Government hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I have long said that you could fund the CAF to 4 percent of GDP, but we would still lag behind in NATO and be much the same where we are.

It's never the money, it's politics. It's procedures. It's the pork-barreling in our defence spending that makes us a paper tiger in NATO.

My only hope in all of this for the CAF and the GoC, whatever the political stripe that may be, is that it will rouse them out of the "Peace Dividend" slumber. The world has been unstable since 1945. We have used geography, proximity, and association as a Defence Policy ever since. ICBMs don't care how close to the U.S. or how far from Russia/China we are.

Don't give us a dime more, but let us spend money on defence like it matters. The fact we follow the same rules for purchasing a fighter aircraft as we do for buying office furniture for a Service Canada office is disgraceful. Don't treat defense procurement as a stimulus package for Canadian Industry. There I said it.

We spend so much money, time, and effort trying to get that money to stay in Canada; be it by awarding contracts to companies with no capability to produce items without first "retooling" and"developing the production lines", or by hamstringing perfectly competent and competitive bidders by forcing the project to be made in St. Margaret de Poutain de Champignon, QC because the ruling government either lost the seat in the election, or won it with promises.

We spend so much money and staff hours jumping through TBS regulations that are great for other departments, but are terrible for defence procurement. Some items you have to sole source, because there are technologies and capabilities no one else makes. By doing the bid process, you get companies clamoring for a project they can't deliver on, but because they tick the bright boxes on the score sheet....

I truly and honestly belief we need to split from PSPC and legislate that its not beholden to TBS, only to the PBO/PCO. The guiding principles of this new Defence Procurement department should be "Off the shelf, from somewhere else" if there isn't an industry in Canada.

BOOTFORGEN has demonstrated how well we do when we are able to actually get what we need, instead of lining the pockets of a Canadian company that got lucky.

That, but with tanks, fighters, ships, weapons systems....

 

[FJAG]

I should probably get a copy of Relentless Struggle, if only to see if I was name checked.

You are not in the index. Sorry.

If they talk about Army Reserve structure and funding in the early 2000s, I should be.

It talks a lot about reserve restructure in the early 2000s. Fitch gets mentioned a lot.

My copy is a paper trade edition but there is now a pdf version available direct from The Dorchester Review for eleven bucks which is a good deal and hopefully searchable.

If you get one, and its searchable, then I might get one too and give the paper one to my local library.

 

[Halifax Tar]

One needs to look at the leadership of the ARes. Effectively its a divide and conquer concept. Other than the CCA, there is no one commander of the ARes. (and in fact I think there shouldn't be - it should be total force). The most senior ARes guy is a BGen - Director General Army Reserve - who is a staff officer and not a commander. Most of the DGARs (and former DG Land Reserve) that I knew were good folks but had limited mandates which pointed primarily at improving force generation of individual augmentees for Afghanistan (which they accomplished) But, they were simply one voice - and a voice with little impact - at the table of army reform. ARes reform MUST be part of army reform or it will never work.

If the direction at the most senior level is to improve the implementation of stage 2 mobilization and ignore Stages 3 and 4 because the army as a whole is ignoring stages 3 and 4, where do you find the impetus for reform from the bottom up. Cross country ARes CO workshops are few and far between and have about as much impact on the CAF proper as our discussions in this forum.

I'm not sure if you have read Relentless Struggle. It's a biased account commissioned by Reserves 2000, but delivers a lot of insight as to how sausages are made in the factory that is NDHQ/CFHQ. It does point out fairly well that there are two solitudes: The Reserves 2000 view of a bigger stronger, well equipped ARes pointed at Stage 3 and 4 mobilization; and the RegF army view based on fiscal limitations, an ever challenging requirement to do more with less, and need to deal with day-to-day crises that suck up all the oxygen in the room.

In short, the CAF and the CA are not good at planning long range. The system makes that difficult and even the best commanders quickly get sucked into putting out the daily brushfires.

So to get to this point. No one who matters gives a shit as to what the ARes wants and at the same time they have no idea what they want from the ARes beyond individual augmentation while sensing that there should be more.

That all makes me sad. Because I see a lot of potential in the ARes. I see a generally really motivated group people. And I will take that kind of troop any day, and twice on Sunday.

FGing civilians needs to be an assigned role and it should be part of a plan - but can you honestly see the 70 some odd folks that make up today's 3rd SRR capable of being the core to train a civilian battalion of civilians to DP1? We constantly deride Sam Hughes and his ad hoc manner of raising the Canadian Expeditionary Corps but for two decades now we have made ad hocing operational Frankensteinian battle groups an art form. Just watch out if we ever need to deploy a division. I suggest a structure and methodology to do that as part of Unsustainable at Any Price.

I think they could. I also think on a time of national mobilization our BRT and DP1 will look very different.

Your view that there will never be a need to send the 3rd SRR to war is shared by many in the RegF and is the root of why the CAF and the CA ignore Stage 3 mobilization or even buying equipment for the ARes. Personally I think that is a dangerous viewpoint for any national military to have. It coincides with reducing war stocks of ammunition to near zero and having no domestic defence industry that can expand to fill war time needs. As a national security insurance policy it sucks big time. The issue should be: How do we maintain a Stage 3 and 4 mobilization capability at a reasonable and sustainable cost? That may or may not include a method by which the 3rd SRR can be sent off to war.

Why deploy the 3rd SRR when you can just incorporate their troops into the already existing deployed organizations ?

I don't make these decisions, just something I suspect.

I also don't see a national mobilization scenario unless the North America itself is under threat. Hell we couldn't even really nationally mobilize during 2 world wars.

 

[dapaterson]

You are not in the index. Sorry.

It talks a lot about reserve restructure in the early 2000s. Fitch gets mentioned a lot.

My copy is a paper trade edition but there is now a pdf version available direct from The Dorchester Review for eleven bucks which is a good deal and hopefully searchable.

If you get one, and its searchable, then I might get one too and give the paper one to my local library.

Oh Ed. I have Ed stories. Even stories about Ed's moustache. Some stories about Ed's moustache when it wasn't even in the room.

 

[KevinB]

Your not describing a problem. What do we need to fix? What is broken that needs this solution?

TBH I’ve been out for over 2 decades so I cannot say with any certainty. Based on comments here (again anecdotal) there is the issue of moving needed experience out for career growth whether the person wanted it or not - and the loss of corporate knowledge due to repeated issues of this, and this applies (again based on anecdotal comments here) to be common in the Army, Navy and RCAF.

 

[FJAG]

Why deploy the 3rd SRR when you can just incorporate their troops into the already existing deployed organizations ?

Because I'm looking to create an army bigger then our current three mechanized brigades and one CCSB.

The corollary of an expanded army, and one which the RegF fears, is an army based on the 3 + 1 structure and all of its current equipment but with 50% of the positions designated as war establishment to be filled by ARes pers. Basically we cut the full-time army by some 10,000 people and fill those positions, when needed, from a part-time ARes of 20,000 folks: 10,000 to fill positions and 10,000 to be the core for national mobilization.

I don't advocate that solution because I think that Canada's army is currently inadequate in deployable capabilities. I do believe that it could have twice the deployable capabilities using existing RegF and ResF personnel if it were properly configured, equipped and trained.

I also don't see a national mobilization scenario unless the North America itself is under threat.

Personally I think N America, and Canada in particular, is already under threat and even hostile acts. We're just not under active conflict. I don't believe in waiting for that stage. We staved off Soviet designs in Europe through a credible defence posture during the Cold War. Unfortunately, unless another Gorbachev comes along, or we resume becoming a nuclear armed country, we're stuck with a hostile opponent who isn't afraid to gather low hanging fruit in Europe or even here.

I guess my growing up in the 1960s where we were taught how to stick our heads under our school desks in case of a nuclear attack beat the Pollyanna ought of me. Hope for the best but plan and build for the worst is what deterrence is all about.

Hell we couldn't even really nationally mobilize during 2 world wars.

I think Canada's mobilizing 600,000 folks out of a population of 8 million in WW1 and a putting a million people into uniform from a population of 11 million in WW2 is a pretty solid effort. There were problems to be sure but at least there were plans and time and a reserve force in each case large enough to build on.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I would still keep the 10,000 Reg army types, but do everything else you suggest and tweak the budget to match.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Because I'm looking to create an army bigger then our current three mechanized brigades and one CCSB.

Why does 3 SRR not being a deployed as a unit hinder that ?

They are still sending their people, just not the the regiment.

The corollary of an expanded army, and one which the RegF fears, is an army based on the 3 + 1 structure and all of its current equipment but with 50% of the positions designated as war establishment to be filled by ARes pers. Basically we cut the full-time army by some 10,000 people and fill those positions, when needed, from a part-time ARes of 20,000 folks: 10,000 to fill positions and 10,000 to be the core for national mobilization.

I thought you didn't want to cut positions in the reg force you wanted to redistribute them ?

I don't advocate that solution because I think that Canada's army is currently inadequate in deployable capabilities. I do believe that it could have twice the deployable capabilities using existing RegF and ResF personnel if it were properly configured, equipped and trained.

I think 6 month rotations since the 60s have left us unable send an Army to foreign land and tell them not to come until they've won.

It will be a tough lesson when the ball drops.

Personally I think N America, and Canada in particular, is already under threat and even hostile acts. We're just not under active conflict. I don't believe in waiting for that stage. We staved off Soviet designs in Europe through a credible defence posture during the Cold War. Unfortunately, unless another Gorbachev comes along, or we resume becoming a nuclear armed country, we're stuck with a hostile opponent who isn't afraid to gather low hanging fruit in Europe or even here.

Wouldn't it have been nice to have had Govs since the 60s who took our job seriously ?

I think Canada's mobilizing 600,000 folks out of a population of 8 million in WW1 and a putting a million people into uniform from a population of 11 million in WW2 is a pretty solid effort. There were problems to be sure but at least there were plans and time and a reserve force in each case large enough to build on.

So long as we acquiesced to the Franco protests.

 

[KevinB]

Why does 3 SRR not being a deployed as a unit hinder that ?

The problem is that looks at an augmentation force, as opposed to actual formed units training together.

They are still sending their people, just not the the regiment.

I thought you didn't want to cut positions in the reg force you wanted to redistribute them ?

Personally I think you need to add to the Reg Force and massively add to the Reserves.

I don’t see how a G7 Nation can’t have

I think 6 month rotations since the 60s have left us unable send an Army to foreign land and tell them not to come until they've won.

100%

It will be a tough lesson when the ball drops.

Very very true

Wouldn't it have been nice to have had Govs since the 60s who took our job seriously ?

The feast or famine years since never kept the CAF in proper shape. The decline has been significant.

So long as we acquiesced to the Franco protests.

Service equals citizenship…

 

[McG]

Based on comments here (again anecdotal) there is the issue of moving needed experience out for career growth whether the person wanted it or not - and the loss of corporate knowledge due to repeated issues of this, and this applies (again based on anecdotal comments here) to be common in the Army, Navy and RCAF.

These are not things that could be fixed with a new rank group. Compensation problems will not be solved with a new rank class. Imposing of career development requirements (courses & postings) beyond core technical competencies will not go away with a new rank class. Commanders ignoring technical expertise will not stop because of a new rank class. Crappy HR systems and practices will not go away with a new rank class. Some of these problems are even likely to be exacerbated.

We have doctors who think they should have access to more GSO jobs through careers to build competitiveness for access to more GOFO jobs at the end of their careers … because that’s just fair. If elements of the medical community can lose focus on why they exist to that degree, we are not insulting other specialists from the same mistakes.

Create a US style WO class and our egalitarian views will quickly decide that they should have access to CO positions because they are capable of doing the job so it is fair that they should have a path to do that (and, the template US WO class already has that path). But then that path becomes core to the occupation, and we start pulling people away from the technical functions for which the occupation exists so they can attend courses and experience jobs to one day be ready to fill a position that does not require the exquisite competencies that the individual actually embodies (and for which they an appropriate paycheque).

 

[Brad Sallows]

These are not things that could be fixed with a new rank group. Compensation problems will not be solved with a new rank class. Imposing of career development requirements (courses & postings) beyond core technical competencies will not go away with a new rank class. Commanders ignoring technical expertise will not stop because of a new rank class. Crappy HR systems and practices will not go away with a new rank class. Some of these problems are even likely to be exacerbated.

Why does "new rank class" have to solve so many problems? I can see the point of bringing in helicopter pilots or physician's assistants or IT/comm/EW geeks with no expectation that they will ever "command" much beyond a small team. No commission needed. Waste of years to advance from Pte(R) to whatever NCM rank is thought to be competitive for compensation.

Whether or not some people might in future agitate for additional responsibilities isn't relevant; it's just made-up fear. The universe of made-up fears is approximately infinite. Which do we allow into the estimate, and which are excluded? Is the institution incapable of saying "No, the lane for this rank class is what it is"?

 

[Blackadder1916]

I also don't see a national mobilization scenario unless the North America itself is under threat. Hell we couldn't even really nationally mobilize during 2 world wars.

Huh?

Usually, especially on these means, "mobilization" is automatically connected to military manpower requirements (e.g., conscription). However, military conscription was only one part of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940 that gave the government the power to
". . . do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, requiring persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty in right of Canada, as may be deemed necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community."

Beside directing private industry what they could do with their raw material, what they could manufacture and who they could hire, mobilization also meant that every male over the age of 16 had to be registered for employment, not in military service but for civilian employment. There were probably more civilians affected by mandatory employment in war industry (that included agriculture and resource extraction) than the "zombies" who were put into uniform.

 

[FJAG]

Why does 3 SRR not being a deployed as a unit hinder that ?

There are 9 equipped, deployable RegF infantry battalions and 50 unequipped, non deployable ResF ones. I want 18 equipped, deployable total force ones;

There are 3 equipped, deployable RegF armoured regiments and 18 unequipped, non deployable ResF ones. I want 8 equipped, deployable total force ones;

There are 4 equipped, deployable RegF arty regiments and the equivalent of 17 unequipped, non deployable ResF ones. I want 9 equipped, deployable total force ones.

There are three equipped, deployable RegF bde HQs and 11 unequipped, non deployable RegF and ResF ones. I want 11+ equipped and deployable total force bde HQs (6+ manoeuvre; 2 arty; 1 CS; and 2 sustainment)

There is maybe 1 equipped, deployable RegF div HQ and 4 unequipped, nondeployable RegF ones. I want 2 equipped, deployable total force ones.

It's the same for engineers, signals, CSS. You can take what Canada has and create what I want using the same number of authorized personnel but with more equipment.

I thought you didn't want to cut positions in the reg force you wanted to redistribute them ?

Correct. I don't want to. I want a bigger, better army. But . . . if Canada is satisfied with just 3 +1 equipped bdes then its a real option to do them cheaper by cutting out RegF PYs and assigning them to use the current augmentation model to fill the war establishment and to fill out peacetime rotos with cheaper reservists.

Create a US style WO class and our egalitarian views will quickly decide that they should have access to CO positions because they are capable of doing the job so it is fair that they should have a path to do that (and, the template US WO class already has that path).

Why not? If they can. That's actually a real thing in the Singapore army where many of the training establishments are run by WOs. I saw a video on the first female CO of the Singapore armoured combat training centre. She was an SWO (which I understand is roughly the equivalent of a US army WO4 which is the rough pay/responsibility equivalent of a LCol in the US Army).

 

[dapaterson]

The Reg F Army is not equipped. To say so is inaccurate at least.

 

[FJAG]

The Reg F Army is not equipped. To say so is inaccurate at least.

On the scale of 1) fully equipped; 2) mostly equipped; and 3) totally screwed, the RegF is at 2) and the ResF at 3).

 

[quadrapiper]

Why not? If they can. That's actually a real thing in the Singapore army where many of the training establishments are run by WOs. I saw a video on the first female CO of the Singapore armoured combat training centre. She was an SWO (which I understand is roughly the equivalent of a US army WO4 which is the rough pay/responsibility equivalent of a LCol in the US Army).

This, especially within the arcs of their trade or field (e.g., a hypothetical green Tac Hel platoon formed of flying WOs and supporting pers, various species of shop, office, and cell, medical establishments, etc.).

Hopefully the creation of this sort of WO would also come with CFR, CT, and similar transitions mapped out.

Thoughts on pushing CPO1/CWO back into trades, aside from the Tech WO concept? Not sure, from my limited exposure, it's done anyone any favours.

 

[Kirkhill]

I guess my growing up in the 1960s where we were taught how to stick our heads under our school desks in case of a nuclear attack beat the Pollyanna ought of me. Hope for the best but plan and build for the worst is what deterrence is all about.

I keep hearing this from contemporaries and I know you have a decade or so on me but I never caught that bug. And I don't think any of my schoolmates did either, regardless of CND Ban the Bomb parades.

Did growing up around bomb-sites and overgrown airfields, surrounded by army surplus kit in the sheds and attics, every male in the family for three generations in uniform, mothers and grannies nursing or at the WI, National Service still part of life, active events from Korea, to Suez, to Malaya, to Cyprus, to Borneo, to Aden, father passing on tips on what to expect (not Hollywood) and how to survive change that perception?

For me and most of my mates it wasn't so much fear of it happening, or even believing that it will never happen, so much as there ain't nuffink I can do abaht it. What's on telly?

....

I think a contributing factor to us moving to Canada was the day, about the time of Churchill's funeral, I was 8 or so, I asked Dad if I was going to have to go to war when I grew up. As I said, every male that I knew had been to war. And Dad was teaching me not to stick the knife in too deep. 4 inches. Under the ribs. Wiggle it around.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think a contributing factor to us moving to Canada was the day, about the time of Churchill's funeral, I was 8 or so, I asked Dad if I was going to have to go to war when I grew up. As I said, every male that I knew had been to war. And Dad was teaching me not to stick the knife in too deep. 4 inches. Under the ribs. Wiggle it around.

And keep your shovel sharpened

 

[Kirkhill]

And keep your shovel sharpened

Who needs a baton when you have an entrenching tool handle?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Who needs a baton when you have an entrenching tool handle?

View attachment 93593

That's for the old pick axe.

When used properly, you can clearly hear it connect with a human skull from quite a distance

 

[Kirkhill]

Concern expressed about fighting the right war....

It may apply to Starmer's buddy Mark Carney.

Keir Starmer is wasting his time trying to defeat Putin’s army​

Instead of focusing on increasing defence spending, the UK should prioritise on fighting Russia’s ‘active measures’

Harlan Ullman
Related Topics

• Ministry of Defence,
• Russia,
• Vladimir Putin,
• Cyber defence

30 May 2025 4:09pm BST


If he is not careful, British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer could find himself metaphorically riding alongside Lord Cardigan astride his horse Ronald in a modern day version of the Light Brigade’s disastrous cavalry charge.

For Starmer, it is not the valley of death in Balaclava he faces, which was brilliantly described in Alfred Lord Tennyson’s poem of tribute to the brigade’s immortal six hundred men.

Instead, this “valley of death” is the concept of a “defence dividend” the Labour Party is counting on to remove itself from political life support. Unlike the promised “peace dividend” arising from the end of the Cold War that was never delivered, Starmer’s defence dividend is intended to supercharge Britain’s economic growth, and thus save the Labour Party from an ignominious defeat.

In 2027, the UK will increase defence spending to 2.5 per cent of its GDP. This stimulus, the public has been told, will strengthen both the British military and provide hundreds of thousands of jobs to build a new arsenal of democracy.

However, as with Cardigan, this charge has more than a few problems that must be fixed if Labour is to retain power. Consider three.

This increase in defence spending, according to currently serving senior British military officers, will not sustain the already tiny UK force, most likely bringing further reductions.

Along with the submarine nuclear deterrent, the Royal Navy has two aircraft carriers and sixteen surface combatants. The Army is down to about 70,000 soldiers. The Royal Air Force musters 137 Typhoon fighter-bomber jets and with the RN 35 F-35B’s scheduled to be increased to 74 by 2033.

As former UK Chief of Defence General The Lord David Richards notes, the brigade he commanded (about 5-7,000 soldiers) in Germany during the Cold War had more firepower than the British Army has today. So unless a new strategy or real change is imposed, the defence dividend will not improve the state of the UK military.

Second, if history matters, more defence spending is unlikely to empower the substantial economic growth Labour needs to become competitive. Under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, large defence spending increases were made. But the economic impact was minor and huge budget deficits accrued.

Third, the most important consequence is strategic. Increasing defence spending will do nothing to address the most dangerous threat currently posed by Russia. Devastated by losses in Ukraine, a Russian military attack on Western Europe or even the threat of one should not be the principal strategic focus.

That Russia is supposedly stiffening defences on its 1400 mile border with Finland is meant to justify the threat to the West. An example is a small decrepit hospital being upgraded near that border. Almost certainly, the hospital is being renovated to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of wounded Russians as far from public view as possible. Yet, who in power in the West will argue that the likelihood of a Russian attack West is practically zero?

No one can win or would fight a nuclear war. It will take five and probably double that number of years for the Russian military to recover from the thrashing it is taking in Ukraine – the US military needed about a decade to rebuild after Vietnam. So what does Vladimir Putin do? The answer is “active measures,” often mischaracterised as “hybrid, asymmetric war or grey zone operations.”

Active measures include espionage; infrastructure and cyber attacks; mis- and disinformation; psychological operations; assassinations and intimidation; and massive propaganda among other tools from Lenin’s playbook. Clearly the West is not ignorant of this threat. But complaints are not action.

Can some of this defence dividend be used to counter Russia’s “active measures” beyond whatever resources are currently allocated? Rather than spend a bit more to defend against active measures, money will go to deterring a distant conventional military threat that may never fully materialise.

Active measures cannot be countered with what the defence dividend and spending on traditional forces will buy: ships, aircraft, expensive combat systems and vehicles.

And, frankly, when the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) is released, do not count on it addressing this issue. So can this strategic disconnect with Russian active measures be repaired?

Putin must be thinking what a geostrategic windfall this is for him. Putin knows that reconstituting his forces takes time. But the US and its European allies are convinced that the Russian army still represents a potent military threat to Nato. Thus, Putin can run virtually unchecked in exploiting active measures. Is anyone in Number 10 listening?

Governments in debt want to raise money to spend.
Putin's threats and Trump's tariffs give cover.
Add in 1.5% of GDP for dual purpose infra-structure investments.

Basically a follow on to this article

RUSI Article on Grey Zone Operations