In coalition chicken, Trudeau throws away his steering wheel
Peter Loewen
Published on: April 17, 2015
Chicken is one of game theory’s clever metaphors. In this story, two cars are hurtling toward one another. The game is one of nerves, so the driver who swerves is the loser, while the driver who continues straight is the winner. If neither car swerves the worst outcome is realized. What’s the best way to win this game? To make a show of throwing your steering wheel out the window. Once your opponent knows you have no way of swerving, it will be left to him to turn away.
When Justin Trudeau declared he could form no coalition with Mr. Mulcair, he threw away his steering wheel.
Trudeau came to this announcement in his typical fashion. He mused and meandered in response to a hypothetical question. He then clarified the next day, while reminding himself aloud not to respond to hypothetical questions. (An observation: when you are in opposition, every question about what you will do in government is hypothetical. Surely, some deserve answering).
Even if Trudeau came to his answer awkwardly, we should still recognize the boldness of his move. It represents a major gamble. If the Liberals can regain second place, this move will reap rewards. But if they remain in third, the losses are substantial.
Trudeau’s pledge to eschew a coalition does not matter much at all if Stephen Harper wins a majority government. Likewise, it does not matter much if Trudeau wins a plurality of seats, especially given the (conventionally incorrect) assertions of both Harper and Mulcair that the party with the most seats gets the first crack at forming a government. Should Trudeau come out on top in the next election, I imagine he will be asked to form a government. Even with a minority, he will find a way to govern while the other two parties replace their leaders.
But what if Harper is able to win a plurality but not majority of seats? The effect of Trudeau’s promise will depend on whether he finishes ahead or behind the NDP. Should the NDP remain second in the seat count, Trudeau’s promise could prove very costly. In this scenario, Mulcair can swiftly extend an invitation to Trudeau to join a progressive coalition and replace the Prime Minister. Trudeau will be in a bind, either because he would break his word by entering a coalition or because he would be identified clearly as the reason Stephen Harper remains Prime Minister. This is a fine way to continue the decline of the Liberal Party.
On the other hand, he could help Mulcair topple the government and then allow him to form a single-party minority government. Trudeau would be keeping his word, but he would also be ushering in the first national NDP government. This too is a fine way to hasten the demise of the Liberals.
What if the Liberals finish in second place? Here there is both upside and downside for Trudeau. The Liberals could quickly replace the government by forming a coalition with the New Democrats, but in doing so Trudeau would both break his word and give the NDP a chance to govern in at least some key portfolios. More importantly, if Harper’s strategy from the 2008 coalition crisis were replayed, this would invite a major political crisis. Coalitions are constitutionally legitimate, of course, but the democratic legitimacy of a coalition that was repeatedly foresworn off by its chief principal would be absent. This is the downside of Trudeau’s position.
But imagine that Trudeau were to go another route. He could quickly and decisively indicate that under no circumstances would he support the government. He would then invite the NDP to prop up a Tory government. As soon as they cease doing this, confidence in Harper’s government would disappear. Provided this happened quickly enough, the Governor General would be likely to invite Trudeau to form a government on his own. He could then offer progressive compromises to the NDP. Should they refuse his offers and defeat his government, they would have to explain their lack of support in the next election. In essence, Trudeau would force Thomas Mulcair to swerve.
The electoral consequences of this strategy are also worth noting. The last election revealed just how many Canadians would be willing to vote for the New Democrats if they believed they had a chance of winning. Trudeau needs to hope that those voters are once again willing to vote strategically for his party, following their heads and not their hearts. He can remind them during the campaign that they cannot expect a coalition between his party and Mulcair’s, and so they should plump with him. But what if an NDP resurgence recurs, and Mulcair pulls into second place? Then he can remind voters that Trudeau wants no part of a coalition, and only by voting for the NDP will they get New Democrats in government.
In short, Trudeau is gambling that his party will come in at least second place. If they do not, the costs of this move will be substantial.
Peter Loewen is an assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Toronto, Mississauga.
