 days.