• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure

IKnowNothing

Member
Reaction score
138
Points
530
@markppcli

What is an independent CS Bn?
Looney toon idea to stash several Coy size sub-units of CS type enablers separate from the CMBG's, capable of deploying in support of any of them, or allies. If we don't have the resources to do something right at a brigade level three times over and are forced to choose between being stretched too thin or not doing it at all, choose the 3rd option and pool it, do it right once and attach when needed.
How does this organize ?
Haven't gotten that far, wanted an answer to the "what's left question" before filling that out

What regimental mafia issues are fixed if they’re still regiments ?
The 3 RegF infantry regiments are kept and kept equal, reducedd by 2 LAV battalions and a LIB that didn't fit. They're the mechanized core of the army, no one of them is slighted.
The leftover PY's are assigned and organized in whatever manner the army sees fit, outside of that pre-existing framework to deliver the capabilities needed.

What vehicles do the infantry have that will be extra capability to the artillery? Do they need a couple dozen LAVs? What for?
Mounting M-Shorad turrets. Denel 105mm. UAV launchers. Things that the artillery should have but don't that make sense LAV mounted. But maybe that's not the priority, maybe the Trainer Platoons and/or pre-positioned fleet is. Would the extra LAV's be enough to do all 3?

The whole point is too consider what could be done, and would the overall result be better.

Is 18 80% manned RegF Lav coy's the best use of men and materiel?
Could 12 100% manned deliver the required ready force?
Could 3 Coy's worth of LAV's each with a platoon of trainers/maintainers allow the reserves to provide platoon or even company strength augments for sustainment?
Could 3 Coy's worth of LAV's help bring GBAD or UAV capability online faster and within budget?
If freed from symmetry, are 3 pure LIB's needed / the best approach?
If not, how many PY's are needed in a pure light infantry role?
What's the best way to employ the leftovers? CSS? CS with greater strategic mobility? More support to bring the reserves up to a usable state?





I
 

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
4,700
Points
1,040
Adm point: based on what we saw during the recent floods in BC's Lower Mainland, the Reserves could be considered 'quick response' if we can shorten the time it takes to load willing soldiers onto Class C contracts in less than 2 or 3 weeks ;)
You see, that's the thing that really frosts my gourd. I can think of a dozen ways to speed that up including a policy that delegates issuing the contract to a Bde HQ (or even the unit) once a named operation is stood up. What could be easier then a message saying "39 Bde is tasked to Op XYZ. 50 Class C positions authorized for the period __ to __ inclusive. Fin Code 123...". Then let the subordinates do their job.

The problem is that no one really care about the reserve.
I'm not so sure I agree with that. I tend to think that the problem is that most senior leadership gets so wrapped up in the day-to-day challenges of the job that they do not invest the time to look at the details of what needs to be done to create a more efficient ResF. To an extent too senior ResF leadership has its own rice bowls to worry about and tend to not be on board with some of the cures needed (like getting rid of most of the senior ResF leadership and amalgamating units).

Let's just say that there are too many vested interests at play which both the RegF and the ResF do not want to see disturbed through creating a more effective force.

🍻
 
Last edited:

Brad Sallows

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
3,190
Points
1,010
Mostly my experience was that COs were deeply wrapped up in administration and/or 'association' matters.

Which is probably what every unit needs - not a "command team", but a "liaison team" (a handful of blarney mechanics), whose job is to soak up all the extra sh!t without delegating/tasking anything away.
 

WLSC

Full Member
Reaction score
173
Points
610
You see, that's the thing that really frosts my gourd. I can think of a dozen ways to speed that up including a policy that delegates issuing the contract to a Bde HQ (or even the unit) once a named operation is stood up. What could be easier then a message saying "39 Bde is tasked to Op XYZ. 50 Class C positions authorized for the period __ to __ inclusive. Fin Code 123...". The let the subordinates do their job.


I'm not so sure I agree with that. I tend to think that the problem is that most senior leadership gets so wrapped up in the day-to-day challenges of the job that they do not invest the time to look at the details of what needs to be done to create a more efficient ResF. To an extent too senior ResF leadership has its own rice bowls to worry about and tend to not be on board with some of the cures needed (like getting rid of most of the senior ResF leadership and amalgamating units).

Let's just say that there are too many vested interests at play which both the RegF and the ResF do not want to see disturbed through creating a more effective force.

🍻
This is the point, exactly. When CBG are told that finishing supplemental part of infantry DP 1 is a waist of time and resources. When the decision is made each time there a « ARes review » not to make decision, when you remove unit ressource to a point that unit can’t even deploy a platoon, when you have 4 x C6 that can go on a range in a CBG and I can go on, I would say that no one really care. The CG make their show in Ottawa, so PRes is good.

At one point,I’ve seen troops buying Dora the Explorer hand held CB to go on exercice because there were no 522 for us. Yes, they could have bought better CB but they were aiming to make a point 🤷🏼‍♂️

Even with all the problems of our sclerosis system, somethings can be done. No decision are taken in a positive way.

Right now, we see an army fighting and transitioning on new equipment in weeks and here, ARes are deem not able to maintain or train on modern kit. I do not see the day it will change. To many time hope was burn.
 

markppcli

Sr. Member
Reaction score
546
Points
860
@markppcli


Looney toon idea to stash several Coy size sub-units of CS type enablers separate from the CMBG's, capable of deploying in support of any of them, or allies. If we don't have the resources to do something right at a brigade level three times over and are forced to choose between being stretched too thin or not doing it at all, choose the 3rd option and pool it, do it right once and attach when needed.

Yes but what does CS enablers mean in this case ?


Haven't gotten that far, wanted an answer to the "what's left question" before filling that out


The 3 RegF infantry regiments are kept and kept equal, reducedd by 2 LAV battalions and a LIB that didn't fit. They're the mechanized core of the army, no one of them is slighted.

That would mean they no longer exist ? Or did you mistype there ? I assume you meant 1 mechanized and 1 light infantry Bn?
The leftover PY's are assigned and organized in whatever manner the army sees fit, outside of that pre-existing framework to deliver the capabilities needed.

I don’t think the army functions better with fewer deployable maneuver elements.

Mounting M-Shorad turrets. Denel 105mm. UAV launchers. Things that the artillery should have but don't that make sense LAV mounted. But maybe that's not the priority, maybe the Trainer Platoons and/or pre-positioned fleet is. Would the extra LAV's be enough to do all 3?

Well you’ve said above that you’ve scrapped all six LAV Bns. You tell me ? Largely though if you actually mean reduce to 3 LAV Bn of four companies you probably have an excess. But I seriously doubt it’s cheaper to retrofit a a LAV to carry a Denel 105 than it is to simply procure an SPG.

The whole point is too consider what could be done, and would the overall result be better.

Is 18 80% manned RegF Lav coy's the best use of men and materiel?

It would be better if they were 100 % manned with full support coys, as per force 2025.
Could 12 100% manned deliver the required ready force?

The last time we were in a combat operation it took just about every able bodied infantry soldier to get the task force going, so likely not no.
Could 3 Coy's worth of LAV's each with a platoon of trainers/maintainers allow the reserves to provide platoon or even company strength augments for sustainment?

LAV Gunner/CC and Driver are both over 20 training days with very little “fluff.” That would probably tap out most reserve units for training time, and mean they’d do nothing but generate crewmen. Which I’m not opposed to but seems a waste of 2/3rd our infantry.

Could 3 Coy's worth of LAV's help bring GBAD or UAV capability online faster and within budget?

No, we have units dedicated to those roles, they have the PYs.

If freed from symmetry, are 3 pure LIB's needed / the best approach?

Probably not. They can fill up the other Bns and our schools so we aren’t sending every MCpl and Sgt in Bn on 180 plus days of TD a year. ( not that isn’t hyperbole).

If not, how many PY's are needed in a pure light infantry role?

700 odd per Bn

What's the best way to employ the leftovers? CSS? CS with greater strategic mobility?

See two above

More support to bring the reserves up to a usable state?

Is that the real purpose of the army? I’m all for reserve integration and making them a viable part of a total force, but if we organize firstly as a means to make the reserves relevant it’s putting the cart before the horse. We should firstly have a capability, the. Figure out how best to manage that.
 

IKnowNothing

Member
Reaction score
138
Points
530
Yes but what does CS enablers mean in this case ?




That would mean they no longer exist ? Or did you mistype there ? I assume you meant 1 mechanized and 1 light infantry Bn?
I don't know, what would be most useful? But I see it starting with an AT and an AD Coy/Battery, ideally road mobile but light enough to deploy quickly by air to support in the early days of a conflict.

I mistyped. Reducing by two mechanized companies, one LIB. Going from 18 to 12, as clarified later in the post.

LAV Gunner/CC and Driver are both over 20 training days with very little “fluff.” That would probably tap out most reserve units for training time, and mean they’d do nothing but generate crewmen. Which I’m not opposed to but seems a waste of 2/3rd our infantry.

18 x .8 = 14.4 Coy's worth of infantry, spread across 18
12 x 1 = 12 left in 100% RegF Lav Coy's.
Closer to 1/6 than 2/3 (of the LAV force) and not all of them tasked to reserve integration

And surely to god if we were going to assign a company worth of PY's and 3 of Lav's with the intent of generating platoon and coy level augments we wouldn't do it in a vacuum and that kind of barrier would be addressed with broader reserve reform.
 

markppcli

Sr. Member
Reaction score
546
Points
860
Your actually going from 27 rifle companies to 12. Your forgetting about cutting the light Bns. I suspect fyi didn’t know what the mandated manning levels were before, so it’s not exactly honest to start introducing it now.

AD / AT support coys? Bit bizarre. What are they intended to do in a vacuum of maneuver elements ? Do you see us rapidly deploying this somewhere without the assets to protect them ?
 

IKnowNothing

Member
Reaction score
138
Points
530
Your actually going from 27 rifle companies to 12. Your forgetting about cutting the light Bns. I suspect fyi didn’t know what the mandated manning levels were before, so it’s not exactly honest to start introducing it now.

AD / AT support coys? Bit bizarre. What are they intended to do in a vacuum of maneuver elements ? Do you see us rapidly deploying this somewhere without the assets to protect them ?
Not forgetting. They went into the pool, with the whatever amount pulled back out of the pool to generate the proper and necessary light force (whatever that is) in a sensible manner outside of the CMBG structure. And I didn't know the exact number, (hence the initial post on this line of discussion being a question explicitly asking what would be left over), but I knew it was a material difference.

Who said anything about a vacuum? If shit hit the fan might eFP Latvia like those assets? Our allies? The light force?
And like I said, AT/AD was a hypothetical starting point, I asked what would be useful. HIMARS? UCAV? an additional 155 battery outside of the CMBG's?


You say this as if I'm defending a tightly knit thesis rather than trying to have an exploratory discussion. But I get it. The status quo is awesome.
 
Last edited:

Kirkhill

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
3,517
Points
1,060
IKN - Your CS Battalion used to be known as a Machine Gun Battalion and was held at the Brigade. Division.

On 15 Dec 1936, as part of sweeping reorganizations within the Militia, the Canadian Machine Gun Corps was disbanded. The companies were absorbed by infantry and cavalry regiments, and a new type of Infantry Battalion - the "infantry battalion (Machine Gun)" was created. Official designations of many regiments were then suffixed with (MG) (or (Mit) in French, short for Mitraiulleuses).​

Second World War​

The mobilization of two divisions in 1939 brought with it the mobilization of six Machine Gun Battalions, assigned to the divisions on a scale of one per brigade. This was scaled back in January 1941 to one per division. Three such battalions eventually saw action with the Canadian Army in Europe. Some regiments changed to or from a machine gun role during the existence of Machine Gun Battalions.​

Organization​

Each battalion was initially organized around four companies of Vickers machine guns. Each company had twelve Vickers Guns, in three platoons of four guns.

In the summer and fall of 1942, the future of the machine gun battalions was in doubt, and a feeling that the heavy Vickers Guns were obsolete gave way to thoughts that the MG battalions might be better employed in other roles. The idea of using them in beachhead administration during amphibious assaults was investigated, until reports from North Africa praising the work of MG battalions there brought such efforts to a halt.

While new emphasis was placed on the value of the Medium Machine Gun, a new organization was announced in the spring of 1943, and the three Machine Gun Battalions were redesignated "Support Battalions" and reorganized and re-equipped.​

Support Battalions​

On 1 May 1943, the former Machine Gun battalions

  • Saskatoon Light Infantry (Machine Gun)
  • Toronto Scottish Regiment (Machine Gun)
  • Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine Gun)
were redesignated

  • 1st Canadian Division Support Battalion (Saskatoon Light Infantry)
  • 2nd Canadian Division Support Battalion (Toronto Scottish Regiment)
  • 3rd Canadian Division Support Battalion (Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa)​
Each Support Battalion consisted of an enlarged headquarters to administer the Division's Administration Area and three Brigade Support Groups, each under the operational control of a brigade when on operations. The new establishment included 20mm anti-aircraft guns as well as 4.2" mortars.

Machine Gun Battalions​

The new changes were short-lived, and the establishment was changed from a three group, nine company Support Battalion back to a four company Machine Gun Battalion; three companies of machineguns and one company of mortars, each with four platoons. The anti-aircraft elements were disbanded, and the old designation of Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG) was resumed. A full slate of T-16 carriers was issued for the mortar crews and Universal Carriers for the machinegun platoons, with special mountings for the Vickers Guns.​

The establishment did not change again for the rest of the war. It called for a total of 36 officers and 711 Other Ranks.

  • Battalion Headquarters
    • Headquarters Company
      • Light Aid Detachment, RCEME (attached)
      • Signals Platoon
    • Medium Machine Gun Company
      • Machine Gun Platoon - 4 x Vickers Gun
      • Machine Gun Platoon
      • Machine Gun Platoon
    • Medium Machine Gun Company
      • (as above)
    • Medium Machine Gun Company
      • (as above)
    • Mortar Company
      • Mortar Platoon - 4 x 4.2" Mortar
      • Mortar Platoon (as above)
      • Mortar Platoon (as above)
      • Mortar Platoon (as above)
 
Last edited:

Kirkhill

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
3,517
Points
1,060
Meanwhile, an update on the USMC's Force 2030 drive

The link to the Force 2030 Update is embedded in the USNI article

Highlights

IndoPacific

MEF III will continue to take the lead on the MLR (Marine Littoral Regiment) concept while generating and maintaining an MEU
MEF I will continue as the largest USMC Force and maintain its ability to generate a MAGTF and sustain MEUs while operating out of Darwin, Australia

Global Response

MEF II will focus on developing a 3-Star Joint Task Force HQ in addition to its MAGTFs. JTF procedures to borrow heavily from the USMC Air element.
Marine Reserves to be closely aligned with MEF II


MLRs likely to be realigned with Artillery or Recce instead of the Infantry

LAR Bns likely to be moved away from the LAV to a more platform independent, sensor heavy structure but still based on small teams.

Infantry Bns to continue with small, dispersed, sensor rich teams that are independent of means of mobility. Augmentation with Precision Weapons. Carl Gustav to feature as a key element emphasising it Multi-Functional suite of munitions. Switchblade/Hero type munitions to feature. 60mm mortars to be retained in the arms locker for the Platoon Commander to access on a mission needs basis. 81mm mortars to be retained at the rate of 2 per company. They could be held at battalion or at company. TBD.

Still emphasising Long Range Fires and littoral movements.
 

GR66

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
1,006
Points
1,040
I think a key to coming up with an improved force structure is to stop using the existing structure as the assumed base that we are starting from. A better approach would be to identify what capabilities we need and what structure will fulfill those needs.

Then you use your existing personnel/equipment to fill out that structure and inform your equipment/vehicle procurement needs. Same with the Reserves. What capabilities are required to support/augment/expand the Reg Force Army you've designed and what structure/equipment/training/support are required to meet that requirement.
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
3,517
Points
1,060
More on the Marines

Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC)


The MRIC is a modified Israeli Iron Dome interceptor integrated with the US Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar and Common Aviation Command and Control System.

The trailer-mounted system has been developed for expeditionary operations. It detects, tracks, identifies, and defeats cruise missiles, manned, and unmanned aircraft.

1652212238803.png
 

markppcli

Sr. Member
Reaction score
546
Points
860
Not forgetting. They went into the pool, with the whatever amount pulled back out of the pool to generate the proper and necessary light force (whatever that is) in a sensible manner outside of the CMBG structure. And I didn't know the exact number, (hence the initial post on this line of discussion being a question explicitly asking what would be left over), but I knew it was a material difference.

So force 2025’s existing plan ? You still discounted them in your estimate.

Who said anything about a vacuum? If shit hit the fan might eFP Latvia like those assets? Our allies? The light force?

A properly manned Bn would have its support Pls. Combat Support (CS) and a Combat Support companies are very different things.

And like I said, AT/AD was a hypothetical starting point, I asked what would be useful. HIMARS? UCAV? an additional 155 battery outside of the CMBG's?

Are we still talking about force 2025 or are we just creating shopping lists now?a single 155 battery outside of it’s parent regiment would be without OPs or STA assets, so no a terrible place.

You say this as if I'm defending a tightly knit thesis rather than trying to have an exploratory discussion. But I get it. The status quo is awesome.

Don’t be petulant when you, self admittedly, throwing mud at a wall and being told it doesn’t stick.

If you want to see what happens when you throw lots of enablers with small about of infantry into a fight, take a look at Russia in Ukraine.
 

markppcli

Sr. Member
Reaction score
546
Points
860
I think a key to coming up with an improved force structure is to stop using the existing structure as the assumed base that we are starting from. A better approach would be to identify what capabilities we need and what structure will fulfill those needs.

Then you use your existing personnel/equipment to fill out that structure and inform your equipment/vehicle procurement needs. Same with the Reserves. What capabilities are required to support/augment/expand the Reg Force Army you've designed and what structure/equipment/training/support are required to meet that requirement.
Do we not already have that though? In terms of Secure and Engaged out lining deployable capabilities we require ?

Fully agree the structure needs to be built for the goal not vice versa; that’s probably it’s glaring within the reserves.
 

GR66

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
1,006
Points
1,040
Do we not already have that though? In terms of Secure and Engaged out lining deployable capabilities we require ?

Fully agree the structure needs to be built for the goal not vice versa; that’s probably it’s glaring within the reserves.
I'd argue that the strategic environment is radically different than when SSE was drafted and is no longer fit for purpose. And frankly I strongly suspect that the deployment capabilities in SSE were based more on what the existing structure was/is capable of generating rather than an actual strategic assessment of what is required to meet the military/political objectives of the Government of Canada.

A new set of capability objectives based on a coherent strategic plan I think is required.
 

markppcli

Sr. Member
Reaction score
546
Points
860
I think the requirements of a battle group size deployment long term or meeting our nato 1 Heavy Bde commitment short term on x days notice is probably the reasonable goal.

That requires the refinement of a battle groups is / means ( I want to say SSE says 1500 person deployment?). It also requires we define a heavy Bde, to incline its structure and its capabilities, and man it. We then need to determine if that Bde will have to be rotated off readiness and how that effects of Bde / forces. Or do we just have “the heavy Bde” that units float in and out of ?
 

McG

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
1,951
Points
1,160
Do we not already have that though? In terms of Secure and Engaged out lining deployable capabilities we require?
SSE does not actually spell out the deployable capabilities that the CAF must have. If does list a few mostly new capabilities, but it primarily lays out requirements in terms of numbers of people and durations of effort. When you link that with a vision that sees the strategic objective as being achieved just by showing up, you end up with the situation where a frigate and a square combat team are interchangeable. It is hardly comprehensive guidance for force development, but it is great for an L1s’ choose your own adventure menue.
 
Top