I'll believe it when I see it.
You are not in the index. Sorry.I should probably get a copy of Relentless Struggle, if only to see if I was name checked.
It talks a lot about reserve restructure in the early 2000s. Fitch gets mentioned a lot.If they talk about Army Reserve structure and funding in the early 2000s, I should be.
One needs to look at the leadership of the ARes. Effectively its a divide and conquer concept. Other than the CCA, there is no one commander of the ARes. (and in fact I think there shouldn't be - it should be total force). The most senior ARes guy is a BGen - Director General Army Reserve - who is a staff officer and not a commander. Most of the DGARs (and former DG Land Reserve) that I knew were good folks but had limited mandates which pointed primarily at improving force generation of individual augmentees for Afghanistan (which they accomplished) But, they were simply one voice - and a voice with little impact - at the table of army reform. ARes reform MUST be part of army reform or it will never work.
If the direction at the most senior level is to improve the implementation of stage 2 mobilization and ignore Stages 3 and 4 because the army as a whole is ignoring stages 3 and 4, where do you find the impetus for reform from the bottom up. Cross country ARes CO workshops are few and far between and have about as much impact on the CAF proper as our discussions in this forum.
I'm not sure if you have read Relentless Struggle. It's a biased account commissioned by Reserves 2000, but delivers a lot of insight as to how sausages are made in the factory that is NDHQ/CFHQ. It does point out fairly well that there are two solitudes: The Reserves 2000 view of a bigger stronger, well equipped ARes pointed at Stage 3 and 4 mobilization; and the RegF army view based on fiscal limitations, an ever challenging requirement to do more with less, and need to deal with day-to-day crises that suck up all the oxygen in the room.
In short, the CAF and the CA are not good at planning long range. The system makes that difficult and even the best commanders quickly get sucked into putting out the daily brushfires.
So to get to this point. No one who matters gives a shit as to what the ARes wants and at the same time they have no idea what they want from the ARes beyond individual augmentation while sensing that there should be more.
FGing civilians needs to be an assigned role and it should be part of a plan - but can you honestly see the 70 some odd folks that make up today's 3rd SRR capable of being the core to train a civilian battalion of civilians to DP1? We constantly deride Sam Hughes and his ad hoc manner of raising the Canadian Expeditionary Corps but for two decades now we have made ad hocing operational Frankensteinian battle groups an art form. Just watch out if we ever need to deploy a division. I suggest a structure and methodology to do that as part of Unsustainable at Any Price.
Your view that there will never be a need to send the 3rd SRR to war is shared by many in the RegF and is the root of why the CAF and the CA ignore Stage 3 mobilization or even buying equipment for the ARes. Personally I think that is a dangerous viewpoint for any national military to have. It coincides with reducing war stocks of ammunition to near zero and having no domestic defence industry that can expand to fill war time needs. As a national security insurance policy it sucks big time. The issue should be: How do we maintain a Stage 3 and 4 mobilization capability at a reasonable and sustainable cost? That may or may not include a method by which the 3rd SRR can be sent off to war.
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Oh Ed. I have Ed stories. Even stories about Ed's moustache. Some stories about Ed's moustache when it wasn't even in the room.You are not in the index. Sorry.
It talks a lot about reserve restructure in the early 2000s. Fitch gets mentioned a lot.
My copy is a paper trade edition but there is now a pdf version available direct from The Dorchester Review for eleven bucks which is a good deal and hopefully searchable.
If you get one, and its searchable, then I might get one too and give the paper one to my local library.
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TBH I’ve been out for over 2 decades so I cannot say with any certainty. Based on comments here (again anecdotal) there is the issue of moving needed experience out for career growth whether the person wanted it or not - and the loss of corporate knowledge due to repeated issues of this, and this applies (again based on anecdotal comments here) to be common in the Army, Navy and RCAF.Your not describing a problem. What do we need to fix? What is broken that needs this solution?
Because I'm looking to create an army bigger then our current three mechanized brigades and one CCSB.Why deploy the 3rd SRR when you can just incorporate their troops into the already existing deployed organizations ?
Personally I think N America, and Canada in particular, is already under threat and even hostile acts. We're just not under active conflict. I don't believe in waiting for that stage. We staved off Soviet designs in Europe through a credible defence posture during the Cold War. Unfortunately, unless another Gorbachev comes along, or we resume becoming a nuclear armed country, we're stuck with a hostile opponent who isn't afraid to gather low hanging fruit in Europe or even here.I also don't see a national mobilization scenario unless the North America itself is under threat.
I think Canada's mobilizing 600,000 folks out of a population of 8 million in WW1 and a putting a million people into uniform from a population of 11 million in WW2 is a pretty solid effort. There were problems to be sure but at least there were plans and time and a reserve force in each case large enough to build on.Hell we couldn't even really nationally mobilize during 2 world wars.
Because I'm looking to create an army bigger then our current three mechanized brigades and one CCSB.
The corollary of an expanded army, and one which the RegF fears, is an army based on the 3 + 1 structure and all of its current equipment but with 50% of the positions designated as war establishment to be filled by ARes pers. Basically we cut the full-time army by some 10,000 people and fill those positions, when needed, from a part-time ARes of 20,000 folks: 10,000 to fill positions and 10,000 to be the core for national mobilization.
I don't advocate that solution because I think that Canada's army is currently inadequate in deployable capabilities. I do believe that it could have twice the deployable capabilities using existing RegF and ResF personnel if it were properly configured, equipped and trained.
Personally I think N America, and Canada in particular, is already under threat and even hostile acts. We're just not under active conflict. I don't believe in waiting for that stage. We staved off Soviet designs in Europe through a credible defence posture during the Cold War. Unfortunately, unless another Gorbachev comes along, or we resume becoming a nuclear armed country, we're stuck with a hostile opponent who isn't afraid to gather low hanging fruit in Europe or even here.
I think Canada's mobilizing 600,000 folks out of a population of 8 million in WW1 and a putting a million people into uniform from a population of 11 million in WW2 is a pretty solid effort. There were problems to be sure but at least there were plans and time and a reserve force in each case large enough to build on.
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The problem is that looks at an augmentation force, as opposed to actual formed units training together.Why does 3 SRR not being a deployed as a unit hinder that ?
They are still sending their people, just not the the regiment.
Personally I think you need to add to the Reg Force and massively add to the Reserves.I thought you didn't want to cut positions in the reg force you wanted to redistribute them ?
100%I think 6 month rotations since the 60s have left us unable send an Army to foreign land and tell them not to come until they've won.
Very very trueIt will be a tough lesson when the ball drops.
Wouldn't it have been nice to have had Govs since the 60s who took our job seriously ?
Service equals citizenship…So long as we acquiesced to the Franco protests.
These are not things that could be fixed with a new rank group. Compensation problems will not be solved with a new rank class. Imposing of career development requirements (courses & postings) beyond core technical competencies will not go away with a new rank class. Commanders ignoring technical expertise will not stop because of a new rank class. Crappy HR systems and practices will not go away with a new rank class. Some of these problems are even likely to be exacerbated.Based on comments here (again anecdotal) there is the issue of moving needed experience out for career growth whether the person wanted it or not - and the loss of corporate knowledge due to repeated issues of this, and this applies (again based on anecdotal comments here) to be common in the Army, Navy and RCAF.
Why does "new rank class" have to solve so many problems? I can see the point of bringing in helicopter pilots or physician's assistants or IT/comm/EW geeks with no expectation that they will ever "command" much beyond a small team. No commission needed. Waste of years to advance from Pte(R) to whatever NCM rank is thought to be competitive for compensation.These are not things that could be fixed with a new rank group. Compensation problems will not be solved with a new rank class. Imposing of career development requirements (courses & postings) beyond core technical competencies will not go away with a new rank class. Commanders ignoring technical expertise will not stop because of a new rank class. Crappy HR systems and practices will not go away with a new rank class. Some of these problems are even likely to be exacerbated.
I also don't see a national mobilization scenario unless the North America itself is under threat. Hell we couldn't even really nationally mobilize during 2 world wars.
There are 9 equipped, deployable RegF infantry battalions and 50 unequipped, non deployable ResF ones. I want 18 equipped, deployable total force ones;Why does 3 SRR not being a deployed as a unit hinder that ?
Correct. I don't want to. I want a bigger, better army. But . . . if Canada is satisfied with just 3 +1 equipped bdes then its a real option to do them cheaper by cutting out RegF PYs and assigning them to use the current augmentation model to fill the war establishment and to fill out peacetime rotos with cheaper reservists.I thought you didn't want to cut positions in the reg force you wanted to redistribute them ?
Why not? If they can. That's actually a real thing in the Singapore army where many of the training establishments are run by WOs. I saw a video on the first female CO of the Singapore armoured combat training centre. She was an SWO (which I understand is roughly the equivalent of a US army WO4 which is the rough pay/responsibility equivalent of a LCol in the US Army).Create a US style WO class and our egalitarian views will quickly decide that they should have access to CO positions because they are capable of doing the job so it is fair that they should have a path to do that (and, the template US WO class already has that path).
On the scale of 1) fully equipped; 2) mostly equipped; and 3) totally screwed, the RegF is at 2) and the ResF at 3).The Reg F Army is not equipped. To say so is inaccurate at least.
This, especially within the arcs of their trade or field (e.g., a hypothetical green Tac Hel platoon formed of flying WOs and supporting pers, various species of shop, office, and cell, medical establishments, etc.).Why not? If they can. That's actually a real thing in the Singapore army where many of the training establishments are run by WOs. I saw a video on the first female CO of the Singapore armoured combat training centre. She was an SWO (which I understand is roughly the equivalent of a US army WO4 which is the rough pay/responsibility equivalent of a LCol in the US Army).
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I guess my growing up in the 1960s where we were taught how to stick our heads under our school desks in case of a nuclear attack beat the Pollyanna ought of me. Hope for the best but plan and build for the worst is what deterrence is all about.
I think a contributing factor to us moving to Canada was the day, about the time of Churchill's funeral, I was 8 or so, I asked Dad if I was going to have to go to war when I grew up. As I said, every male that I knew had been to war. And Dad was teaching me not to stick the knife in too deep. 4 inches. Under the ribs. Wiggle it around.