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If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....I was reading various F2025 PowerPoints on DWAN. Most of it goes into opsec state of the CAF that can't be shared here.
If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....I was reading various F2025 PowerPoints on DWAN. Most of it goes into opsec state of the CAF that can't be shared here.
There you go again... using facts during an Internet discussion.If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....
If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....
Either way, threat actors now know that "something" exists where they may not have before, what system it resides on, and even the file format to look for!True but still not information that should be released publicly even if it's unclassified
Is the overarching principle of Future Reserve 2020 realistically achievable by the British Army?
As we reach the end of 2020, regardless of restrictions and delays by the COVID-19 virus and the fallout from it, the Future Reserve 2020 (FR2020) policy should lead to a fundamentally different Army Reserve. The FR2020 policy was developed in order to learn lessons from operational deployments and to create a Reserve that is fit for purpose.
Having been a reservist for nearly fifteen years, and having deployed operationally, I have been able to see the transformation of the Territorial Army (TA) into the Army Reserve (AR). The development taking place to transform the TA into a respected force that regularly supplies individual augmentees to the Field Army is being stymied by its mismanagement across the board. Many of the issues identified by FR2020 are still extant, with the cumbersome and inappropriate reporting process just one example. Indeed, FR2020 has been frustrated by rivalry and a lack of action between departments that are supposed to work together for a common goal. This was explored by Patrick Bury and Sergio Catignani in their scholarly analysis of FR2020, which criticised the intra departmental rivalries and lack of communication as being characteristic of poor management of the Reserves.
Furthermore, the quality of the soldier being promoted in the AR has diminished. This is a direct result of a lack of understanding of the role and capabilities of the Army Reserve has and resulted in unachievable demands placed on those in full-time employment trying to balance their civilian jobs with their commitment to defence. The shift towards a “One Army” method of training and attendance on Regular courses means that those able to and most likely to attend and progress are the unemployed or the unemployable. This creates other issues further down the line relating to morale, quality of training, and the perception of the Reserves. Furthermore, the misapplication of the “One Army” concept and a haphazard approach to the allocation of permanent staff has failed to develop the Reserve into an effective tool for supporting the “Whole Force”.
The desire for a fully integrated Reserve into the field army does not appear to have advanced at all since the publication of FR2020, and this is unlikely to ever be achieved unless there is fundamental change. In order to effect this change, senior elements of the Regular Army need to adjust their expectations and decide clearly on what type of a Reserve they actually want with a clearly delineated role. In conjunction, the AR needs to evolve professionally to become suitable for its role of supporting the Regular Army, with a more robust approach to Military Annual Training Tests (MATTs) a suitable starting point, especially considering physical fitness can be worked on in reservists’ spare time. Whilst FR2020 was a good start to this process, at this point it serves as a policy document not been acted upon by any stakeholder. ...
I mean fair point, but as of right now full time employment is available for all reserve force members who want it. Why not integrate that into the field force? Especially given the Force 2025 assertion that we are not getting any bigger anytime soon.That Class B battalion would sort of go against the NDA’s stipulation that PRes are for other than full time employment. If we want more full time battalions, we should create more Reg F. We should also make it easier to move between components for people who want to move between full & part time service.
To me it doesn't really matter, if I'm totally honest. Regimental names are, in this case, a note to tradition and that is it. The TAPV Sqn is there to provide mobility and fire support. Similarly I see that "sqn" dispersed across the area in multiple troops. When I worked out numbers for the TAPV across the army I think 24... ish provides enough mobility for a company? So if that works out being like 4 troops of 5 and an HQ split across those armouries, or two troops of ten so be it. In short Operational tasks > Regimental Tradition.You gave TAPVs to units that have no links back to Armd (Mud) Recce...and made those Mud Recce Sqn's Inf Coys in your 40 CRB?
Give it to the MP's for convoy escortsWhy not give the PRes Inf something like the US Army ISV made by GM? If they had ATGM and a vehicle to move them quickly around the battlespace (but not to fight from) it might work, no?
You can still have the TAPVs do...whatever.
Give it to the MP's for convoy escorts
Even the MPs don't like the MPs, so it's a perfect fit.You really don't like the MPs, do you?
a hundred percent. Which is why I also think we need to reimagine what a reserve unit looks like. In my force structure I included dispersed "support Bns" and I would see those being pushed out as much as possible to cast as wide a net as possible for getting folks into the reserves as RCEME, other trades too but RCEME I feel is most critical, dispersion of TAPV would have to be based on that. As I said before, if in one Bn that looks like two troops split between two major centres, in another it's across three provinces, and in a third they're all in one city, that's all fine. What's important is capability's that are equipped, in roles that are defined and make sense as part of a total force.Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at trsining large numbers of RCEME.
And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?
Which is exactly why I suggested the GM ISV.Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at trsining large numbers of RCEME.
And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?