GBAD - The return of 'FOBS'

[Kirkhill]

You are correct that Halifax ceased to be for a good 20 years because of the explosion. I am not denying that we have had tragedies a plenty as a nation that give pause to think about our disaster and emergency response capabilities.

My point was strictly on hostile action from an external force in the form of missile or air attack requiring GBAD of a major city/facility.

Right now, if Kharkiv was Calgary; we'd be fucked. If Tel Aviv was Ottawa, we'd be fucked. If Odessa was Halifax or Victoria... you guessed it, we'd be fucked.

There isn't a thought to these outcomes because of the 200 and even 100 year gap in memory in both the political and electoral populations within this country; and it stems from a false belief that "It could never happen here!"

I pay for insurance not because I plan on running my car into a lamp post, but because when it does happen, I want to make sure I'm not completely screwed. We should view GBAD assets the same way.

Our justification for a GBAD system may actually be better because we are dealing with an occasional, limited risk of an attack. Our risk is of one missile launched by a terrorist rather than multiple barrages launched by armies, navies or air forces. Our risk is manageable with some GBAD assets.

 

[AmmoTech90]

Is it even possible for there to be a miss? Surely the rockets are going to hit something? Isn't that the plan?

I don't think its directly comparable to our need to protect a high value target or overwatch so cost is probably not as important as avoiding taking out our own troops as colateral damage

Sure, it it detonates in empty desert or an empty park it missed. I shoot at a target with my rifle and it doesn't get a hole in it, it's a miss.

Take 1 part civic responsibility, get to the shelters, and 95 parts tech, only intercept incoming that are going to hit something you value. That leaves the failures, running out of ammo, 1 too many incoming to the last 4 parts.
Note the quantity of "parts" are examples.

Iron Dome is designed for high value targets. If something isn't going to impact in an area you designate it doesn't get engaged.

 

[AmmoTech90]

Our justification for a GBAD system may actually be better because we are dealing with an occasional, limited risk of an attack. Our risk is of one missile launched by a terrorist rather than multiple barrages launched by armies, navies or air forces. Our risk is manageable with some GBAD assets.

How many missiles has Russia launched in any single salvo?
How many dumb rockets are launched at Israel by a terrorist organization on a bad day?
How easy is it for some redneck rebels to get some pipe and find a sympathetic oilfield chemist and engineer. (Example only- could be angry cat people). It's hard for a new terrorist organization to execute attacks.

The reason we are lucky is that it is actually difficult to keep plans anything secret when there's more than one of you. But that sort of enemy only has to get lucky once.

 

[Kirkhill]

How many missiles has Russia launched in any single salvo?
How many dumb rockets are launched at Israel by a terrorist organization on a bad day?
How easy is it for some redneck rebels to get some pipe and find a sympathetic oilfield chemist and engineer. (Example only- could be angry cat people). It's hard for a new terrorist organization to execute attacks.

The reason we are lucky is that it is actually difficult to keep plans anything secret when there's more than one of you. But that sort of enemy only has to get lucky once.

Fair. So what, if any, GBAD coverage would be right for Canadian cities?

 

[AmmoTech90]

Fair. So what, if any, GBAD coverage would be right for Canadian cities?

Depends on the threat. Right now there is no threat at the level we are talking about. I think we as a nation should have some sort of BMD-like system shared with the US. Remember threat is risk and probability. The risk from nuclear weapons is huge even if the probability is low.
The probability of barrages of 122mm rockets is minimal and the risk is really medium falling to low as targets are hardened and we become aware of the threat.
The first attack would suck.
I think there would be very quick GBAD based mitigation would be implemented after a successful attack has demonstrated that security service mitigation failed.
The risk of an attack also changes based on things like who is in the area, witness ADATS at G7.

 

[Kirkhill]

@AmmoTech90

So if I go back to this map I created, depicting all the major ports, airports and sites of military significance, protected by 40 km radius bubbles, I ended up with 48 sites, covering about 1% of the landmass but over 90% of the population and all of the major cities.

How many systems?
How many launchers?
How many missiles?
At what readiness?
Stationed how close to the targets?
Permanently stationed units on site or GBAD units held with the Brigades for multi-tasking?

My inclination is towards one system for each site, with a small number of launchers (1 or 2) with a small number of missiles 4 to 8 total per site, permanently located and manned and ready to launch.

The whole issue to be backed by mobile GBAD batteries with the Brigades.

For Continental coverage 3 or 4 AEGIS Ashore (SM2/SM3/SM6) or THAADs Batteries placed high in the North - Alert, Resolute, Inuvik, Iqaluit eg.
coupled with RCN CSC patrols on the approaches

And all, of course, backed by the RCAF F35s.

 

[AmmoTech90]

How many systems?
How many launchers?
How many missiles?
At what readiness?
Stationed how close to the targets?
Permanently stationed units on site or GBAD units held with the Brigades for multi-tasking?

Pointless questions unless you know the system your going to use.

For the rest, sure. Any of the above. Barring an actual attack, by the time any of this gets bought there will be other stuff on the market.

 

[Kirkhill]

Pointless questions unless you know the system your going to use.

For the rest, sure. Any of the above. Barring an actual attack, by the time any of this gets bought there will be other stuff on the market.

Let me put it another way.

What is worth defending? And how would you defend it?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Kirkhill, what can possibly be the point for air defense of your CSC "patrols" of choke points such as Cabot Strait, Strait of Belle-Isle, Juan de Fuca Strait, and both ends of the North West Passage?

Do you actually expect our potential ennemies will somehow try and sneak a cruise missiles through those gaps to "elude" our GBAD? Or that they will try and sail their ships through those gaps to get closer before launching - when they can in fact launch at us from their own waters?

Rhetorical question here: Why are army people somehow always thinking geographically in terms of hundreds of square kilometer theaters? The naval view takes in hundreds of thousands, even millions of square Kms as their theater of operation.

If you did, instead of having CSC's patroling "approaches" (whatever that is in maritime terms), you would have had, as the primary system, fleets of MPA's compiling the recognized maritime picture so that the CSC's could be deployed to the most likely location permitting intercepts.

 

[Kirkhill]

Kirkhill, what can possibly be the point for air defense of your CSC "patrols" of choke points such as Cabot Strait, Strait of Belle-Isle, Juan de Fuca Strait, and both ends of the North West Passage?

Do you actually expect our potential ennemies will somehow try and sneak a cruise missiles through those gaps to "elude" our GBAD? Or that they will try and sail their ships through those gaps to get closer before launching - when they can in fact launch at us from their own waters?

Rhetorical question here: Why are army people somehow always thinking geographically in terms of hundreds of square kilometer theaters? The naval view takes in hundreds of thousands, even millions of square Kms as their theater of operation.

If you did, instead of having CSC's patroling "approaches" (whatever that is in maritime terms), you would have had, as the primary system, fleets of MPA's compiling the recognized maritime picture so that the CSC's could be deployed to the most likely location permitting intercepts.

I am assuming that regardless of where the CSC patrols, in home waters, foreign waters or the High Seas, it will have its own Air Defence Bubble.

That makes it one of the few places where Canadians are protected against incoming missiles.

As to patrolling choke points - I would have left it up to the Coast Guard or the Mounties to monitor inbound traffic. But the Coast Guard aren't armed and the Mounties seem to want to be able to cadge a lift on an RCN or Coast Guard vessel.

My sense was that if there is going to be Continental Integrated Air Missile Defence Plan, and the RCN is going to be involved, and the RCN is going to have the capability to add to that defence then somebody is going to post it some place. In the absence of any greater knowledge I plunked a CSC in the middle of the North Atlantic and another in the middle of the North Pacific.



As to monitoring choke points

Specifically

Dixon Entrance
Straits of Juan de Fuca
Cabot Straits
Straits of Belleisle
Hudson Strait
Nares Strait
Barrow Strait

By their nature Choke Points can be monitored and defended from land, or by air, or by sea. I'd like to think somebody had a plan to lock them up but I fear the Army will be busy in Latvia and the Navy will be engaged off Taiwan escorting American carriers. I guess that leaves it to the Air Force.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

My point about the choke points was only that this thread deals with continental missiles defence. With your plan using bubles of defense at the sites of important targets, I was trying to figure out why we would have anything sit at those choke points for that purpose only of missile defense. That's all. I don't see why the actual passages would be missile targets. Vessels within them maybe, but the intel required for a foreign nation to usefully do that is quite beyond most as you need real time knowledge of the transit. Land targets are a much better employment for the few and expensive long range missiles at issue here, IMHO.

 

[KevinB]

My point about the choke points was only that this thread deals with continental missiles defence. With your plan using bubles of defense at the sites of important targets, I was trying to figure out why we would have anything sit at those choke points for that purpose only of missile defense. That's all. I don't see why the actual passages would be missile targets. Vessels within them maybe, but the intel required for a foreign nation to usefully do that is quite beyond most as you need real time knowledge of the transit. Land targets are a much better employment for the few and expensive long range missiles at issue here, IMHO.

Depending on your missile the choke points can interdict targets that can bubble the surrounding area and anything that would pass over into the major population areas.

Control the coasts and nothing can get through to the center.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Depending on your missile the choke points can interdict targets that can bubble the surrounding area and anything that would pass over into the major population areas.

Control the coasts and nothing can get through to the center.

Alfred Thayer Mahan has entered the chat.

 

[AmmoTech90]

Let me put it another way.

What is worth defending? And how would you defend it?

Canadian civilians and infrastructure.
Security services- RCMP, CSIS, CSE, others.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm starting to feel like a Rheinmetall pimp

But

good descriptive videos

Canada-Quebec link

 

[FJAG]

Anyone else a little nervous about the name "Skynex"?

 

[Kirkhill]

A bit more catalog shopping.

I thought I would give our newest allies some time

Saab MSHORAD

The mobile shield that will transform ground-based air defence

Saab’s Mobile Short-Range Air Defence system is a vehicle-integrated solution that can identify, counter and neutralise air threats quickly, effectively and decisively.

www.saab.com

Interesting that the transporter seems to be in the TAPV class.

And it has height adjusting suspension.

 

[OldSolduer]

Anyone else a little nervous about the name "Skynex"?

Now that you mention it.....

 

[Kirkhill]

And working at higher altitudes and speeds - this is more applicable to the Prime Minister's promissory note on NORAD.
Some really useful graphics.

Why is the US investing $1.3bn into a hypersonic weapons satellite tracking system?

The move aims to expand and enhance the US' ability to counter increasing missile threats from Russia and China.

www.forces.net

 

[Kirkhill]

Interesting simulation of a NASAMs battery with 48 AIM-120Cs operating against simulated Russian cruise missiles.

Don't know about the Probability of Kill assessments but it is interesting to see how the pieces are supposed to work together.

4 runs made

1st run - 12 missiles vs no NASAMs
2nd run - 12 missiles vs NASAMs
3rd run - 24 missiles vs NASAMs
4th run - 48 missiles vs NASAMs.