Eye In The Sky said:I'm sorry, but having heard this argument before, I always remember reading Red Storm Rising and the callup of the Category C units in the old Red Army; how their fitness, training and equipment actually demonstrated they lacked combat capability when the bullets started flying (yes, I know it was a book, but you get my point). Strategic Reserve...like how 41 CBG might be able to form a Rifle Coy? I don't see much punch there for the price point.
Yup, I was in the PRes when Yugo was going on, UNPROFOR...Afghanistan. I'm not slighting anyone who served in, well, any operational theatre or on DOMOPs. Both are important. But, during any of those, did a Reserve unit go "complete" or were they plugged in here and there? It's not like the 8 CH loaded up all their Cougars and deployed to FYR, right? So, we could cut down on the amount of HQs (which are fairly top-heavy in terms of rank/pay) and even Res units...and put that money into Cpls and Lts on the armoury floor. Example; what is the actual need for 2 CBGs and CBG HQs in the Atlantic provinces?
I'm never sold on the "military presence" part. I don't believe it plays a part, at all, in how big/small the defense budget is.
Start paying less; see how many people release, or start 'working less'. I think our personnel costs (salary, programs, benefits) are reasonable and if we need more for O & M, that indicates we need a bigger budget.
RCPalmer said:Apologies for the delay. Its been an extremely busy week. Yep, there are definitely training deltas, and no one is saying that the reserve component should be part of the "fight tonight" force or Roto 0 scenarios. Given 6-12 months of warning, a great many of those gaps can be closed. In many ways, large parts of the RegF would need the same amount of time to spool up. It is about having some capability depth at a reasonable cost. This methodology has informed the U.S. military's full-time/part time mix since the end of WW2.
As I've said before, I would completely agree that there are lots of efficiencies that could be gained by restructuring the PRes. We probably don't need
10any CBG HQs and there are lots of non-viable units that could be rolled into others to save on the HQ positions. However, when you are only paying most people 40 days per year, the costs of those inefficiencies are a lot less than when you pay everyone full time.
When we are talking about generating a rifle coy from a CBG, we are talking about pulling volunteers from a part-time force to fullfill the missions of a military that (a few SOF elements aside) is basically operating on a footing of peacetime military engagement and strategic deterrence. I'm not sure we would want to commit our reserve force to a greater extent than that for those types of missions, nor would we expect or desire a higher proportion of part-time soldiers to put their civilian careers on hold in the service of such missions. On the other hand, the capability potential from the PRes for DOMOPs is a completely different animal, as is the capability potential for the PRes in the event of a major, protracted conflict.
Also to be clear, when I was talking about personnel savings, I was talking about a smaller force, not decreasing benefits, hence the comparison of the Canadian 68,000 RegF to the Australian 55,000. The Aussies have elected to focus on capital acquisition to build capability and O&M to maintain readiness, while CAF has over the last 20 years, proportionally increased its personnel costs significantly to a benefit that is not at all clear.
If you have access to an academic search engine to pull up the full text, you might find the LCol Michael Rostek's application of Peak Load Theory to the full-time/part time mix interesting:
daftandbarmy said:All of those are great ideas. But we probably don’t need 50 + people and the associated infrastructure to get between the units and the Div Comd.
daftandbarmy said:There, FTFY
dapaterson said:Units with realistic command structures for their size would mean probably 20 or so Res units, in 3 or 4 Res brigades. Probably with most commanded by full time, not part time, personnel.
Of course, capping Res F progression at Maj with the odd LCol would be extremely unpopular, but likely more productive.
daftandbarmy said:And realistic. Seriously.
MilEME09 said:They did that to an extent when they merged CER and Service battalions together in the PRes, Alberta Dragoons got folded into the South Alberta Light horse. Also heard that Engineers are parading with the Fort Gary Horsw because there aren't enough to have their own unit. I agree this doesnt go far enough, units can keep their heritage while till being part of a larger unit in the PRes.
daftandbarmy said:It's called 'Tactical Grouping' but should probably be called 'Strategic Compromise'.
daftandbarmy said:We probably don't need any CBG HQs ...
There are lots of options, and ...MilEME09 said:
Once we come to terms with this reality there are even more options that can be considered.MilEME09 said:[Units] can keep their heritage while till being part of a larger unit in the PRes.
MCG said:There are lots of options, and ...Once we come to terms with this reality there are even more options that can be considered.
FJAG said:There's little wonder why we can't deploy more than a battle group these days. We just don't have the support legs to do it with.
I think I said it before upthread. Running the numbers for the current reserve force (if you could make it a reliable organization and add in health services and a few other non-army specialists) you could probably come up with between 4 and 6 fully manned brigades (or brigade groups). I've got an article coming out where I suggested two heavy brigades, one artillery brigade, one sustainment brigade and one manoeuvre enhancement brigade (although the later three also contain some infantry, recce and artillery as individual replacements for the three Reg and two Res manoeuvre brigades). If we upsized the reserves then every new person and equipment dollar should go into further support brigades. - we desperately need an enhanced system of maintainers and logisticians that can keep the Army running.
MilEME09 said:Problem is our entire structure is still back in 1945, we would need a fundimental complete reorg of the CAF, not just the reserves, our biggest enemy though is geography. 3 Div for example is the largest geographic profile in the CAF, 38 CBG covers Saskatchewan, Manitoba and part of western Ontario. If we restructure to a handful of brigades, and one division total (lets face it this 5 divisions + CJOC and other high level HQ's is ridiculous and needs to end.) we can shift PY's from our tail to our teeth.