Dresden Firestorm

[Long in the tooth]

Ok, I've thought about this (again) about strategic bombing.  I'll throw this out - were the assets of heavy bomber group used to the best of their abilities by strategic bombing?  In the rudist sense, was Bomber Harris building an empire?  In the CBC documentary (and I will question the viewpoint myself), when asked for bomber support of the Dieppe Raid, Harris says "If you don't have bomber support, will it still go forward? (yes) Then you don't need my support".

Ok, all this was very political, but at least we should question this.

 

[pbi]

I can't recall where I read this (wish I could...) but I know that some years ago I read an assertion that the Allied operational research done after WWII showed that German industrial production went up considerably during the later years of the war that corresponded with the heaviest bombing campaigns. The piece suggested that this was due to three things:

a) the inherent inaccuracy of bombing in the 1940's coupled with the difficulties of doing fully accurate BDA;

b) the German drive for efficiency in war industries in the latter part of the war, as opposed to the rather chaotic and ill-managed system that IIRC they started the war with;and

c) the German practice of dispersing various industrial operations to satellite plants located in camouflaged sites in smaller centres.

Anybody read anything like this?

I agree that such immensely destructive raids (by Axis and by Allies) must have had some effect, but IMHO the jury is still out on the issue of the stand-alone decisiveness of the Allied strategic bombing campaign.

Cheers

 

[big bad john]

I can't recall where I read this (wish I could...) but I know that some years ago I read an assertion that the Allied operational research done after WWII showed that German industrial production went up considerably during the later years of the war that corresponded with the heaviest bombing campaigns. The piece suggested that this was due to three things:

a) the inherent inaccuracy of bombing in the 1940's coupled with the difficulties of doing fully accurate BDA;

b) the German drive for efficiency in war industries in the latter part of the war, as opposed to the rather chaotic and ill-managed system that IIRC they started the war with;and

c) the German practice of dispersing various industrial operations to satellite plants located in camouflaged sites in smaller centres.

Anybody read anything like this?

I agree that such immensely destructive raids (by Axis and by Allies) must have had some effect, but IMHO the jury is still out on the issue of the stand-alone decisiveness of the Allied strategic bombing campaign.

Cheers

I remember reading something about it also.  If I remember correctly, some believe that When Speer took over complete control as Minister in charge of Industry (the exact title escapes me) he ruthlessly streamlined production methods and sorted out blockages.

 

[Shec]

I recall a couple of things as well.   Immediately after WW2 the USAAF conducted a Strategic Bombing Survey which supported many of the conclusions "pbi"   relates above.

I also remember that amongst my late father's war souvenirs (he was a Bomber Command vet) was a late 1945 or early 1946 Reader's Digest article reporting that one of the more decisive effects of the air campaign was to disrupt the transportation network.    It asserted that while much of this was accomplished by tactical airpower knocking out rolling stock,   strategic airpower played an important role by damaging or destroying major transportation infrastructure such as railway marshalling yards.

 

[DaveK]

Milward in "The German Economy at War" states that the reason was Speer's efforts to place the economy on a "Total War" footing with all the efforts that it entails, i.e. dispersal of industry, deception, camouflage.

An excellent pre-war economy article is to be found here: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1373/is_11_51/ai_80163115/pg_2

If you really want an interesting read try "Russia's War" by Richard Overy, it provides excellent reading on how the Soviets transformed their economy during the winter of '41-'42 in order to outstrip German production. Just a thought as I think we gaze too long at the second place trophy and forget who won.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The US Strategic Bombing Survey Europe(USSBS) referred to by pbi and Shek was available (in part) in the old OPDP 7 study guide.  It gives a good overview of the bombing campaign. 

The Casablanca conference produced the following direction for the strategic bombing campaign "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."  The RAF and USAF had somewhat divergent approaches on the bombing campaign as seen in the double-barrelled mission statement.

Area bombing (aimed at the morale of the German people) accounted for roughly a third of total tonnage dropped and perhaps half of the tonnage dropped on Germany.  The RAF favoured area bombing while the USAF had faith in precision bombing.  Precision bombing, however, requried complete air superiority to achieve.  Specific target industries/facilities were sub pens, oil production and storage, aircraft and anti-friction bearings, transportation and "miscellaneous."  The Germans adapted counter-mearures to the campaign (such as dispersion) and as noted in other posts made efficiencies under Speer.  It does appear that the aircraft gasoline, railway system and Ruhr steel industries were hit hard.  For example, by end 1944, railway carloading were reduced by 75 percent.

On the whole, the USSBS felt that "The most that can be saidis that bombing destroyed a substantial part of the consumer-goods cushion and thereby prevented further conversion to war production during 1944."

On the area bombing aspect, there were over 1,000,000 civilian casualties of whom just over 300,000 were killed.  20 percent of German dwellings were destroyed or seriously damaged.  The USSBS felt that "bombing appreciably affected the German will to resist...War Weariness, willingness to surrender, loss of hope in German victory, distrust of leaders, feelings of disunity, and demoralizing fear were all more common among bombed than among unbombed people."

I feel that the bombing campaign did contribute to the defeat of Germany although it could not have done it on its own.  Strategic bombing offered the only tangible means of bringing offensive action directly against Germany during the early and middle years of the war.  It also had an effect on the ability of the Germans to respond to the Normandy invasion due to the shifting of strategic bombing empahsis towards transportation nodes.

Does this justify the civilian losses?  I'm not sure and the answer one gives will probably depend on the point of view of the individual.  It does appear that the war was won by the time of Dresden but it is much easier to look back than look forward in time.  The bombing campaign should be judged in the context of the time.  I would characterize Dresden as an example of "momentum."  The bombing campaign had been ongoing for several years with high losses on both sides.  I feel that the bomber offensive had achieved a momentum of its own at that point.  I believe that the bombing of Dresden had little military value but was not a war crime. 

2B

 

[Infanteer]

I'll state again, the fact that over half of the German war production went into countering the Bomber Offensive (regardless of its actual effects) should count for something.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The Axis had to be defeated and the bombing campaign definately contributed to that victory.  We have the comparative luxury of looking back on desperate times and judging the actions of the people invovled.  I, for one, do not condemn the bombing offensive or the use of the two atomic weapons against Japan. 

2B

 

[Baloo]

I am wondering if the Axis powers had been victorious would there be a similar discussion?  Makes one think.......

Is this a condemnation of the German people (or Japanese for that matter) as a whole, or merely the political regimes at the time? The majority of Germans cared little for exterminating the Soviet people, or any other for that matter, and while yes, they were not exactly sympathetic, the German populace were not soulless, heartless monsters that many people seem to forget. Just because the government would not have decried it, does not mean that the people wouldn't have regretted it.

Aside from that, assuming that the Axis would not have had this discussion, what does that matter? Is that not what separates "us from them"? The same principle goes for the current war in Iraq, and terrorists. Some would prefer to shoot the jihadists in the head, no questions asked. But in the end, our beliefs in free trials and justice allows us to achieve the "good", and maintain our beliefs that we package all over the world. Resorting to their level and not caring or ignoring violations of law or human rights would make us no better than them, and smack of hypocrisy. So yes, continue with the debate, and I am glad for it. For if we did not win, as you mention, we would not be allowed (or even informed!) of these types of actions. Our grandfathers and relatives fought for us to be able to examine our actions and debate openly about such matters. Whether or not we agree is irrelevant.

 

[TCBF]

Is it wise to judge yesterday's actions through today's timid, lying, flacid morality?

Tom

 

[big bad john]

Is it wise to judge yesterday's actions through today's timid, lying, flacid morality?

Tom

I don't know...it seems to me it is still wrong to send people to the gas chambers, shoot POWs and other prisoners, and commit crimes against humanity.  But that is only thinking with todays morality.

 

[TCBF]

Well, your examples were wrong back then too, but I see your point: I should have been more specific.

I am refering to the revisionist philosophy that has seized our elites with a death grip, and allows them to re-interpret history without the facts.  This is easy today, since most Canadians don't learn WW2 history, and can't argue the facts.

So, just for argument, let me state that:

1. Dresden was a major rail and communications hub.

2. Nagasaki was home to a Japanese Army HQ, a rifle factory, and countless other war industries, notwithstanding the fact that the two atom bombings actually saved more Japanese lives than they took.

3. The As Ye Sew Dept.: The NSDAP got over 6,000,000 votes at one point in the 1930s.

Have fun with these, guys.

Tom

 

[Baloo]

Dresden did indeed have many of it's factories producing ammunition at the time. And, it is unconfirmed that they had precision optics production areas there. But as stated, the Russians wanted the main railway systems and marshalling areas wiped out. As a result, the Allies bombed it. Not only bombed it, created a firestorm. This was literally a massacre. The Germans managed to rebuild the factories in due time. While you can argue the value of the A-Bombs in Nagasaki or Hiroshima (which I agree with...), you cannot by any stretch validate the deaths caused in Dresden. Did it end the war earlier? As a result of the industrial bombings, no. The city was gutted, and you cannot justify that. I am not agreeing with the levelling of most any city, but this was just as bad as Guernica or London. The city was terror-bombed. and the industry prevailed, while the people inside did not. No, you cannot justify Dresden.

 

[TCBF]

When you engage a target, you do so with the best technology you can apply to that target at the time.  Not good enough?  Then you do a risk analysis: the damage the enemy can do to us with and without the target in operation.  If taking out the target is justified militarily, then it is attacked.  Would we have liked smart bombs in WW2?  Of course!  We almost lost as many aircrew as we did infantrymen!
As for enemy cas, it is the responsibility of the en to sight their potential targets away from populated areas.  The casualty rolls would appear to indicate they were criminally negligent in this regard.  Of course, no suprise to find they didn't care about their OWN people either.  Tough luck.  A target is a target.

Tom

 

[Gunner]

Great discussion everyone and I would just like to add the following.

I'm not sure if you can suggest that looking at the morality of the Dresden and other fire bombings can be considered revisionist thinking.  There was considerable outrage (some would say horror) at the use of area bombardment against German, British and Japanese cities during WWII.  Doctrinally, prior to WWII, the British advocated the use of bombers to break the cohesion (economic, morale, etc) of the enemy.  Whereas the Germans did not view air power as a strategic resource and most of its aircraft were developed for tactical support to the army (which better suited their central location in Europe).  This was a major strategic mistake for the Germans that would cost them both in the Battle for Britain and the campaign against Russia.  Directed area bombings against the Germans began retailiation strikes against British cities. 

As a baseline for discussion, according to Makers of Modern Strategy (1986), most of the controversy has been centred on:

a.  the ineffectiveness and inhumanity of RAF Bomber Command's avowed policy of are bombing directed against German civilian morale;

For the most part I agree with this statement.  Bomber Command did not have the right equipment (heavy bomber) nor the right tactics to effectively conduct an air war against Germany. The cost of daylight raids pushed their tactics into night flying and limited their capability to actually find and hit the target.  The use by the Germans of the Himmelbelt, Freya radar, etc was extremely costly for the British who were slow in developing measures to allow their bombers to get through.  For the most part, I believe the use of bombers against Germany was nothing short of incompetent on the part of the British High Command until 1944.  Having said that, I also acknowledge the relatively limited ability of the British to take the fight to the Germans between 1940-43.  From a purely psychological perspective, I think the British people needed to feel they were doing something in the war.   

b.  the long-delayed effectiveness of US precision bombing efforts;

The US, as with the British, did not fully become effective until 1944 against Germany.  For want of a long range fighter to escort the B-17 Flying Fortresses into Europe led to considerable losses by the Americans in late 1942 and 1943.  The raid on the ball bearing plant at Schweinfurt in 1943 was the proverbial "straw the broke the camel's back" that led to a rethinking of US daylight tactics.  The development of the P-51D (previously a recon aircraft) into a long range fighter escort provided a capable and versatile aircraft to bring the fight against Germany.  By breaking the Luftwaffe mastery of the skies over Germany the allies were given full air superiority for the remainder of the war (with one notable exception).

c.  the drift of US attacks by early 1945 towards a bombing effort more clublike than swordlike;

I think the US move to area bombing from precision bombing was the result of the movement of German production from most urban centres.  Unable to find suitable precision targets, the US air staff adopted the British model of attempting to crack the populations morale.  Which didn't work in the end.

d.  given that victory through air power alone proved unattainable in the prevailing circumstances, whether the immense material and human resources deveoted to the bombing campaigns might have been better employed in other ways.

I think in the earlier part of the war, addition air assets from bomber command could have been given over to the battle of the Altantic.  Certainly by 1944 the air forces of all allied countries outnumbered whatever the Germans could put up (for example the fighter ratio was somewhere in the neighbourhood of 25:1 during the Overlord landings.  The tactical support provided to the allies during the drive into Germany was an outstanding example of combined arms cooperation that must be inherent in modern combat.  Infanteer mentioned the size of the Luftwaffe air defence units.  I haven't heard the figure of 50% of Geman combat power was utilized by the Luftwaffe.  Although well supported by Goering, it remained a lesser arm to the army.  I have heard the number of personnel in flak units as 1 million and this was of considerable discussion as the army required additional manpower and air defence units were draft to serve in army positions.  If I remember correctly, all anti-tank units were manned by luftwaffe personnel (Micheal?).

Cheers,

 

[pbi]

If I remember correctly, all anti-tank units were manned by luftwaffe personnel (Micheal?).

Most German anti-tank units were manned by the Army or SS, unless they were in Luftwaffe ground combat divisions. You may be thinking about the 88mm battalions which were formed primarily for anti-aircraft work and were thus manned by the Luftwaffe, but had a very powerful anti-tank capability.

Cheers.

 

[Long in the tooth]

We sometimes forget the gauntlet that Allied Crews had to fly through to reach their objectives.  I've read that at it's peak the Germans could man 100,000 air defense weapons; of course these weren't all 88s or 128s.

Curtis Lemay stated near the end of his life that if the Axis had won the war he quite expected to be tried as a war criminal.

 

[pbi]

I am also a bit reluctant to completely condemn "revisionist" history. IMHO the essence of the study of history (as I understand it...) is to uncover facts on a continuous basis, then interpret them to get a picture of the past. The further an issue or event recedes into the past, the more interpretation comes to the fore and the fewer facts are available. Of course, as we discover new facts, it causes us to re-interpret other previously known facts, and perhaps to change our entire view of a particular issue. This, to me as a soldier, is a more professionally correct way of viewing history than to take a particular "snapshot" view of events, encase it in glass and say (figuratively) "That's what we say happened so don't question it because it pisses us off when you do that".

Simply because concepts or morality change does not make any one age or era innately "superior" or "inferior" to another. History at all times is IMHO replete with examples of immoral and unethical decision making: we are not newcomers to that.

Cheers.

 

[pbi]

Thanks, S. Baker, but I was actually replying to a series of posts by TCBF. I should have made myself more clear.

Cheers.

 

[Gunner]

Most German anti-tank units were manned by the Army or SS, unless they were in Luftwaffe ground combat divisions. You may be thinking about the 88mm battalions which were formed primarily for anti-aircraft work and were thus manned by the Luftwaffe, but had a very powerful anti-tank capability.

Thanks PBI.  As I mentioned, the large number of male personnel in Lufwaffe air defence units was always of source of displeasure by the German army, as they badly needed them for ground combat operations (antitank units).  I'll have to see if I can dig up any of my old readings from my master's degree.

I am doubtful there would have been much discussion by the Japanese or German Governments had they had atomic weapons.  Does it make them better than or worse than us?

SBaker, the difference being is we were on the good side and they were on the bad side. You can't ride a white horse and claim to be morally superior if you subscribe to the same tactics as the Germans and Japanese.  As our mothers use to tell us, two wrongs don't make a right.  I believe the wholescale area bombardment of civilian cities was wrong choice in WWII and view it as the wrong choice today.  Very little was achieved by this tactic other than solidifying the resolve of the German people.