Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

I'm not sure that the British Reserve system is the way we want to go.

If I understand things right, basic reserve training in the UK is very brief. Basic Training comes in two parts - Part 1A is four weekends and Part 1B is a two week module. That is followed by Initial Trade Training which, for the infantry for example, is a two week Combat Infantry Course.

Officer training is equally brief coming in four modules of two weeks each for basic training to reach 2nd Lt status. and several more for special to arms training. I wasn't able to determine what the Classification training requirements are but I'm thinking a few two week modules as well. All in all it reminds me very much of the old MITCP program to reserve career progression.

Ongoing commitments are from 19 to 26 days per year.

All-in-all it sounds highly basic and far short of our own training requirements.

Fundamentally I think Canada has two key problems with reserve service which makes our reservists less than optimum.

The first is the 'come-when-you-feel-like-it' model of service. Courses appear adequate but unit training is virtually impossible under this model. Training cannot and does not progress beyond the platoon level. This allows for adequate individual augmentation of RegF units but is totally inadequate as a tool for expanding force capabilities beyond that of RegF establishments.

The second is leadership. ResF leaders are taught the fundamentals of their craft but rarely have the opportunity to put it into practice. Administration requirements are too onerous, take leaders away from actually leading, and above all, the 'come-when-you-feel-like-it' structure of the force is frustrating for leaders, especially RegF RSS staff. Only the most dedicated leaders in ResF units accomplish anything. That isn't good enough. A proper leadership model should make it possible for even average leaders to be successful in their roles.

We can always add more RegF leaders to ResF units (and should do so) but more full-time leaders will not solve the problem until such time that a habit of attendance is created. Very good leaders can accomplish that, but there are too few of them so the sine qua non need is to create a system, reinforced by regulations, that guarantees regular and predictable attendance so that even average leaders can move the goal posts on their units' capabilities.

The highlighted portion is why in my earlier proposal I focused on having each Reserve unit (Company) focus on generating a single Platoon/Troop to augment their Reg Force parent unit.

There are lots of roles (especially CS roles) where having a trained Reserve Platoon to plug into a unit would be of great benefit. In the absence of both the equipment for and a policy calling for expansion of the military through mobilization of the Reserves then effective augmentation capability is good role for the Reserves.

The other benefit of having a bunch of Company-sized Reserve units generating augmentation platoons is that you have a pool of at least partially trained soldiers to draw on if you ever do need to have a more general mobilization. Each Company (and Regional Training Depot) could continue to train new recruits across the country and generate new Platoons to be pulled together by the CF to man any new units generated for mobilization.

 

[FJAG]

The highlighted portion is why in my earlier proposal I focused on having each Reserve unit (Company) focus on generating a single Platoon/Troop to augment their Reg Force parent unit.

There are lots of roles (especially CS roles) where having a trained Reserve Platoon to plug into a unit would be of great benefit. In the absence of both the equipment for and a policy calling for expansion of the military through mobilization of the Reserves then effective augmentation capability is good role for the Reserves.

The other benefit of having a bunch of Company-sized Reserve units generating augmentation platoons is that you have a pool of at least partially trained soldiers to draw on if you ever do need to have a more general mobilization. Each Company (and Regional Training Depot) could continue to train new recruits across the country and generate new Platoons to be pulled together by the CF to man any new units generated for mobilization.

Don't get me wrong, I'm totally behind having ResF CS platoons.

My thought though is that one should push the envelope a bit more to training formed ResF companies, batteries and squadrons albeit with a healthy sprinkling of RegF leadership. The reason I have for that is that it's at the company level that you start to see semi-independent action as well as the integration of all-arms activities. Not so much at the platoon. A company is more of a building block for a battalion than a platoon is of a company. In other words its easier to build a battalion from formed companies then it is to build one from formed platoons.

I'll add to that the fact that currently most ResF battalions or regiments have establishments that roughly equate to company, battery and squadron size as well as having facilities to house them. That tells me that if properly run, they should be able to train and sustain a company-sized sub-unit.

Practically speaking though, I agree with you. Under our current ResF model forming CS platoons is generally doable. Forming full companies is probably a bridge too far at the moment. That's why I think that things need to change rather than fine tuning to the status quo.

 

[GR66]

Don't get me wrong, I'm totally behind having ResF CS platoons.

My thought though is that one should push the envelope a bit more to training formed ResF companies, batteries and squadrons albeit with a healthy sprinkling of RegF leadership. The reason I have for that is that it's at the company level that you start to see semi-independent action as well as the integration of all-arms activities. Not so much at the platoon. A company is more of a building block for a battalion than a platoon is of a company. In other words its easier to build a battalion from formed companies then it is to build one from formed platoons.

I'll add to that the fact that currently most ResF battalions or regiments have establishments that roughly equate to company, battery and squadron size as well as having facilities to house them. That tells me that if properly run, they should be able to train and sustain a company-sized sub-unit.

Practically speaking though, I agree with you. Under our current ResF model forming CS platoons is generally doable. Forming full companies is probably a bridge too far at the moment. That's why I think that things need to change rather than fine tuning to the status quo.

There is no reason that a Company-sized Reserve unit cannot train as a Company in addition to being able to force generate a Platoon. In fact, those Reserve Companies should be double-hatted and grouped together to mobilize as part of Territorial Battalions for domestic response in addition to generating an augmentation Platoon for expeditionary service.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There is no reason that a Company-sized Reserve unit cannot train as a Company in addition to being able to force generate a Platoon. In fact, those Reserve Companies should be double-hatted and grouped together to mobilize as part of Territorial Battalions for domestic response in addition to generating an augmentation Platoon for expeditionary service.

I agree, and I could have easily done that as an OC in a Reserve Infantry Regiment....

.... if over half the (very) meagre training time allotted wasn't taken up with preparing for the:

• Next Change of Command/ Ego Boosting parade, or
• Freedom of the City event, or the Soldiers/ Officers Mess/ WO & Sgts Mess Annual Dinner, or
• Next SAV visit, or
• Hosting of the Bde Comd's Conference/ Annual Bde Dinner, or
• Completion of yet another fairly uselss, and boring, annual IBTS cycle (or other mandatory training) when over half the troops don't need to..

Etcetera, etcetera, etcetera

 

[Kirkhill]

• Protection of public authorities, local governments, critical facilities and communications.
• Deployment at checkpoints.
• Combating sabotage and intelligence forces of the enemy, formed by anti-illegal armed formations and looters.
• Maintaining safety and security on their respective territories (region, city).
• Organization of resistance and (or) guerrilla groups - in case of territory being captured by the enemy.
• Emergencies of natural and man-made disasters in peacetime.[citation needed]

Tasks of the Ukrainian Territorials

• Assist/protect mobilisation of specialised units (Swedish Defence)
• Early intelligence
• Make use of forward operating forces difficult or impossible
• Protect key assets from sabotage and theft by qualified or unqualified actors
• Contingency: Free War Doctrine

Tasks of the Swedish Territorials

Support for the Armed Forces includes:	Support for civil preparedness includes:
Guarding military installations Training of Armed Forces soldiers Marine environment tasks Guarding of air stations Airspace monitoring Sovereignty enforcement at sea .	Assist the police with tasks at sea Securing civilian airports Support TAX at maritime control Barricade Traffic regulation Search

Tasks of the Danish Territorials

All of these people volunteer their time, generally conduct their training on their own time and do much of their training on-line.

They don't fill vacancies in the ranks of the regulars. That is the job of the Reserves and Recruiters.

They perform tasks compatible with their skills and organization so that the Regulars don't have to do them.


Some of them could be available for more comprehensive training that would make them useful to the Regular forces as Augmentees.

 

[FJAG]

I agree, and I could have easily done that as an OC in a Reserve Infantry Regiment....

.... if over half the (very) meagre training time allotted wasn't taken up with preparing for the:

• Next Change of Command/ Ego Boosting parade, or
• Freedom of the City event, or the Soldiers/ Officers Mess/ WO & Sgts Mess Annual Dinner, or
• Next SAV visit, or
• Hosting of the Bde Comd's Conference/ Annual Bde Dinner, or
• Completion of yet another fairly uselss, and boring, annual IBTS cycle (or other mandatory training) when over half the troops don't need to..

It's interesting sometimes to see how experiences can vary. When I was at 26th Fd as RSS the regiment's time was spent in running BMQ, basic gun number, arty sig, driver and tech courses and preparing for and conducting four battery level live-fire exercises every year.

There was an annual ball but no training time was spent on it. No parades. No SAVs and no IBTS in those days. Yup. Had to go to Winnipeg for the odd Bde conference but no troops were harmed or annoyed in the course of that.

Things have changed a bit and it now takes two regiments (Regina and Brandon) and an independent battery (Kenora) to field a six-gun artillery brigade tactical group (whatever the hell that's supposed to be).

 

[daftandbarmy]

It's interesting sometimes to see how experiences can vary. When I was at 26th Fd as RSS the regiment's time was spent in running BMQ, basic gun number, arty sig, driver and tech courses and preparing for and conducting four battery level live-fire exercises every year.

There was an annual ball but no training time was spent on it. No parades. No SAVs and no IBTS in those days. Yup. Had to go to Winnipeg for the odd Bde conference but no troops were harmed or annoyed in the course of that.

Things have changed a bit and it now takes two regiments (Regina and Brandon) and an independent battery (Kenora) to field a six-gun artillery brigade tactical group (whatever the hell that's supposed to be

The levels of interference, and erosion of training time, in what should be a fairly easy to deliver training program are generally astronomical.

Experiences differ depending on who's in charge, of course, but also speaks to the deep lack of accountability for COs to train their troops above more than a very basic level of expertise e.g., IBTS and various mandatory online courses. This was all in the name of 'readiness', I guess.

As a result, we continually had to dumb down training to the lowest common denominator .... in the slivers of time we had available.

 

[FJAG]

The levels of interference, and erosion of training time, in what should be a fairly easy to deliver training program are generally astronomical.

Experiences differ depending on who's in charge, of course, but also speaks to the deep lack of accountability for COs to train their troops above more than a very basic level of expertise e.g., IBTS and various mandatory online courses. This was all in the name of 'readiness', I guess.

As a result, we continually had to dumb down training to the lowest common denominator .... in the slivers of time we had available.

There our experiences are similar. I generally found most ResF COs were disconnected from training. That was usually left with the company/battery commanders - which is generally as it should be although I rarely saw the supervision of training or the field visits which you would expect from CO. In that respect I worked with a couple and saw quite a few when I provided legal advice to them as a DJA and DAJAG. The ones I dealt with as RSSO basically left supervision of training up to me.

Mostly my experience was that COs were deeply wrapped up in administration and/or 'association' matters.

I guess the real difference is whether they allowed those matters to interfere with training.

 

[MilEME09]

There is no reason that a Company-sized Reserve unit cannot train as a Company in addition to being able to force generate a Platoon. In fact, those Reserve Companies should be double-hatted and grouped together to mobilize as part of Territorial Battalions for domestic response in addition to generating an augmentation Platoon for expeditionary service.

In fact STARS says we should be forming platoons. Which in 3 Div, the various platoons would then be bashed together to form a company. What our biggest hindering factor is, our selves. We screamed for purpose, was given it and the first thing I heard was that "its not doable ", no plan to get to the goal, road map, just a nope, to me that's poor leadership.


To solve this I do think the reg force needs to be more involved at the higher levels of Pres leadership, upto and including regular posting of reg force officers as reserve OCs or COs. Many of our leaders need thst mentorship at the senior levels to be more successful in anything but the status quo

 

[Fabius]

It’s been discussed elsewhere about how to effectively get the Reserves to an employable level of training. It’s often been a delta between the Res and the Reg force training and skill levels that has been a problem for integration whether at an individual or unit level.

I wonder if we could alleviate this problem if we worked to change where the reserve personnel come from. Right now we essentially recruit both Reg and Res personnel right off of the street. There is some component transfers back and forth but it’s usually junior reservists going regular and senior retiring regulars going reservist. Most of the junior releases I have seen have declined to join the reserves.

What is we adopted enlistment contracts similar to other countries where in you join up and sign an 8 year contract. First 4 are regular force with the remaining 4 being with a reserve unit (same trade). We would have experienced and fully trained personnel who are qualified LAV Dvr, Gnr, TOW, moving into the reserves able to operate equipment and who would be able to use their reserve mandated trg time to remain proficient vs becoming trained.

I don’t doubt there are some issues to sort out with the concept but it seems to work well elsewhere so I wonder if it would work for us.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It’s been discussed elsewhere about how to effectively get the Reserves to an employable level of training. It’s often been a delta between the Res and the Reg force training and skill levels that has been a problem for integration whether at an individual or unit level.

I wonder if we could alleviate this problem if we worked to change where the reserve personnel come from. Right now we essentially recruit both Reg and Res personnel right off of the street. There is some component transfers back and forth but it’s usually junior reservists going regular and senior retiring regulars going reservist. Most of the junior releases I have seen have declined to join the reserves.

What is we adopted enlistment contracts similar to other countries where in you join up and sign an 8 year contract. First 4 are regular force with the remaining 4 being with a reserve unit (same trade). We would have experienced and fully trained personnel who are qualified LAV Dvr, Gnr, TOW, moving into the reserves able to operate equipment and who would be able to use their reserve mandated trg time to remain proficient vs becoming trained.

I don’t doubt there are some issues to sort out with the concept but it seems to work well elsewhere so I wonder if it would work for us.

Given the current state of our Reserve force I assume that, if we did this, the first four years of a soldier's career would be busy and fruitful with the last four years leaving them to dream about self-harming in some way so they can be released before the end of their contracts

 

[Kirkhill]

Ben Wallace - UK Defence Minister via Paul Mason

Wallace asked can he see way back to a larger army. "If I got new money would i triple the size of the army? No." Talks about boosting UAVs.

Phillips O'Brien

Second, first lessons to be taken from the Ukraine war for the U.K; this is not a justification for a return to a large land army (lots of tanks). Instead future will be more autonomous aerial platforms.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1523637437221978113

 

[Kirkhill]

What is a UAV these days?

How about anything that can fly a non-ballistic trajectory to a designated location? Both armed and unarmed?

That very broad definition would encompass everything from Black Hornet nano-drones through Malloy T-150s to the MQ-8C autonomous Jet Ranger. From 40mm projector launched Drone40s to MLRS launched GLSDBs and Kratos RATO launched Valkyries. From Shoulder launched missiles to cannon launched Volcano and Excalibur rounds. Some that fly pre-programmed paths. Some that incorporate mid-course corrections. Some that have varying degrees of autonomy.

All of which put distance between the target and the killer.

Kevin has long argued against the need for a bayonet lug on his rifle because he would rather eliminate the threat without having to close. Sending a bullet instead of a man. UAV-PGM technology makes the operator more effective at removing threats without having to close.

You don't need as many closers.

 

[McG]

If anyone thinks they have found the next new war winning panacea in the lessons of Ukraine, then they are not paying attention or are seeing what they want.

... or both.

 

[GR66]

What is a UAV these days?

How about anything that can fly a non-ballistic trajectory to a designated location? Both armed and unarmed?

That very broad definition would encompass everything from Black Hornet nano-drones through Malloy T-150s to the MQ-8C autonomous Jet Ranger. From 40mm projector launched Drone40s to MLRS launched GLSDBs and Kratos RATO launched Valkyries. From Shoulder launched missiles to cannon launched Volcano and Excalibur rounds. Some that fly pre-programmed paths. Some that incorporate mid-course corrections. Some that have varying degrees of autonomy.

All of which put distance between the target and the killer.

Kevin has long argued against the need for a bayonet lug on his rifle because he would rather eliminate the threat without having to close. Sending a bullet instead of a man. UAV-PGM technology makes the operator more effective at removing threats without having to close.

You don't need as many closers.

Which is fine...until you start running out of the precision, long-range munitions. Not arguing against getting those systems, but weapon consumption rates in Ukraine show that you'll want to back them up with large volumes of cheap, quick to procure, low-tech systems as well.

 

[Kirkhill]

Which is fine...until you start running out of the precision, long-range munitions. Not arguing against getting those systems, but weapon consumption rates in Ukraine show that you'll want to back them up with large volumes of cheap, quick to procure, low-tech systems as well.

In 1915 they were running out of dumb shells.
In 1940 they were running out of Pilots, Planes, Rifles, Trucks, Boots....

The issue is maintaining a supply of the relevant tools of war.

In 1860 the Confederates were running out of cannons.

The thing is there will always be a run on those things that work. Therefore the need is to be able to produce in bulk that which is being used.

Smart Phones -


GLOBAL YEARLY SMARTPHONE UNIT SALES TO END USERS 2021
1.43bn
GLOBAL ANNUAL SMARTPHONE UNIT SHIPMENTS
1.29 bn
ANNUAL SMARTPHONE SHIPMENTS WITH THE ANDROID OPERATING SYSTEM
1.32bn

Topic: Smartphones

The smartphone industry is one of the largest product markets in the world, and is poised to recover from the initial effects of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.

www.statista.com

I think there is a lot more capacity available to produce Smart Weapons.

 

[KevinB]

If anyone thinks they have found the next new war winning panacea in the lessons of Ukraine, then they are not paying attention or are seeing what they want.

... or both.

Superior Equipment, Superior Training, Superior Numbers, and Superior Logistics
I win

 

[ueo]

And with respect to being engaged in a fight - battle taxis, like the M113, do not engage. They dismount their troops before the fight and go into Zulu harbour. The troops take their pintle mounted gun with them. That was one of the problems with the Grizzly. The guns stayed with the vehicle. As a result the vehicle was drawn into the fight.

Ummmmm what? Doctrine taught at CAS/RCSof I and employed in Europe for a long while allowed the Z harbor but more often the guy on the ground opted to have the 4 vehs form a hull down fire base to sp his attack. Better ammo supply and the Charlie C/S usually mounted an M2. Ever tried to manpack one of those on a quick or deliberate attack with a bunch of ammo? On completion of the task the Pl 2IC would bring the zulus forward and commence normal battle drills.

 

[Kirkhill]

Ummmmm what? Doctrine taught at CAS/RCSof I and employed in Europe for a long while allowed the Z harbor but more often the guy on the ground opted to have the 4 vehs form a hull down fire base to sp his attack. Better ammo supply and the Charlie C/S usually mounted an M2. Ever tried to manpack one of those on a quick or deliberate attack with a bunch of ammo? On completion of the task the Pl 2IC would bring the zulus forward and commence normal battle drills.

Lack of clarity on my part. I was thinking about the defence and being able to dig in. With the M2s on pintles they could be dismounted and dug in. With the AVGP system that was a lot more difficult which meant it tended not to happen.

 

[KevinB]

Lack of clarity on my part. I was thinking about the defence and being able to dig in. With the M2s on pintles they could be dismounted and dug in. With the AVGP system that was a lot more difficult which meant it tended not to happen.

Generally RunUp's where used with the Grizzly's but it really wasn't much of a useful addition - as the turret was crap - and the lack of useful optics meant it was pretty useless at night. It did take a lot of Engineer assets to prep Coy and Bn positions though...