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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

If we were to do away with the infantry battalions and consolidate the RegF infantry regiments down to 4 fully manned line companies and a fully manned CS company, what kind of PY and equipment pool would that create to be played with?
 
If we were to do away with the infantry battalions and consolidate the RegF infantry regiments down to 4 fully manned line companies and a fully manned CS company, what kind of PY and equipment pool would that create to be played with?

You would be moving back to 1946

1946​
Canadian Army reduced to 15,563 all ranks
1946​
Canadian Active Force - 3 Infantry Battalions, 2 Armoured Regiments, 1 Artillery Regiment, 1 Engineering Squadron plus Support
1946​
Active RRCA - 1 RCHA (renamed 71 RCHA at Shilo), 68 Med Bty, 127 AT Bty, 128 HAA Bty, 129 LAA Bty
1946​
Canadian Reserve Force - after two years mobilization and training by the Active Force - 4 Infantry Divisions and 2 Armoured Divisions
1946​
Threat appreciation of October - subversion
and sabotage by internal groups; covert biological and chemical attacks; air attacks against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland and the use of airborne irregular forces ranging throughout the continent.
1946​
By 1952 planners projected the use ofthe atomic bomb delivered by long range aircraft and the occupation of Newfoundland Alaska and Greenland for the forward basing of Soviet bomber aircraft and airborne forces
1946​
Canada to provide 1 Airborne or Airtransportable Brigade with necessary airlift
1946​
Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee designated a Mobile Reserve from the Canadian Active Force but provided no organization or funding
 
You would be moving back to 1946

1946​
Canadian Army reduced to 15,563 all ranks
1946​
Canadian Active Force - 3 Infantry Battalions, 2 Armoured Regiments, 1 Artillery Regiment, 1 Engineering Squadron plus Support
1946​
Active RRCA - 1 RCHA (renamed 71 RCHA at Shilo), 68 Med Bty, 127 AT Bty, 128 HAA Bty, 129 LAA Bty
1946​
Canadian Reserve Force - after two years mobilization and training by the Active Force - 4 Infantry Divisions and 2 Armoured Divisions
1946​
Threat appreciation of October - subversion
and sabotage by internal groups; covert biological and chemical attacks; air attacks against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland and the use of airborne irregular forces ranging throughout the continent.
1946​
By 1952 planners projected the use ofthe atomic bomb delivered by long range aircraft and the occupation of Newfoundland Alaska and Greenland for the forward basing of Soviet bomber aircraft and airborne forces
1946​
Canada to provide 1 Airborne or Airtransportable Brigade with necessary airlift
1946​
Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee designated a Mobile Reserve from the Canadian Active Force but provided no organization or funding
"create to be played with" =/= "eliminated"
 
"create to be played with" =/= "eliminated"

Interesting when you think that in 1946 there were 15,563 All Ranks to maintain the institution of the Army, train 6 divisions of "reserves" in two years and deploy a single Brigade Group.

1 Armoured Recce Regiment
1 Tank Regiment
1 Eng Sqn
1 17 pdr AT Bty
1 40mm LAA Bty
3 105mm CS Bty
1 155mm Med Bty
1 HAA Bty
3 Single Battalion Infantry Regiments each Battalion with 4 Rifle Coys and a Support Coy.

Now we have 7,500 more people, a total of 23,000 regulars, and are trying to staff 4 Brigades with 9 Battalions, 3 Armd Rgts, 4 Artillery Rgts, 4 Engineer Regiments, a bunch of other stuff nobody heard about in 1946 ..... and a SOF Battle Group, a Division HQ and a whole pile of support.
 
What is a UAV these days?

How about anything that can fly a non-ballistic trajectory to a designated location? Both armed and unarmed?

That very broad definition would encompass everything from Black Hornet nano-drones through Malloy T-150s to the MQ-8C autonomous Jet Ranger. From 40mm projector launched Drone40s to MLRS launched GLSDBs and Kratos RATO launched Valkyries. From Shoulder launched missiles to cannon launched Volcano and Excalibur rounds. Some that fly pre-programmed paths. Some that incorporate mid-course corrections. Some that have varying degrees of autonomy.

All of which put distance between the target and the killer.

Kevin has long argued against the need for a bayonet lug on his rifle because he would rather eliminate the threat without having to close. Sending a bullet instead of a man. UAV-PGM technology makes the operator more effective at removing threats without having to close.

You don't need as many closers.
The problem with that being the confirmation bias inherent in drone warfare. All we see is the success propaganda because the feeds are already there and it’s easy to post it. Much harder to show the hard fighting in city building blocks where you can’t just hit fortified positions.
 
If we were to do away with the infantry battalions and consolidate the RegF infantry regiments down to 4 fully manned line companies and a fully manned CS company, what kind of PY and equipment pool would that create to be played with?

So 2200 total infantry soldiers ? Roughly?
 
Much harder to show the hard fighting in city building blocks where you can’t just hit fortified positions.
Waaaay out of my field, but wonder what difference a) cheapo drones (including the practice of dropping explosives from same) and b) every random with a cell phone being able to stream whatever's in front of them will turn out to have made to that realm.
 
So 2200 total infantry soldiers ? Roughly?
Cutting the infantry to the bone would seem to be attractive because the infantry has a large reserve structure to fall back on and what we are actually in desperate need of is many more full time technical tradesmen — RCEME, RCCS, CIntC… — if we want to take our army into the 21st century.

The counter argument would be that those technical corps are all broken to such an extent that handing them thousands of positions they can’t ever fill would be a complete waste of effort. And would also break the infantry in the process.
 
The problem with that being the confirmation bias inherent in drone warfare. All we see is the success propaganda because the feeds are already there and it’s easy to post it. Much harder to show the hard fighting in city building blocks where you can’t just hit fortified positions.

Not wrong.

Just as it is not wrong to say that there is still a place for the tank.

In my mind though, the question is, how much of each is required to win a war and are the ratios changing?

What the UAV is doing now is what the helicopter did, the Bronco did, the Auster did, the SE5A did and the Balloon did.... and the Satellite does.
But now instead of being scarce and expensive and only available to the few at HQ they are now universally available making it difficult not to be seen and tracked. And positions readily communicated.

I think it is right to say that this war will be a bad predictor of wars to come. But that is only because every war is a poor predictor of the next one.
 
Cutting the infantry to the bone would seem to be attractive because the infantry has a large reserve structure to fall back on and what we are actually in desperate need of is many more full time technical tradesmen — RCEME, RCCS, CIntC… — if we want to take our army into the 21st century.

The counter argument would be that those technical corps are all broken to such an extent that handing them thousands of positions they can’t ever fill would be a complete waste of effort. And would also break the infantry in the process.
The problem being that reservist support is unreliable and not capable or handling the equipment in a regular Bn.
 
Not wrong.

Just as it is not wrong to say that there is still a place for the tank.

In my mind though, the question is, how much of each is required to win a war and are the ratios changing?

What the UAV is doing now is what the helicopter did, the Bronco did, the Auster did, the SE5A did and the Balloon did.... and the Satellite does.
But now instead of being scarce and expensive and only available to the few at HQ they are now universally available making it difficult not to be seen and tracked. And positions readily communicated.

I think it is right to say that this war will be a bad predictor of wars to come. But that is only because every war is a poor predictor of the next one.
This.
 
The problem being that reservist support is unreliable and not capable or handling the equipment in a regular Bn.
In any credible organization which has goals to achieve, if its subordinate departments were unreliable or not capable of handling the equipment it needs to operate with, a program of corrective actions would be initiated or its chief operations officer and all his staff would be fired and replaced by capable managers.

We've had over a half a century of failure. How many more decades of failure will be tolerated?

:mad:
 
In any credible organization which has goals to achieve, if its subordinate departments were unreliable or not capable of handling the equipment it needs to operate with, a program of corrective actions would be initiated or its chief operations officer and all his staff would be fired and replaced by capable managers.

We've had over a half a century of failure. How many more decades of failure will be tolerated?

:mad:
Well I’d argue that cutting 1/2 your maneuver elements PYs probably isn’t the solution to our problems.

But yes I generally agree the reserve system needs a massive overhaul.
 
So 2200 total infantry soldiers ? Roughly?
Is that what comes from 12 line Coy's and 3 CS fully manned, with an 3 HQ's that can split when a tank squadron is attached to fight as two combined arms battalion (-)

If so yes. But with the amendment to "2200 total infantry soldiers organized and equipped to fight as mechanized infantry in fully manned 100% RegF Units, roughly"

With x vehicles and y PY's freed up to be assigned to other tasks, free of regimental mafia interference etc. Possibilities
-consolidated and separate light infantry unit (PY's)
-transferred to artillery to bring additional capabilities online (PY's and vehicles)
-transferred to CSS (PY's)
-to provide trainer/maintainer platoons so that the PRes can train on LAV's (PY's and vehicles)
-to pre-position vehicles and maintainers in Europe (PY's and vehicles)
-to convert hulls to fill capability gaps (vehicles)
-to stand up an independent CS btn


Lots of ideas, not enough no how to understand how many resources would be available.
 
Is that what comes from 12 line Coy's and 3 CS fully manned, with an 3 HQ's that can split when a tank squadron is attached to fight as two combined arms battalion (-)

If so yes. But with the amendment to "2200 total infantry soldiers organized and equipped to fight as mechanized infantry in fully manned 100% RegF Units, roughly"

With x vehicles and y PY's freed up to be assigned to other tasks, free of regimental mafia interference etc. Possibilities
-consolidated and separate light infantry unit (PY's)
-transferred to artillery to bring additional capabilities online (PY's and vehicles)
-transferred to CSS (PY's)
-to provide trainer/maintainer platoons so that the PRes can train on LAV's (PY's and vehicles)
-to pre-position vehicles and maintainers in Europe (PY's and vehicles)
-to convert hulls to fill capability gaps (vehicles)
-to stand up an independent CS btn


Lots of ideas, not enough no how to understand how many resources would be available.
Well roughly 140-150 in a rifle company so 600 in 4 companies add a bit more and multiply by three.

What is an independent CS Bn?

How does this organize ?

What regimental mafia issues are fixed if they’re still regiments ?

If your building a new Light Bn then add that in to 4.

What vehicles do the infantry have that will be extra capability to the artillery? Do they need a couple dozen LAVs? What for?

We actually have the PYs available for 80 % manned Bns. We just can’t retain the people. 3 v 4 companies is what ever, we’ve spent a great deal more time going 2 up 1 back with CS as support than we ever did with 4 coys.
 
How do you get 80 manned Bns? Or are you wishing away support completely?


EDIT: Seen.
 
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Well I’d argue that cutting 1/2 your maneuver elements PYs probably isn’t the solution to our problems.
Fully agree. Whenever I look at the possibilities I use as a starting point that fact that the government has already approved to fund X number of Army PYs and Y number of ResF Army positions. I then look at all the PYs that are all already supporting the ResF and try to figure out what can be done with that to improve things and then look elsewhere.
But yes I generally agree the reserve system needs a massive overhaul.
A fine distinction is that it's not just the reserve system that needs a massive overhaul. Its the entire Army that needs a massive overhaul if one wants to create a system that optimizes what each of the RegF and ResF brings to the table. In very simple terms, the RegF brings expertise and a quick reaction capability while the ResF brings cost efficiency and an ability to create a larger force than the RegF alone can generate. It really is a Total Force issue that needs to be addressed.

🍻
 
A fine distinction is that it's not just the reserve system that needs a massive overhaul. Its the entire Army that needs a massive overhaul if one wants to create a system that optimizes what each of the RegF and ResF brings to the table. In very simple terms, the RegF brings expertise and a quick reaction capability while the ResF brings cost efficiency and an ability to create a larger force than the RegF alone can generate. It really is a Total Force issue that needs to be addressed.

🍻

Adm point: based on what we saw during the recent floods in BC's Lower Mainland, the Reserves could be considered 'quick response' if we can shorten the time it takes to load willing soldiers onto Class C contracts in less than 2 or 3 weeks ;)
 
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